Intermediate Public Economics

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Contents

Preface

This book has been prepared as the basis for a final-year undergraduate or first-year graduate course in Public Economics. It is based on lectures given by the authors at several institutions over many years. It covers the traditional topics of efficiency and equity but also emphasizes more recent developments in information, games and, especially, political economy.

The book should be accessible to anyone with a background of intermediate microeconomics and macroeconomics. We have deliberately kept the quantity of math as low as we could without sacrificing intellectual rigor. Even so, the book remains analytical rather than discursive.

To support the content, further reading is given for each chapter. This reading is intended to offer a range of material from the classic papers in each area through recent contributions to surveys and critiques. Exercises are included for each chapter. Most of these should be prove possible for a good undergraduate but some may prove challenging.

There are many people who have contributed directly or indirectly with the preparation of this book. Nigar Hashimzade is entitled to special thanks for making incisive comments on the entire text and for assisting with the analysis in Chapters 4 and 23. Thanks are also due to Paul Belleflamme, Tim Besley, Chuck Blackorby, Christopher Bliss, Craig Brett, John Conley, Richard Cornes, Philippe De Donder, Sanjit Dhami, Peter Diamond, Jean Gabszewicz, Peter Hammond, Arye Hillman, Norman Ireland, Michael Keen, Jack Mintz, James Mirrlees, Frank Page Jr., Susana Peralta, Pierre Pestieau, Pierre Picard, Ian Preston, Maria Racionero, Antonio Rangel, Les Reinhorn, Elena del Rey, Todd Sandler, Kim Scharf, Hyun Shin, Michael Smart, Stephen Smith, Jacques Thisse, John Weymark, and Myrna Wooders.

Public Economics is about the government and the economic effects of its policies. This book offers an insight into what Public Economics says and what it can do. We hope that you enjoy it.

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Part I

Public Economics and the Public Sector

Chapter 1

An Introduction to Public Economics

1.1 Public Economics

Public economics studies the government and how its policies affect the economy. It considers how the choices of the government are made and how they can improve or hinder economic efficiency. Public economics also investigates the extent to which it is possible for the government to influence the distribution of income and wealth and whether this is desirable. In undertaking these tasks, public economics draws upon influences from many areas of economics. This is reflected in the diversity of its subject matter which ranges from the traditional study of the effects of taxation to public-choice explanations of bureaucracy. There are many sides to public economics, and we hope that this book provides an interesting insight into the richness of the subject.

The study of public economics has a long tradition. It developed out of the original political economy of Mill and Ricardo, through the public finance tradition of tax analysis into public economics, and has now returned to its roots with the development of the new political economy. From the inception of economics as a scientific discipline, public economics has always been one of its core branches. The explanation for why it has always been so central is the foundation that it provides for practical policy analysis. This has always been the motivation of public economists, even if the issues studies and the analytical methods employed have evolved over time. We intend the theory described in this book to provide an organized and coherent structure for addressing economic policy.

In the broadest interpretation, public economics is the study of economic efficiency, distribution, and government economic policy. The subject encompasses topics as diverse as responses to market failure due to the existence of externalities, the motives for tax evasion, and the explanation of bureaucratic decision making. In order to reach into all of these areas, public economics has developed from its initial narrow focus upon the collection and spending of government revenues, to its present concern with every aspect of government interaction with the economy. Public economics attempts to understand both *how* the government makes decisions and *what* decisions it should make.

To understand how the government makes decisions it is necessary to investigate the motives of decisions makers within government, how they are chosen and how they are influenced by outside parties. Determining what decisions should be made involves studying the effects of the alternative policies that are available and evaluating the outcomes to which they lead. These aspects are interwoven throughout the text. By pulling them together, this book provides an accessible introduction to both these aspects of public economics.

1.2 Methods

The feature that most characterizes modern public economics is the use made of *economic models*. These models are employed as a tool to ensure that arguments are conducted coherently with a rigorous logical basis. Models are used for analysis because the possibilities for experimentation are limited and past experience cannot always be relied upon to provide a guide to the consequences of new policies. Each model is intended to be a simplified description of the part of the economy that is relevant for the analysis. What distinguishes economic models from models in the natural sciences is the incorporation of independent decision making by the firms, consumers and politicians that populate the economy. These actors in the economy do not respond mechanically but are motivated by personal objectives and are strategic in their behavior. Capturing the implications of this complex behavior in a convincing manner is one of the key skills of a successful economic theorist.

Once a model has been chosen its implications have to be derived. These implications are obtained by applying logical arguments that proceed from the assumptions of the model to a set of formally correct conclusions. Those conclusions then need to be given an interpretation in terms that can be related to the original question of interest. Policies recommendations can then be derived but with a recognition of the limitations of the model.

The institutional setting for the study of public economics is invariably the mixed economy where individual decisions are respected, but the government attempts to affect these through the policies it implements. Within this environment, many alternative objectives can be assigned to the government. For instance, the government can be assumed to care about the aggregate level of welfare in the economy and to act selflessly in attempting to increase this. Such a viewpoint is the foundation of optimal policy analysis that enquires how the government should behave. But there can be no presumption that actual governments act in this way. An alternative, and sometimes more compelling view, is that the government is composed of a set of individuals, each of whom is pursuing their own selfish agenda. Such a view provides a very different interpretation of the actions of the government and often provides a foundation for understanding how governments actually choose their policies. This perspective will also be considered in this book.

The focus upon the mixed economy makes the analysis applicable to most developed and developing economies. It also permits the study of how the government behaves and how it should behave. To provide a benchmark from which to judge the outcome of the economy under alternative policies, the command economy with an omniscient planner is often employed. This, of course, is just an analytical abstraction.

1.3 Analyzing Policy

The method of policy analysis in public economics is to build a model of the economy and to find its equilibrium. The positive aspect of policy analysis determines the effect of a policy by tracing through the ways in which it changes the equilibrium of the economy relative to some *status quo*. Alternative policies are contrasted by comparing the equilibria to which they lead.

In conducting the assessment of policy, it is often helpful to emphasize the distinction between *positive* and *normative* analysis. The positive analysis of government investigates topics such as why there is a public sector, the emergence of government objectives and how government policies are chosen. It is also about understanding what effects policies have upon the economy. In contrast, normative analysis investigates what the best policies are, and aims to provide a guide to good government. These are not entirely disjoint activities. To proceed with a normative analysis it is first necessary to conduct the positive analysis: it is not possible to say what is the best policy without knowing the effects of alternative policies upon the economy. It could also be argued that a positive analysis is of no value until used as a guide to policy.

Normative analysis is conducted under the assumption that the government has a specified set of objectives and its action are chosen in the way that best achieves these. Alternative policies (including the policy of *laissez faire* or, literally "leave to do") are compared by using the results of the positive analysis. The optimal policy is that which best meets the government's objective. Hence, the equilibria for different policies are determined and the government's objective is evaluated for each equilibrium.

In every case restrictions are placed upon the set of policies from which the government may choose. These restrictions are usually intended to capture limits upon the information that the government has available. The information the government can obtain on the consumers and firms in the economy restricts the degree of sophistication that policy can have. For example, the extent to which taxes can be differentiated between different taxpayers depends on the information the government can acquire about each individual. Administrative and compliance costs are also relevant in generating restrictions upon possible policies.

When the government's objective is taken to be some aggregate level of social welfare in the economy, important questions are raised as to how welfare can be measured. This issue is discussed in some detail in a later chapter, but it can be noted here that the answer involves invoking some degree of comparability between the welfare levels of different individuals. It has been the willingness to proceed on the basis that such comparisons can be made that has allowed the development of public economics. Whilst differences of opinion exist upon the extent to which these comparisons are valid, it is still scientifically justifiable to investigate what they would imply if they could be made. Furthermore, general principles can be established that apply to any degree of comparability.

1.4 Preview

Part I of the book, including this chapter and Chapter 2, introduces public economics and provides an overview of the public sector. Chapter 2 begins by charting the historical growth of public sector expenditure over the previous century. It then reviews statistics on the present size of the public sector in several of the major developed economies. The division of expenditure and the composition of income are then considered. Finally, issues involved in measuring the size of the public sector are addressed.

Part II provides an analysis of the public sector and its decision-making processes. This can be seen as a dose of healthy scepticism before proceeding into the body of normative analysis. The issues raised by the statistics of Chapter 2 are addressed by the discussion in Chapter 3 of theories of the public sector. Reasons for the existence of the public sector are considered, as are theories that attempt to explain its growth. A positive analysis of how the government may have its objectives and actions determined is undertaken. An emphasis is given to arguments for why the observed size of government may be excessive. An important practical method for making decisions and choosing governments is voting. Chapter 4 analyses the success of voting as a decision mechanism and the tactical and strategic issues it involves. The main results that emerge are the Median Voter Theorem and the shortcomings of majority voting. The consequences of rent seeking are then analyzed in Chapter 5. The theory of rent-seeking provides an alternative perspective upon the policy-making process that is highly critical of the actions of government.

Following the discussion of methodology, it is clear that a necessary starting point for the development of the theory of policy analysis is an introduction to economic modelling. This represents the content of Chapter 6 in which the basic model of a competitive economy is introduced. The chapter describes the agents involved in the economy and characterizes economic equilibrium. An emphasis is placed upon the assumptions on which the analysis is based since much of the subject matter of public follows from how the government should respond if these are not satisfied. Having established the basic model, Chapter 7 investigates the efficiency of the competitive equilibrium. This generates several fundamentally important results.

The focus of Part IV is upon relaxing the assumptions on which the competitive economy is based. Chapter 8 introduces public goods into the economy and contrasts the allocation that is achieved when these are privately provided with the optimal allocation. Mechanisms for improving the allocation are considered and methods of preference revelation are also addressed. This is followed by an analysis of clubs and local public goods, which are special cases of public goods in general, in Chapter 9. The focus in this chapter returns to an assessment of the success of market provision. The treatment of externalities in Chapter 10 relaxes another of the assumptions. It is shown why market failure occurs when externalities are present and reviews alternative policy schemes designed to improve efficiency. Imperfect competition and its consequences for taxation is the subject of Chapter 11. The measurement of welfare loss is discussed and emphasis is given to the incidence of taxation. A distinction is also drawn between the effects of specific and *ad valorem* taxes. A symmetry of information is required to sustain efficiency. When it is absent, inefficiency can arise. The implications of informational asymmetries and potential policy responses are considered in Chapter 12.

Parts III and IV focus upon economic efficiency. Part V complements this by considering issues of equity. Chapter 13 analyses the policy implications of equity considerations and addresses the important restrictions placed on government actions by limited information. Several other fundamental results in welfare economics are also developed including the implications of alternative degrees of interpersonal comparability. Chapter 14 considers the measurement of economic inequality and poverty. The economics of these measures ultimately reemphasizes the fundamental importance of utility theory.

Part VI is concerned with taxation. It analysis the basic tax instruments and the economics of tax evasion. Chapters 15 and 16 consider commodity taxation and income taxation respectively which are the two main taxes levied upon consumers. In both of these chapters the economic effects of the instruments are considered and rules for setting the taxes optimally are derived. The results illustrate the resolution of the equity/efficiency trade-off in the design of policy and the consequences of the limited information available to the government. In addition to the theoretical analysis, the results of application of the methods to data are considered. The numerical results are useful since the theoretical analysis leads only to characterizations of optimal taxes rather than explicit solutions. Chapter 17 determines the degree to which taxation can achieve redistribution and contrasts this to other economic allocation mechanisms. These chapters all assume that the taxes which are levied are paid honestly and in full. This empirically-doubtful assumption is corrected in Chapter 18 which looks at the extent of the hidden economy and analyses the motives for tax evasion and its consequences.

Part VII studies public economics when there is more than one decision-making body. Chapter 19 on fiscal federalism addresses why there should be multiple levels of government and discusses the optimal division of responsibilities between different levels. The concept of tax competition is studied in Chapter 20. It is shown how tax competition can limit the success of delegating tax-setting powers to independent jurisdictions.

Part VIII concentrates upon intertemporal issues in public economics. The first chapter, 21, describes the overlapping generations economy that is the main analytical tool of this part. The concept of the Golden Rule is introduced for economies with production and capital accumulation, and the potential for economic inefficiency is discussed. Chapter 22 analyses social security policy and relates this to the potential inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium. Both the motivation for the existence of social security programmes and the determination of the level of benefits are addressed. Ricardian equivalence is linked to the existence of gifts and bequests. Finally, the book is completed by Chapter 23 which considers the effects of taxation and public expenditure upon economic growth. Alternative models of economic growth are introduced and the evidence linking government policy to the level of growth is discussed.

1.5 Scope

This book is essentially an introduction to the theory of public economics. It presents a unified view of this theory and introduces the most significant results of the analysis. As such, it provides a broad review of what constitutes the present state of public economics.

What will not be found in the book are many details of actual institutions for the collection of taxes or discussion of existing tax codes and other economic policies though we do present relevant data where it illuminates the argument. There are several reasons for this. This book is much broader than a text focusing on taxation and to extend the coverage in this way, something else has to lost. Primarily, however, the book is about understanding the effects of public policy and how economists think about the analysis of policy. This will give an understanding of the consequences of existing policies but to benefit from it does not require a detailed knowledge of these.

Furthermore, tax codes and tax law are country-specific and pages spent discussing in detail the rules of one particular country will have little value for those resident elsewhere. In contrast, the method of reasoning and the analytical results described here have value independent of country-specific detail. Finally, there are many texts available that describe in detail tax law and tax codes. These are written for accountants and lawyers and have a focus rather distinct than that adopted by economists.

Further Reading

The history of political economy is described in the classic volume:

Blaug, M. (1996) *Economic Theory in Retrospect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Two classic references on economic modelling are:

Friedman, M. (1953) *Essays on Positive Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press),

Koopmans, T.C. (1957) *Three Essays on the State of Economic Science* (New York: McGraw-Hill).

The issues involved in comparing individual welfare levels are explored in:

Robbins, L. (1935) *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science* (London: Macmillan).

Chapter 2

Government

2.1 Introduction

In 1913 the 16^{th} Amendment to the US Constitution gave Congress the legal authority to tax income. By doing so, it made income taxation a permanent feature of the US tax system and provided a significant source of additional tax revenues. Revenue collection passed the $1bn mark in 1918, increased to $5.4 bn. by 1920 and reached $43bn in 1945. It was not until the tax cut of 1981 that this process of growth showed any marked sign of slowing. This growth in tax revenues in the US mirrors the events in all western economies.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the nature of the public sector in modern markets economies and to provide a historical perspective upon this. A review of data on the public sector which looks at its size, sources of income, and expenditure shows the extent and range of activities that the public sector undertakes. It also demonstrates the similarity in public sector behavior in countries that are otherwise very different culturally. The fundamental justifications for the existence of the public sector are then considered, as are theories that explain the steady growth of the public sector over the last century.

2.2 Historical Development

The historical development of the public sector over the past century can be briefly described as one of significant growth. In most western economies government expenditure was around 10% of gross domestic product in 1900. Expenditure then rose steadily over the next sixty years, levelling out in the latter part of the century. This pattern of growth is illustrated in the following figures.

Figure 2.1 displays the growth of public spending during the last century in five developed economies. Only a selection of years are plotted – the years of the Second World War are left out for example – but the figure provides a clear impression of the overall trend. There is a persistent difference in the levels of



Figure 2.1: Growth of Total Expenditure

expenditure between the three European countries and the non-European countries but the pattern of growth is the same for all. The economies have a clear long-run upward path in public spending relative to gross domestic product.

Starting at a level of public spending around 10% of gross domestic product in the late nineteenth century, the share increased markedly at around the time of the First World War and then continued to rise afterwards. It now exceeds a third of gross domestic product in all cases and, for France, exceeds one half. A number of explanations have been offered for this long-run increase and these are discussed in Chapter 3.

A more detailed representation of expenditure in the last thirty years is provided in Figure 2.2. The picture this presents is of a slowing, or even a stagnation, of the growth in public sector expenditure. Although expenditure is higher in 2002 for the six countries shown, the increases for the UK and the US are very small. For the UK especially, expenditure was clearly higher in the early 1980s than in 2002. The figure also suggests that there has been convergence in the level of expenditure between the countries. For example, in 1970 expenditure in Japan was only half that in France, Germany and the UK but by 2002 it almost matched that in the UK.

The major implication of Figure 2.2 is that it clearly justifies the claim that the public sector is significant in the economies of the industrialized countries. The mixed economies of these countries are characterized by substantial government involvement and are far from being free-market with minimal government intervention. The size of the public sector alone is justification for the study of how it should best choose its means of revenue collection and its allocation of



Figure 2.2: Total Outlays as a Percentage of GDP

expenditure. It is also worth noting that data on expenditure typically understates the full influence of the public sector upon the economy. For instance, regulations such as employment laws or safety standards infringe upon economic activity but without generating any measurable government expenditure or income.

Figure 2.3 shows the growth in selected subcategories of public spending since the late nineteenth century. This is helpful in understanding the composition of the long-run increase. The path of defence spending, which constituted one of the largest items of public spending in the late nineteenth century, has been somewhat erratic and has clearly been driven in large part by the history of international relations. Military spending in the two former Axis powers peaks at around the time of the Second World War but then falls away dramatically. Spending in the three Allied powers continued at a higher level after the war than before, reaching its height in the 1960s before also falling back. Among those nations represented, only in the US does defence now constitute more than 10% of spending.

The most marked rises have come from social spending on items like health, education and pensions. Publicly-provided education can be seen to have been rising gradually as a share of gross domestic product in all five countries since the nineteenth century but particularly so since the war (and perhaps slightly earlier in the UK). Health and pensions spending have both grown considerably since the war. If we consider subsidies and transfers in total then these have risen on average fourfold between 1937 and 1995 (from about 2.1% of gross domestic product to 13.1% in the US, from 10.3% to 23.6% in the UK, from 7.0% to 19.4% in Germany, from 7.2% to 29.9% in France and from 1.4% to 13.5% in Japan).



Figure 2.3: Growth of Expenditure Items

2.3 Composition of Expenditure

The historical data display the broad trend in public expenditure. This section looks in more detail at the composition of expenditure. Expenditure is considered from the perspective of its division into categories and its allocation between various levels of government.

Figure 2.4 displays consolidated expenditure for the US, UK and Germany. By consolidated general spending we mean the combined expenditure of all levels of government. The figures avoid double counting by subtracting intergovernmental transfers. The expenditures are presented as proportions of government spending and the numbers recorded on the right are unweighted averages across the three countries.

The diversity of goods provided through the public sector is clear. Note that the spending on the goods associated with the core functions of the state - defence and public order - appear relatively minor, and make up only a tenth of spending on average. Costs of an administrative and governmental nature are recorded under the heading general public services and add no more than another 6% on average.

Health and education, despite providing benefits of an arguably largely private nature, are substantial in all countries. Spending on housing and community amenities, on recreation and culture, and on transport and communications sectors are comparatively small. Subsidies to agriculture, energy, mining, manufacturing, and construction sectors are brought together here under the heading



Figure 2.4: Composition of Consolidated General Spending

of other economic affairs and also appear relatively minor on average.

Social security and welfare spending is the largest single item in all countries, under this classification. This is so even in the US where it is noticeably smaller than in the three European countries. On average it constitutes over a third of spending.

Figure 2.5 to 2.7 show how spending responsibilities are allocated between different tiers of government in the US, UK and Germany. This provides an interesting contrast since Germany and the US are federal countries with highly devolved government whereas the UK is not. Nonetheless, some common observations can be made. Certain items such as defence are always allocated to the centre. Redistributive functions also tend to be concentrated centrally for the good reason that redistribution between poor and rich regions is only possible that way and also that attempts at redistribution at lower levels are vulnerable to frustration through migration of richer individuals away from localities with internally redistributive programs.

Education on the other hand seems in all these countries to be largely devolved to lower levels – either to the states or to local government. Public order is also typically dealt with at lower levels. Health spending, on the other hand, is always substantial at the central level but can also be important at lower tiers, for example in Germany.

The fact that spending is made at lower levels need not mean that it is financed from taxes levied locally. In most multiple-tier systems, central government partly finances lower-tier functions by means of grants. These have many purposes, including correcting for imbalances of resources between localities and between tiers given the chosen allocation of tax instruments. Sometimes



Figure 2.5: Composition of Central Spending

grants are lump sum and sometimes they depend on the spending activities of the lower tiers. In the latter case, the incentives of lower tiers to spend can be changed by the design of the grant formula and central government can use this as a way to encourage recognition of externalities between localities.

2.4 Revenue

The discussion of expenditure is now matched by a discussion of revenue. The following figures first view tax revenues from a historical perspective and then relate revenues to tax instruments and levels of government.

The first perspective is to consider the development of total tax revenue from 1965 to 2000. Figure 2.8 charts total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP for seven countries. The general picture that emerges from this mirrors that drawn from the expenditure data. Most of the countries have witnessed some growth in the tax revenues and there has been a degree of convergence. In 2000 the revenues in these countries as a percentage of GDP ranges between 27% and 45%.

Looking more closely at the details, France (45%) and the United Kingdom (37%) have the highest percentage, closely followed by Canada (36%) and Turkey (33%). The United States (30%) and Japan (27%) are somewhat lower. The country that has witnessed the most growth is Turkey, where tax revenue has risen form 11% of GDP in 1965 to 33% in 2000. Tax revenue also grew strongly in Japan between 1965, when it was 11%, and 1990, when it reached 30%, but has levelled off since.



Figure 2.6: Composition of State Spending by Country. Source: IMF 2001.



Figure 2.7: Composition of Local Spending



Figure 2.8: Total Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP

Overall, this data is suggestive of a degree of convergence and uniformity between these countries. All can be characterized as mixed economies with tax revenues a significant percentage of GDP. The countries have reached fairly similar outcomes as this level. The following figures consider the details behind these aggregates.

Figure 2.9 looks at the proportion of tax revenue raised by six categories of tax instrument in 2000. This figure shows that income and profits taxes raise the largest proportion of revenue in Australia (57%), the US (51%), Canada (49%) and the UK (39%). Social security taxes are the largest proportion in Japan (36%), France (36%) and Germany (39%). Amongst these countries, Turkey is unique with taxes on goods and services the most significant item (41%).

There is also a noticeable division between the European countries, where taxes on goods and services are much more significant, and the US. For instance, taxes on goods and services raise 32% of revenue in the UK but only 16% in the US. This is a reflection of the importance of valued-added taxation (VAT) in Europe which has been a significant element of European Union tax policy. Property taxes are significant in the majority of countries (12% in the UK and 10% in the US and Japan). Payroll taxes are only really significant in Australia (6%).

The next two figures display the proportion of tax revenue raised by each level of government. Figure 2.10 considers the proportions in five federal countries. By federal it is meant that the structure in these countries consists of central government, state government and local government. In contrast, Figure 2.11 considers five unitary countries. These unitary countries divide responsibilities between central government and local government.



Figure 2.9: Tax Revenue for Category of Taxation, 2000

For all the federal countries, the central government raises more revenue than state government. The two are closest in Canada, with the central government raising 42% and the provinces 36%, and in Germany, with central government 31% and the Bundeslander 23%. The federal governments in the US and Australia raises considerably more revenue than the states (46% and 20% for the US and 83% and 14% for Australia).

In all countries, local government raises the smallest proportion of revenue. The US local government raises 11% of revenue which is the largest amongst these countries. The smallest proportion of revenue raised by local government is 3% in Australia.

The unitary countries in Figure 2.11 display the same general pattern that the central government raises significantly more revenue than local government. The largest value is 70% in Turkey and the smallest 37% in Japan. Local government is most significant in Japan (25%) and least significant in France (10%).

Comparing the federal and unitary countries, it can be seen that local government raises slightly more revenue on average in the unitary countries than the federal countries. What really distinguishes them is the size of central government. The figures suggest that the revenue raised by central government in the unitary countries is almost the same on average as that of central plus state in the federal countries. The absence of state government does not therefore put more emphasis on local government in the unitary countries. Instead, the role of the state government is absorbed within central government.

The final set of figures present the share of revenue raised by each category of tax instrument at each level of government for two federal countries, the



Figure 2.10: Tax Revenue by Level of Government, Federal Countries, 2000



Figure 2.11: Tax Revenue by Level of Government, Unitary Countries, 2000



Figure 2.12: Tax Shares at each Level of Government, United States, 2000

US and Germany, and two unitary countries, Japan and the UK. Most of the previous figures have shown remarkable similarities in the behavior of a range of countries. In contrast, allocating revenues to tax instruments for the alternative levels of government reveal some interesting differences.

For the US, Figure 2.12 shows that the importance of income and profits taxes falls as the progression is made from central to local government (91% for central, 7% for local). Their reduction is matched by an increase in importance of property taxes from 2% for central government up to 72% for local government. It would be easy to argue that this is the natural outcome since property is easily identified with a local area but income is not. However, Figure 2.13 for Germany shows that the opposite pattern with income and profits taxes becoming more important for local government (78% of revenue) than for central government (42% of revenue) can also arise. Despite this, Germany and the United States do share the common feature that property taxes are more important for local government than for central government.

The same data is now considered for two unitary countries. In Japan (Figure 2.14) income and profits taxes are almost equally important for both central government (58% of revenue) and local government (47%). They are also more important for both levels of government than any other category of tax instrument. Where the difference arises is that property taxation is much more significant for local government (raising 31% of revenue) than for central (6%). For central government, general taxes (19% of revenue) make up the difference.

The UK data, in Figure 2.15, displays an extreme version of the importance of property taxation for local government. As the figure shows, property taxes raise over 99% of all tax revenue for local government. No revenue is raised by local government in the UK from income and profit taxes.

Comparing between the unitary and federal countries does not reveal any



Figure 2.13: Tax Shares at each Level of Government, Germany, 2000



Figure 2.14: Tax Shares at each Level of Government, Japan, 2000



Figure 2.15: Tax Shares at each Level of Government, United Kingdom, 2000

standard pattern of revenues within each group. In fact, the differences are as marked within the categories as they are across the categories. The one feature that is true for all four of the countries is that property taxes raise a larger proportion of revenue for local government than they do for central government.

This section has looked at data on tax revenues from an aggregate level down to the revenue raised from each category of tax instrument for different levels of government. What the figures show is that at an aggregate level there are limited differences between the countries. Those for which data is reported have converged on a mixed-economy solution with tax revenues at a similar percentage of GDP. The most significant differences emerge when the source of revenue for the various levels of government is analyzed. Even countries that have adopted the same form of government structure (either unitary or federal) can have very different proportions of revenue raised by the various categories of tax instrument.

2.5 Measuring the Government

The statistics given above have provided several different viewpoints on the public sector. They have traced both the division of expenditure and the level of expenditure. For the purpose of obtaining a broad picture of the public sector, these are interesting and informative statistics. However, they do raise two important questions which must be addressed in order to gain a proper perspective on their meaning.

The first issue revolves around the fact that the figures have expressed the size of the public sector relative to the size of the economy as a whole. To trace the implications of this, take as given that these exists an accurate measure of the expenditure level of the public sector. The basic question is then: what should this expenditure be expressed as a proportion of? The standard approach is to use nominal gross domestic product (*i.e.* gross domestic product measured using each year's own prices) but this is very much an arbitrary choice which can have a significant impact upon the interpretation of the final figure.

Recall from basic national income accounting that the size of the economy can be measured in either nominal or real terms using gross output or net output. Domestic or national product can be employed. Outputs can be valued at market prices or factor prices. For many purposes, as long as the basis of measurement is made clear, this does not make much real difference. Where it can make a critical difference is in the impression it gives about the size of the public sector. By adopting the smallest measure of the size of the economy (which this is depends on a number of factors such as the level of new investment relative to depreciation, the structure of the tax system and income from abroad), the apparent size of the public sector can be increased by several percent over that from using the largest.

Whilst not changing anything of real economic significance, such manipulation of the figures can be very valuable in political debate. There is a degree of freedom for those who are supportive of the public sector, or are opponents of it, to present a figure that is more favorable for their purposes. This may useful for those wishing to push a particular point of view, but it hinders informed discussion. Consequently, as long as the figures are calculated in a consistent way it does not matter for comparative purposes which precise definition of output is used. In contrast, for an assessment of whether the public sector is "too large" it can matter significantly.

The second issue of measurement concerns what should be included within the definition of government. To see what is involved here, consider the question of whether should state-run industries be included. Assume that these are allowed to function as if they were private firms, so that they follow the objective of profit maximization, and simply remit their profits to the government. In this case they should certainly not be included since the government is simply acting as if it were a private shareholder. The only difference between the state-run firm and any other private firm in which the government was a shareholder would be the extent of the shareholding. Conversely, assume that the state-run firm was directed by the government to follow a policy of investment in impoverished areas and to use cross-subsidization to lower the prices of some of its products. In this case, there are compelling reasons to include the activities of the firm within the measure of government.

What this example illustrates is that it is not government expenditure *per se* that is interesting to the economist. Instead, what is really relevant is the degree of influence the government has over the economy. When the government is simply a shareholder, it is not directly influencing the firm's decisions. The converse is true when it directs the firm's actions. Looked at in this way, measuring the size of government via its expenditure is a means of estimating government influence using an easily observable statistic. In fact, the extent of government influence is somewhat broader than just its expenditure. What must also be included are the economic consequences of government-backed regulations and restrictions on economic behavior. Minimum wage laws, weights and measures regulation, health and safety laws are all examples of government intervention in the economy. However none of these would feature in any observation of government expenditure.

What this discussion shows is that there is a degree of flexibility in interpreting measures of government expenditure. Furthermore, government influence on the economy is only approximately captured by the expenditure figure. The true extent, including all relevant laws and regulations, is most certainly much larger.

2.6 Conclusions

This chapter has reviewed the growth and activities of the public sector using data from a range of countries. Despite there clear cultural differences these countries have all experienced the same phenomenon of significant public sector growth in the last century. From being only a minor part of the economy at the start of the Twentieth Century, the public sector has grown to be significant in all developed countries at the start of the Twenty-First. There may be much variation within the figures for the exact size but the pattern of growth is the same for all. There is also evidence that the growth has now ceased and, unless there is a some major upheaval, the size of the public sector will remain fairly constant for some time.

In terms of the composition of public sector income and expenditure it can be noted that there are differences in the details between countries. However there is common reliance on similar tax instruments and spending patterns are not all that dissimilar. It is these commonalities that make the ideas and concepts of public economics so broadly applicable.

Further Reading

Detailed evaluations of the different areas of public expenditure can be found in

Miles, D., Myles, G.D. and Preston, I. (2003) *The Economics of Public Spending* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

The data for Figure 2.1 and 2.3 are taken from:

Tanzi, V. and Schuknecht, L. (2000) *Public Spending in the 20th Century: A Global Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Figure 2.2 is compiled using data from:

OECD Economic Outlook, Volumes 51 and 73.

The expenditure data in Figures **??** to 2.7 uses data from:

IMF (2001a) *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook* (Washington: IMF), and

IMF (2001b) *Government Finance Statistics Manual* (Washington: IMF).

Data on revenues in Figures 2.8 to 2.15 is drawn from:

OECD (2002) *Revenue Statistics 1965 - 2001* (Paris: OECD).

Part II

Political Economy

Chapter 3

Theories of the Public Sector

3.1 Introduction

The statistics of Chapter 2 have described the size, growth and composition of the public sector in a range of developed and developing countries. These illustrated that the pattern of growth was similar across countries, as was the composition of expenditure. Although there is some divergence in the size of the public sector, it is significant in all the countries. Such observations raise two inter-related questions. First, why is there a public sector at all - would it not be possible for economic activity to function satisfactorily without government intervention? Second, is it possible to provide a theory that explains the increase in size of the public sector and the composition of expenditure? The purpose of this chapter is to consider possible answers to these questions.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the justifications that have been proposed for the public sector. These show how the requirements of efficiency and equity lead to a range of motives for public sector intervention. Alternative explanations for the growth in the size of the public sector are then assessed. As a by-product, they also provide an explanation for the composition of expenditure. Finally, some economists would argue that the public sector is excessively large. Several arguments for why this may be so are considered.

3.2 Justification for the Public Sector

Two basic lines of argument can be advanced to justify the role of the public sector. These can be grouped under the headings of *efficiency* and *equity*. Efficiency relates to arguments concerning the aggregate level of economic activity whereas equity refers to the distribution of economic benefits. In considering them, it is natural to begin with efficiency since this is essentially the more fundamental concept.

3.2.1 The Minimal State

The most basic motivation for the existence of a public sector follows from the observation that entirely unregulated economic activity could not operate in a very sophisticated way. In short, an economy would not function effectively if there were no *property rights* (the rules defining the ownership of property) or *contract laws* (the rules governing the conduct of trade).

Without property rights, satisfactory exchange of commodities could not take place given the lack of trust that would exist between contracting parties. This argument can be traced back to Hobbes, who viewed the government as a social contract that enabled people to escape from the anarchic "state of nature" where their competition in pursuit of self-interest would lead to a destructive "war of all against all". The institution of property rights is a first step away from this anarchy. In the absence of property rights, it would not be possible to enforce any prohibition against theft. Theft discourages enterprise since the gains accrued may be appropriated by others. It also results in the use of resources in the unproductive business of theft prevention.

Contract laws determine the rules of exchange. They exist to ensure that the participants in a trade receive what they expect from that trade or, if they do not, have open an avenue to seek compensation. Examples of contract laws include the formalization of weights and measures and the obligation to offer product warranties. These laws encourage trade by removing some of the uncertainty in transactions.

The establishment of property rights and contract laws is not sufficient in itself. Unless they can be policed and upheld in law, they are of limited consequence. Such law enforcement cannot be provided free of cost. Enforcement officers must be employed and courts must be provided in which redress can be sought. In addition, an advanced society would also face a need for the enforcement of more general criminal laws. Moving beyond this, once a country develops its economic activity it will need to defend its gains from being stolen by outsiders. This implies the provision of defence for the nation. As the statistics made clear, national defence is also a costly activity.

Consequently, even if only the minimal requirements of the enforcement of contract and criminal laws and the provision of defence are met, a source of income must be found to pay for them. This need for income requires the collection of revenue, whether these services are provided by the state or by private sector organizations. But they are needed in any economy that wishes to develop beyond the most rudimentary level. Whether it is most efficient for a central government to collect the revenue and provide the services could be debated. Since there are some good reasons for assuming this is the case, the coordination of the collection of revenue and the provision of services to ensure the attainment of efficient functioning of economic activity provides a natural role for a public sector.

This reasoning illustrates that to achieve even a most minimal level of economic organization, some unavoidable revenue requirements are generated and require financing. From this follows the first role of the public sector which is to assist with the attainment of economic efficiency by providing an environment in which trade can take place. The *minimal state* provides contract law, polices it, and defends the economy against outsiders. The minimal state does nothing more than this, but without it organized economic activity could not take place. These arguments provide a justification for at least a minimal state and hence the existence of a public sector and of public expenditure.

Having concluded that the effective organization of economic activity generates a need for public expenditure, one role for public economics is to determine how this revenue should be collected. The collection should be done with as little cost as possible imposed upon the economy. Such costs arise from the distortion in choice that arise from taxation. Public economics aims to understand these distortions and to describe the methods of keeping them as low as possible.

3.2.2 Market versus Government

Moving beyond the basic requirements for organized economic activity, there are other situations where intervention in the economy can potentially increase welfare. Unlike the minimal provision and revenue requirements however, there will always be a degree of contentiousness about additional intervention whatever the grounds on which it is motivated. The situations where intervention may be warranted can be divided into two categories: those that involve market failure and those that do not.

When market failure is present, the argument for considering whether intervention would be beneficial is compelling. For example, if economic activity generated externalities (effects that one economic agent imposes on another without their consent), so that there is divergence between private and social costs and the competitive outcome is not efficient, it may be felt necessary for the state to intervene to limit the inefficiency that results. This latter point can also be extended to other cases of market failure, such as those connected to the existence of public goods and of imperfect competition. Reacting to such market failures is intervention motivated on efficiency grounds.

It must be stressed that this reasoning does not imply that intervention will always be beneficial. In every case, it must be demonstrated that the public sector actually has the ability to improve upon what the unregulated economy can achieve. This will not be possible if the choice of policy tools is limited or government information is restricted. It will also be undesirable if the government is not benevolent. These various imperfections in public intervention will be a recurrent theme of this book.

While some useful insights follow from the assumption of an omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent policy maker, in reality it can give us very misleading ideas about the possibilities of beneficial policy intervention. It must be recognized that the actions of the state, and the feasible policies that it can choose, are often restricted by the same features of the economy that make the market outcome inefficient. One role for public economics is therefore to determine the desirable extent of the public sector or the boundaries of state intervention. For instance, if we know that markets will fail to be efficient in the presence of imperfect information, to establish the merit of government intervention it is crucial to know if a government subject to the same informational limitations can achieve a better outcome.

Furthermore, a government managed by non-benevolent officials and subject to political constraints may fail to correct market failures and may instead introduce new costs of its own creation. It is important to recognize that this potential for government failure is as important as market failure and that both are often rooted in the same informational problems. At a very basic level, the force of coercion must underlie every government intervention in the economy. All policy acts take place, and in particular taxes are collected and industry is regulated, with this force in the background. But the very power to coerce raises the possibility of its misuse. Although the intention in creating this power is that its force should serve the general interest, nothing can guarantee that once public officials are given this monopoly of force, they will not try to abuse this power in their own interest.

3.2.3 Equity

In addition to market failure, government intervention can also be motivated by the observation that the economy may have widespread inequality of income, opportunity or wealth. This can occur even if the economy is efficient in a narrow economic sense. In such circumstances, the level of economic welfare as viewed by the government may well be raised by a policy designed to alleviate these inequalities. This is the reasoning through which the provision of state education, social security programmes and compulsory pension schemes are justified. It should be stressed that the gains from these policies are with respect to normative assessments of welfare, unlike the positive criterion lying behind the concept of economic efficiency.

In the cases of both market failure and welfare-motivated policies, policy intervention concerns more than just the efficient collection of revenue. The reasons for the failure of the economy to reach the optimal outcome have to be understood and a policy that can counteract these has to be designed. Extending the scope of the public economics to address such issues provides the breadth to the subject.

3.2.4 Efficiency and Equity

When determining economic policy, governments are faced with two conflicting aims. They are all concerned with organizing economic activity so that the best use is made of economic resources. This is the efficiency side of policy design. To varying degrees, governments are also concerned to see that the benefits of economic activity are distributed fairly. This is the equity aspect of policy design.

The difficulty facing the government is that the requirements of equity and efficiency frequently conflict. It is often the case that the efficient policy is highly inequitable, whilst the equitable policy can introduce significant distortions and disincentives. Given this fact, the challenge for policy design is to reach the correct trade-off between equity and efficiency. Quite where on the trade-off the government should locate is dependent upon the relative importance it assigns to equity over efficiency.

In this context, it is worth adding one final note concerned with the nature of the arguments often used in this book. A standard simplification is to assume that there is a single consumer or that all consumers are identical. In such a setting there can be no distributional issues, so any policy recommendations derived within it relate only to efficiency and not to equity. The reason for proceeding in this way is that it usually permits a much simpler analysis to be undertaken and for the conclusions to be much more precise. When interpreting such conclusions in terms of practical policy recommendations, their basis should never be overlooked.

3.3 Public Sector Growth

The data of Chapter 2 showed quite clearly the substantial growth of the public sector in a range of countries during the past century. There are numerous theories that have been advanced to explain why this has occurred. These differ in their emphasis and perspective and are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it is reasonable to argue that a comprehensive explanation would involve elements drawn from all.

3.3.1 Development Models

The basis of the development models of public sector growth is that the economy experiences changes in its structure and needs as it develops. Tracing the nature of the development process from the beginning of industrialization through to the completion of the development process, a story of why public sector expenditure increases can be told.

It is possible to caricature the main features of this story in the following way. The early stage of development is viewed as the period of industrialization during which the population moves from the countryside to the urban areas. To meet the needs that result from this, there is a requirement for significant infrastructural expenditure in the development of cities. The typically rapid growth experienced in this stage of development results in a significant increase in expenditure and the dominant role of infrastructure determines the nature of expenditure.

In what are called the middle stages of development, the infrastructural expenditure of the public sector becomes increasingly complementary with expenditure from the private sector. Developments by the private sector, such as factory construction, are supported by investments from the public sector, *e.g.* the building of connecting roads. As urbanization proceeds and cities increase in size, so does population density. This generates a range of externalities such as pollution and crime. An increasing proportion of public expenditure is then diverted away from spending upon infrastructure to the control of these externalities.

Finally, in the developed phase of the economy, there is less need for infrastructural expenditure or for the correction of market failure. Instead, expenditure is driven by the desire to react to issues of equity. This results in transfer payments, such as social security, health and education, becoming the main items of expenditure. Of course, once such forms of expenditure become established, they are difficult to ever reduce. They also increase with heightened expectations and through the effect of an ageing population.

Although this theory of the growth of expenditure concurs broadly with the facts, it has a number of weaknesses. Most importantly, it is primarily a description rather than an explanation. From an economist's perspective, the theory is lacking in that it does not have any behavioral basis but is essentially mechanistic. What an economist really would wish to see is an explanation in which expenditure is driven by the choices of the individuals that constitute the economy. In the development model the change is just driven by the exogenous process of economic progress. Changes in expenditure should be related to how choices change as preferences or needs evolve over time.

3.3.2 Wagner's Law

Wagner was a 19th century economist who analyzed data on public sector expenditure for several European countries, Japan, and the US. This data revealed the fact that was shown in the data of Chapter 2: the share of the public sector in GDP had been increasing over time. The content of Wagner's Law was an explanation of this trend and a prediction that it would continue. In contrast to the basic developments models, Wagner's analysis provided a theory rather then just a description and an economic justification for the predictions.

The basis for the theory consisted of three distinct components. Firstly, it was observed that the growth of the economy resulted in an increase in complexity. This required continuous introduction of new laws and development of the legal structure. These implied continuing increases in public sector expenditure. Secondly, there was the process of urbanization and the increased externalities associated with it. These two factors have already been discussed in connection with the development models.

The final component underlying the Wagner's Law is the most behavioral of the three and is what distinguishes it from other explanations. Wagner argued that the goods supplied by the public sector have a high income elasticity of demand. This claim appears reasonable, for example, for education, recreation and health care. Given this fact, economic growth which raised incomes would lead to an increase in demand for these products. In fact, the high elasticity would imply that public sector expenditure would rise as a proportion of income. This conclusion is the substance of Wagner's Law.

In many ways, Wagner's Law provides a good explanation of public sector growth. Its main failing is that it concentrates solely on the demand for public sector services. What must determine the level is some interaction between demand and supply. The supply side is explicitly analyzed in the next model.

3.3.3 Baumol's Law

Rather than work from the observed data, Baumol's Law starts from an observation about the nature of the production technology in the public sector. The basic hypothesis is that the technology of the public sector is labor-intensive relative to that of the private sector. In addition, the type of production undertaken leaves little scope for increases in productivity and that makes it difficult to substitute capital for labor. As examples, hospitals need minimum numbers of nurses and doctors per patient and maximum class sizes place lower limits on teacher numbers in schools.

Competition on the labor market ensures that labor costs in the public sector are linked to those in the private sector. Although there may be some frictions in transferring between the two, wage rates cannot be too far out of line. However, in the private sector it is possible to substitute capital for labor when the relative cost of labor increases. Furthermore, technological advances in the private sector lead to increases in productivity. These increases in productivity result in the return to labor rising. The latter claim is simply a consequence of optimal input use in the private sector resulting in the wage rate being equated to the marginal revenue product.

Since the public sector cannot substitute capital for labor, the wage increases in the private sector feed through into cost increases in the public sector. Maintaining a constant level of public sector output must therefore result in public sector expenditure increasing. If public sector output/private sector output remain in the same proportion, public sector expenditure rises as a proportion of total expenditure. This is *Baumol's Law* which asserts the increasing proportional size of the public sector.

There are a number of problems with this theory. It is entirely technology-driven and does not consider aspects of supply and demand or political processes. There are also reasons for believing that substitution can take place in the public sector. For example, additional equipment can replace nurses and less-qualified staff can take on more mundane tasks. Major productivity improvements have also been witnessed in universities and hospitals. Finally, there is evidence of a steady decline in public sector wages relative to those in the private sector. This reflects lower-skilled labor being substituted for more skilled.

3.3.4 A Political Model

A political model of public sector expenditure needs to capture the conflict in public preferences between those who wish to have higher expenditure and those who wish to limit the burden of taxes. It must also incorporate the resolution of this conflict and show how the size and composition of actual public spending reflects the preferences of the majority of citizens as expressed through the political process. The political model we now describe is designed to achieve these aims. The main point that emerges is that the equilibrium level of public spending can be related to the income distribution, and more precisely that the growth of government is closely related to the rise of income inequality.

To illustrate this, consider an economy with H consumers whose incomes fall into a range between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of $\widehat{y}$. The government provides a public good which is financed by the use of a proportional income tax. The utility of consumer i who has income y_i is given by

$$u_i(t,G) = [1-t]\, y_i + b(G), \tag{3.1}$$

where t is the income tax rate and G the level of public good provision. The function $b(\cdot)$ represents the benefit obtained from the public good and it is assumed to be increasing (so the marginal benefit is positive) and concave (so the marginal benefit is falling) as G increases. Denoting the mean income level in the population of consumers by μ, the government budget constraint is

$$G = tH\mu. \tag{3.2}$$

Using this budget constraint, a consumer with income y_i will enjoy utility from provision of a quantity G of the public good of

$$u_i(G) = \left[1 - \frac{G}{H\mu}\right] y_i + b(G). \tag{3.3}$$

The ideal level of public good provision for the consumer is given by the first-order condition

$$\frac{\partial u_i(G)}{\partial G} \equiv -\frac{y_i}{H\mu} + b'(G) = 0 \tag{3.4}$$

This condition relates the marginal benefit of an additional unit of the public good, $b'(G)$, to its marginal cost $\frac{y_i}{H\mu}$. The quantity of the public good demanded by the consumer depends upon their income relative to the mean since this determines the marginal cost.

The marginal benefit of the public good has been assumed to be a decreasing function of G, so it follows that the preferred public good level is decreasing as income rises. The reason for this is that with a proportional income tax the rich pay a higher share of the cost of public good than the poor. Thus public good provision will disproportionately benefit the poor.

The usual way to resolve the disagreement over the desired level of public good is to choose by majority voting. If the level of public good is to be determined by majority voting which level will be chosen? In the context of this model the answer is clear-cut because all consumers would prefer the level of public good to be as close as possible to their preferred level. Given any pair of alternatives, consumers will vote for that which is closest to their preferred alternative. The alternative that is closest for the largest number of consumers will receive maximal support. There is in fact only one option that will satisfy this requirement: the option preferred by the consumer with the median income. The reason is that exactly one half of the electorate, above the median income (the rich), would like less public good and the other half, below the median (the poor), would like more public good. Any alternative that is better for one group would be opposed by the other group with opposite preferences. (We explore the theory of voting in detail in Chapter 4.)

The political equilibrium G^*, determined by the median voter, is then the solution to

$$b'(G^*) = \frac{y_m}{H\mu}, \tag{3.5}$$

where y_m/μ is the income of the median voter relative to the mean. Since the marginal benefits decrease as public good provision increases, the political equilibrium level of public good increases with income inequality as measured by the ratio of the median to mean income. Accordingly, more inequality as measured by a lower ratio of the median to mean income would lead the decisive median voter to require more public spending.

Government activities are perceived as redistributive tools. Redistribution can be explicit, such as social security and poverty alleviation programs, or it can take a more disguised form like public employment which is probably the main channel of redistribution from rich to poor in many countries. Because of its nature, and interaction with the tax system, the demand for redistribution will increase as income inequality increases as demonstrated by this political model.

3.3.5 Ratchet Effect

Models of the ratchet effect develop the modeling of political interaction in a different direction. They assume that the preference of the government is to spend money. Explanations of why this should be so can be found in the economics of bureaucracy which is explored in the next section. For now, the fact is just taken as given. In contrast, it is assumed that the public do not want to pay taxes. Higher spending can only come from taxes, so by implication the public partially resists this; they do get some benefit from the expenditure. The two competing objectives are moderated by the fact that governments desire re-election. This makes it necessary for it to take some account of the public's preferences.

The equilibrium level of public sector expenditure is determined by the balance between these competing forces. In the absence of any exogenous changes or of changes in preferences, the level of expenditure will remain relatively constant. In the historical data on government expenditure, the periods prior to 1914, between 1920 and 1940 and post-1945 can be interpreted as displaying such constancy. Occasionally, though, economies go through periods of significant upheaval such as occurs during wartime. During these periods normal economic activity is disrupted. Furthermore, the equilibrium between the government and the taxpayers becomes suspended. Ratchet models argue that this permits the government to raise expenditure with the consent of the taxpayers on the understanding that this is necessary to meet the exceptional needs that have arisen.

The final aspect of the argument is that the level of expenditure does not fall back to its original level after the period of upheaval. Several reasons can be advanced for this. Firstly, the taxpayers could become accustomed to the higher level of expenditure and perceive this as the norm. Secondly, debts may be incurred during the period of upheaval which have to be paid-off later. This requires the raising of finance. Thirdly, promises could be made by the government to the taxpayers during periods of upheaval which then have to be met. These can jointly be termed *ratchet effects* that sustain a higher level of spending. Finally, there may also be an *inspection effect* after an upheaval, meaning that the taxpayers and government reconsider their positions and priorities. The discovery of previously unnoticed needs then provides further justification for higher public sector spending.

The prediction of the ratchet-effect model is that spending remains relatively constant unless disturbed by some significant external event. When these events occur they lead to substantial increases in expenditure. The ratchet and inspection effects work together to ensure that expenditure remains at the higher level until the next upheaval.

Referring to data of Chapter 2, it can be seen that the description of expenditure growth given by this political model is broadly consistent with the evidence. Before 1914, between 1918 and 1940 and post-1945 the level of expenditure is fairly constant but steps-up between these periods. Whether this provides support for the explanation is debatable because the model was constructed to explain these known facts. In other words, the data cannot be employed as evidence that the model is correct, given that the model was designed to explain that data.

3.4 Excessive Government

The theories of the growth of public sector expenditure described above attempt to explain the facts but do not offer comment on whether the level of expenditure is deficient or excessive. They merely describe processes and do not attempt to evaluate the outcome. In fact, there are many economists who would argue that public sector expenditure is too large and represents a growing burden on the economy. While the evidence on this issue is certainly not conclusive, there are a number of explanations of why this should be so and several are now described. These reach their conclusions not through a cost-benefit analysis of expenditure but via an analysis of the functioning of government.

3.4.1 Bureaucracy

A traditional view of bureaucrats is that they are motivated solely by the desire to serve the common good. They achieve this by conducting the business of government in the most efficient manner possible without political or personal bias. This is the idealistic image of the bureaucrat as a selfless public servant. There is a possibility that such a view may be correct. Having said this, there is no reason why bureaucrats should be any different to other individuals. From this perspective, it is difficult to accept that they are not subject to the same motivations of self-serving.

Adopting this latter perspective, the theoretical analysis of bureaucracy starts with the assumption that bureaucrats are in fact motivated by maximization of their private utilities. If they could, they would turn the power and influence that their positions give them into income. But, due to the nature of their role, they face difficulties in achieving this. Unlike similarly-positioned individuals in the private sector, they cannot exploit the market to raise income. Instead, they resort to obtaining utility from pursuing non-pecuniary goals. A complex theory of bureaucracy may include many factors that influence utility such as patronage, power and reputation. However, to construct a basic variant of the theory, it is sufficient to observe that most of these can be related to the size of the bureau. The bureaucrat can therefore be modeled as aiming to maximize the size of their bureau in order to obtain the greatest non-pecuniary benefits. It is as a result of this behavior that the size of government becomes excessive.

To demonstrate this, let y denote the output of the bureau as observed by the government. In response to an output y, the bureau is rewarded by the government with a budget of size $B(y)$. This budget increases as observed output rises ($B'(y) > 0$) but at a falling rate ($B''(y) < 0$). The cost of producing output is given by a cost function $C(y)$. Marginal cost is positive ($C'(y) > 0$) and increasing ($C''(y) > 0$). It is assumed that the government does not know this cost structure - only the bureaucrat fully understands the production process. What restrains the behavior of the bureaucrat is the requirement that the budget received from the government is sufficient to cover the costs of running the bureau.

The decision problem of the bureaucrat is then to choose output to maximize the budget subject to the requirement that the budget is sufficient to cover costs. This optimization can be expressed by the Lagrangian

$$L = B(y) + \lambda [B(y) - C(y)], \tag{3.6}$$

where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint that the budget equals cost. Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to y and solving characterizes the optimum output from the perspective of the bureaucrat, y^b, by

$$B'\left(y^b\right) = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + 1} C'\left(y^b\right). \tag{3.7}$$

Since the Lagrange multiplier, λ, is positive, this expression implies that $B' < C'$ at the bureaucrats optimum choice of output.



Figure 3.1: Excessive Bureaucracy

We wish to contrast the outcome with the bureaucrat in charge that which occurs when the government has full information. With full information there exists a variety of different ways to model efficiency. On way would be to place this bureau within a more general setting and consider its output as one component of overall government intervention. A benefit/cost calculation for government intervention would then determine the efficient level of bureau output. A simpler alternative, and the one we choose to follow, is to determine the efficient output by drawing an analogy between the bureau and a profit-maximizing firm. The firm would choose its output to ensure that the difference between revenue and costs was made as large as possible. Applying this analogy, the bureau should choose output to maximize its budget less costs, $B(y) - C(y)$. For the bureau, this is the equivalent of profit maximization.

Differentiating with respect to y, the efficient output, y^*, equates the marginal effect of output on the budget to marginal cost, so $B'(y^*) = C'(y^*)$. The output level chosen by the bureaucrat can easily be shown to be above the efficient level. This argument is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The increasing marginal cost curve and declining marginal benefit curve are consequences of the assumptions already made. The efficient output occurs at the intersection of these curves. In contrast, the output chosen by the bureaucrat satisfies $B'\left(y^b\right) < C'\left(y^b\right)$, so it must lie to the right of y^*. In fact, the budget covers costs when the area under the marginal budget curve equals the area under the marginal cost curve. It is clear from this figure that the size of the bureaucracy is excessive when it is determined by the choice of a bureaucrat.

This simple model shows how the pursuit of personal objectives by bureaucrats can lead to an excessive size of bureaucracy. Adding together the individual bureaus that comprise the public sector makes this excessive in aggregate. This excessive size is simply an inefficiency since money is spent on bureaus which are not generating sufficiently valuable results.

The argument just given is enticing in its simplicity but it is restricted by the fact that it is assumed that the bureaucrats have freedom to set the size of the bureau. There are various ways this limitation can be addressed. Useful extensions are to have the freedom constrained by political pressure or through a demand function. Although doing either of these would lessen the excess, the basic moral that bureaucrats have incentives to overly enlarge their bureaus would still remain. Whether they do so in practice is dependent upon the constraints placed upon them.

3.4.2 Budget-Setting

An alternative perspective upon excessive bureaucracy can be obtained by considering a different process of budget determination. A motivation for this is the fact that each government department is headed by a politician who obtains satisfaction from the size of the budget. Furthermore, in many government systems, budgets for departments are determined annually by a meeting of cabinet. This meeting takes the budget bids from the individual departments and allocates a central budget on the basis of these. Providing a model incorporating these points then determines how departments' budgets evolve over time.

A simple process of this form can be the following. Let the budget for year t be given by B_t. The budget claim for year $t+1$ is then given by

$$B_{t+1}^c = [1+\alpha]\, B_t, \tag{3.8}$$

where $\alpha > 0$. Such a rule represents a straightforward mechanical method of updating the budget claim - last year's is taken and a little more added. It is, of course, devoid of any basis in efficiency. The meeting of cabinet then takes these bids and proportionately reduces them to reach the final allocation. The agreed budget is then

$$B_{t+1} = [1-\gamma]\, B_{t+1}^c = [1-\gamma]\,[1+\alpha]\, B_t. \tag{3.9}$$

The expression above gives a description of the change in the budget over time.

It can be seen that if $\alpha > \gamma$, then the budget will grow over time. Its development bears little relationship to needs, so that there is every possibility that expenditure will eventually become excessive even if it initially begins at an acceptable level. When $\alpha < \gamma$ the budget will fall over time. Although either case is possible, the observed pattern of growth lends some weight to the former assumption.

This form of model could easily be extended to incorporate more complex dynamics but these would not really enhance the content of the simple story it tells. The modeling of budget determination as a process entirely independent of what is good for the economy provides an important alternative perspective on how the public sector may actually function. Even if the truth is not quite this stark, reasoning of this kind does put into context models that are based on the assumption that the government is informed and efficient.

3.4.3 Monopoly Power

The basis of elementary economics is that market equilibrium is determined via the balance of supply and demand. Those supplying the market are assumed to be distinct from those demanding the product. In the absence of monopoly power, the equilibrium that is achieved will be efficient. If the same reasoning could be applied to the goods supplied by the public sector, then efficiency would also arise there. Unfortunately, there are two reasons why this is not possible. Firstly, the public sector can award itself a monopoly in the supply of its goods and services. Secondly, this monopoly power may be extended into market capture.

Generally, a profit-maximizing monopolist will always want to restrict its level of output below the competitive level, so that monopoly power will provide a tendency for too little government rather than the converse. This would be a powerful argument were it not for the fact that the government can choose not to exercise its monopoly power in this way. If it is attempting to achieve efficiency, then it will certainly not do so. Furthermore, since the government may not be following a policy of profit maximization, it might actually exploit its monopoly position to over-supply its output. This takes the analysis back in the direction of the bureaucracy model.

The idea of market capture is rather more interesting and arises from the nature of goods supplied by the public sector. Rather than being standard market goods, many of them are complex in nature and not fully understood by those consuming them. Natural examples of such goods would be education and health care. In both cases, the consumer may not understand quite what the product is, nor what is best for them. Although this is important, it is also true of many other goods. The additional feature of the public sector commodities is that demand is not determined by the consumers and expressed through a market. Instead it is delegated to specialists, such as teachers or doctors. Furthermore, these same specialists are also responsible for setting the level of supply. In this sense, they can be said to capture the market.

The consequence of this market capture is that the specialists can set the level of output for the market that most meets their objectives. Naturally, since most would benefit from an expansion of their profession, within limits, this gives a mechanism which leads to supply in excess of the efficient level. The limits arise because they won't want to go so far that competition reduces the payment received or lowers standards too far. Effectively, they are reaching a trade-off between income and power, where the latter arises through the size of the profession. The resulting outcome has no grounds in efficiency and may well be too large.

3.4.4 Corruption

Corruption does not emerge as a moral aberration, but as a general consequence of government officials using their power for personal gain. Corruption distorts the allocation of resources away from productive toward rent-seeking occupations. Rent-seeking (studied in Chapter 5) is the attempt to obtain a return above what is judged adequate by the market. Monopoly profit is one example, but the concept is much broader. Corruption is not just redistributive (taking wealth from others to give it to some special interests) but it can also have enormous efficiency costs. By discouraging the entrepreneurs on whom they prey, corruptible officials may have the effect of stunting economic growth.

Perhaps the most important form of corruption in many countries is predatory regulation. This describes the process of the government intentionally creating regulations that entrepreneurs will have to pay bribes to get around. Because it raises the cost of productive activity, corruption reduces efficiency. The damage is particularly large when several government officials, acting independently, create distinct obstacles to economic activity so that each can collect a separate bribe in return for removing the obstacle (such as creating the need for a license and then charging for it). When entrepreneurs face all these independent regulatory obstacles, they eventually cease trying, or else move into the underground economy to escape regulation altogether. Thus corruption is purely harmful in this perspective.

How could we give a positive role for a bribe-based corruption system? One possibility is that bribery is like an auction mechanism that directs resources to their best possible use. For example, corruption in procurement is similar to auctioning off the contract to the more efficient entrepreneurs who can afford the highest bribes. However there are some problems with this bribery-based system. First, we care about the means as well as the ends. Bribery is noxious. Allowing bribery will destroy much of the goodwill that supports the system. Second, people should not be punished for their honesty. Indeed, honest government officials can be used to create benchmarks by which to judge the performance of the more opportunistic officials. Third, it is impossible to optimize or even manage underground activities such as bribery.

3.4.5 Government Agency

Another explanation for excessive government is the lack of information available to voters. The imperfect information of voters enables the government to grow larger by increasing the tax burden. From this perspective government growth reflects the abuse of power by greedy bureaucrats. The central question is then how to set incentives which encourage the government to work better and to cost less, subject to the information available.

To illustrate this point, consider a situation in which the cost to the government of supplying a public good can vary. The unit cost is either low, at c_ℓ, or is high, at c_h. The gross benefit to the public from a level G of public good is given by the function $b(G)$ which is increasing and concave. The net benefit



Figure 3.2: Government Agency

is $w(G, t) = b(G) - t$, where t is the fee paid to the government for the public good. The chosen quantity of the public good will depend upon the unit cost of the government. The benefit to the government of providing the public good is the difference between the fee and the cost, so when the cost is c_i the benefit is $t_i - c_iG_i$.

When the public are informed about the level of cost of the government, the quantity of public good will be chosen to maximize the net benefit subject to the government breaking even. For cost c_i, the public net benefit with the government breaking even is $b(G_i) - c_iG_i$. The public will demand a level of public good such that the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost, so $b'(G_i) = c_i$, and will pay the government $t_i = c_iG_i$, for $i = h, \ell$. This is shown in Figure 3.2.

Now assume that the public cannot observe whether the government has cost c_ℓ or c_h. The government can then benefit by misrepresenting the cost to the public: for instance, it can exaggerate the cost by adding expenditures that benefit the government but not the public. When the cost is high, the government cannot exaggerate. When the cost is low, the government is better off pretending the cost is high to get fee t_h for the amount G_h of public good instead of getting t_ℓ for producing G_ℓ. Misrepresenting in this way leads to the benefit of $G_h [c_h - c_\ell]$ for the government which is shown in Figure 3.2.

To eliminate this temptation taxpayers must pay an extra amount $r > 0$ to the government in excess of its cost when the government pretends to have the low cost. This is called the informational rent. Since the truly high cost government cannot further inflate its cost, the public pay $t_h = c_hG_h$ when the government reports a high cost. If the reported cost is low, the taxpayers demand the amount G_ℓ of public good defined by $b'(G_\ell) = c_\ell$ and pay the government $t_\ell = c_\ell G_\ell + r$ where r is exactly the extra revenue the government could have made if it had pretended to have high cost. To give a government with a low cost just enough revenue to offset its temptation to pretend to have higher cost it is necessary that $r = [c_h - c_l]G_h$. This is the rent required to induce truthful revelation of the cost and have the provision of the public good equal to that when the public are fully informed.

It is possible for the taxpayers to reduce this excess payment by demanding that the high-cost government supply less than it would with full information. Assume that cost is low with probability p_ℓ and high with probability $p_h = 1-p_\ell$. By maximizing their expected benefit subject to the government telling the truth, it can be shown that revelation can be obtained at the least cost by demanding an amount G_h of public services defined by

$$b'(G_h) = c_h + \frac{p_\ell}{1-p_\ell}[c_h - c_\ell]. \tag{3.10}$$

This quantity is lower than that with full information. The distortion of the quantity demanded from the high-cost government results from a simple cost-benefit argument. It trades off the benefit of reducing the rent, which is proportional to the cost difference $[c_h - c_\ell]$, and the probability that the government is of the low cost type p_ℓ, against the cost of imposing the distortion of the quantity on the high-cost government with probability $1 - p_\ell$.

Therefore if the government is truly low cost it need not be given the high tax, but in order to eliminate the temptation for cost inflation taxpayers have to provide the government just enough of the rent as a reward for reporting truthfully when its cost of public services is low. The ability of the government to misrepresent its costs therefore allows it to earn rents and can distort the level of provision.

3.4.6 Cost Diffusion

The last explanation we present for the possibility of excessively large government is the *common resource* problem. The idea is that spending authorities are dispersed while the treasury has the responsibility of collecting enough revenue to balance the overall budget. Each of the spending authorities has its own spending priorities, with few consideration for others' priorities, which it can better meet by raiding the overall budget. This is the common resource problem, just like that of several oil companies tapping into a common pool underground or fishermen netting in a single lake. In all cases it leads to excess pressure on the common resource. From this perspective a single committee with expenditure authority would have a much better sense of the opportunity cost of public funds, and can better compare the merits of alternative proposals, than the actual dispersed spending authorities. The current trend toward federalism and devolution aggravates this common pool problem. The reason is essentially that each district can impose projects whose cost is shared by all other districts and so they support higher size projects than they would if they had to cover the full costs. We discuss in more detail the various aspects of federalism in Chapter 19.

The problem can also be traced down to the individual level. Consider public services like pensions, health care, schools and infrastructure work like bridges, roads and railtracks. It is clear that for these public services, and in fact many others, the government does not charge the direct users the full marginal cost, but subsidizes these activities partly or wholly from tax revenues. There is an obvious equity concern behind this fact. But it is then also natural that users who do not bear the full cost will support more public services than they would if they had to cover the full cost. The same argument applies in the opposite direction when contemplating some cut in public spending: contributors who are asked to make concessions are concentrated and possibly organized through a lobby with large per capita benefits from continued provision of specific public services. In contrast the beneficiaries of downsizing public spending, the taxpayers as a whole, are diffuse with small per capita stakes. This makes it less likely that they can offer organized support for the reform. To sum up, many public services are characterized by the concentration of benefits to a small group of users or recipients and the diffusion of costs to the large group of taxpayers. This results in biases toward continuous demand for more public spending.

3.5 Conclusions

This chapter has provided a number of theories of public sector growth which have been designed to explain the growth patterns exhibited in Chapter 2. Each of these has some points to commend it but none is entirely persuasive. It is fair to say that all provide a partial insight and have some element of truth. A more general story drawing together the full set of components, including the ratchet effect, income effect, political process, production technology and bureaucracy, would have much in its favor. This would be especially so if combined with the voting models of the next chapter.

The bureaucracy models are particularly attractive since they show how economic analysis can be applied to what appears to be a non-economic problem. In doing so they generate an interesting conclusion which casts doubt on the efficiency of government. This illustrates how the method of economic reasoning can be applied to understand the outcome of what is at first sight a non-economic problem.

The perennial question of whether the government has grown too large is difficult to answer. The reason is that the government is both complementary to the market and a competitor of the market. As a major employer, the government competes with any business looking to hire talented people. The possibility that the best and brightest become public officials and politicians, rather than entrepreneurs, is considered by many as very costly to society because they are seen as devoting their talents to taking wealth from others rather than creating it. When people pay taxes, they have less money to spend on other goods and services provided by the market. Likewise when the government borrows money, it competes with companies looking to raise capital. In some areas like health care and education, public and private services are competing with each other. But at the same time, the government also serves as useful complement to every business activity by providing basic infrastructure and civil order. Every business depends on the government for things like protection of life and property, a transportation network, civil courts, a stable currency, and so on. Without these things, people couldn't do business. Finally whether an activity is carried out in the public sector or the private sector is itself endogenous.

As in architecture, the functions suggest the form. Take the example of education where the goals are multiple (literacy, vocational skills, citizenship, equality of chance, preparation for life) and not precisely measurable and several stakeholders are involved (parents, employers, students, teachers, taxpayers) with possibly conflicting preferences. It is not immediately clear that the market with its single-minded focus can cope adequately with all these aspects, and the risk is that the market could bias the activity toward dimensions that matter more for profit-making. For example, teaching various skills to the most able students may conflict with teaching the same things to the least able ones. In the United States voucher programs are creating more competition from private schools but for the vast majority of the population, the local public school remains the monopoly provider. The net result of switching to the market can well be detrimental for the society as a whole. To sum up, there is potential for the government to step in when the market is likely to fail.

Further Reading

An account of Wagner's law can be found in:

Bird, R.M. (1971) "Wagner's law of expanding state activity", *Public Finance*, **26**, 1 - 26.

The classic study of public sector growth is:

Peacock, A.K. and Wiseman, J. (1961) *The Growth of Public Expenditure in the UK* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

An non-technical account on corruption and government is:

Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999), *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

The theory of bureaucracy was first developed in:

Niskanen, W.A. (1974) "Non-market decision making: the peculiar economics of bureaucracy", *American Economic Review*, **58**, 293 - 305.

A fascinating book on bureaucracy from a political scientist is:

Wilson, J.Q., (1989) *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (New York: Basic Books).

The political theory of the size of the government is based on:

Meltzer, A. and Richard, S. (1981) A rational theory of the size of government, *Journal of Political Economy* **89**, 914-27

The main reference on government agency is:

Laffont, J.-J. (2001) *Incentives and Political Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

Chapter 4

Voting

4.1 Introduction

Voting is the most commonly employed method of resolving a diversity of views or eliciting expressions of preference. It is used to determine the outcome of elections from local to supra-national level. Within organizations, voting determines who is elected to committees and it governs the decision-making of those committees. Voting is a universal tool that is encountered in all spheres of life. The prevalence of voting, its use in electing governments, and its use by those governments elected to reach decisions, is the basis for the considerable interest in the properties of voting.

The natural question to ask of voting is whether it is a good method of making decisions. There are two major properties to look for in a good method. First is the success or failure of the method in achieving a clear-cut decision. Second is the issue of whether voting always produces an outcome that is efficient. Voting would be of limited value if it frequently left the choice of outcome unresolved or lead to a choice that was clearly inferior to other alternatives. Whether voting satisfies these properties is shown to be somewhat dependent upon the precise method of voting adopted. Ordinary majority voting is very familiar but it is only one amongst a number of ways of voting. Several of these methods of voting will be introduced and analyzed alongside the standard form of majority voting.

4.2 Stability

Voting is an example of collective choice - the process through which a group (or collective) reaches a decision. A major issue of collective choice is *stability.* By stability we mean the tendency of the decision-making process to eventually reach a settled conclusion, and not to keep jumping around between alternatives. We begin this chapter by a simple illustration of the central fact that when you have a large group of people, with conflicting preferences, stability is not guaranteed.

The example involves three married couples living as neighbors on a remote island. Initially, the couples are comprised of Alil and Alice, Bob and Beth, and Carl and Carol, respectively. We assume that each husband has his own preference list of the women as potential wives and each wife has a list of preferences among husbands, each ranking partners from best to worst. We also make the assumption that the top preference for any given wife may or may not be her own husband, and similarly for the men. To avoid untenable frustrations developing, the island society introduces a rule that if two people prefer each other to their existing partners they can reform as a new couple. For example, if Alil prefers Beth to his own wife, Alice, and Beth prefers Alil to her own husband, Bob, then Alil can join Beth, leaving Bob and Alice to console each other. (It is forbidden on this island to live alone or to form a couple with someone of the same sex.)

Now consider the following lists of preferences for all participants. It follows from these preferences that Beth will join Alil (she prefers him to Bob, and Alil prefers her to Alice), then she will continue her ascension to Carl (who prefers her to Carol, while he is her first choice). By then Alice has been left with Bob, her worst choice, so she will go to Carl, and finally back to Alil, her favorite. In every case, the leaving male is also improving his own position. But now the end result is that this round of spouse trading leaves us back exactly with the initial situation, so the cycle can begin again, and go on forever. The attempt to prevent frustrations has lead to an unstable society.

Alil	**Alice**	**Bob**	**Beth**	**Carl**	**Carol**
Beth	Alil	Beth	Carl	Alice	Bob
Alice	Carl	Alice	Alil	Beth	Carl
Carol	Bob	Carol	Bob	Carol	Alil

Table 4.1: Stability

The example has shown that stability may not be achieved. One argument for wanting stability is that it describes a settled outcome in which a final decision has been reached. If the process of changing position is costly, as it would be in our example, then stability would be beneficial. It can also be argued that there are occasions when stability is not necessarily desirable. In terms of the example, consider the extreme case in which each man is married to his first choice but each husband is at the bottom of his wife's preference list. This would be a stable outcome because no man would be interested in switching and no wife can switch either because she can't find an unhappy man who prefers her. So it is stable, but not necessarily desirable since the stability is forcing some of the participants to remain with unwanted choices.

4.3 Impossibility

Determining the preferences of an individual is just a matter of accepting their judgement which cannot be open to dispute. In contrast, determining the preferences of a group of people is not a simple matter. And that's what social choice theory (including voting as a one particular method) is all about. Social choice takes a given set of individual preferences and tries to aggregate them into a social preference.

The central result of the theory of social choice, Arrow's *Impossibility Theorem*, says that there is no way to devise a collective decision-making process that satisfies a few commonsense requirements and works in all circumstances. If there are only two options, majority voting works just fine, but with more than two we can get into trouble. Despite all the talk about the "will of the people", it is not easy - in fact the theorem proves it impossible - to always determine what that will is. This is the remarkable fact of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.

Before presenting the theorem, a taste of it can be obtained with the simplest case of three voters with the following (conflicting) rankings over three options.

Voter 1	Voter 2	Voter 3
a	c	b
b	a	c
c	b	a

Table 4.2: Condorcet Paradox

Every voter has preferences over the three options which are transitive; for example voter 1 prefers a to b to c, and therefore a to c. As individuals, the voters are entirely self-consistent in their preferences. Now suppose we use majority rule to select of one of these options. We see that two out of three voters prefer a to b, while two out of three prefer b to c, and two out of three prefer c to a. At the collective level there is a cycle in preference and no decision is possible. We say that such preferences are intransitive, meaning that that the preference for a over b and for b over c does not imply a is preferred to c. As the example shows, intransitivity of group preferences can arise even when individual preferences are transitive. This generation of social intransitivity from individual transitivity is called the *Condorcet Paradox.*

The general problem addressed by Arrow in 1951 was to seek a way of aggregating individual rankings over options into a collective ranking. In doing so, difficulties such as the Condorcet paradox had to be avoided. Arrow's approach was to start from a set of requirements that a collective ranking must satisfy and then consider if any ranking could be found that met them all.

Condition 1 *(I) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Adding new options should not affect the initial ranking of the old options; so the collective ranking over the old options should be unchanged.*

For example, assume the group prefers option A to option C, and the new option B is introduced. Wherever it fits into each individual's ranking, Condition I requires that the group preference should not switch to C over A. They may like or dislike the new option B, but their relative preferences for other options should not change. If this condition wasn't imposed on collective decision making, any decision could be invalidated by bringing in new irrelevant (inferior) options. Since it is always possible to add new options, no decision could ever be made.

Condition 2 *(N) Non dictatorship. The collective preference should not be determined by the preferences of one individual.*

This is the weakest equity requirement. Having a dictatorship as a collective decision process may solve transitivity problems but it is manifestly unfair to the other individuals. Any conception of democracy aspires to some forms of equity among all the voters.

Condition 3 *(P) Pareto criterion: If everybody agrees on the ranking of all the possible options, so should the group; the collective ranking should coincide with the common individual ranking.*

The Pareto condition requires that unanimity should prevail where it arises. It is hardly possible to argue with this condition.

Condition 4 *(U) Unrestricted domain: The collective choice method should accommodate any possible individual ranking of options.*

This is the requirement that the collective choice method should work in all circumstances so that the method is not established in such a way as to rule out (arbitrarily), or fail to work on, some possible individual rankings of alternatives.

Condition 5 *(T) Transitivity: If the group prefers A to B and B to C; then this group cannot prefer C to A.*

This is merely a consistency requirement that ensures that a choice can always be made from any set of alternatives. The Condorcet Paradox shows that majority voting fails to meet this condition and can lead to cycles in collective preference.

That is it, and one can hardly disagree with any of these requirements. Each one seems highly reasonable taken individually. Yet the remarkable result that Arrow discovered is that there is no way to devise a collective choice method that satisfies them all simultaneously.

Theorem 1 *(Arrow's Impossibility Theorem) When choosing among more than two options, there exists no collective decision-making process that satisfies the conditions I.N.P.U.T.*

The proof is slightly, rather than very, complicated but is quite formal. We will not reproduce it here. The intuition underlying the proof is clear enough and follows this reasoning:

(i) The unrestricted domain condition allows for preferences such that no option is unanimously preferred.

(ii) The independence of irrelevant alternatives forces the social ranking over any two options to be based exclusively on the individual preferences over those two options only.

(iii) From the Condorcet Paradox, we know that a cycle can emerge from three successive pair-wise comparisons.

(iv) The transitivity requirement forces a choice among the three options.

(v) The only method for deciding must give one individual all the power, thus contradicting the non-dictatorship requirement.

The implication of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is that any search for a "perfect" method of collective decision-making is doomed to failure. Whatever process is devised, a situation can be constructed in which it will fail to deliver an outcome that satisfies one or more of the conditions *I.N.P.U.T.* As a consequence, all collective decision-making must make the most of imperfect decision rules.

4.4 Majority Rule

In any situation involving only two options, majority rule simply requires that the option with the majority of votes is chosen. Unless unanimity is possible, asking that the few give way to the many is a very natural alternative to dictatorship. The process of majority voting is now placed into context and its implications determined.

4.4.1 May's Theorem

Non-dictatorship is a very weak interpretation of the principles of democracy. A widely held view is that democracy should treat all the voters in the same way. This symmetry requirement is called *Anonymity.* It requires that permuting the names of any two individuals does not change the group preference. Thus Anonymity implies that there cannot be any dictator. Another natural symmetry requirement is that the collective decision-making process should treat all possible options alike. No apparent bias in favor of one option should be introduced. This symmetric treatment of the various options is called *Neutrality.*

Now a fundamental result due to May is that majority rule is the obvious way to implement these principles of democracy (Anonymity and Neutrality) in social decision-making when only two options are considered at a time. The theorem asserts that majority rule is the unique way of doing so if the conditions of *Decisiveness* (*i.e.*, the social decision rule must pick a winner) and *Positive Responsiveness* (*i.e.*, increasing the vote for the winning option should not lead to the declaration of another option the winner) are also imposed.

Theorem 2 *(May's theorem) When choosing among only two options, there is only one collective decision-making process that satisfies the requirements of*

Anonymity, Neutrality, Decisiveness and Positive Responsiveness. This process is majority rule.

Simple majority rule is the best social choice procedure if we consider only two options at a time. Doing so is not at all unusual in the real world. For instance, when a vote is called in a legislative assembly there are usually only two possible options: to approve or to reject some specific proposal that is on the floor. Also in a situation of two-party political competition, voters again face a binary choice. Therefore interest in other procedures arises only when there are more than two options to consider.

4.4.2 Condorcet Winner

When there are only two options, majority rule is a simple and compelling method for social choice. When there are more than two options to be considered at a time, we can still apply the principle of majority voting by using binary agendas which allow us to reduce the problem of choosing among many options to a sequence of votes each of which is binary.

For example, one simple binary agenda for choosing among the three options $\{a, b, c\}$ in the Condorcet Paradox is as follows. First, there is a vote on a against b. Then, the winner of this first vote is opposed to c. The winner of this second vote is the chosen option. The most famous pair-wise voting method is the *Condorcet method*. It consists of a complete round-robin of majority votes, opposing each option against all of the others. The option which defeats all others in pair-wise majority voting is called a *Condorcet winner*, after Condorcet suggested that such an option should be declared the winner. That is, using $\succ$ to denote majority preference, a Condorcet winner is an option x such that $x \succ y$ for every other option y in the set of possible options X.

The problem is that the existence of a Condorcet winner requires very special configurations of individual preferences. For instance, with the preferences given in the Condorcet paradox, there is no Condorcet winner. So a natural question to ask is under what conditions a Condorcet winner does exist.

4.4.3 Median Voter Theorems

When the policy space is one-dimensional, sufficient (but not necessary) conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner are given by the *Median Voter Theorems*. One version of these theorems refers to single-peaked preferences, while the other version refers to single-crossing preferences. The two conditions of single-peaked and single-crossing are logically independent but both conditions give the same conclusion that the median position is a Condorcet winner.

As an example of single-peaked preferences, consider a population of consumers who are located at equally-spaced positions along a straight road. Along this road there is to be located a bus stop. It is assumed that all consumers would prefer this to be located as close as possible to their own location. If the



Figure 4.1: Location of Households

location of the bus stop is to be determined by majority voting (taking pair-wise comparisons again), which location will be chosen?

When there is an odd number of houseowners, the answer to this question is clear-cut. Given any pair of alternatives, the households will vote for that which is closest to their own location. The location that is the closest choice for the largest number of voters will receive a majority of votes.

Now consider a voting process in which votes are taken over every possible pair of alternatives. This is very much in the form of a thought-process rather than a practical suggestion since, if there are many alternatives, there must be many rounds of voting and the process will rapidly becomes impractical. Putting this difficulty aside, it can easily be seen that this process will lead to the central outcome being the chosen alternative. This location which wins all votes is the Condorcet winner. Expressed differently, the location preferred by the median voter (that is, the voter in the centre) will be chosen. At least half the population will always vote for this.

This result is the basis of the Median Voter Theorem. Formally, it applies only when the votes are taken over all alternatives but it is usually adopted as the solution to any majority voting problem. When there is an even number of voters, there is no median voter but the two locations closest to the centre will both beat any other locations in pair-wise comparisons. They will tie when they are directly compared. The chosen location must therefore lie somewhere between them.

The essential features that lie behind the reasoning of the example is that each consumer has single-peaked preferences, and that the decision is one-dimensional. Preferences are termed single-peaked when there is a single preferred option. Figure 4.2b illustrates preferences that satisfy this condition, those in 4.2a are not single-peaked. In the bus stop example, each consumer most prefers their own location and ranks the others according to the how close they are to the ideal. Such preference look exactly like those in Figure 4.2b. The choice variable is one-dimensional since it relates to location along a line.

The first general form of the Median Voter Theorem can be stated as follows.

Theorem 3 *Median Voter Theorem I (Single-peaked version) Suppose there is an odd number of voters and that the policy space is one-dimensional (so that the options can be put in a transitive order). If the voters have single-peaked preferences, then the median of the distribution of voters' preferred options is a Condorcet winner.*

The idea of median voting has also been applied to the analysis of politics.



Figure 4.2: Single-Peaked Preferences

Instead of considering the line in Figure 4.1 as a geographical identity, view it as a representation of the political spectrum running from left to right. The houseowners then becomes voters and their locations represent political preferences. Let there be two parties who can choose their location upon the line. A location in this sense represents the manifesto upon which they stand. Where will the parties choose to locate? Assume as above that the voters always vote for the party nearest their location. Now fix the location of one party at any point other then the centre and consider the choice of the other. Clearly, if the second party locates next to the first party on the side containing more than half the electorate, it will win a majority of the vote. Realizing this, the first party would not be content with its location. It follows that the only possible equilibrium set of locations for the parties is to be side-by-side at the centre of the political spectrum.

This agglomeration at the centre is called *Hotelling's principle of minimal differentiation* and has been influential in political modelling. The reasoning underlying it can be observed in the move of the Democrats in the United States and labor in the United Kingdom to the right in order to crowd out the Republicans and Conservatives respectively. The result also shows how ideas developed in economics can have useful applications elsewhere.

Although a powerful result, the Median Voter Theorem does have significant drawbacks. The first is that the literal application of the theorem requires that there is an odd number of voters. This condition ensures that there is a majority for the median. When there is an even number of voters, there will be a tie in voting over all locations between the two central voters. The theorem is then silent on which of these locations will eventually be chosen. In this case, though, there is a median tendency. The second, and most significant drawback, is that the Median Voter Theorem is applicable only when the decision over which voting is taking place has a single dimension. This point will be investigated in the next section. Before doing that let us consider the single-crossing version of the Median Voter Theorem.

The single-crossing version of the Median Voter Theorem assumes not only that the policy space is transitively ordered, say from left to right (and thus one-dimensional), but also that the voters can be transitively ordered, say from left to right in the political spectrum. The interpretation is that voters at the left prefer left options more than voters at the right. This second assumption is called the single-crossing property of preferences. Formally,

Definition 1 *(Single-crossing property) For any two voters i and j such that $i < j$ (voter i is to the left of voter j), and for any two options x and y such that $x < y$ (x is to the left of y):*
(i) If $u^j(x) > u^j(y)$ then $u^i(x) > u^i(y)$;
and
(ii) If $u^i(y) > u^i(x)$ then $u^j(y) > u^j(x)$.

The median voter is characterized as the median individual on the left-right ordering of voters, so that half the voters are to the left of the median voter and the other half is to the right. Therefore, according to the single-crossing property, for any two options x and y, with $x < y$, if the median voter prefers x then all the voters to the left also prefer x; and if the median voter prefers y then all the voters to the right also prefer y. So there is always a majority of voters who agree with the median voter, and the option preferred by the median voter is a Condorcet winner.

Theorem 4 *Median Voter Theorem II (Single-crossing version) Suppose there is an odd number of voters and that the policy space is one-dimensional (so that the options can be put in a transitive order). If the voters' preferences together satisfy the single-crossing property, then the preferred option of the median voter is a Condorcet winner.*

Single-crossing and single-peakedness are different conditions on preferences. But both give us the same result that the median voter's preferred option is a Condorcet winner. However there is a subtle difference. With the single-peakedness property we refer to the median of the voters' preferred options, but with the single-crossing property we refer to the preferred option of the median voter. Notice that single-crossing and single-peakedness are logically independent as the example in Figure 4.3. The options are ranked left-to-right along the horizontal axis and the individual 3 is to the left of 2 who is to the left of 1. It can be checked that single-crossing holds for any pair of options but single-peakedness does not hold to individual 2. So one property may fail to hold when the other is satisfied.

An attractive aspect of the Median Voter Theorem is that it does not depend on the intensity of preferences, and thus nobody has an incentive to misrepresent their preferences. This implies that honest, or sincere, voting is the best



Figure 4.3: Single-Crossing without Single-Peakedness

strategy for everyone. Indeed, for a voter to the left of the median, misrepresenting preference more to the left does not change the median and therefore the final outcome; while misrepresenting preferences more to the right, either does nothing or moves the final outcome further away from his preferred outcome. Following the same reasoning, a voter to the right of the median has no incentive to misrepresent his preferences either way. Lastly, the median gets his most-preferred outcome and thus cannot benefit from misrepresenting his preferences.

Having seen how the Median Voter Theorem leads to a clearly predicted outcome, we can now enquire whether this outcome is efficient. The chosen outcome reflects the preferences of the median voter, so the efficient choice will only be made if this is the most preferred alternative for the median voter. Obviously, there is no reason why this should be the case. Therefore the Median Voter Theorem will not in general produce an efficient choice. In addition, without knowing the precise details, it is not possible to predict whether majority voting will lead, via the Median Voter Theorem, to a choice that lies to the left or to the right of the efficient choice.

A further problem with the Median Voter Theorem is its limited applicability. It always works when policy choices can be reduced to one dimension but only works in restricted circumstances when there is more than dimension. We now demonstrate this point.

4.4.4 Multi-Dimensional Voting

The problem of choosing the location of the bus stop was one-dimensional. A second dimension could easily be introduced into this example by extending the



Figure 4.4: Single-Peakedness in Multi-Dimensions

vote to determine both the location of the bus stop and the time at which the bus is to arrive. The important observation for majority voting is that when this extension is made there is no longer any implication that single-peaked preferences will lead to a transitive ranking of alternatives.

This finding can be illustrated by considering the consumer's indifference curves over the two-dimensional space of location and time. To do this, consider location as the horizontal axis and time as the vertical axis with the origin at the far-left of the street and midnight respectively. The meaning of single-peaked preferences in this situation is that a consumer has a most-preferred location and any move in a straight line away from this must lead to a continuous decrease in utility. This is illustrated in Figure 4.4 where x_i denotes the most preferred location of i and the oval around this point is one of the consumer's indifference curves.

Using this machinery, it is now possible to show that the Median Voter Theorem can fail with majority voting failing to generate a transitive outcome. The three voters, denoted 1, 2 and 3, have preferred locations x_1, x_2 and x_3. Assume that voting is to decide which of these three locations is to be chosen (this is not necessary for the argument as will become clear but it does simplify it). The rankings of the three consumers of these alternatives in Table 4.3 are consistent with the preferences represented by the ovals in Figure 4.4. Contrasting these to Table 4.2, one can see immediately that these are exactly the rankings that generate an intransitive social ordering through majority voting. Consequently, even though preferences are single peaked, the social ordering is intransitive and the Median Voter Theorem fails. Hence, the theorem does not extend beyond one-dimensional choice problems.

Voter 1	Voter 2	Voter 3
x_1	x_2	x_3
x_2	x_3	x_1
x_3	x_1	x_2

Table 4.3: Rankings

4.4.5 Agenda Manipulation

In a situation in which there is no Condorcet winner, the door is opened to agenda manipulation. This is because changing the agenda, meaning the order in which the votes over pairs of alternatives are taken, can change the voting outcome. Thus the agenda-setter may have substantial power to influence the voting outcome. To determine the degree of the agenda-setter's power, we must find the set of outcomes that can be achieved through agenda manipulations.

To see how agenda-setting can be effective, suppose there are three voters with preferences as in the Condorcet paradox (described in Figure 4.2). Then there is a majority (voters 1 and 2) who prefer a over b, there is a majority (voters 2 and 3) who prefer c over a, and there is a majority (voters 1 and 3) who prefer b over c. Given these voters' preferences, what will be the outcome of different binary agendas? The answer is that when voters vote sincerely, then it is possible to set the agenda so that any of the three options can be the ultimate winner. For example, to obtain option a as the final outcome it suffices to first oppose b against c (knowing that b will defeat c) and then at the second stage to oppose the winner b against a (knowing that a will defeat b). Similarly, to get b as the final outcome, it suffices to oppose a against c at the first stage (given that c will defeat a) and then the winner c against b (given that b will defeat c). These observations show how the choice of agenda can affect the outcome.

This reasoning is based on the assumption that voters vote sincerely. However, the voters may respond to agenda manipulation by misrepresenting their preferences. That is, they may vote strategically. Voters can choose to vote for options that are not actually their most-preferred options if they believe that such behavior in the earlier ballots can affect the final outcome in their favor. For example, if we first oppose b against c then voter 2 may vote for c rather than b. This ensures that c then goes on to oppose a. Option c will then win, an outcome preferred by voter 2 to the victory for a that emerges with sincere voting. So, voters may not vote for their preferred option in order to prevent their worst option from winning. The question is then how strategic voting affects the set of options that could be achieved by agenda-manipulation. Such outcomes are called *sophisticated outcomes* of binary agendas, because voters anticipate what the ultimate result will be, for a given agenda, and vote optimally in earlier stages.

A remarkable result, due to Miller, is that strategic voting (relative to sincere voting) does not alter the set of outcomes that can be achieved by agenda-manipulation when the agenda-setter can design any binary-agendas, provided only that every option must be included in the agenda. Miller called the set that can be achieved the *top cycle*.



Figure 4.5: Binary Agenda

When there exists a Condorcet winner, the top cycle reduces to that single option. With preferences as in the Condorcet Paradox, the top cycle contains all three options $\{a, b, c\}$. For example, option b can be obtained by the following agenda (different from the agenda under sincere voting): at the first stage, a is opposed to b, then the winner is opposed to c. This binary agenda is represented in Figure 4.5.

The agenda begins at the top, and at each stage the voters must vote with the effect of moving down the agenda tree along the branch that will defeat the other with a sophisticated majority vote. To resolve this binary agenda, sophisticated voters must anticipate the outcome of the second stage and vote optimally in the first stage. Either the second stage involves c against a, and thus c will beat a, or the second stage involves c against b and thus b will beat c. So the voters should anticipate that in the first stage voting for a will in fact lead to the ultimate outcome c while voting for b will lead to the ultimate outcome b (as displayed in parentheses). So in voting for a in the first stage they vote in effect for c while voting for b in the first stage effectively leads to the choice of b as the ultimate outcome. Because b is preferred by a majority to c, it follows that a majority of voters should vote for b at the first stage (even though a majority prefers a over b).

The problem with the top cycle is that it can contain options that are Pareto dominated. To see this, suppose preferences are as in the Condorcet paradox and let us add a fourth alternative d that falls just below c in every individual's preference. The resulting rankings are give in Table 4.4. We see that there is a cycle since two out of three prefer b to c, while two out of three prefer a to b, and two out of three prefer d to a, and lastly all prefer c to d, making it a full circle. So d is included in the top cycle, even though d is Pareto dominated by c.

Voter 1	Voter 2	Voter 3
a	c	b
b	d	c
c	a	d
d	b	a

Table 4.4: Top Cycle

The situation is in fact worse than this. An important theorem, due to McKelvey, says that if there is no Condorcet winner, then the top cycle is very large and can even coincide with the full space of alternatives. There are two implications of this result. First, the agenda-setter can bring about any possible option as the ultimate voting outcome. So the power of the agenda-setter may be very substantial. Such dependence implies that the outcome chosen by majority rule cannot be characterized, in general, as the expression of the voters' will. Second, the existence of voting cycle makes the voting outcome arbitrary and unpredictable, with very little normative appeal.

We know that the existence of a Condorcet winner requires very special conditions on voters' preferences. In general, with preferences that do not have the single-peakedness or single-crossing properties on a simple one-dimensional issue space, we should not generally expect that a Condorcet winner exists. For example Fishburn tells us that when voters' preferences are drawn randomly and independently from the set of all possible preferences, then the probability of a Condorcet winner existing tends to zero as the number of possible options goes to infinity.

Before embarking on the alternatives to majority rule, let us present some Condorcet-consistent selection procedures; that is, procedures that select the Condorcet winner as the single winner when it exists. The first, due to Miller, is the *uncovered set*. An option x is covered if there exists some other option y such that (i) y beats x (with a majority of votes), and (ii) y beats any option z that x can beat. If x is Pareto dominated by some option, then x must be covered. The uncovered set is the set of options that are not covered. For the preferences such as in top cycle example above, d is covered by c because d is below c in everyone's ranking. Thus the uncovered set is a subset of the top cycle.

If more restrictions are imposed on the agenda, then it is possible to reduce substantially the set of possible voting outcomes. One notable example is the successive-elimination agenda according to which all options are put into an ordered list, and voters are asked to eliminate the first or second option, and thereafter the previous winner or the next option. The option surviving this successive elimination is the winner and all eliminations are resolved by sophisticated majority votes. The *Bank's set* is the set of options that can be achieved as (sophisticated) outcomes of the successive-elimination agendas. It is a subset of the uncovered set.

4.5 Alternatives to Majority Rule

Even if one considers the principle of majority rule to be attractive, the failure to select the Condorcet winner when one exists may be regarded as a serious weakness of majority rule as a voting procedure. This is very relevant because many of the most popular alternatives to majority rule also do not always choose the Condorcet winner when one does exist, although they always pick a winner even when a Condorcet winner does not exist. This is the case for all the *scoring rule methods*, like plurality voting, approval voting and Borda voting.

Each scoring rule method selects as a winner the option with the highest aggregate score. The difference is in the score voters can give to each option. Under *plurality voting*, voters give 1 point to their first choice and 0 points to all other options. Thus only information on voters' most preferred option is used. Under *approval voting,* voters can give 1 point to more than one option, in fact to as many or as few options as they want. Under *Borda voting,* voters give the highest possible score to their first choice, then progressively lower scores to worse choices.

4.5.1 Borda Voting

Borda voting (or weighted voting) is a scoring rule. With n options each voter's first choice gets n points, second choice gets $n - 1$ points and so forth, down to a minimum of 1 point for the the worst choice. Then the scores are added up, and the option with the *highest* score wins. It is very simple, and almost always picks a winner (even if there is no Condorcet winner). So a fair question is: which requirements of Arrow's theorem does it violate?

Suppose there are seven voters whose preferences over three options $\{a, b, c\}$ are as shown in Table 4.5 (with numbers in parentheses representing the number of voters). Thus three voters have a as their first choice, b as their second and c as their third.

(3)	(2)	(2)
a	c	b
b	a	c
c	b	a

Table 4.5: Borda Voting

Clearly there is no Condorcet winner: five out of the seven voters prefer a to b, and four out of seven prefer c to a, and then five out of seven prefer b to c, which leads to a voting cycle. Applying the Borda method as described above, it is easy to see that a with three first places, two second places and two third places will be the Borda winner with 15 points (while b gets 14 points and c gets 13 points). So we get the Borda ranking $a \succ b \succ c$. But now let us introduce a new option d. This becomes the first choice of three voters but a majority prefer c, the worst option under Borda rule, to the new alternative d. The new preference lists are given in Table 4.6.

(3)	(2)	(2)
d	c	b
a	d	c
b	a	d
c	b	a

Table 4.6: Independence of Irrelevant Alternative

If we compute the scores with Borda method (now with points from one to four), the election results are different: d will be the Borda winner with 22 points, c will be second with 17 points, b will be third with 16 points and a will be fourth with 15 points. So, the introduction of the new option d has reversed the Borda ranking between the original alternatives to $a \prec b \prec c$. This reversal of the ranking shows that the Borda rule violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives and should be unacceptable in a voting procedure.

This example illustrates the importance of the Arrow's Condition I. Without imposing this requirement it would be easy to manipulate the voting outcome by adding or removing irrelevant alternatives without any real chance of them winning the election in order to alter the chance of real contenders winning.

4.5.2 Plurality Voting

Under *Plurality voting* only the first choice of each voter matters and is given one point. Choices other than the first do not count at all. These scores are added and the option with the highest score is the plurality winner. Therefore, the Plurality winner is the option which is ranked first by the largest number of voters.

Consider the voters' preferences over the three options given in Table 4.7. Clearly a majority of voters rate c as worst option but it also has a dedicated minority who rate if best (four out of nine voters). Under plurality voting c is the winner, with four first-place votes, while b and a have three and two, respectively.

(2)	(3)	(4)
a	b	c
b	a	a
c	c	b

Table 4.7: Plurality Voting

The example illustrates the problem that plurality rule fails to select the Condorcet winner which, in this case, is a. The reason for this is that plurality voting dispenses with all information other than about the first choices.

4.5.3 Approval Voting

One problem with plurality rule is that voters don't always have an incentive to vote sincerely. Any rule that limits each voter to cast a vote for only one option forces the voters to consider the chance that their first-choices will win the election. If the first choice option is unlikely to win, the voters may instead vote for a second (or even lower) choice to prevent the election of a worse option.

In response to this risk of misrepresentation of preferences (*i.e.*, strategic voting), Brams and Fishburn have proposed the *approval voting* procedure. They argue that this procedure allows voters to express their true preferences. Under approval voting, each voter may vote (approve) for as many options as they like. Approving one option does not exclude approving any other options. So, there is no cost in voting for an option which is unlikely to win. The winning option is the one which gathers the most votes. This procedure is simpler than Borda voting because instead of giving a score for all the possible options, voters only need to separate the options they approve of from those they do not. Approval voting also has the advantage over pair-wise voting procedures that voters need only vote once, instead of engaging in a repetition of binary votes (as in the Condorcet method).

The problem with approval voting is that it may fail to pick the Condorcet winner when one exists. Suppose there are seven voters with the preferences shown in Table 4.8. With pair-wise majority voting, a beats both b and c with a majority of 3 votes out of 5, making a a Condorcet winner. Now consider approval voting and suppose that each voter gives his approval votes to the first and second- choices on his list, but not the bottom choice. Then b will be the winner with 5 approval votes (everyone gives it an approval vote), a will be second with 4 approval votes (one voter does not approve this option) and c will be third with 1 vote. So approval voting fails to pick the Condorcet winner.

(3)	(1)	(1)
a	b	c
b	a	b
c	c	a

Table 4.8: Approval Voting

4.5.4 Runoff Voting

The *runoff* is a very common scheme used in many presidential and parliamentary elections. Under this scheme only first-place votes are counted; and if there is no majority, there is a second runoff election involving only the two strongest candidates. The purpose of a runoff is to eliminate the least-preferred options. Runoff voting seems fair, and is very widely used. However it has two drawbacks. First, it may fail to select a Condorcet winner when it exists; second, it can violate positive responsiveness which is a fundamental principle of democracy. Let us consider these two problems in turn.

The failure to select a Condorcet winner is easily seen by considering the same set of voters' preferences as for the plurality voting example (Table 4.7). In the first round, c has 4 votes, b has 3 votes and a has 2 votes. So a is eliminated and the second runoff election is between b and c. Supporters of the eliminated option, a, move to their second choice, b; that would give b an additional two votes in the runoff, and a decisive victory over c (with 5 votes against 4). So this runoff voting fails to select the Condorcet winner, a.

To illustrate the violation of positive responsiveness, consider the example in Table 4.9, which is due to Brams, with 4 options and 17 voters. There is no Condorcet winner: a beats b, c beats a and b beats c. Under runoff voting, the result of the first election is a tie between options a and b, with 6 votes each, while c is eliminated, with only 5 votes. There is no majority and a runoff is necessary. In the runoff between a and b, the supporters of c move to their second choice, a, giving a an extra 5 votes and and a decisive victory for a over b. This seems fair: c is the least-preferred option and there is a majority of voters who prefer a over b. Now suppose that preferences are changed so that option a attracts extra support from the 2 voters in the last column who switch their first-choice from b to a. Then a will lose!

(6)	(5)	(4)	(2)
a	c	b	b
b	a	c	a
c	b	a	c

Table 4.9: Runoff Voting

Indeed the effect of this switch in preferences is that b is now the option eliminated in the first election; and there is still no majority. Thus a runoff is necessary between a and c. The disappointed supporters of b move to their second choice giving c 5 more votes and the ultimate victory over a. The upshot is that by attracting more supports, a can lose a runoff election it would have won without that extra support.

4.6 The Paradox of Voting.

The working assumption employed in analyzing voting so far has been that all voters choose to cast their votes. It is natural to question whether this assumption is reasonable. Although in some countries voting is a legal obligation, in others it is not. The observation that many of the latter countries frequently experience low voter turnouts in elections suggests that the assumption is unjustified.

Participation in voting almost always involve costs. There is the direct cost of travelling to the point at which voting takes place and there is also the cost of the time employed. If the individuals involved in voting are rational utility-maximizers, then they will only choose to vote if the expected benefits of voting exceed the costs.

To understand the interaction of these costs and benefits, consider an election that involves two political parties. Denote the parties by 1 and 2. Party 1 delivers to the voter an expected benefit of E^1 and party 2 a benefit of E^2. It is assumed that $E^1 > E^2$ so the voter prefers party 1. Let $B = E^1 - E^2 > 0$ be the value of party 1 winning versus losing. If the voter knows that party 1 will win the election, then they will choose not to vote. This is because they gain no benefit from doing so but still bear a cost. Similarly, they will also not vote if they expect party 2 to win. In fact, the rational voter will only ever choose to vote if they expect that they can affect the outcome of the election. Denoting the probability of breaking a tie occurring by P, then the expected benefit of voting is given by PB. The voting decision is then based on whether PB exceeds the private cost of voting C. Intuition suggests that the probability of being pivotal decreases with the size of the voting population and increases with the predicted closeness of the election. This can be demonstrated formally by considering the following coin-toss model of voting.

There is a population of potential voters of size N. Each of the voters chooses to cast a vote with probability p (so they don't vote with probability $1 - p$). This randomness in the decision to vote is the "coin toss" aspect of the model. There are two political parties contesting the election which we will call party 1 and party 2. A proportion σ_1 of the population support party 1, meaning that if they did vote they would vote for party 1. Similarly, a proportion σ_2 of the population support party 2. It must be the case that $0 \leq \sigma_1 + \sigma_2 \leq 1$. If $\sigma_1 + \sigma_2 < 1$ then some of the potential voters do not support either political party and abstain from the election. The number of votes cast for party 1 is denoted X_1 and the number for party 2 by X_2.

Now assume that the election is conducted. The question we want to answer is: what is the probability that an additional voter can affect the outcome? An additional person casting a vote can affect the outcome in two circumstances:

- If the vote had resulted in a tie with $X_1 = X_2$. The additional vote can then break the tie in favor of the party they support.

- If the party the additional person supports was 1 vote short of a tie. The additional vote will then lead to a tie.

Now assume that the additional voter supports party 1. (The argument is identical if they support party 2.) The first case arises when $X_1 = X_2$ so the additional vote will break the tie in favor of party 1. The second case occurs if $X_1 = X_2 - 1$, so the additional vote will ensure a tie. The action in the event of a tie is now important. We assume, as is the case in the UK, that a tie is broken by the toss of a fair coin. Then when a tie occurs each party has a50/50 chance of winning the vote.

Putting these points together, the probability of being pivotal can be calculated. If the original vote resulted in a tie, the additional vote will lead to a clear victory. Without the additional vote the tie would have been broken in favor of party 1 just 1/2 of the time so the additional vote leads to a reversal of the outcome with probability 1/2. If the original vote had concluded with party 1 having 1 less vote than party 2, the addition of another vote for party 1 will lead from defeat to a tie. The tie is won party 1 just 1/2 of the time. The probability, P, of being pivotal and affecting the outcome can then be calculated as

$$P = \frac{1}{2} \Pr\left(X_1 = X_2\right) + \frac{1}{2} \Pr\left(X_1 = X_2 - 1\right). \tag{4.1}$$

Figure 4.6: Probabilities of Election Outcomes

To see how result works, take the simple case of $N = 3, \sigma_1 = \frac{1}{3}, \sigma_2 = \frac{2}{3}$ and $p = \frac{1}{2}$. The probabilities of the various outcomes of the election are summarized in Figure 4.6. These are calculated by observing that with 3 voters and 2 alternatives for each voter (vote or not vote), there are 8 possible outcomes. Since 2 of the 3 voters prefer party 2, the probability of party 2 receiving 1 vote is twice that of party 1 receiving 1 vote.

Using these probabilities, the probability of the additional voter affecting the outcome can be calculated as

$$\begin{aligned} P &= \frac{1}{2}\left[\Pr\left(X_1 = X_2 = 0\right) + \Pr\left(X_1 = X_2 = 1\right)\right] \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{2}\left[\Pr\left(X_1 = 0, X_2 = 1\right) + \Pr\left(X_1 = 1, X_2 = 2\right)\right] \\ &= \frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{1}{8} + \frac{2}{8}\right] + \frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{2}{8} + \frac{1}{8}\right] \\ &= \frac{3}{8}. \end{aligned} \tag{4.2}$$

With this probability, the voter will choose to vote in the election if

$$V = \frac{3}{8}B - C > 0. \tag{4.3}$$

In an election with a small number of voters the benefit does not have to be much higher than the cost to make it worthwhile to vote.

The calculation of the probability can be generalized to determine the dependence of P upon the values of N, σ_1, σ_2 and p. This is illustrated in the following two figure. Figure 4.7 displays the probability of being pivotal against the number of potential voters for three values of p given that $\sigma_1 = \sigma_2 = 0.5$. We can interpret the value of p as being the willingness to participate in the election. The figures show clearly how an increase in the number of voters reduces the probability of being pivotal. Although the probability tends to zero as N becomes very large, is still significantly above zero at $N = 100$.

Figure 4.7: Participation and the Probability of being Pivotal

Figure 4.8 confirms the intuition that the probability of being pivotal is highest when the population is evenly divided between the parties. If the population is more in favor of party 2 (the case of $\sigma_1 = 0.25, \sigma_2 = 0.75$) then the probability of the additional voter being pivotal in favor of party 1 falls to 0 very quickly. If the initial population is evenly divided, the probability of a tie remains significant for considerably larger values of N.

The probability of a voter being pivotal can be aprroximated by a reasonably simple formula if the number of potential voters, N, is large and the probability of each one voting, p, is small. Assume that this is so, and that the value of pN tends to the limit of n. The term n is the number of potential voters that actually choose to vote. The probability of being pivotal is then

$$P = \frac{e^{n(2\sqrt{\sigma_1\sigma_2}-\sigma_1-\sigma_2)}}{4\sqrt{\pi n\left(\sigma_1\sigma_2\right)^{1/2}}}\left(\frac{\sqrt{\sigma_1}+\sqrt{\sigma_2}}{\sqrt{\sigma_1}}\right), \tag{4.4}$$

where π is used in its standard mathematical sense. From this equation can be observed three results:

- The probability is a decreasing function of n. This follows from the facts that $2\sqrt{\sigma_1\sigma_2} - \sigma_1 - \sigma_2 \leq 0$, so the power on the exponential is negative, and that n is also in the denominator. Hence as the number of voters participating in the election increases, the probability of being pivotal falls.

- For any given value of σ_1, the probability increases the closer is σ_2 to σ_1. Hence, the probability of being pivotal is increased the more evenly divided is support for the parties.

Figure 4.8: Closeness and the Probability of being Pivotal

- For a given value of n, the probability of being pivotal is at its maximum when $\sigma_1 = \sigma_2 = 1/2$ and the expression for P simplifies to$P = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi n}}$. In this case the effect of increasing n is clear.

The bottom line of this analysis is that the probability that someone's vote will change the outcome is essentially zero when the voting population is large enough and so if voting is costly, the cost-benefit model, should imply almost no participation. The small probability of a large change is not enough to cover the cost of voting. Each person's vote is like a small voice in a very large crowd.

The following table presents the results of an empirical analysis of the participation rate to test the basic implications of the pivotal-voter theory (*i.e.*, that voting should depend on the probability of a tie). It uses a linear regression over aggregate state-by-state data for the 11 US presidential elections (1948-1988) to estimate the empirical correlation between the participation rate and the strategic variables (population size and electoral closeness). The analysis also reveals other main variables relevant for participation. As the table reveals there is strong empirical support for the pivotal-agent argument: smaller population and closer election are correlated with higher participation. It also reveals that black participation is 48 percent lower, that new residents are 1.2 percent less likely to vote, and that rain on the election day decreases participation by 3.4 percent.

Variable	Coefficients(*)	Standard Error
Constant	0.4033	0.0256
Closeness	0.1656	0.0527
Voting population	-0.0161	0.0036
Blacks(%)	-0.4829	0.0357
Rain on election day	-0.0349	0.0129
New residents (%)	-0.0127	0.0027

(*) all coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level.
(Source: Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999, Table 6)
Table 4.10: Testing the Paradox of Voting

The paradox of voting raises serious questions about why so many people do actually vote. Potential explanations for voting could include mistaken beliefs about the chance of affecting the outcome or feelings of social obligation. After all, every democratic society encourages its citizens to take civic responsibilities seriously and to participate actively in public decisions. Even if the act of voting is unlikely to promote self-interest, citizens feel they have a duty to vote. And this is exactly the important point made by the cost-benefit model of voting. Economists are also suspicious about trying to explain voting only by the civic responsibility argument. This is because the duty model cannot explain what the cost-benefit model can; namely that many people do not vote and that turnout is higher when the election is expected to be close.

4.7 The "Alabama" Paradox

The Alabama paradox is associated with the apportionment problem. Many democratic societies require representatives to the parliament to be apportioned among the several states or regions according to their respective population shares. Similar proportional representation apportionment rule arises in the European Union context when representation in European institutions is based on the population shares of member states. At the political parties level, there is also the proportional representation assignment of seats to different parties based on their respective vote shares. For instance, with the "list system" in Belgium, voters vote for the list of candidates provided by each party. Then, the number of candidates selected from each list is determined by the share of vote a party receives. the selection being made according to the ordering of the candidates on a list from top to the bottom.

In all these forms of apportionment, the solutions may involve fractions whereas the number of representatives has to be an integer. How can these fractions be handled? With only two parties, rounding off will do the job. But rounding off loses simplicity once there are more than two parties and it can produce an unexpected shift in power. To illustrate, suppose 25 seats are to be allocated among three political parties (or states) based on their voting (population) shares as given in the table below. The exact apportionment for a party is obtained by allocating the 25 seats in proportion of the vote shares. However such scheme requires that the three parties should share one seat together (hardly feasible!). The obvious solution is to allocate the contested seat to the party with the largest fractions. This solution seems reasonable and has indeed been proposed by the American statesman Alexander Hamilton (despite the strong opposition of Thomas Jefferson). It was then used for a long period of time in the US. Applying this solution to our problem gives the contested seat to the small Center party.

Party	Vote Share	Exact Apportionment	Hamilton Apportionment
Left	0.45	11.25	11
Right	0.41	10.25	10
Center	0.14	3.5	4
Total	1	25	25

Table 4.11: The Apportionment of Seats

Now what is the problem? Recall the runoff voting problem that more support for a candidate can make this candidate lose the election. A similar paradox arises with the Hamilton's apportionment scheme: increasing the number of seats available can remove seats from some parties. And it did happen in practice: when the size of the US house of Representatives grew, some states did lose representation. The first to lose seats was Alabama (hence, the name Alabama paradox). To see this paradox with our simple example, suppose one extra seat has to be allocated bringing the total number of seats to 26. Recalculating the Hamilton apportionment accordingly, it follows that the small party loses out by one seat which implies a 25 percent loss of its representation. The large parties have benefited from this expansion in the number of seats. It is unfair that one party loses one seat when more seats become available. The explanation for this paradox is that larger parties have their fractional part quickly jumping to the top of the list when extra seat becomes available.

Party	Vote Share	Exact Apportionment	Hamilton Apportionment
Left	0.45	11.7	12 (+1seat)
Right	0.41	10.66	11 (+1 seat)
Center	0.14	3.64	1 (-1 seat)
Total	1	26	26

Table 4.12: The Paradox

4.8 Conclusions

Voting is one of the most common methods used to make collective decisions. Despite its practical popularity, it is not without its shortcomings. The theory of voting that we have described carefully catalogues the strengths and weaknesses of voting procedures. The major result is that there is no perfect voting system. Although there are many alternative systems of voting none can always deliver in every circumstance. Voting is important, but we should never forget its limitations.

Further Reading

Some of the fundamental work on collective choice can be found in:

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Brams, S.J. and Fishburn, P.C. (1978) "Approval voting", *American Political Science Review,* **72**, 831 - 847.

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May, K. (1952) "A set of independent, necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision", *Econometrica,* **20**, 680 - 684.

McKelvey, R.D. (1976) "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control", *Journal of Economic Theory,* **12**, 472 - 482.

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Myerson, R.B. (2000) "Large Poisson games", *Journal of Economic Theory,* **94**, 7 - 45.

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Chapter 5

Rent-Seeking

5.1 Introduction

The United States National Lobbyist Directory records there to be over 40,000 state registered lobbyists and a further 4,000 federal government lobbyists registered in Washington. Some estimates put the total number, including those who are on other registers or are unregistered, as high as 100,000. Although the number of lobbyists in the United States dwarfs those elsewhere, there are large numbers of lobbyists in all major capitals.

These lobbyists are not engaged directly in production. Instead, their role is to seek favorable government treatment for the organizations that employ them. Viewed from the United States perspective, the economy has at least 40,000 (presumably skilled) individuals who are contributing no net value to the economy but are merely attempting to influence government policy and shift the direction of income flow.

The behavior that the lobbyists are engaged in has been given the name of *rent-seeking* in the economic literature. Precisely what constitutes rent-seeking is discussed in Section 5.2, but for the purpose of this introduction it is sufficient to distinguish it from profit-seeking which is activity that is economically useful and creates additional income. What troubles economists about rent-seeking is that it uses valuable resources unproductively and can push the government into inefficient decisions. This places the economy within its production possibility frontier and implies that efficiency-improvements will be possible. As such, rent-seeking can be viewed as a potential cause of economic inefficiency.

The chapter will first consider the nature and definition of rent-seeking. It will then proceed onto the analysis of a simple game which demonstrates the essence of rent-seeking. This game will generate the fundamental results on the consequences of rent-seeking and forms a basis on which the later analysis is developed. The insights generated from the game are then applied to rent-seeking in the context of monopoly. The basic point made there is that the standard measure of monopoly welfare loss understates the true loss to society if rent-seeking behavior is present. This partial equilibrium analysis of monopoly is then extended to a general equilibrium setting. The emphasis is then placed on how and why rents are created. Government policy is analyzed and the relationship between lobbying and economic welfare is characterized in detail. The motives for a government to allow itself to be swayed by lobbyists are then detailed. Finally, possible policies for containing rent-seeking are considered.

5.2 Definitions

Rent seeking has received a number of different definitions in the literature. These differ only in detail, particularly in whether the resources used in rent-seeking are directly wasted and in whether the term can be applied only to rents created by government. It is not the purpose here to catalogue these definitions but instead to motivate the concept of rent-seeking by example and to draw out the common strands of the definitions.

The ideas that lie behind rent-seeking can be seen by considering the following two situations:

- A firm is engaged in research intended to develop a new product. If the research is successful, the product will be unique and the firm will have a monopoly position, and extract some rent from this, until rival products are introduced.

- A firm has introduced a new product to the home market. A similar product is produced overseas. The firm hires lawyers to lobby the government to prevent imports of the overseas product. If it is successful, it will enjoy a monopoly position from which it will earn rents.

What is the difference between these two situations? Both will give the firm a monopoly position, at least in the short run, from which it can earn monopoly rents. The first, though, would be seen by many economists as something to be praised but the second as something to be condemned. In fact, the fundamental difference is that the first case, with the firm expending resources to develop a new product, will lead to monopoly rent only if the product is successful and valued by consumers. Hence, the resources used in research may ultimately lead to an increase in economic welfare. In contrast, the resources used in the second case are reducing economic welfare. If the lawyers are successful, consumers will be denied a choice between products and the lack of competition will mean that they face higher prices. Their welfare is reduced and some of their income, via the higher prices, is diverted to the monopolist. There is also (implicitly) a transfer from the overseas producers to the monopolist. Some of the monopoly rents are transferred to the lawyers via their fees (we will clarify how much in Section 5.3). In short, although the research and the lawyers are both directed to attaining a monopoly position, in the first case research increases economic welfare but in the second the lawyers reduce it.

These comments now allow us to distinguish between two concepts:

- Profit-seeking is the expenditure of resources to create a profitable position that is ultimately beneficial to society. Profit seeking, as exemplified by the example of research, is what drives progress in the economy and is the motivating force behind competition.

- Rent-seeking is the expenditure of resources to create a profitable opportunity that is ultimately damaging to society. Rent-seeking, as exemplified by the use of lawyers, hinders the economy and limits competition.

There are some other points that can be drawn out of these definitions. Notice that the scientists and engineers employed in research are being productive. If their work is successful, then new products will emerge that raise the economy's output. On the other hand, the lawyers engaged in lobbying the government are doing nothing productive. Their activity does not raise output. At best it simply redistributes what there already is, and generally it reduces it. Furthermore, output would be higher if they were usefully employed in a productive capacity rather than working as lawyers. In this respect, rent-seeking always reduces total output since the resources engaged in rent-seeking can be expected to have alternative productive uses.

It can be seen from this discussion that rent-seeking can take many forms. All lobbying of government for beneficial treatment, be it protection from competition or the payment of subsidies, is rent-seeking. Expenditure on advertising or the protection of property rights is rent-seeking. And so is arguing for tariffs to protect infant industries. These activities are rife in most economies, so rent-seeking is a widespread and important issue.

One of the factors that will feature strongly in the discussion below is the level of resources wasted in the lobbying process. At first sight, there appears to be a clear distinction between the time a lobbyist uses talking to a politician and a bribe passed to a politician. The time is simply lost to the economy - it could have been used in some productive capacity but has not. This is a resource wasted. In contrast, the bribe is just a transfers of resources. Beyond the minimal costs needed to deliver the bribe, there appear to be no other resource costs. Hence it is tempting to conclude that lobbying time has a resource cost whereas bribes do not. Thus if rent-seeking is undertaken entirely by bribes it appears to have no resource cost.

Before reaching this conclusion, it is necessary to take a further step back. Consider the position of the politician receiving the bribe. How did they achieve their position of authority? Clearly, resources would have been expended to obtain election. If potential politicians believed they would receive bribes once elected, they would be willing to expend more resources to become a politician - they are in fact rent-seeking themselves. Much of the resources used in seeking election will simply be a cost to the economy with no net output resulting from them. Through this process a bribe which is just a transfer actually becomes transformed further down the line into a resource loss caused by rent-seeking. These arguments suggest that caution is required in judging between lobby costs which seem to be transfers and those which are clearly resource costs.

So far the discussion has concentrated upon rent-seeking. The economic literature has also dealt with the very closely related concept of *directly unproductive activities*. The distinction between the two is not always that clear and many economists use them interchangeably. If there is a precise distinction, it is in the fact that directly unproductive activities are by definition a waste of resources whereas the activity of rent-seeking may not always involves activities which waste resources. The focus below will be placed on rent-seeking though almost all of what is said could be rephrased in terms of directly unproductive activities.

5.3 Rent-Seeking Games

This section considers several variants of a simple game that is designed to capture the essential aspects of rent-seeking. From the analysis emerge several important conclusions which will form the basis of more directly economic applications in the following sections. The game may appear at first sight to be extreme but on reflection its interpretation in terms of rent-seeking will become clear.

The basic structure of the game is as follows. Consider the offer of a prize of $10,000. Competitors enter the game by simultaneously placing a sum of money on a table and setting it alight. The prize is awarded to the competitor that burns the most money. Assuming that the competitors are all identical and risk-neutral, how much money will each one burn? This question will be answered when there is either a fixed number of competitors or the number of competitors is endogenously determined through free-entry into the competition.

Before conducting the analysis, it is worth detailing how this game relates to rent-seeking. The prize to be won is the rent - think of this as the profit that will accrue if awarded a monopoly in the supply of a product. The money that is burnt represents the resources used in lobbying for the award of the monopoly. Instead of burning money, it could be fees paid to a lobby company for the provision of their services. The game can then be seen as representing a number of companies each wishing to be granted the monopoly and employing lobbyists to make their case. We consider two different games. In the deterministic game, the prize is awarded to the firm that spends most on lobbying. In the probabilistic game, the chance of obtaining the prize is an increasing function of one's share in the total spending on lobbying so that spending the most does not necessarily secure a win.

5.3.1 Deterministic game

A game of this form is solved by constructing its equilibrium. In this case we look for the *Nash equilibrium* which occurs when each competitor's action is optimal given the actions of all other competitors. Consequently, at a Nash equilibrium no variation in one competitor's choice can be beneficial for that competitor. It is this latter property that allows potential equilibria to be tested.

Assume initially that there are 2 competitors for the prize. To apply the Nash equilibrium argument, the method is to fix the strategy choice of one competitor and to consider what the remaining competitor will do. Strategies for the game can be of two types. There are *pure strategies* which involve the choice of a single quantity of money to burn. There are also *mixed strategies* in which the competitor uses a randomizing device to select their optimal strategy. For instance, labelling six possible strategies from 1 to 6 and then using the roll of a dice to choose which one to play is a mixed strategy. The central component of finding a mixed strategy equilibrium is to determine the probabilities assigned to each pure strategy. The argument will first show that there can be no pure strategy equilibrium for the game. The mixed strategy equilibrium will then be constructed.

To show that there can be no pure strategy equilibrium, let one competitor burn an amount B^*. Then if the remaining competitor burns $B^* + \epsilon$ they will win the contest and receive the prize of value V. This argument applies for any values of $B^* < V$ and any positive value of ϵ no matter how small. Since they have lost the contest, burning B^* cannot be an equilibrium choice for the other competitor: they would wish to burn slightly more than $B^* + \epsilon$. From this reasoning, no amount of burning less than V can be an equilibrium. The only way the other competitor can prevent this "leapfrogging“ argument is by burning exactly V. The second competitor must then also burn V.

However, burning V each is still not an equilibrium. If both competitors burn V then each has an equal chance of winning. This chance of winning is $\frac{1}{2}$, so their expected payoff, EP, is equal to the expected value of the prize minus the money burnt

$$EP = \frac{1}{2}V - V = -\frac{1}{2}V < 0. \tag{5.1}$$

Clearly, given that the other burns V, a competitor would be better off to burn 0 and make an expected payoff of 0 rather than burn V and make an expected loss of $-V/2$. So, the strategies of both burning V are not an equilibrium. The conclusion of this reasoning is that the game has no equilibrium in pure strategies. Therefore to find an equilibrium it becomes necessary to look for one in mixed strategies.

The calculation of the mixed strategy for the game is easily motivated. It is first noted that each player can obtain a payoff of at least 0 by burning nothing. Therefore, the equilibrium strategy must yield a payoff of at least 0. No player can ever burn a negative amount of money nor is there any point in burning more than V. Hence the strategy must assign positive probability only to amounts in the range 0 to V.

It turns out that the equilibrium strategy is to assign the same probability to all amounts in the range 0 to V. This probability, denoted $f(B)$, must then be given by $f(B) = \frac{1}{V}$. Given that the other competition plays this mixed strategy, the probability of winning when burning an amount B is the probability that the other competitor burns less than B. This can be calculated as $F(B) = \frac{B}{V}$.

Burning B then gives an expected payoff of

$$EP = \left(\frac{B}{V}\right) V - B = 0. \tag{5.2}$$

Therefore, whatever amount the random device suggests should be played, the expected payoff from that choice will be zero. In total, the mixed strategies used in this equilibrium give both players an expected payoff of zero.

In the context of rent-seeking, the important quantity is the total sum of money burnt since this can be interpreted as the value wasted. The mixed strategy makes each value between 0 and V equally likely so the expected burning for each player is $V/2$. Adding these together, the total amount burnt is V - which is exactly equal to the value of the prize. This conclusions forms the basis of the important result that the effort put into rent-seeking will be exactly equal to the rent to be won.

The argument can now be extended to any number of players. With three players, the strategy of giving the same probability to each value between 0 and V is not the equilibrium. To see this, observe that with this mixed strategy the average amount burnt remains at $V/2$ but the probability of winning now that there are three players is reduced to $\frac{1}{3}$. The expected payoff is therefore

$$EP = (\frac{1}{3})V - \frac{V}{2} = -\frac{V}{6}, \tag{5.3}$$

so an expected loss is made. This strategy gives too much weight to higher levels of burning now that there are three players. Consequently, the optimal strategy must give less weight to higher values of burning so that the level of expected burning must match the expected winnings.

The probability distribution for the mixed strategy equilibrium when the are n players can be found as follows. Let the probability of beating one of the other competitors when B is burnt be $F(B)$. There are $n-1$ other competitors, so the probability of beating them all is $F(B)^{n-1}$. The expected payoff in equilibrium must be zero, so $F(B)^{n-1}V = B$ for any value of B between 0 and V. Solving this equation for $F(B)$ gives the equilibrium probability distribution as

$$F(B) = \left(\frac{B}{V}\right)^{\frac{1}{n-1}}. \tag{5.4}$$

This distribution has the property that the probability applied to higher levels of B falls relative to that on lower levels as n increases. It can also be seen that when $n = 2$ it gives the solution found earlier.

What is important for the issue of rent-seeking is the expected amount burnt by each competitor. Given that the expected payoff in equilibrium is zero and that everyone is equally likely to win V with probability $\frac{1}{n}$, the expected amount burnt by each competitor is

$$EB = \frac{V}{n}. \tag{5.5}$$

Using this result, the expected amount burnt by all the competitors is $nEB = V$, which again is exactly equal to the prize being competed for. This finding is summarized as a theorem.

Theorem 5 *(Complete Dissipation Theorem) If there are two or more competitors in a deterministic rent-seeking game, the total expected value of resources expended by the competitors in seeking a prize of V is exactly V.*

The interpretation of this is that between them the set of competitors will burn (in expected terms) a sum of money exactly equal to the value of the prize. The theorem is just a restatement of the fact that the expected payoff from the game is zero.

This theorem has been very influential in the analysis of rent-seeking. Originally demonstrated in the context of monopoly (we will look at its application in this context later), the theorem provides the conclusion that from a social perspective there is nothing gained from the existence of the prize. Instead, all the possible benefits of the prize are wasted through the burning of money. In the circumstances in which it is applicable, the finding of complete dissipation provides an exact answer to the question of how many resources are expended in rent-seeking.

It is important to note before proceeding that the theorem holds whatever the value of n (provided it is at least 2). Early analyses of rent-seeking concluded that rents would be completely dissipated if there were large numbers of competitors for the rent. This conclusion was founded on standard arguments that competition between many would drive the return down to zero. Prior to the proof of the complete dissipation theorem it had been suspected that this would not be the case with only a small number of competitors and that some rent would be undissipated. However, the theorem proves that this reasoning is false and that even with only two competitors attempting to win the prize, rents are completely dissipated.

5.3.2 Probabilistic game

The key feature of the complete dissipation theorem is that it takes only a slight advantage over your competitors to obtain a sure win. This is the situation when the rent-seeking contest takes the form of a race or an auction with maximal competition. However in many cases there is inevitable uncertainty in rent seeking so that higher effort increases the probability of obtaining the prize but does not ensure a win. A natural application is political lobbying where lobbying expenditures involves real resources that seek to influence public decision. Even if a lobby can increase its chance of success by spending more, it cannot obtain a sure win by simply spending more that its competitors. We now show that such uncertainty will reduce the equilibrium rent-seeking efforts, preventing full dissipation of the rent.

Consider the payoff function modified to let the probability of anyone obtaining the prize be equal to her share of the total rent-seeking expenditures of all contestants

$$EP_i = \left(\frac{B_i}{B_i + (n-1)B_{-i}}\right) V - B_i, \tag{5.6}$$

where $(n-1)B_{-i}$ is the total effort of the other contestants. So the expected payoff of contestant i is the probability of obtaining the prize, which is his spending as a proportion of the total amount spent in the competition, times the value of the rent, V, minus his own spending.

A Nash equilibrium in this game is an expenditure level for each contestant such that nobody would want to alter their expenditure given that of the other contestants. Because all contestants are identical, we should expect a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which rent-seeking activities are the same for all and everyone is equally likely to win the prize. To find this Nash equilibrium we proceed in two steps. First we derive the optimal response of contestant i as a function of the total efforts of the other contestants. Second we use the symmetry property to obtain the Nash equilibrium.

To find player i's best response when the others are choosing B_{-i}, we must take the derivative of player i's expected payoff and set it equal to zero (this is the first-order condition). To facilitate the derivative, let express the probability of winning as a power function in the expected payoff,

$$EP_i = B_i \left[B_i + (n-1)B_{-i}\right]^{-1} V - B_i. \tag{5.7}$$

Using the product rule for the derivative of a power function (derivative of the first function times the second, plus the first function times the derivative of the second), the first order condition is given by

$$\left[B_i + (n-1)B_{-i}\right]^{-1} V - B_i \left[B_i + (n-1)B_{-i}\right]^{-2} V - 1 = 0. \tag{5.8}$$

Next we use the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium $B_i = B_{-i} = B$. Making this substitution in the first-order condition, gives

$$\left[B + (n-1)B\right]^{-1} V - B \left[B + (n-1)B\right]^{-2} V - 1 = 0, \tag{5.9}$$

or

$$(nB)^{-1} V - B\,(nB)^{-2} V = 1. \tag{5.10}$$

Finally multiplying both sides by $n^2 B$ we obtain

$$nV - V = n^2 B. \tag{5.11}$$

Hence the equilibrium level of rent-seeking expenditure is

$$B = \frac{(n-1)}{n^2} V, \tag{5.12}$$

and the total expenditure of all contestants in equilibrium is

$$nB = \frac{(n-1)}{n} V. \tag{5.13}$$

Thus the fraction of the rent that is dissipated is $(n-1)/n < 1$, which is an increasing function of the number of contestants. With two contestants only one half of the rent is dissipated in a Nash equilibrium, and the fraction increases to 1 as the number of contestants gets large. In equilibrium each contender is equally likely to obtain the prize (with probability $1/n$) and using the equilibrium value of B, their expected payoff is $EP = \left(\frac{1}{n}\right) V - B = V/n$.

Theorem 6 *(Partial Dissipation Theorem) If there are two or more competitors in a probabilistic rent-seeking game, the total expected value of resources expended by the competitors in seeking a prize of V is a fraction $(n-1)/n$ of the prize value V, and is increasing with the number of competitors.*

It follows that the total costs of rent seeking activity are significant, and are greater than one half of the rent value in all cases. Notice that the rate of rent dissipation is independent of the value of the rent. It is also worth mentioning that in the Nash equilibrium, contestants play a pure strategy and do not randomize as in the previous deterministic rent seeking game. This is because the probability of obtaining the rent is a *continuous* function of the person's own rent-seeking activity. Finally, in equilibrium, no single person would spend more on rent seeking than the prize is worth, but with a large number of contenders, there is the disturbing possibility that the total expenditure on rent seeking activities may dissipate a substantial fraction of the prize value. This destruction of value is often innocuous because the contestants participate willingly expecting to gain. However as in any competition where *the winner takes all* there is only one winner who may earn large profits, but many losers who bear the full cost of the destruction of value.

5.3.3 Free-Entry

Beginning with a fixed number of competitors does not capture the idea of a potential pool of competitors who may opt to enter the competition if there is a rent to be obtained. It is therefore of interest to consider what the equilibrium will be if there is free-entry into the competition. In the context of the game, free-entry means that competitors enter to bid for the prize until there is no expected benefit from further entry. This has the immediate implication that the expected payoff has to be driven to zero in any free-entry equilibrium.

How can the game be solved with free-entry? The analysis of the deterministic game showed that the expected payoff of each competitor is zero in the mixed strategy equilibrium. From this it follows that once at least two players have entered the competition, the expected payoff is zero. The free-entry equilibrium concept is therefore compatible with any number of competitors greater that or equal to two, and all competitors who enter play the mixed strategy.

There is an important distinction between this equilibrium and the one considered for fixed numbers. In the former case it was assumed (but without being explicitly stated) that all competitors played the same strategy and only such symmetric equilibria were considered. If this is applied to the free-entry case, it means that all the unlimited set of potential competitors must enter the game and play the mixed strategy given by (5.4) as $n \to \infty$. An alternative to this cumbersome equilibrium is to consider an asymmetric equilibrium in which different competitors play different strategies. An asymmetric equilibrium of the game is for some competitors to choose not to enter while some (at least 2) enter and play the mixed strategy in (5.4). All competitors (both those who enter and those who do not) have an expected payoff of 0.

The other important feature of the both the symmetric and asymmetric free-entry equilibria is that there is again complete dissipation of the rent. This finding is less surprising in this case than it is with no entry, since the entry could be expected to reduce the net social value of the competition to zero.

In the probabilistic game, contestants get a positive expected payoff from their rent-seeking activities of $\frac{V}{n}$. Such a gain from rent seeking will attract new contestants until the rent value is fully dissipated, that is $n \to \infty$ and $\frac{V}{n} \to 0$. So free entry will make the two games equivalent with full dissipation of the rent.

5.3.4 Risk Aversion

The analysis so far has relied on the assumption that competitors for the prize care only about the expected amount of money with which they will leave the contest. This is a consequence of the assumption that they are risk neutral and hence indifferent about accepting a fair gamble. Although risk neutrality may be appropriate in some circumstances, such as for governments and large firms that can diversify risk, it is not usually felt to correctly describe the behavior of individual consumers. It is therefore worth reflecting on how the results are modified by the incorporation of risk aversion.

The first effect of risk aversion is that the expected monetary gain from entering the contest must be positive in order for a competitor to take part - this is the compensation required to induce the risk-averse competitors to take on risk. In terms of the deterministic game with mixed strategy equilibrium, for a given number of competitors this means that less probability must be given to high levels of money burning and more to lower levels. However, the expected utility gain of the contest will be zero, since competition will bid away any excess utility.

In contrast to the outcome with risk neutrality there will not be complete dissipation of the rent. This is a consequence of the expected monetary gain being positive which implies that something must be left to be captured. With risk aversion, the resources expended on rent-seeking will be strictly less than the value of the rent. But note carefully that this does not say that society has benefited. Since the expected utility gain of each competitor is zero, the availability of the rent still does not raise society's welfare.

The same reasoning applies for the probabilistic game with more risk averse individuals tending to expend less on rent seeking activities. As a result a lower fraction of the rent will be dissipated. The effect of free entry will be to drive the expected utility of each contender to zero.

5.3.5 Conclusions

This section has analyzed a simple game that can be interpreted as representing the most basic of rent-seeking situations. The burning of money captures the use of resources in lobbying and the fact that these resources are not being productive. The fundamental conclusion is that when competitors are risk neutral, competition leads to the complete or at least significant dissipation of the rent. This applies no matter how many competitors there are (provided there are at least two) and whether or not the number of competitors is fixed or variable. This fundamental conclusion of the rent-seeking literature shows that the existence of a rent does not benefit society since a significant amount of resources (possibly equal in value to that rent) will be exhausted in capturing it. This conclusion has to be slightly modified with risk aversion. In this case there is less expenditures on rent seeking and thus less rent dissipation. However the expected utility gain of the competition is zero. In welfare terms, society does not benefit from the rent.

5.4 Social Cost of Monopoly

Monopoly is one of the causes of economic inefficiency. A monopolist restricts output below the competitive level in order to raise price and earn monopoly profits. This causes some consumer surplus to be turned into profit and some to become deadweight loss. Standard economic analysis views this deadweight loss to be the cost of monopoly power. The application of rent-seeking concepts suggests that the cost may actually be much greater.

Consider Figure 5.1. This depicts a monopoly producing with constant marginal cost c and no fixed costs. Its average revenue is denoted AR and marginal revenue MR. The monopoly price and output are p^m and y^m respectively while the competitive output would be y^c. Monopoly profit is the rectangle π and deadweight loss the triangle d. In a static situation the deadweight loss d is the standard measure of the cost of monopoly. (The emphasis on "static" is necessary here because there may be dynamic gains through innovation from the monopoly that offset the deadweight loss.)

How can the introduction of rent-seeking change this view of the cost of monopoly? There are two scenarios in which it can do so. Firstly, the monopoly position may have been created by the government. An example would be the government deciding that an airline route can be served only by a single carrier. If airlines must then compete in lobbying for the right to fly this route the situation is just like the money-burning competition of Section 5.3. The rent-seeking here comes from the bidders for the monopoly position. Another example is the allocation in the late 1980's by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission of regional cell phone licenses. The lure of extremely high potential profits was strong enough to attract many contenders. There were about 320,000 contestants competing for 643 licenses. Hazlett and Michaels (1993) estimated the total cost of all applications (due to the technical expertise required) to

Figure 5.1: Monopoly Deadweight Loss

be about \$400,000. Each winner earned very large profits well in excess of their application costs, but the costs incurred by others were lost, and the total cost of the allocation of licenses was estimated to be about forty percent of the market value of the license.

Secondly, the monopoly may be already in existence but having to defend itself from potential competitors. Such defence could involve lawyers or an effective lobbying presence attempting to prevent the production of similar products using copyright or patent law or it could mean advertising to stifle competition. Or it could even mean direct action to intimidate potential competitors.

Whichever case applies, the implications are the same. The value of having the monopoly position is given by the area π. If there are a number of potential monopolists bidding for the monopoly, then the analysis of money-burning can be applied to show that, if they are risk neutral, the entire value will be dissipated in lobbying. Alternatively, if an incumbent monopolist is defending their position, they will expend resources up to value π to do so. In both cases the costs of rent-seeking will be π.

Combining these rent-seeking costs with the standard deadweight loss of monopoly, the conclusion of the analysis is that the total cost of the monopoly to society is at least d and may be as high as $\pi + d$. What determines the total cost is the nature of the rent-seeking activity. We can conclude that resources of value π will be expended but not how much is actually waste. As the discussion of Section 5.2 noted, some of the costs may just be transfer payments (or, more simply, bribes) to officials. These are not directly social costs but, again referring to Section 5.2, may become so if they induce rent-seeking in obtaining official positions. In contrast, if all the rent-seeking costs are expended on unproductive activities, such as time spent lobbying, then the total social cost of the monopoly is exactly $\pi + d$.

These results demonstrate one of the most basic insights of the rent-seeking literature: the social costs of monopoly may be very much greater than measurement through deadweight loss would suggest. To see the extent of the difference that this can make, consider the following two estimates of the social cost of monopoly. In 1954 Harberger, using just the deadweight loss d, calculated the cost of monopolization in United States manufacturing industry for the period 1924 to 1928 as equal to 0.08% of national income. In contrast the 1978 calculations by Cowling and Mueller followed the rent-seeking approach and included the cost of advertising in the measure of welfare loss. Their analysis of the United States concluded that welfare loss was between 4% and 13% of Gross Corporate Product. Further discussion of the measurement of welfare loss is given in Chapter 11.

This discussion of monopoly has shown that rent-seeking does have important implications. In particular, it strongly alters our assessment of the social costs of monopoly - the standard deadweight loss measure seriously understates the true loss. This conclusion does not apply just to monopoly. Rent-seeking has the same effect when applied to any distortionary government policy. This includes regulation, tariffs, taxes and spending. It also shows that the net costs of a distortionary policy may be much higher than an analysis of benevolent government suggests. Attempts at quantifying the size of these effects show that they can be very dramatic.

5.5 Equilibrium Effects

The discussion of monopoly welfare loss in the previous section is an example of partial equilibrium analysis. It considered the monopolist in isolation and did not consider any potential spillovers into related markets nor the consequences of rent-seeking for the economy as a whole. This section will go some way towards remedying these omissions. The analysis here will be graphical; an algebraic development of similar arguments will be given is Section 5.6.1.

Consider an economy that produces two goods and has a fixed supply of labor. The production possibility frontier depicting the possible combinations of output of the two goods is denoted by $G(y_1, y_2) = 0$ in Figure 5.2. The competitive equilibrium prices ratio $p^c = \frac{p_1}{p_2}$ determines the gradient of the line tangent to $G(y_1, y_2) = 0$ at point a. This will be the equilibrium for the economy in the absence of lobbying.

The lobbying that we consider is for the monopolization of industry 1. If this is successful it will have two effects. The first effect will be to change the relative prices in the economy. The second will be to use some labor in the lobbying process which could usefully be used elsewhere. The consequences of these effects will now be traced on the production possibility diagram.

Let the monopoly price for good 1 be given by p_1^m and the monopoly price ratio by $p^m = \frac{p_1^m}{p_2}$. Since $p^m > p^c$ the monopoly price line will be steeper than



Figure 5.2: Competitive and Monopoly Equilibria

the competitive price line. The price effect alone move the economy from point a to point b around the initial production possibility frontier - see Figure 5.2. Evaluated at the competitive prices, the value of output can be seen to have reduced.

The effect of introducing lobbying can be seen by realizing that the labor of lobbyists does not produce either good 1 or good 2 but is effectively lost to the economy. With labor used in lobbying the potential output of the economy must fall. Hence, the production possibility frontier with lobbying must lie inside that without lobbying. This is shown in Figure 5.3 where the production possibility frontier with lobbying is denoted $G^L(y_1, y_2) = 0$. When faced with the monopoly price line the equilibrium with monopoly and lobbying will be at point c in Figure 5.3.

The outcome in Figure 5.3 is what might have been expected. The move to monopoly pricing shifts the equilibrium around the frontier and lobbying shifts the frontier inward. The value at competitive prices of output at a is higher than at b, and value at b is higher than at c. Hence the lobbying has resulted in a diminution of the value of output. At the aggregate level, this is damaging for the economy. At the micro-level there will be income transfers towards the owners of the monopoly and the lobbyists, and away from the consumers so the outcome is not necessarily bad for all individuals.

In contrast, Figure **??** displays a surprising outcome. In this case the value of output at c is actually higher than it is at b when evaluated at the competitive prices. The cause of this is the way in which the labor used in lobbying has affected the shape of the production possibility frontier. When this happens, the value of output at competitive prices is higher with monopoly and lobbying than it is with just monopoly. This could be construed to be a positive argument in favour of lobbying, but before it could be taken as such the conditions under

Figure 5.3: Monopoly and Lobbying

which it could arise would require very careful elaboration.

The final comparison that can be made is between the equilibrium with unsuccessful lobbying where the resources costs are spent but the prices remain at the competitive level (point d in Figure 5.5) and monopoly with no lobbying (point b). As Figures 5.5a and 5.5b show, either of these could have the highest value at competitive prices. From this it can be concluded that there may be situations (as shown in 5.5b) when it may be better to concede to the threat of lobbying and allow the monopoly (without the lobbying taking place) rather than refuse to concede to the lobby.

This section has extended the partial equilibrium analysis of lobbying to illustrate the combined effects of the distortions generated by successful lobbying and the waste of the resources used in the lobbying process. While some of the results are unsurprising, particularly the finding that lobbying reduces the total value of the economy's output, the comparisons between different equilibria are not always as expected. In fact, it would rarely be suspected that equilibrium with monopoly could lead to a lower value of output than equilibrium with monopoly and lobbying. But once again, this is a reflection of the fact that when multiple distortions are added to an economy the outcome is not necessarily clear cut.

5.6 Government Policy

Rent-seeking may be important for the study of private-sector monopoly, but most proponents of rent-seeking would see its application to government as being far more significant. Much analysis of policy choice sees the government as benevolent and trying to make the best choices it can. The rent-seeking

Figure 5.4: Lobbying Raises Value of Output

Figure 5.5: The Threat of Lobbying

model of government is very different. This takes the view of the government as a creator of rents and those involved in government as seeking rent wherever possible. Chapter 3 touched upon some of these issues in the discussion of bureaucracy, but that discussion can be extended much further.

There are two channels through which the government is connected with rent-seeking. These are:

- *Lobbying* The introduction noted that the United States may have up to 100,000 professional lobbyists. These lobbyists attempt to change government policy in favour of the interests that employ them. If the lobbyists are successful, rents are created.

- *Politicians and bureaucrats* Politicians and bureaucrats in government are able to create rents through their policy choices. These rents can be "sold" to the parties that benefit. Selling rents generates income for the seller and gives an incentive for careers to be made in politics and bureaucracy.

These two channels of rent-seeking are now discussed in turn.

5.6.1 Lobbying

The discussion so far has frequently referred to lobbying but without going into great detail about its economic effects. Section 5.4 showed graphically how the use of labor in lobbying shifted the production possibility frontier inward but a graphical analysis of that kind could not provide an insight into the size of the effects. The purpose now is to analyze an example that can quantify the potential size of the economic loss resulting from the use of labor in lobbying.

Many of the implications of lobbying can be found by analyzing the use of productive labor to lobby for a tariff. The effect of a tariff is to make imports more expensive, so allowing the home firm to charge a higher price and earn greater profits. The potentially higher profit gives an incentive for lobbying. For example, the owners of textile firms will benefit from a lobby-induced tariff on imported clothing. Also, the U.S. steel industry is a well organized group and has long been active in encouraging tariffs on competing imports. The resources used for lobbying have a social value (equal to their productivity elsewhere in the economy) so the lobbying is not without cost. The calculations below will reveal the extent of this cost.

Consider a small economy in which two consumption goods are produced. In the absence of tariffs, the world prices of these commodities are both equal to 1 and the assumption that the economy is small means that it treats these prices as fixed. Some output is consumed and some is exported. A quantity, $\bar{\ell}$, of labor is supplied inelastically by consumers. This is divided between production of the two goods and lobbying. Good 2 is produced with constant returns to scale and one unit of labor produces one unit of output. This implies that the wage rate, w, must equal 1 (if it were higher the firms would make a loss producing good 2, if it were lower their profit would be unlimited since the price is fixed at the world level).

The cost function for the firm producing good 1 is assumed to be

$$C\left(y_1; w\right) = \frac{1}{2} w y_1^2 = \frac{1}{2} y_1^2, \tag{5.14}$$

where y_1 is output. With a tariff τ , which may be zero, the price of good 1 on the domestic market becomes $1+\tau$. Assuming that all of the output of the firm is sold on the domestic market, the profit level of the firm is

$$\pi_1\left(\tau\right) = y_1\left(1+\tau\right) - \frac{1}{2} y_1^2. \tag{5.15}$$

Profit is maximized at output level

$$y_1 = 1 + \tau. \tag{5.16}$$

The resulting level of profit is given by

$$\pi_1\left(\tau\right) = \frac{1}{2}\left[1+\tau\right]^2, \tag{5.17}$$

and labor demand from the firm is

$$\ell_1 = \frac{1}{2}\left[1+\tau\right]^2. \tag{5.18}$$

Equilibrium on the labor market requires that labor supply must equal the use of labor in the production of good 1, ℓ_1 , plus that used in the production of good 2, ℓ_2, plus that used for lobbying, ℓ_L. Hence

$$\bar{\ell} = \ell_1 + \ell_2 + \ell_L. \tag{5.19}$$

The only value not yet determined is the labor used in lobbying. To find this, the complete dissipation result of Section 5.3 is applied. That is, it is assumed that resources are used in lobbying up to the point at which the extra profit they generate is exactly equal to the resource cost. Without lobbying, profit is $\pi_1\left(0\right)$. After a successful lobby with a tariff implemented it becomes $\pi_1\left(\tau\right)$. The value of labor that the firm will devote to lobbying is therefore

$$w\ell_L = \pi_1\left(\tau\right) - \pi_1\left(0\right) = \frac{1}{2}\left[2\tau + \tau^2\right]. \tag{5.20}$$

Since the production of each unit of good 2 requires one unit of labor, the output of good 2 equals the labor input into the production of that good, so $\ell_2 = y_2$. Using these results, (5.16), (5.18) and (5.19) give

$$y_1 = 1+\tau, y_2 = \bar{\ell} - \frac{1}{2}\left[1 + 4\tau + 2\tau^2\right], \ell_L = \frac{1}{2}\left[2\tau + \tau^2\right]. \tag{5.21}$$

It can be seen from (5.21) that the output of good 1 is increasing in the value of the tariff, that output of good 2 is decreasing as the square of the tariff, and labor wasted in lobbying is increasing as the square of the tariff. From these observations it can be judged that the rent-seeking is damaging the economy since resources are being diverted at a rapid rate from the production of good 2 but only increasing the production of good 1 slowly.

One way of calculating the effect of this process is to determine the value of national output at world prices. World prices are used since these are the true measure of value. Doing this gives

$$y_1 + y_2 = \bar{\ell} - \frac{1}{2}\left[2\tau^2 + 2\tau - 1\right]. \tag{5.22}$$

Hence national income is reduced at the rate of the tariff squared.

The conclusion in (5.22) shows just how damaging rent-seeking can be. The possible availability of a tariff sees resources devoted to lobbying for it. These resources are withdrawn from the production of good 2 and national income, evaluated at world prices, declines.

5.6.2 Rent Creation

The analysis so far has focused primarily on the effects of rent-seeking in the presence of pre-existing rents. We now turn to study the other side of the issue: the motives for the deliberate creation of rents. Such rent-creation is important since the existence of a rent implies a distortion in the economy. Hence the economic cost of a created rent is the total of the rent-seeking costs plus the cost of the economic distortion - this is the sum of deadweight loss plus profit identified in the Section 5.4.

To be in a position to create rents requires the power to make policy decisions. In most political systems, this authority is formally vested in politicians. Assuming that they are solely responsible for decision-making would, though, be short-sighted. Politicians are advised and informed by bureaucrats. Many of the responsibilities for formulating policy options and for clarifying the vague policy notions of politicians are undertaken by bureaucrats. By carefully limiting the policies suggested or by choosing their advice carefully, a bureaucrat may well be able to wield implicit political power. It therefore cannot be judged in advance whether it is the politicians or the bureaucrats who actually make policy decisions. This does not matter unduly. For the purpose of the analysis, all that is necessary is that there is someone in a position to make decisions that can create rents, be it a politician or a bureaucrat. When the arguments apply to both politicians and bureaucrats, the generic term "decision-maker" will be adopted.

How are rents created? To see this most clearly, consider an initial position where there is a uniform rate of corporation tax applicable to all industries. A rent can then be created by making it known that sufficient lobbying will be met by a reduction in the rate of tax. For instance, if the oil sector were to expend resources on lobbying then they would be made a special case and permitted a lower corporation tax. The arguments already applied several times show that the oil sector will be willing to lobby up to a value equal to the benefit of the tax reduction. The monopoly airline route mentioned in Section 5.4 is another example of rent-creation.

The reason for the rent-creation can now be made clear. By ensuring that the nature of the lobbying is in a form that they find beneficial, the decision-maker will personally gain. Such benefits could take many forms ranging from meals, to gifts, through to actual bribes in the form of cash payments. Contributions to campaign funds are an especially helpful form of lobbying for politicians, as are lucrative appointments after a term of office is completed. All of these forms of lobbying are observed to greater or lesser degrees in political systems across the world.

It has already been noted that this rent-creation leads to the economic costs of the associated rent-seeking. There are also further costs. Since there are rents to be gained from being a politician or a bureaucrat - the returns from the lobbying - there will be excessive resources devoted to securing these positions. Political office will be highly sought after with too many candidates spending too much money in seeking election. Bureaucratic positions will be valued far in excess of the contribution that bureaucrats make to economic welfare. Basically, if there are rents to be had as a politician or a bureaucrat then this will generate its own rent-seeking as these positions are competed for. In short, the ability to create rents has cumulative effects throughout the system. The complete dissipation theorem can again be applied here: in expected terms these rents are dissipated. But it is important to bear in mind that the winner of the rent does gain: the politician who is elected or the bureaucrat who secures their position will personally benefit from the rent. The losses accrue to those who competed but failed to win.

Two further effects arise. Firstly, there will be an excessive number of distortions introduced into the economy. Distortions will be created until there is no further potential for the decision-maker to extract additional benefits from lobbyists. Secondly, there will be an excessive number of changes in policy. Decision-makers will constantly seek new methods of creating rents and this will involve policy being continually revised. One simple way for a new decision-maker to obtain rents is to make tax rates uniform with a broad base on appointment, and then gradually auction off exemptions throughout the term of office. The broader the chosen base, the greater the number of exemptions that can be sold.

5.6.3 Conclusions

The discussion of this section has presented a very negative view of government and economic policy making. The rent-seeking perspective argues that decisions are not made for reasons of economic efficiency but are made on the basis of how much can be earned for making them. As a result of this, the economy is damaged by inefficient and distortionary policies. In addition, resources are wasted in the process of rent-seeking. Both lobbying and attempting to obtain decision-making positions waste resources. When these are combined, the damage to the economy is significant. It suggests that political power is sought after not as an end in itself but simply as a means to access rent.

5.7 Informative lobbying

The discussion so far has presented a picture of lobbyists as a group who contribute nothing to the economy and are just a source of welfare loss. To provide some balance, it is important to note that circumstances can arise in which lobbyists do make a positive contribution. Lobbyists may be able to benefit the economy if they, or the interest groups they represent, have superior information about the policy environment than the decision maker. By transmitting this information to the policy-maker, they can assist in the choice of a better policy.

Several issues arise in this process of information transmission. To provide a simple description of these, assume that a policy has to be chosen for the next economic period. At the time the policy has to be chosen, the policy-maker is uncertain what the economic environment will. This uncertainty is modeled by assuming that environment will one of several alternative "states of the world". Here, a state of the world is a summary of all relevant economic information. The policy-maker knows that different states of the world require different policy choices to be mad, but they do not know what the state of the world will be. Without any additional information, the policy-maker would have to base policy choice upon some prior beliefs about the probability of alternative states of the world. Unfortunately, if the chosen policy is not correct for the state of the world which is realized, welfare will not be maximized.

Now assume that there is a lobbyist who knows which state of the world will occur. It seems that if they were just to report this information to the policy-maker then the correct policy would be chosen and welfare maximized. But this misses the most important point: the objectives of the lobbyists. If the lobbyists had the same preferences as the policy-maker there would be no problem. The policy-maker would accept the information that was offered knowing that the lobbyists were pursuing the same ends. In contrast, if the lobbyists have different preferences then they may have an incentive to reveal false information about the future state of the world with the intention of distorting policy in a direction that they find beneficial. Therefore the policy-maker faces the problem of determining when the information they receive from lobbyists is credible and correct, and when it represents a distortion of the truth.

To see how these issues are resolved, consider an model in which there are only two possible values for the future state of the world. Let these values be denoted θ_h and θ_ℓ with $\theta_\ell < \theta_h$, where we term θ_h the "high state" and θ_ℓ is the "low state". The policy-maker seeks to maximize a social welfare function that depends on the state of the world and the policy choice, π. Suppose this objective function takes the form

$$W(\pi, \theta) = -(\pi - \theta)^2. \tag{5.23}$$

If the policy-maker had perfect information, when the high state was known to occur a high policy level $\pi_h = \theta_H$ is required and, when the state was known to be low, a low policy level $\pi_\ell = \theta_\ell$ is required. If instead the policy-maker is uninformed about the state of the world and initially regards the two states as equally likely. In this case, the policy-maker will choose a policy based on the expected state of the world, so

$$\pi^e = \frac{\theta_\ell + \theta_h}{2}. \tag{5.24}$$

That is, the policy-maker sets the policy equal to the expected value of θ.

Now we introduce a lobbyist who knows what the state of the world will be. The welfare of the lobby also depends on the policy level and the state of the world. However the lobbyist does not share the same view as the policy-maker about the ideal policy level in each state of the world. We assume that the ideal policy for the lobbyist exceeds the ideal policy of the policy-maker by an amount Δ in both states of the world. We can refer to such difference in the ideal policy as the *extent of the disagreement* between the policy-maker and the lobbyist. Such a lack of agreement can be obtained by adopting preferences for the group given by

$$U(\pi, \theta) = -(\pi - \theta - \Delta)^2. \tag{5.25}$$

To see the condition under which the lobbyist can credibly transmit information about the state of the world, we must investigate the incentives the lobbyist has to truthfully report the state of the world. First note that the lobbyist can only report either θ_h or θ_ℓ and, if he is trusted by the policy-maker, the policy choice will be respectively π_h or π_ℓ. If the true state is θ_h the lobbyist has no incentive to missreport the information. Indeed the lobbyist has a bias towards a high policy level, so misreporting the state as being low would lead to a policy π_ℓ which is worse than its ideal policy $\pi_h + \Delta$ when the state is high. On the other hand, if the state is θ_ℓ the lobbyist has a potential incentive to missreport because a truthful report, if trusted by the policy-maker, leads to a policy level π_ℓ that is below the ideal policy of the lobbyist $\pi_\ell + \Delta$. The lobbyist may then prefer to claim that the state is high to exploit the trust and obtain policy π_h instead of π_ℓ. However it may be that π_h is too large for the lobbyist when the state is θ_ℓ, in which case the lobbyist will report truthfully. The latter is the case if π_ℓ is closer to the ideal policy of the lobbyist in the low state than π_h, which occurs if the following inequality is satisfied

$$(\theta_\ell + \Delta) - \theta_\ell \leq \theta_h - (\theta_\ell + \Delta). \tag{5.26}$$

This inequality reduces to

$$\Delta \leq \frac{\theta_h - \theta_\ell}{2}. \tag{5.27}$$

This condition says that policy-maker can expect the lobbyist to report truthfully the state of the world if the extent of the disagreement is not too large. The equilibrium that results is then fully revealing because the lobbyist can credibly transmit information about the state of the world. Lobbying is then informative and desirable for the society. If in contrast the above inequality is not satisfied, the extent of the disagreement is too large for the policy-maker to expect truthful reporting when the state is low. The lobbyist's report lacks credibility because the policy-maker knows that the lobbyist prefers reporting high state no matter what the true state happened to be. The report is then uninformative and the policy-maker will rightly ignore it. The policy-maker then sets the policy equal to the expected value $\pi^e = \frac{\theta_\ell + \theta_h}{2}$. This policy choice is suboptimal for society because it is too large when the state is low and too small when the state is high. Note that the lobbyist is also worse off with the uninformative outcome because policy choice π^e is smaller than its ideal policy $\pi_h + \Delta$ when the state is high.

The problem of securing credibility is magnified when there are more than two states of the world. As the number of possible states increases, honest information revelation becomes ever more difficult to obtain. This is easily demonstrated. For a lobbyist to credibly report the true state, Δ must be smaller than one-half of the distance between any two adjacent states - this is the content of (5.27). With n states, $\theta_1 < ... < \theta_i < ... < \theta_n$, the conditions for truthtelling are for all $i = 1, ..., n-1$

$$\Delta \leq \frac{\theta_{i+1} - \theta_i}{2}. \tag{5.28}$$

Evidently, as the number of states grows, intermediate states are added which reduces the distance between any two states. Eventually the states become too close to each other for the lobbyist to be able to credibly communicate the true state, even if Δ is small. Full revelation is then impossible. What can the lobbyist do in such a situation? The answer is to reveal partial information.

Suppose the states is partitioned into two sets, $L = (\theta_1, ..., \theta_i)$ and $H = (\theta_{i+1}, ..., \theta_n)$. Then the lobbyist can report the interval in which the true state is, instead of reporting the precise state - we term this *partial revelation*. If he reports Θ_L then it means that $\theta_1 \leq \theta \leq \theta_i$. If all states are equally likely, then a trusty policy-maker sets the policy equal to the expected value on this interval $\pi(L) = \frac{\theta_1 + \theta_i}{2}$. Similarly, the report Θ_H induces a policy choice $\pi(H) = \frac{\theta_{i+1} + \theta_n}{2}$). The question is whether the lobbyist has any incentive to lie. Among the states in the interval L, the greatest temptation to lie (by reporting Θ_H) is when the true state is close to θ_i: if the lobbyist does not want to claim H when $\theta = \theta_i$ then he will not wish to do so when $\theta < \theta_i$, because it would push the policy choice further away from his ideal policy. Hence we can restrict attention to the incentive to report truthfully L when the true state is θ_i. Truthful reporting induces policy $\pi(L)$ and misreporting induces policy $\pi(H)$. The lobbyist will report truthfully if the former policy is closer than the latter from his ideal policy $\theta_i + \Delta$ given the true state θ_i. This is the case if

$$(\theta_i + \Delta) - \pi(L) \leq \pi(H) - (\theta_i + \Delta), \tag{5.29}$$

which reduces to

$$\theta_i + \Delta \leq \frac{\pi(H) + \pi(L)}{2} \tag{5.30}$$

Now suppose that θ actually is in H. We must check the incentive of the lobbyist to truthfully report H instead of L. The temptation is highest to missreport when true state is close to θ_{i+1}. In such a case, to sustain truthful reporting it is required that it must induce a policy $\pi(H)$ that is closer to the ideal policy $\theta_{i+1} + \Delta$ than the policy that would be induced by misreporting $\pi(L)$. That is

$$(\theta_{i+1} + \Delta) - \pi(L) \geq \pi(H) - (\theta_{i+1} + \Delta), \tag{5.31}$$

which reduces to

$$\theta_{i+1} + \Delta \geq \frac{\pi(H) + \pi(L)}{2} \tag{5.32}$$

Combining the two incentive constraints (5.30) and (5.32), truthtelling requires

$$\frac{\pi(H) + \pi(L)}{2} - \theta_{i+1} \leq \Delta \leq \frac{\pi(H) + \pi(L)}{2} - \theta_i$$

This condition puts both a lower bound and an upper bound on the extent of the disagreement for the lobbyist to be able to communicate credibly partial information about the state to the policy-maker.

The outcome of this analysis is that lobbyists can raise welfare if they are able to credibly report information to the policy-maker. Unfortunately, this argument is limited by the potential for incentives to report false information when there is divergence between the preferences of the lobbyist and the policy-maker. With a limited number of states, credible correct transmission can be sustained if the divergence is not too great. However, as the number of states of the world increases, credible transmission cannot be sustained if there is any divergence at all in preferences. In this latter case, though, it is possible to have partial information credibly released - again provided the divergence is limited. In conclusion, informed lobbyists can be beneficial through the advice they can offer a policy-maker, but this can be undermined by their incentives to reveal false information.

5.8 Controlling Rent-Seeking

Much has been made of the economic cost of rent-seeking. These insights are interesting (and also depressing for those who may believe in benevolent government) but are of little value unless they suggest methods of controlling the phenomenon. This section gathers together a number of proposals that have made in this respect.

There are two channels through which rent-seeking can be controlled. The first channel is to limit the efforts that can be put into rent-seeking. The second is to restrict the process of rent-creation.

Beginning with the latter, rent-creation relies on the unequal treatment of economic agents. For instance, the creation of a monopoly is based on one economic agent being given the right to operate in the market and all other agents being denied. Equally, offering a tax concession for one industry treats the agents in that industry more favorably than those outside. Consequently, a first step in controlling rent-seeking would be to disallow policies that discriminate between economic agents. The restriction to the implementation of non-discriminatory policies only would forbid the creation of tax-breaks for special interests or the imposition of tariffs on particular imports. If restricted in this way, the decision-maker could not auction off rents - if all parties gain, none has the incentive to pay.

The drawback of a rule preventing discrimination is that sometimes it is economically efficient to discriminate. As an example, the theory of optimal commodity taxation (see Chapter 15) describes circumstances in which it is efficient for necessities to be taxed more heavily than luxuries. This would not be possible with non-discrimination since the industries producing necessities would have grounds for complaint. Similarly, the theory of income taxation (see Chapter 16) finds that in general it is optimal to have a marginal rate of income tax that is not uniform. If implemented, the taxpayers facing a higher marginal rate would have grounds for alleging discrimination. Hence a non-discrimination ruling would result in uniform commodity and income taxes. These would not usually be efficient, so there would be a trade-off between economic losses through restrictions on feasible policy choices and losses through rent-seeking. It is not unlikely that the latter will outweigh the former.

There are other ways in which the process of rent-seeking can be lessened but all of these are weaker than a non-discrimination rule. These primarily focus on ensuring that the policy-making process is as transparent as possible. Amongst them would be policies such as limiting campaign budgets, insisting on the revelation of names of donors, requiring registration of lobbyists, regulating and limiting gifts, and reviewing bureaucratic decisions. Policing can be improved to lessen the use of bribes. Unlike non-discrimination, none of these policies has any economic implications other than their direct effect on rent-seeking.

5.9 Conclusions

Lobbyists are very numerous in number; they are also engaged in a non-productive activity. The theory of rent-seeking provides an explanation for this apparent paradox and looks at the consequences for the economy. The fundamental insight of the literature is the Complete Dissipation Theorem: competition for a rent will result in resources being expended up until the expected gain of society from the existence of the rent is zero. If competitors for the rent are risk-neutral, this implies that the resources used in rent-seeking are exactly equal in value to the size of the rent. The applications of these rent-seeking ideas show that the losses caused by distortions are potentially much larger than the standard measure of deadweight loss.

The other aspect of rent-seeking is that economic decision makers have an incentive to create distortions. They do this in order to receive benefits from the resulting rent-seeking. This leads to a perspective of policy driven not by what is good for the economy but by what the decision maker can get out of it and of a politics corrupted by self-interest. If this view is the correct description of the policy-making process, the response should be to limit the discretion for policy-makers. Lastly, lobbying can be desirable when the lobbyists have better information about policy-relevant variable than the policy-maker. The question is then how the lobbyists can credibly communicate this information when there is some disagreement about the ideal policy choice.

Reading

The classic analysis of rent-seeking is in:

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The second article is reprinted in:

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which also contains other interesting reading. For more discussion of the definition of rent-seeking and a survey of the literature see:

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The complete analysis of the rent-seeking game is in:

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Cowling, K.G. and Mueller, D.C. (1978) "The social costs of monopoly power", *Economic Journal*, **88**, 727 - 748,

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Another important paper in this area is:

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More on interest groups and lobbying can be found in:

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Grossman G. and Helpman E. (2001) *Special Interest Politics* (Cambridge: MIT Press)

A debate about the relative merits of rent-seeking and the traditional public finance approach is found in:

Buchanan, J.M. and Musgrave, R.A. (1999) *Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State* (Cambridge: MIT Press).

Part III

Equilibrium and Efficiency

Chapter 6

Competitive Economies

6.1 Introduction

To make predictions about the effects of economic policies, economists construct and analyze models. Such models, while inevitably being simplifications of the real economy, are designed to capture the essential aspects of the problem under study. Models are used because of problems of conducting experiments on economic systems and because the system is too large and complex to analyze in its entirety.

Although many different models will be studied in this book, there are important common features which apply to all. Most models used in public economics specify the objectives of the individual agents (such as firms and consumers) in the economy, and the constraints they face, and then aggregate individual decisions to arrive at market demand and supply. The equilibrium of the economy is then determined and, in a policy analysis, the effects of government choice variables upon this are calculated. This is done with various degrees of detail. Sometimes only a single market is studied - which is the case of partial equilibrium analysis. At other times, many markets are analyzed simultaneously. Similarly, the number of firms and consumers varies from one or two to very many.

An essential consideration in the choice of the level of detail for a model is that its equilibrium must demonstrate a dependence upon policy that gives insight into the functioning of the actual economy. If the model is too highly specified it may not be capable of capturing important forms of response. On the other hand, if it is too general it may not be able to provide any clear prediction. Achieving a successful compromise between these competing objectives is the "art" of economic modelling. The theory described in this book will show how this trade-off can be successfully resolved.

The focus of this chapter is on the basic model of the competitive economy. Variants of this model will see extensive service in later chapters. In particular, it is used to develop the fundamental results of welfare economics and the basic principles of tax theory. The essential feature of competition is that the consumers and firms in the economy do not consider their actions to have any effect upon prices. Consequently, in making decisions they treat the market prices as fixed. This assumption can be justified when all consumers and firms are truly negligible in size relative to the market. But it can be imposed as a modeling tool even in an economy with a single consumer and a single firm.

This definition of competition places a focus upon the role of prices which is maintained throughout the chapter. Prices measure values and are the signals which guide the decisions of firms and consumers. The adjustment of prices equates supply and demand to ensure that equilibrium is achieved. It was the exploration of the determinants of the relative values of different goods and services that lead to the formulation of the models. The role of prices in coordinating the decisions of independent economic agents is also crucial for the attainment of economic efficiency.

Two forms of the competitive model are introduced in this chapter. The first is concerned with an exchange economy in which there is no production. Initial stocks of goods are held by consumers and economic activity occurs through the trade of these stocks to mutual advantage. The second form of competitive economy introduces production. This is undertaken by firms with given technologies who use inputs to produce outputs and distribute their profits as dividends to consumers.

6.2 The Exchange Economy

The model of the exchange economy considers the simplest form of economic activity: the trade of commodities between two parties in order to obtain mutual advantage. Despite the simplicity of this model, it is a surprisingly instructive tool for obtaining fundamental insights about taxation and tax policy. This will become evident in later chapters.

This section will present a description of a two-consumer, two-good exchange economy. The restriction on the number of goods and consumers does not alter any of the conclusions that will be derived - they will all extend to larger numbers. What restricting the numbers does is allow the economy to be depicted and analyzed in a simple diagram.

6.2.1 Endowments, Budgets and Preferences

Each of the two consumers has an initial stock, or endowment, of the economy's two goods. The endowments can be interpreted literally as stocks of goods or less literally as human capital and are the quantities that are available for trade. Given the absence of production, these quantities remains constant. The consumers exchange quantities of the two commodities in order to achieve consumption levels that are preferred to their initial endowments. The rate at which one commodity can be exchanged for the other is given by the market prices. Both consumers believe that their behavior cannot affect these prices.

This is the fundamental assumption of competitive price-taking behavior. More will be said about the validity and interpretation of this in Section 6.5.

A consumer is described by their endowments and their preferences. The endowment of consumer h, is denoted by $\omega^h = \left(\omega_1^h, \omega_2^h\right)$, where $\omega_i^h > 0$ is h's initial stock of good i. With prices p_1 and p_2, a consumption choice for consumer h, $x^h = \left(x_1^h, x_2^h\right)$, is affordable if it satisfies the budget constraint

$$p_1 x_1^h + p_2 x_2^h = p_1 \omega_1^h + p_2 \omega_2^h. \tag{6.1}$$

The preferences of the consumers are described by utility functions. These functions should be seen as a representation of the consumer's indifference curves that do not imply any comparability of utilities between consumers. The utility function for consumer h is denoted by

$$U^h = U^h \left(x_1^h, x_2^h\right). \tag{6.2}$$

Taking the prices as given, the consumers choose their consumption of the two goods to reach the highest attainable utility level subject to their budget constraint. The level of demand must depend upon the prices, so for consumer i the demand for good h is

$$x_i^h = x_i^h \left(p_1, p_2\right) \tag{6.3}$$

6.2.2 The Edgeworth Box

The economy described above can be given a simple diagrammatic representation which can be used to explore its functioning. The diagram is constructed by first noting that the total consumption of the two consumers must equal the available stock of the goods. Any pair of consumption choices that satisfies this requirement is called a *feasible plan* for the economy. A plan for the economy is feasible if the consumption levels can be satisfied by the value of the endowments, so

$$x_i^1 + x_i^2 = \omega_i^1 + \omega_i^2, i = 1, 2. \tag{6.4}$$

The values satisfying (6.4) can be represented as points in a rectangle with sides of length $\omega_1^1 + \omega_1^2$ and $\omega_2^1 + \omega_2^2$. In this rectangle the south-west corner can be treated as the zero consumption point for consumer 1 and the north-east corner as the zero consumption point for consumer 2. The consumption of good 1 for consumer 1 is then measured horizontally from the south-west corner and for consumer 2 horizontally from the north-east corner. Measurements for good 2 are made vertically.

The diagram constructed in this way is called an *Edgeworth box* and a typical box is shown in Figure 6.1. It should be noted that the method of construction results in the initial endowment point, marked ω, being the initial endowment point for both consumers.

The Edgeworth box is completed by adding the preferences and budget constraints of the consumers. The indifference curves of consumer 1 are drawn relative to the south-west corner and those of consumer 2 relative to the north-east corner. From (6.1), it can be seen that the budget constraint of consumer

Figure 6.1: An Edgeworth Box

h must pass through the endowment point since they can always afford their endowment. The endowment point is common to both consumers, so a single budget line through the endowment point with gradient $-\frac{p_1}{p_2}$ captures their market opportunities. Thus, viewed from the south-west it is the budget line of 1 and viewed from the north-east the budget line of 2. Given the budget line determined by the prices p_1 and p_2, the utility-maximizing choices for the two consumers are characterized by the standard tangency condition between the highest attainable indifference curve and the budget line. This is illustrated in Figure 6.2, where x^1 denotes the choice of consumer 1 and x^2 that of 2.

6.2.3 Equilibrium

In an *equilibrium* of the economy, supply is equal to demand. This is assumed to be achieved via the adjustment of prices. The prices at which supply is equal to demand are called *equilibrium prices*. How such prices are arrived at will be discussed later. For the present, the focus will be placed on the nature of equilibrium and its properties.

The consumer choices shown in Figure 6.2 do not constitute an equilibrium for the economy. This can be seen by summing the demands and comparing these to the level of the endowments. Doing this gives

$$x_1^1 + x_1^2 > \omega_1^1 + \omega_1^2, \tag{6.5}$$

and

$$x_2^1 + x_2^2 < \omega_2^1 + \omega_2^2. \tag{6.6}$$

From (6.5) the demand for good 1 exceeds the endowment but from (6.6) the demand for good 2 falls short. To achieve an equilibrium position, the relative

Figure 6.2: Preferences and Demand

prices of the goods must change. An increase in the relative price of good 1 raises the absolute value of the gradient $-\frac{p_1}{p_2}$ of the budget line, making the budget line steeper. It becomes flatter if the relative price of good 1 falls. At all prices, it continues to pass through the endowment point so a change in relative prices sees the budget line pivot about the endowment point.

The effect of a relative price change upon the budget constraint is shown in Figure **??**. In the figure the price of good 1 has increased relative to the price of good 2. This causes the budget constraint to pivot upwards around the endowment point. As a consequence of this change the consumers will now select consumption plans off this new budget constraint.

Using the demand functions, demand is equal to supply for this economy when the prices ensure that

$$x_i^1\left(p_1,p_2\right)+x_i^2\left(p_1,p_2\right)=\omega_i^1+\omega_i^2,\quad i=1,2. \tag{6.7}$$

Study of the Edgeworth box shows that such an equilibrium is achieved when the prices determine a budget line on which the indifference curves of the consumers have a common point of tangency. An equilibrium is shown in Figure **??**. Having illustrated an equilibrium, this raises the question of whether such an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. In fact, under reasonable assumptions, it will always do so and Exercise **??** gives an indication of why. More important for public economics is the issue of whether the equilibrium has any desirable features from a welfare perspective. This is discussed in depth in the next chapter in which the Edgeworth box sees substantial use.

This completes the description of the Edgeworth box diagram. Using this tool it is possible to see the effect upon the equilibrium of changing the endowment point for given preferences and of changing preferences for a given endowment. Some exercises of this kind are given at the end of the chapter.

Figure 6.3: Relative Price Change

Figure 6.4: Equilibrium

6.2.4 Normalizations and Walras' Law

Two points now need to be made that are important for understanding the functioning of the model. These concern the number of prices that can be determined and the number of independent equilibrium equations.

In the equilibrium conditions (6.7) there are two equations to be satisfied by the two equilibrium prices. It is now argued that the model can determine only the ratio of prices and not the actual prices. Accepting this, we would seem to be in a position where there is one price ratio attempting to solve two equations. If this were the case, a solution would be unlikely and we would be in the position of having a model that generally did not have an equilibrium. This situation is resolved by noting that there is a relationship between the two equilibrium conditions which ensures that there is only one independent equation. The single price ratio then has to solve a single equation, thus making it possible for there to be always a solution.

The first point is developed by observing that the budget constraint always passes through the endowment point and its gradient is determined by the price ratio. The consequence of this is that only relative prices matter, rather than the absolute level, in determining demands and supplies. This can be seen taking the budget constraint (6.1) and solving for the quantity of good 2

$$x_2^h = \left[\frac{p_1}{p_2}\omega_1^h + \omega_2^h\right] - \frac{p_1}{p_2}x_1^h. \tag{6.8}$$

Only the ratio of prices, not their levels, enters (6.8). It follows that if both prices are increased by a factor λ the budget opportunities for the consumer do not alter because $\frac{\lambda p_1}{\lambda p_2} = \frac{p_1}{p_2}$. The economic explanation for this result is that consumers are only concerned with the real purchasing power embodied in their endowment, and not with the level of prices. Since their nominal income is equal to the value of the endowment, any change in the level of prices raises nominal income just as much as it raises the cost of purchases. This leaves real incomes unchanged.

The fact that only relative prices matter is also reflected in the demand functions. If $x_i^h(p_1, p_2)$ is the level of demand at prices p_1 and p_2, then it must be that case that

$$x_i^h(p_1, p_2) = x_i^h(\lambda p_1, \lambda p_2), \text{ for } \lambda > 0. \tag{6.9}$$

A demand function having the property shown in (6.9) is said to be *homogeneous of degree* 0. In terms of what can be learnt from the model, the homogeneity shows that only relative prices can be determined at equilibrium not the level of prices. So, given a set of equilibrium prices any scaling up, or down, of these will also be equilibrium prices since the change will not alter the level of demand. This is as it should be, since all that matters for the consumers is the rate at which they can exchange one commodity for another, and this is measured by the relative prices. This can be seen in the Edgeworth box. The budget constraint always goes through the endowment point so only its gradient can change and this is determined by the relative prices.

In order to analyze the model the indeterminacy of the level of prices needs to be removed. This is achieved by adopting a *price normalization* which is simply a method of fixing a scale for prices. There are numerous ways to do this. The simplest way is to select a commodity as *numeraire*, which means that its price is fixed at 1 and measure all other prices relative to this. The numeraire chosen in this way can be thought of as the *unit of account* for the economy. This is the role usually played by money but, formally, there is no money in this economy.

The next step is to demonstrate the dependence between the two equilibrium equations. It can be seen that at the disequilibrium position described in equations (6.5) and (6.6) the demand for good 1 exceeds its supply whereas the supply of good 2 exceeds demand. Considering other budget lines and indifference curves in the Edgeworth box, it can be seen that whenever there is an excess of demand for one good there is a corresponding deficit of demand for the other. There is, in fact, a very precise relationship between the excess and the deficit which can be captured in the following way. Let the level of *excess demand* for good i be determined by

$$Z_i = x_i^1 + x_i^2 - \omega_i^1 - \omega_i^2. \tag{6.10}$$

Using (6.10)

$$\begin{aligned} p_1 Z_1 + p_2 Z_2 &= \sum_{i=1}^{2} p_i \left[x_i^1 + x_i^2 - \omega_i^1 - \omega_i^2 \right] \\ &= \sum_{h=1}^{2} \left[p_1 x_1^h + p_2 x_2^h - p_1 \omega_1^h - p_2 \omega_2^h \right] \\ &= 0, \end{aligned} \tag{6.11}$$

where the second equality is a consequence of the budget constraints in (6.1). The relationship in (6.11) is known as *Walras' Law* and states that the value of excess demand is zero. This must hold for any set of prices so it provides a connection between the extent of disequilibrium and prices. In essence, Walras' Law is simply an aggregate budget constraint for the economy. Since all consumers are equating their expenditure to their income, so must the economy as a whole.

Walras' Law implies that the equilibrium equations are interdependent. Since $p_1 Z_1 + p_2 Z_2 = 0$, if $Z_1 = 0$ then $Z_2 = 0$ (and *vice versa*). That is, if demand is equal to supply for good 1 then demand must also equal supply for good 2. Equilibrium in one market necessarily implies equilibrium in the other. This observation allows the construction of a simple diagram to illustrate equilibrium. Choose good 1 as the numeraire (so $p_1 = 1$) and plot the excess demand for good 2 as a function of p_2. The equilibrium for the economy is then found where the graph of excess demand crosses the horizontal axis. At this point, excess demand for good 2 is zero so, by Walras' Law, it must also be zero for good 1. This is illustrated in Figure 6.5 for an economy that has 3 equilibria.

Figure 6.5: Equilibrium and Excess Demand

Finally, it should be noted that the arguments made above can be extended to include additional consumers and additional goods. Income, in terms of an endowment of many goods, and expenditure, defined in the same way, must remain equal for each consumer. The demand functions that result from the maximization of utility are homogeneous of degree zero in prices. The value of excess demand remains zero, so Walras' Law continues to hold. The number of price ratios and the number of independent equilibrium conditions are always one less than the number of goods.

6.3 Production and Exchange

The addition of production to the exchange economy provides a complete model of economic activity. Such an economy allows a wealth of detail to be included. Some goods can be present as initial endowments (such as labor), others can be consumption goods produced from the initial endowments, while some goods, intermediates, can be produced by one productive process and used as inputs into another. The fully-developed model of the competitive economy is called the *Arrow-Debreu economy* in honor of its original constructors.

6.3.1 Firms and Consumers

An economy with production consists of consumers (or households) and producers (or firms). The firms use inputs to produce outputs with the intention of maximizing their profits. Each firm has available a production technology which describes the ways in which it can use inputs to produce outputs. The consumers have preferences and initial endowments as for the exchange economy, but they now also hold shares in the firms. The firms' profits are distributed as dividends in proportion to the shareholdings. The consumers receive income from the sale of their initial endowments and from the dividends from firms. When the economy is competitive both firms and consumers treat prices as out-

Figure 6.6: A Typical Production Set

side of their control. That is, in determining their choice of action, consumers and firms do not believe their decisions will affect the prices they face. The standard justification for this assumption is that there are a large number of firms and consumers and that each is small relative to the size of the economy. Alternatively, it could be that the agents are simply ignorant of the effects they have.

Let the economy have n goods. Good i has associated price p_i. Production is carried out by m firms. Each firm uses inputs to produce outputs and maximizes profits given the market prices. Demand comes from the H consumers. They aim to maximize their utility. The total supply of each good is the sum of the production of it by firms and the initial endowment of it held by the consumers.

Firm j is characterized by its production set, Y^j, which summarizes the production technology it has available. A production technology can be thought of as a complete list of ways that the firm can turn inputs into outputs. In other words, it catalogs all the production methods of which the firm has knowledge. A typical production set for a firm operating in an economy with two goods is illustrated in Figure 6.6. This figure employs the standard convention of measuring inputs as negative numbers and outputs as positive. The reason for adopting this convention is that the use of a unit of a good as an input represent a subtraction from the stock of that good available for consumption

Consider the firm shown in Figure 6.6 choosing the production plan $y^j = (-2, 3)$. When faced with prices $p = (2, 2)$, the firm's level of profit is

$$\pi^j = py^j = (2,2) \, . \, (-2,3) = -4 + 6 = 2. \tag{6.12}$$

The positive part of this sum can be given the interpretation of sales revenue and the negative part that of production costs. This is then equivalent to writing profit as the difference between revenue and cost. Written in this way, (6.12) gives a simple expression of the relation between prices and production choices. For given prices, profit is a linear function of output. What places a limit on

Figure 6.7: Profit Maximization

achievable profit is the technological possibilities open to the firm.

The process of profit maximization is illustrated in Figure 6.7. Under the competitive assumption the firm takes the prices p_1 and p_2 as given. These prices are used to construct *isoprofit curves*, which show all production plans that give a specific level of profit. For example, all the production plans on the isoprofit curve labelled $\pi = 0$ will lead to a profit level of 0. Production plans on higher isoprofit curves lead to progressively larger profits and those on lower curves to negative profits. Since doing nothing (which means choosing $y_1 = y_2 = 0$) earns zero profit, the $\pi = 0$ isoprofit curve always passes through the origin.

The profit-maximizing firm will choose a production plan that places it upon the highest attainable isoprofit curve. What restricts the choice is the technology that is available as described by the production set. In Figure 6.7 the production plan that maximizes profit is shown by y^* which is located at a point of tangency between the isoprofit curve and the production set. There is no other technologically-feasible plan which can attain higher profit.

It should be noted that the isoprofit curves are determined by the prices. In fact, the geometry is that the isoprofit curves are at right-angles to the price vector. The angle of the price vector is determined by the price ratio, $\frac{p_1}{p_2}$, so that a change in relative prices will alter the gradient of the isoprofit curves. The figure can be used to predict the effect of relative price changes. For instance, if p_1 increases relative to p_2, which can be interpreted as the price of the input (good 1) rising in comparison to the price of the output (good 2), the price vector become flatter. This makes the isoprofit curves steeper, so the optimal choice must move round the boundary of the production set towards the origin. The use of the input and the production of the output both fall.

In the economy with n-goods, each firm will choose a production plan

$y^j = \left(y_1^j, ..., y_n^j\right)$.This production plan is chosen to maximize profits, $\pi^j = py^j$, subject to the constraint that the chosen plan must be in the production set. From this maximization can be determined firm j's supply function for good i as

$$y_i^j = y_i^j\left(p\right). \tag{6.13}$$

If good i is an output, then the level of supply in (6.13) is positive. If it is an input, the "supply" is negative. The interpretation of the sign convention here is that a positive supply adds to the economy's stock of the good. In contrast, a negative supply reduces it and captures the idea of the input being used up in the production process. Using (6.13), the level of profit is

$$\pi^j = py^j\left(p\right) = \pi^j\left(p\right), \tag{6.14}$$

which also depends upon prices.

Aggregate supply from the production sector of the economy is obtained from the individual supply decisions of the individual firms by summing across the firms. This gives aggregate supply as

$$Y_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m} y_i^j\left(p\right) = Y_i\left(p\right). \tag{6.15}$$

Since some goods must be inputs, and others outputs, the aggregate supply $Y(p) = (Y_1(p), ..., Y_n(p))$ will have some positive elements and some negative.

Each consumer has an initial endowment of commodities and also a set of shareholdings in firms. The latter assumption makes this a *private ownership economy* in which the means of production are ultimately owned by individuals. In the present version of the model, these shareholdings are exogenously given and remain fixed. A more-developed version would introduce a stock market and allow them to be traded. For consumer h the initial endowment is denoted ω^h and the shareholding in firm j is θ_j^h. The firms must be fully owned by the consumers so $\sum_{h=1}^{H} \theta_j^h = 1$. That is, the shares in the firms must sum to one.

The preferences of consumer h are given by the utility function

$$U^h = U^h\left(x^h\right). \tag{6.16}$$

Consumer h chooses a consumption plan x^h to maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i x_i^h = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i \omega_i^h + \sum_{j=1}^{m} \theta_j^h \pi^j. \tag{6.17}$$

This budget constraint requires that the value of expenditure is not more than the value of the endowment plus income received from dividends. Since firms always have the option of going out of business (and hence earning zero profit), the dividend income must be non-negative. The profit level of each firm is dependent upon prices. A change in prices therefore affects a consumer's budget constraint through a change in the value of their endowment and through a change in profit income.

The maximization of utility by the consumer results in the demand for good i from consumer h taking the form

$$x_i^h = x_i^h \left(p_1, ..., p_n\right). \tag{6.18}$$

The level of aggregate demand is found by summing the individual demands of the consumers to give

$$X_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i^h \left(p_1, ..., p_n\right) = X_i \left(p_1, ..., p_n\right). \tag{6.19}$$

6.3.2 Equilibrium

The same notion of equilibrium that was used for the exchange economy can be applied in this economy with production. That is, equilibrium occurs when supply is equal to demand. The distinction between the two is that supply, which was fixed in the exchange economy, is now variable and dependent upon the production decisions of firms. Although this adds a further dimension to the question of the existence of equilibrium, the basic argument why such an equilibrium always exists is essentially the same as that for the exchange economy.

As already noted, the equilibrium of the economy occurs when demand is equal to supply or, equivalently, when excess demand is zero. Excess demand for good i, $Z_i\left(p\right)$, can be defined by

$$Z_i\left(p\right) = X_i\left(p\right) - Y_i\left(p\right) - \sum_{h=1}^{H} \omega_i^h. \tag{6.20}$$

Here excess demand is the difference between demand and the sum of initial endowment and firms' supply. The equilibrium occurs when $Z_i\left(p\right) = 0$ for all of the goods $i = 1, ..., n$. There are standard theorems that prove such an equilibrium must exist under fairly weak conditions.

The properties established for the exchange economy also apply to this economy with production. Demand is determined only by relative prices (so it is homogeneous of degree zero). Supply is also homogeneous of degree zero. Together, these imply that excess demand is also homogeneous of degree zero. To determine the equilibrium prices that equate supply to demand, a normalization must again be used. Typically, one of the goods will be chosen as numeraire and its price set to one. Equilibrium prices are then those which equate excess demand to zero.

6.4 Diagrammatic Illustration

If there is a single firm and a single consumer, the economy with production can be illustrated in a helpful diagram. This can be constructed by superimposing the profit-maximization diagram for the firm over the choice diagram for the consumer. Such a model is often called the *Robinson Crusoe economy.* The interpretation is that Robinson acts as a firm carrying out production and as a consumer of the product of the firm. It is then possible to think of Robinson as a social planner who can coordinate the activities of the firm and producer. It is also possible (though in this case less compelling!) to think of Robinson as having a split personality and acting as a profit-maximizing firm on one side of the market and as a utility maximizing consumer on the other. In the latter interpretation, the two sides of Robinson's personality are reconciled through the prices on the competitive markets. An important fact, which is demonstrated in Chapter 7, is that these two interpretations lead to exactly the same levels of production and consumption.

The budget constraint of the consumer needs to include the dividend received from the firm. With two goods, the budget constraint is

$$p_1 [x_1 - \omega_1] + p_2 [x_2 - \omega_2] = \pi, \tag{6.21}$$

or

$$p_1 \widetilde{x}_1 + p_2 \widetilde{x}_2 = \pi, \tag{6.22}$$

where $\widetilde{x}_i$, the change from the endowment point, is the *net consumption* of good i. This is illustrated in Figure 6.8 with good 2 chosen as numeraire. The budget constraint (6.22) is always at right-angles to the price vector and is displaced above the origin by the level of profits. Utility maximization occurs where the highest indifference curve is reached given the budget constraint. This results in net consumption plan $\widetilde{x}^*$.

The equilibrium for the economy is shown in Figure 6.9 which superimposes Figure 6.7 onto 6.8. At the equilibrium, the net consumption plan from the consumer must match the supply from the firm. The feature that makes this diagram work is the fact that the consumer receives the entire profit of the firm so the budget constraint and the isoprofit curve are one and the same. The height above the origin of both is the level of profit earned by the firm and received by the consumer. Equilibrium can only arise when the point on the economy's production set which equates to profit maximization is the same as that of utility maximization. This is point $\widetilde{x}^* = y^*$ in Figure 6.9.

It should be noted that the equilibrium is on the boundary of the production set so that it is efficient: it is not possible for a better outcome to be found in which more is produced with the same level of input. This captures the efficiency of the competitive equilibrium, about which much more is said in Chapter 7.

There is one special case that is worth noting before moving on. When the firm has constant returns to scale the efficient production frontier is a straight line through the origin. The only equilibrium can be when the firm makes zero profits. If profits were positive at some output level, then the constant returns

Figure 6.8: Utility Maximization

Figure 6.9: Efficient Equilibrium

Figure 6.10: Constant Returns to Scale

to scale allows the firm to double profit by doubling output. Since this argument could then be repeated, there is no limit to the profits that the firm could make. Hence the claim that equilibrium profit must be zero. Now the isoprofit curve for zero profits is also a straight line through the origin. The zero profit equilibrium can only arise when this is coincident with the efficient production frontier. At this equilibrium the price vector is at right angles to both the isoprofit curve and the production frontier. This is illustrated in Figure 6.10.

There are two further implications of constant returns. Firstly, the equilibrium price ratio is determined by the zero profit condition alone and is independent of demand. Secondly, the profit income of the consumer is zero so the consumer's budget constraint also passes through the origin. As this is determined by the same prices as the isoprofit curve, the budget constraint must also be coincident with the production frontier.

6.5 Discussion of Assumptions

The description of the model has introduced a number of important assumptions that described the economic environment and how trade was conducted. These are important since they bear directly upon the efficiency properties of competition which are discussed in the next chapter. The interpretation and limitation of these assumptions is now discussed. This should help to provide a better context for later results.

The most fundamental assumption was that of competitive behavior. This is the assumption that both consumers and firms view prices as fixed when they make their decisions. The natural interpretation of this assumption is that the individual economic agents are small relative to the total economy. When they are small, they naturally have no consequence. This assumption rules out any kind of market power such as monopolistic firms or trade unions in labor markets.

Competitive behavior leads to the problem of who actually sets prices in the economy. In the exchange model it can be thought that equilibrium prices are achieved via a process of barter and negotiation between the trading parties. However barter cannot be a credible explanation of price determination in an advanced economic environment. The theoretical route out of this difficulty is to assume the existence of a fictitious Walrasian auctioneer who literally calls out prices until equilibrium is achieved. At this point trade is allowed to take place. Obviously, this does not provide a credible explanation of reality. Although there are other theoretical explanation of price setting, none is entirely consistent with the competitive assumption. How to integrate the two remains an unsolved puzzle.

The second important assumption is the focus upon equilibrium positions. This emphasis can be given several explanations. Historically, economists viewed the economy as self-correcting so that, if it were ever away from equilibrium, forces existed that move it back towards equilibrium. In the long run, equilibrium would then always be attained. Although such adjustment can be justified in simple single-market contexts, both the practical experience of sustained high levels of unemployment and the theoretical study of the stability of such processes have shown that it is not generally justified. The present justifications for focusing upon equilibrium are more pragmatic. The analysis of a model must begin somewhere, and the equilibrium has much merit as a starting point. In addition, even if the final focus is on disequilibrium, there is much to be gained from comparing the properties of points of disequilibrium to those of the equilibrium. Finally, no positions other than those of equilibrium have any obvious claim to prominence.

6.6 Conclusions

This chapter has introduced models of competitive economies involving the exchange and production of commodities. It has been shown how the individual decisions of consumers and producers are determined. The individual decisions have been aggregated and a description of equilibrium given. Arguments were advanced as to why such equilibria would usually exist.

These basic models will see much service in this book. They will be used to derive some basic results in welfare theory and as the foundation for the analysis of taxation. They will be extended to introduce market imperfections and to introduce time. In short, an understanding of the basic facts outlined above is essential to what follows.

Further reading

The two fundamental texts on the competitive economy are:

Arrow, K.J. and Hahn, F.H. (1971) General Competitive Analysis (Amsterdam: North-Holland),

and

Debreu, G. (1959) *The Theory of Value* (Yale: Yale University Press).

A textbook treatment can be found in:

Ellickson, B. (1993) *Competitive Equilibrium: Theory and Applications* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

The competitive economy has frequently been used as a practical tool for policy analysis. A survey of applications is in:

Shoven, J.B. and Whalley, J. (1992) Applying General Equilibrium Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

A historical survey of the development of the model is given in:

Duffie, D. and Sonnenschein, H. (1989) "Arrow and General Equilibrium Theory", *Journal of Economic Literature*, 27, 565 - 598.

Some questions concerning the foundations of the model are addressed in:

Koopmans, T.C. (1957) *Three Essays on the State of Economic Science* (New York: McGraw-Hill).

Chapter 7

Efficiency of Competition

7.1 Introduction

The discussion of Chapter 6 showed how the competitive model combined independent decision-making of consumers and firms into a complete model of the economy. Equilibrium was achieved in the economy by prices adjusting to equate demand and supply. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the competitive equilibrium can be shown to possess properties of efficiency, a fact that has been known to economists for some considerable time. The roots of this analysis can be traced back at least to Adam Smith's 18th century description of the workings of the invisible hand of competition. The formalization of the efficiency argument and the deeper understanding that comes with it, is a more recent innovation.

That equilibrium prices can always be found which simultaneously equate demand and supply for all goods is surprising. What is even more remarkable is that the equilibrium so obtained also has properties of efficiency. Why this is remarkable is that individual households and firms are all pursuing their independent objectives with no apparent coordination other than through the price system. Even so, the final state which emerges achieves efficiency solely through the coordinating role played by prices.

The chapter first looks at the single consumer Robinson-Crusoe economy. It is shown that the competitive equilibrium achieves the outcome that is unambiguously best for the economy. To reach a similar conclusion in an economy with more that one consumer it is necessary to be more sophisticated in the analysis. This is because what is good for one consumer need not be so for another; so it is rarely possible to define a measure of what is unambiguously good. This reasoning motivates the introduction of the concept of Pareto efficiency which is the measure by which the efficiency of competitive equilibrium is judged. Given this concept, the efficiency theorems are described for both the exchange economy and the production economy. The discussion then turns to the role of lump-sum taxes and transfers in achieving a chosen equilibrium.

This provides one of the foundations for the normative analysis of public policy.

7.2 Efficiency

Economics is often defined as the study of scarcity. This viewpoint is reflected in the concern with the efficient use of resources that runs throughout the core of the subject. Efficiency would seem to be a simple concept to characterize: if more cannot be achieved then the outcome is efficient.

When an individual decision maker is considered the problem of determining what is efficient and what is not is this simple. The individual will employ their resources to maximize utility subject to the constraints they face. When utility is maximized, the efficient outcome has been achieved. Problems arise when there is more than one decision maker. To be unambiguous about efficiency it is necessary to resolve the potentially competing needs of different decision makers. Efficiency has to be defined with respect to a set of aggregate preferences.

The difficulty of progressing from individual to social preferences has already been met in Chapter 4. There the limitations of voting as a method of collective choice were observed. These limitations are representative of the more general issues analyzed in Chapter 13. The conclusion will remain that determination of aggregate preferences is not simple. So defining a criteria for efficiency is not a simple question to answer though it is core to what we try to do.

One route to a solution is to look at a single-consumer economy or an economy of identical consumers. Then there is no conflict between competing preferences. But with different consumers some creativity has to be used to describe efficiency. How this is done will be shown in Section 7.4 where the concept of Pareto efficiency is introduced. The trouble with such creativity is that it leaves the definition of efficiency open to debate. We will postpone further discussion of this until Chapter 13.

Before proceeding some definitions are need. A *first-best* outcome is achieved when only the production technology and limitations on endowments restrict the choice of the decision maker. Essentially, the first-best is what would be chosen by an omniscient planner with complete command over resources. A *second-best* arises whenever constraints other than technology and resources are placed upon what the planner can do. Such constraints could be limits on income distribution or an inability to remove monopoly power.

7.3 Single Consumer

With a single consumer there is no doubt as to what is good and bad from a social perspective: the single individual's preferences can be taken as the social preferences. To do otherwise would be to deny the validity of the consumer's judgements. Formally, it would involve violation of Condition P, the Pareto principle of Chapter 4. Hence, if the individual prefers one outcome to another, then so must society. The unambiguous nature of preferences provides

Figure 7.1: Optimal Allocation

significant simplification of the discussion of efficiency in the single-consumer economy.

The issue of efficiency with a single consumer can be studied by using the Robinson Crusoe economy of Chapter 6. We assume that a set of preferences and a production technology are given for the economy. Using these the "best" outcome for the economy is determined and this is then compared to the outcome obtained through competitive behavior. In this case the "best" outcome must be first-best since no constraints on policy choices have not been invoked nor is there an issue of income distribution to consider.

The first-best outcome for the single-consumer economy achieves the highest indifference curve possible subject to the restriction that it is feasible under the technology. This is illustrated in Figure 7.1 where the most preferred outcome is determined as the tangency between the indifference curve and the efficient frontier of the production set. Point $\widetilde{x}^*$ is the net level of consumption relative to the endowment point and the production plan for the firm in the first-best.

A simple characterization of this first-best allocation can be given by using the fact that it is at a tangency point between two curves. The gradient of the indifference curve is equal to the ratio of the marginal utilities of the two goods and is called the *marginal rate of substitution*. This measures the rate at which good 1 must be traded for good 2 to maintain constant utility. Using subscripts to denote the marginal utilities of the two goods, the marginal rate of substitution is given by $MRS_{1,2} = \frac{U_1}{U_2}$. Similarly, the gradient of the production possibility set is termed the marginal rate of transformation and denoted $MRT_{1,2}$. The $MRT_{1,2}$ measures the rate at which good 1 has to be given up to allow an increase in production of good 2. At the tangency point, the two gradients are equal so

$$MRS_{1,2} = MRT_{1,2}. \tag{7.1}$$

The reason why this equality characterizes the first-best equilibrium can be explained as follows: The MRS captures the marginal value of good 1 to the consumer relative to the marginal value of good 2 while the MRT measures the marginal cost of good 1 relative to the marginal cost of good 2. The first-best is achieved when the marginal value is equal to the marginal cost.

Having characterized the first-best outcome it is necessary to contrast this with what the market achieves. This can be done by comparing Figure 7.1 which displays the competitive market equilibrium to Figure 6.9 . Doing this makes it immediately apparent that the same allocation is reached in both cases: the same tangency point is achieved so the market equilibrium is also the first-best outcome for the economy.

The market achieves efficiency through the coordinating role of prices. The consumer maximizes utility subject to their budget constraint. The optimal choice occurs when the budget constraint is tangential to highest attainable indifference curve. The condition describing this is that ratio of marginal utilities is equal to the ratio of prices. Expressed in terms of the MRS this is

$$MRS_{1,2} = \frac{p_1}{p_2}. \tag{7.2}$$

Similarly, profit maximization by the firm occurs when the production possibility set is tangential to the highest isoprofit curve. Using the MRT, the profit-maximization condition is

$$MRT_{1,2} = \frac{p_1}{p_2}. \tag{7.3}$$

Combining these conditions the competitive equilibrium satisfies

$$MRS_{1,2} = \frac{p_1}{p_2} = MRT_{1,2}. \tag{7.4}$$

The condition in (7.4) demonstrates that the competitive equilibrium satisfies the same condition as the first-best and reveals the essential role of prices. Under the competitive assumption, both the consumer and the producer are guided in their decisions by the same price ratio. Each optimizes relative to the price ratio, hence their decisions are mutually efficient.

In this single consumer context the equilibrium reached by the market simply cannot be bettered. Such a strong statement cannot be made when further consumers are introduced since issues of distribution between consumers then arise. However, what will remain is the finding that the competitive market ensures that firms produce at an efficient point on the frontier of the production set and that the chosen production plan is what is demanded at the equilibrium prices by the consumer. The key to this coordination are the prices that provide the signals guiding choices.

7.4 Pareto Efficiency

When there is more than one consumer the simple analysis of the Robinson Crusoe economy does not apply. Since consumers can have differing views about the success of an allocation, there is no single, simple measure of efficiency. The essence of the difficulty is that of judging between allocations with different distributional properties. What is needed is some measure that can take account of the potentially diverse views of the consumers and separate efficiency from distribution.

To achieve this, economists employ the concept of *Pareto efficiency.* The philosophy behind this concept is that efficiency means there must be no unexploited economic gains. Testing the efficiency of an allocation then involves checking whether there are any such gains available. Pareto efficiency judges an allocation by considering whether it is possible to undertake a reallocation of resources that can benefit at least one consumer without harming any. If it were possible to do so, then there would exist unexploited gains. When no such improving reallocation can be found, then the initial position is deemed to be Pareto efficient. An allocation that satisfies this test can be viewed as having achieved an efficient distribution of resources. For the present chapter this concept will be used uncritically. The interpretations and limitations of this form of efficiency will be discussed in Chapter 13.

To provide a precise statement of Pareto efficiency that applies in a competitive economy it is first necessary to extend the idea of feasible allocations of resources that was used in (6.4) to define the Edgeworth box. When production is included, an allocation of consumption is feasible if it can be produced given the economy's initial endowments and production technology. Given the initial endowment, ω, the consumption allocation x is feasible if there is production plan y such that

$$x = y + \omega. \tag{7.5}$$

Pareto efficiency is then tested using the feasible allocations. A feasible consumption allocation $\widehat{x}$ is Pareto efficient if there does not exist an alternative feasible allocation $\overline{x}$ such that:

(i) Allocation $\overline{x}$ gives all consumers at least as much utility as $\widehat{x}$;

(ii) Allocation $\overline{x}$ gives at least one consumer more utility than $\widehat{x}$.

These two conditions can be summarized as saying that allocation $\widehat{x}$ is Pareto efficient if there is no alternative allocation (a move from $\widehat{x}$ to $\overline{x}$) that can make someone better-off without making anyone worse-off. It is this idea of being able to make someone better-off without making someone else worse-off that represents the unexploited economic gains in an inefficient position.

It should be noted even at this stage how Pareto efficiency is defined by the negative property of being unable to find anything better than the allocation. This is somewhat different to a definition of efficiency that looks for some positive property of the allocation. Pareto efficiency also sidesteps issues of distribution rather than confronting them. More will be said about this in Chapter 13 when the construction of social welfare indicators is discussed.

Figure 7.2: Pareto Efficiency

7.5 Efficiency in an Exchange Economy

The welfare properties of the economy, which are commonly known as the *Two Theorems of Welfare Economics*, are the basis for claims concerning the desirability of the competitive outcome. In brief, the First Theorem states that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient and the Second Theorem that any Pareto efficient allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium. Taken together, they have significant implications for policy and, at face value, they seem to make a compelling case for the encouragement of competition.

The Two Theorems are easily demonstrated for a two-consumer exchange economy by using the Edgeworth box diagram. The first step is to isolate the Pareto efficient allocations. Consider Figure 7.2 and the allocation at point a. To show that a is not a Pareto efficient allocation it is necessary to find an alternative allocation which gives at least one of the consumers a higher utility level and neither consumer a lower level. In this case, moving to the allocation at point b raises the utility of both consumers when compared to a. This establishes that a is not Pareto efficient. Although b improves upon a it is not Pareto efficient either: the allocation at c provides higher utility for both consumers than b.

The allocation at c is Pareto efficient. Beginning at c any change in the allocation must lower the utility of at least one of the consumers. The special property of point c is that it lies at a point of tangency between the indifference curves of the two consumers. As it is a point of tangency, moving away from it must lead to a lower indifference curve for one of the consumers if not both. Since the indifference curves are tangential, their gradients are equal so

$$MRS^1_{1,2} = MRS^2_{1,2}. \tag{7.6}$$

Hence the rate at which consumer 1 will exchange good 1 for good 2 is equal to the rate at which consumer 2 will exchange the two goods. It is this equality

Figure 7.3: The First Theorem

of marginal values at the tangency point that results in there being no further unexploited gains and so makes c Pareto efficient.

The Pareto efficient allocation at c is not unique. In fact, there are many points of tangency between the two consumers' indifference curves. A second Pareto Efficient allocation is at point d in Figure 7.2. Taken together, all the Pareto efficient allocations form a locus in the Edgeworth box which is called the *contract curve*. This is illustrated in Figure 7.3. With this construction it is now possible to demonstrate the First Theorem.

Referring back to Figure 6.4, a competitive equilibrium is given by a price line through the initial endowment point, ω, which is tangential to both indifference curves at the same point. The common point of tangency results in consumer choices that lead to the equilibrium levels of demand. Such an equilibrium is indicated by point e in Figure 7.3. As the equilibrium is a point of tangency of indifference curves, it must also be Pareto efficient. For the Edgeworth box, this completes the demonstration that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.

The alternative way of seeing this result is to recall that the consumer maximizes utility at the point where their budget constraint is tangential to the highest indifference curve. Using the MRS, this condition can be written for consumer h as $MRS^h_{1,2} = \frac{p_1}{p_2}$. The competitive assumption is that both consumers react to the same set of prices so it follows that

$$MRS^1_{1,2} = \frac{p_1}{p_2} = MRS^1_{1,2}. \tag{7.7}$$

Comparing this condition with (7.6) provides an alternative demonstration that the competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. It also shows again the role of prices in coordinating the independent decisions of different economic agents to ensure efficiency.

This discussion can be summarized in the precise statement of the theorem.

Theorem 7 *(The First Theorem of Welfare Economics) The allocation of commodities at a competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.*

This theorem can be formally proved by assuming that the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto efficient and deriving a contradiction. Assuming the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto efficient implies there is a feasible alternative that is at least as good for all consumers and strictly better for at least one. Now take the consumer who is made strictly better off. Why did they not choose the alternative consumption plan at the competitive equilibrium? The answer has to be because it was more expensive than their choice at the competitive equilibrium and not affordable with their budget. Similarly, for all other consumers the new allocation has to be at least as expensive as their choice at the competitive equilibrium. (If it were cheaper, they could afford an even better consumption plan which made them strictly better-off than at the competitive equilibrium.) Summing across the consumers, the alternative allocation has to be strictly more expensive than the competitive allocation. But the value of consumption at the competitive equilibrium must equal the value of the endowment. Therefore the new allocation must have greater value than the endowment which implies it cannot be feasible. This contradiction establishes that the competitive equilibrium must be Pareto efficient.

The theorem demonstrates that the competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient but it is not the only Pareto efficient allocation. Referring back to Figure 7.3, any point on the contract curve is also Pareto efficient since all are defined by a tangency between indifference curves. The only special feature of e is that it is the allocation reached through competitive trading from the initial endowment point ω. If ω were different, then another Pareto efficient allocation would be achieved. In fact there is an infinity of Pareto efficient allocations. Observing these points motivates the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics.

The Second Theorem is concerned with whether a given Pareto efficient allocation can be made into a competitive equilibrium by choosing a suitable location for the initial endowment. Expressed differently, can a competitive economy be constructed which has a selected Pareto efficient allocation as its competitive equilibrium? In the Edgeworth box, this involves being able to choose any point on the contract curve and turning it into a competitive equilibrium.

Using the Edgeworth Box diagram it can be seen that this is possible in the exchange economy if the households' indifference curves are convex. The common tangent to the indifference curves at a Pareto efficient allocation provides the budget constraint that each consumer must face if they are to afford the chosen point. The convexity ensures that, given this budget line, the Pareto efficient point will also be the optimal choice of the consumers. The construction is completed by choosing a point on this budget line as the initial endowment point. This process of constructing a competitive economy to obtain a selected Pareto efficient allocation is termed *decentralization.*

This process is illustrated in Figure 7.4 where the Pareto efficient allocation e' is made a competitive equilibrium by selecting ω' as the endowment point.

Figure 7.4: The Second Theorem

Starting from ω', trading by consumers will take the economy to its equilibrium allocation e'. This is the Pareto efficient allocation that it was intended should be reached. Note that if the endowments of the households are initially given by ω and the equilibrium at e' is to be decentralized, it is necessary to adjust the initial endowments of the consumers in order to begin from ω'.

The construction described above can be given a formal statement as the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics.

Theorem 8 *(The Second Theorem of Welfare Economics) With convex preferences, any Pareto efficient allocation can be made a competitive equilibrium.*

The statement of the Second Theorem provides a conclusion but does not describe the mechanism involved in the decentralization. The important step in decentralizing a chosen Pareto efficient allocation is placing the economy at the correct starting point. For now it is sufficient to observe that behind the Second Theorem lies a process of redistribution of initial wealth. How this can be achieved is discussed later. Furthermore, the Second Theorem determines a set of prices that make the chosen allocation an equilibrium. These prices may well be very different from those that would have been obtained in the absence on the wealth redistribution.

7.6 Extension to Production

The extension of these theorems to an economy with production is straightforward. The major effect of production is to make supply variable: it is now the sum of the initial endowment plus the net outputs of the firms. In addition, a consumer's income includes the profit derived from their shareholdings in firms.

Section 7.3 has already described the Two Theorems for the Robinson Crusoe economy which included production. It was shown that the competitive equilibrium achieved the highest attainable indifference curve given the production possibilities of the economy. Since the single consumer cannot be made better off by any change, the equilibrium is Pareto efficient and the First Theorem applies. The Second Theorem is of limited interest with a single consumer since there is only one Pareto efficient allocation and this is attained by the competitive economy.

When there is more than one consumer the proof of the First Theorem follows the same lines as for the exchange economy. Given the equilibrium prices, each consumer is maximizing utility so their marginal rate of substitution is equated to the price ratio. This is true for all consumers and all goods, so

$$MRS_{i,j}^{h} = \frac{p_i}{p_j} = MRS_{i,j}^{h'}, \tag{7.8}$$

for any pair of consumers h and h' and any pair of good i and j. This is termed *efficiency in consumption.* In an economy with production this condition alone is not sufficient to guarantee efficiency and it is also necessary to consider production. The profit-maximization decision of each firm will ensure that it equates its marginal rate of transformation between any two goods to the ratio of prices. For any two firms m and m' this give

$$MRT_{i,j}^{m} = \frac{p_i}{p_j} = MRT_{i,j}^{m'}, \tag{7.9}$$

a condition that characterizes *efficiency in production.* The price ratio also coordinates consumers and firms giving

$$MRS_{i,j}^{h} = MRT_{i,j}^{m}, \tag{7.10}$$

for any consumer and any firm for all pairs of goods. As for the Robinson-Crusoe economy, the interpretation of this condition is that it equates the relative marginal values to the relative marginal costs. Since (7.8) - (7.10) are the conditions required for efficiency, this shows that the First Theorem extends to the economy with production.

The formal proof of this claim mirrors that for the exchange economy, except for the fact that the value of production must also be taken into account. Given this, the basis of the argument remains that since the consumers chose the competitive equilibrium quantities anything that is preferred must be more expensive and hence can be shown not to be feasible.

The extension of the Second Theorem to include production is illustrated in Figure 7.5. The set W describes the feasible consumption plans for the economy with each point in w equal to the sum of a production plan and the initial endowment, $w = \omega + y$. Set Z denotes the consumption plans that would allow a Pareto improvement over the allocation $\widehat{x}^1$ to consumer 1 and $\widehat{x}^2$ to consumer 2. If W and Z are convex, which occurs when firms' production sets and preferences are convex, then a common tangent to W and Z can be found. This would make $\widehat{x}$ an equilibrium. Individual income allocations, the sum of the value of endowment plus profit income, can be placed anywhere on the

Figure 7.5: Proof of the Second Theorem

budget lines tangent to the indifference curves at the individual allocations $\widehat{x}_1$ and $\widehat{x}_2$ provided they sum to the total income of the economy.

Before proceeding further, it is worth emphasizing that the proof of the Second Theorem requires more assumptions than the proof of the First so there may be situations in which the First Theorem is applicable but the Second is not. The Second Theorem requires that a common tangent can be found which relies on preferences and production sets being convex. A competitive equilibrium can exist with some non-convexity in the production sets of the individual firms or the preferences of the consumers, so the First Theorem will apply, but the Second Theorem will not apply.

7.7 Lump-Sum Taxation

The discussion of the Second Theorem noted that it did not describe the mechanism through which the decentralization is implemented. Instead, it was implicit in the statement of the theorem that the consumers would be given sufficient income to purchase the Pareto-efficient allocation. Any practical value of the Second Theorem depends on being able to achieve these required income levels. The way in which the theorem sees this as being done is by making what are called *lump-sum transfers* between consumers.

A transfer is defined as lump-sum if no change in a consumer's behavior can affect the size of the transfer. For example, working less hard or changing the pattern of demand must not affect the size of the transfer. This differentiates a lump-sum transfer from other taxes, such as income or commodity taxes, for which changes in behavior do affect the value of the tax payment. Lump-sum

Figure 7.6: A Lump-Sum Transfer

transfers have a very special role in the theoretical analysis of public economics because, as we will show, they are the idealized redistributive instrument.

The lump-sum transfers envisaged by the Second Theorem would involve quantities of endowments and profit shares being transferred between consumers to ensure the necessary income levels. Some consumers would gain from the transfers, others would lose. Without recourse to such transfers, the decentralization of the optimum would not be possible. Although the value of the transfer cannot be changed, lump-sum transfers do affect consumers' behavior since their incomes are either reduced or increased by the transfers. The transfers have an income effect but do not lead to a substitution effect between commodities.

The illustration of the Second Theorem in an exchange economy in Figure 7.6 makes clear the role and nature of lump-sum transfers. The initial endowment point is denoted ω and this is the starting point for the economy. Assuming that the Pareto efficient allocation at point e is to be decentralized, the income levels have to be modified to achieve the new budget constraint. At the initial point, the income level of h is $\widehat{p}\omega^h$ when evaluated at the equilibrium prices $\widehat{p}$. The value of the transfer to consumer h that is necessary to achieve the new budget constraint is $M^h - \widehat{p}\omega^h = \widehat{p}\widetilde{x}^h - \widehat{p}\omega^h$. One way of ensuring this is to transfer a quantity $\widetilde{x}_1^1$ of good 1 from consumer 1 to consumer 2. But any transfer of commodities with the same value would work equally well.

There is a problem though if we attempt to interpret the model this literally. For most people, income is earned almost entirely from the sale of labor so that their endowment is simply the capitalized value of lifetime labor supply. This makes it impossible to transfer the endowments since one person's labor cannot be given to another. Responding to such difficulties leads to the reformulation of lump-sum transfers in terms of *lump-sum taxes*. Suppose that the two consumers both sell their entire endowments at prices $\widehat{p}$. This generates incomes $\widehat{p}\omega^1$ and $\widehat{p}\omega^2$ for the two consumers. Now make consumer 1 pay a tax of amount $T^1 = \widehat{p}\widetilde{x}_1^1$ and give this tax revenue to consumer 2. Consumer 2 therefore pays a negative tax (or, in simpler terms, receives a subsidy) of $T^2 = -\widehat{p}\widetilde{x}_1^1 = -T^1$. This pair of taxes can be seen to move the budget constraint in exactly the same way as the lump-sum transfer of endowment. The pair of taxes and the transfer of endowment are therefore economically equivalent and have the same effect upon the economy. The taxes are also lump-sum since they are determined without reference to either consumers' behavior and their values cannot be affected by any change in behavior.

Lump-sum taxes have a central role in public economics due to their efficiency in achieving distributional objectives. It should be clear from the discussion above that the economy's total endowment is not reduced by the application of the lump-sum taxes. This point applies to lump-sum taxes in general. As households cannot affect the level of the tax by changing their behavior, lump-sum taxes do not lead to any inefficiency. There are no resources lost due to the imposition of lump-sum taxes and redistribution is achieved with no efficiency cost. In short, if they can be employed in the manner described they are the perfect taxes.

7.8 Summary

This chapter has described and proved the Two Theorems of Welfare Economics. To do this it was necessary to introduce the concept of Pareto efficiency. Whilst this was simply accepted in this chapter, it will be considered very critically in Chapter 13. The Two Theorems characterize the efficiency properties of the competitive economy and state when a selected Pareto efficient allocation can be decentralized. The role of lump-sum transfers or taxes in supporting the Second Theorem has been highlighted. These transfers constitute the ideal tax system since they have no resource costs.

The subject matter of this chapter has very strong implications which are investigated fully in later chapters. An understanding of them, and of their limitations, is fundamental to appreciating many of the developments of public economics. Since claims about the efficiency of the competition feature routinely in economic debate it is important to subject it to the most careful of scrutiny.

Further reading

The classic proof of these theorems is in

Debreu, G. (1959) *Theory of Value*, (New York: Wiley).

A formal analysis of lump-sum taxation can be found in:

Mirrlees, J.A. (1986) "The theory of optimal taxation“ in K.J. Arrow and M.D. Intrilligator (eds.), *Handbook of Mathematical Economics* (Amsterdam: North-Holland).

An extensive textbook treatment of Pareto efficiency is:

Ng, Y.-K. (2003) *Welfare Economics*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan).

Part IV

Departures from Efficiency

Chapter 8

Public Goods

8.1 Introduction

When a government provides a level of national defense sufficient to make a country secure, all inhabitants are simultaneously protected. Equally, when a radio program is broadcast it can be received simultaneously by all listeners in range of the transmitter. The possibility for many consumers to benefit from a single unit of provision violates the assumption of the private nature of goods underlying the efficiency analysis of Chapter 7. The Two Theorems relied on all goods being private in nature, so that they could only be consumed by a single consumer. If there are goods such as national defense in the economy, market failure occurs and the unregulated competitive equilibrium will fail to be efficient. This inefficiency implies that there is a potential role for government intervention.

The chapter begins by defining a public good and distinguishing between public goods and private goods. Doing so provides considerable insight into why market failure arises when there are public goods. The inefficiency is then demonstrated by analyzing the equilibrium that is achieved when it is left to the market to provide public goods. The Samuelson rule characterizing the optimal level of the public good is then derived. This permits a comparison of equilibrium and optimum.

The focus of the chapter then turns to the consideration of methods through which the optimum can be achieved. The first of these, the Lindahl equilibrium, is based on observation that the price each consumer pays for the public good should reflect their valuation of it. The Lindahl equilibrium achieves optimality but, since the valuations are private information, it generates incentives for consumers to provide false information. Mechanisms designed to elicit the correct statement of these valuations are then considered. The theoretical results are then contrasted with the outcomes of experiments designed to test the extent of false statement of valuations and the use of market data to calculate valuations. These results are primarily static in nature. To provide some insight into the dynamic aspects of public good provision, the chapter is completed by the analysis of two different forms of fund-raising campaign which permit sequential contributions.

8.2 Definitions

The *pure public good* has been the subject of most of the economic analysis of public goods. In some ways, the pure public good is an abstraction that is adopted to provide a benchmark case against which other, more realistic, cases can be assessed. A pure public good has the following two properties.

- *Non-excludability.* If the public good is supplied, no consumer can be excluded from consuming it.

- *Non-rivalry.* Consumption of the public good by one consumer does not reduce the quantity available for consumption by any other.

In contrast, a *private good* is excludable at no cost and is perfectly rivalrous: if it is consumed by one person then none of it remains for any other. Although they were not made explicit, these properties of a private good have been implicit in how we have analyzed market behavior in earlier chapters. As we will see, the efficiency of the competitive economy is dependent upon them.

The two properties that characterize a public good have important implications. Consider a firm that supplies a pure public good. Since the good is non-excludable, if the firm supplies one consumer then it has effectively supplied the public good to all. The firm can charge the initial purchaser but cannot charge any of the subsequent consumers. This prevents it from obtaining payment for the total consumption of the public good. The fact that there is no rivalry in consumption implies that the consumers should have no objection to multiple consumption. These features prevent the operation of the market equalizing marginal valuations as it does to achieve efficiency in the allocation of private goods.

In practice, it is difficult to find any good that perfectly satisfies both the conditions of non-excludability and non-rivalry precisely. For example, the transmission of a television signal will satisfy non-rivalry but exclusion is possible at finite cost by scrambling the signal. Similar comments apply, for example, to defense spending which will eventually be rivalrous as a country of fixed size becomes crowded and from which exclusion is possible by deportation. Most public goods eventually suffer from congestion when too many consumers try to use them simultaneously. For example, parks and roads are public goods which can become congested. The effect of congestion is to reduce the benefit the public good yields to each user. Public goods which are excludable, but at a cost, or suffer from congestion beyond some level of use are called *impure.* The properties of impure public goods place them between the two extremes of private goods and pure public goods.

Figure 8.1: Typology of Goods

A simple diagram summarizing the different types of good and the names given to them is shown in Figure 8.1. These goods vary in the properties of excludability and rivalry. In fact, it is helpful to envisage a continuum of goods which gradually vary in nature as they become more rivalrous or more easily excludable. The pure private good and the pure public good have already been identified. An example of a common property good is a lake which can be used for fishing by anyone who wishes, or a field that can be used for grazing by any farmer. This class of goods (usually called *the commons*) are studied in Chapter 10. The problem with the commons is the tendency of overusing them, and the usual solution is to establish property rights to govern access. This is what happened in the sixteenth century in England where common land was enclosed and became property of the local landlords. The landlords then charged grazing fees, and so cut back the use. In some instances property rights are hard to define and enforce, as is the case of the control over the high seas or air quality. For this reason, only voluntary cooperation can solve the international problem of overfishing, acid rain and greenhouse effect. Club goods are public goods for which exclusion is possible. The terminology is motivated by sport clubs whose facilities are a public good for members but from which non-members can be excluded. Clubs are studied in Chapter 9.

8.3 Private Provision

Public goods do not conform to the assumptions required for a competitive economy to be efficient. Their characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry lead to the wrong incentives for consumers. Since they can share in consumption, each consumer has an incentive to rely on others to make purchases of the public good. This reliance on others to purchase is call *free-riding* and it is this that leads to inefficiency.

To provide a model that can reveal the motive for free-riding and its consequences, consider two consumers who have to allocate their incomes between purchases of a private good and of a public good. Assume that the consumers take the prices of the two goods as fixed when they make their decisions. If the goods were both private, we could move immediately to the conclusion that an efficient equilibrium would be attained. What makes the public good different is that each consumers derives a benefit from the purchases of the other. This link between the consumers, which is absent with private goods, introduces a strategic interaction into the decision processes. With the strategic interaction, the consumers are involved in a game so equilibrium is found using the concept of a Nash equilibrium.

The consumers have income levels M^1 and M^2. Income must be divided between purchases of the private good and the public good. Both goods are assumed to have a price of 1. Using x^h to denote purchase of the private good by consumer h and g^h to denote purchase of the public good, the choices must satisfy the budget constraint $M^h = x^h + g^h$. The link between consumers comes from the fact that the consumption of the public good for each consumer is equal to the total quantity purchased, $g^1 + g^2$. Hence, when making the purchase decision, each consumer must take account of the decision of the other.

This interaction is captured in the preferences of consumer h by writing the utility function as

$$U^h \left(x^h, g^1 + g^2 \right). \tag{8.1}$$

The standard Nash assumption is now imposed that each consumer takes the purchase of the other as given when they make their decision. Under this assumption, consumer 1 chooses g^1 to maximize utility given g^2, while consumer 2 chooses g^2 given g^1. This can be expressed by saying that the choice of consumer 1 is the best reaction to g^2 and that of consumer 2 the best reaction to g^1. The Nash equilibrium occurs when these reactions are mutually compatible, so that the choice of each is the best reaction to the choice of the other.

The Nash equilibrium can be displayed by analyzing the preferences of the two consumers over different combination of g^1 and g^2. Consider consumer 1. Using the budget constraint, their utility can be written as $U^1 \left(M^1 - g^1, g^1 + g^2 \right)$. The indifference curves of this utility function are shown in Figure 8.2. These can be understood by noting that an increase in g^2 will always lead to a higher utility level for any value of g^1. For given g^2, an increase in g^1 will initially increase utility as more preferred combination of private and public good are achieved. Eventually, further increases in g^1 will reduce utility as the level of private good consumption becomes too small relative to that of public good. The income level places an upper limit upon g^1.

Consumer 1 takes the provision of 2 as given when making their choice. Consider consumer 2 having chosen $\overline{g}^2$. The choices open to consumer 1 then lie along the horizontal line drawn at $\overline{g}^2$ in Figure 8.2. The choice that maximizes the utility of consumer 1 occurs at the tangency of an indifference curve and the horizontal line - this is the highest indifference curve they can reach. This is shown as the choice $\widehat{g}^1$. In the terminology we have chosen, $\widehat{g}^1$ is the best reaction to $\overline{g}^2$. Varying the level of $\overline{g}^2$ will lead to another best reaction for

Figure 8.2: Preferences and Choice

consumer 1. Doing this for all possible $\overline{g}^2$ traces out the optimal choices of g^1 shown by the locus through the lowest point on each indifference curve. This locus is known as the *Nash reaction function* and depicts the value of g^1 that will be chosen in response to a value of g^2. This construction can be repeated for consumer 2 and leads to Figure 8.3. For consumer 2, utility increases with g^1 and thus indifference curves further to the right reflect higher utility levels. The best reaction for consumer 2 is shown by $\widehat{g}^2$ which occurs where the indifference curve is tangential to the vertical line at $\overline{g}^1$. The Nash reaction function links the points where the indifference curves are vertical.

The Nash equilibrium occurs where the choices of the two consumers are the best reactions to each other so neither has an incentive to change their choice. This can only hold at a point at which the Nash reaction functions cross. The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 8.4 in which the reaction functions are simultaneously satisfied at their intersection. By definition, $\widehat{g}^1$ is the best reaction to $\widehat{g}^2$ and $\widehat{g}^2$ is the best reaction to $\widehat{g}^1$. The equilibrium is privately optimal: if a consumer were to unilaterally raise or reduce their purchase then they would move to a lower indifference curve.

Having determined the equilibrium, its welfare properties can now be addressed. From the construction of the reaction functions, it follows that at the equilibrium the indifference curve of consumer 1 is horizontal and that of consumer 2 is vertical. This is shown in Figure 8.5. It can be seen that all the points in the shaded area are Pareto-preferred to the equilibrium - moving to one of these points will make both consumers better-off. Starting at the equilibrium, these points can be achieved by both consumers simultaneously raising

Figure 8.3: Best Reaction for 2

Figure 8.4: Nash Equilibrium

Figure 8.5: Inefficiency of Equilibrium

their purchase of the public good. The Nash equilibrium is therefore not Pareto efficient although it is privately efficient. No further Pareto improvements can be made when a point is reached where the indifference curves are tangential. The locus of these tangencies, which constitutes the set of Pareto efficient allocations, is also shown in Figure 8.5.

The analysis has demonstrated that the outcome when individuals privately choose the quantity of the public goods they purchase is Pareto inefficient. A Pareto improvement can be achieved by all consumers increasing the purchases of public goods. Consequently, compared to Pareto preferred allocations, the total level of the public good consumed is too low. Why is this so? The answer can be attributed to strategic interaction and the free-riding that results. The free-riding emerges from each consumer relying on the other to provide the public good and thus avoiding the need to provide themselves. Since both consumers are attempting to free-ride in this way, too little of the public good is ultimately purchased. In the absence of government intervention or voluntary cooperation, inefficiency arises.

8.4 Optimal Provision

Efficiency in consumption for private goods is guaranteed by each consumer equating their marginal rate of substitution to the price ratio. The strategic interaction inherent with public goods does not ensure such equality. At a Pareto efficient allocation with the public good the indifference curves are tangential. However, this does not imply equality of the marginal rates of substitution because the indifference curves are defined over different combinations of public good purchased by the two consumers. As will soon be shown, the efficiency condition involves the sum of marginal rates of substitution and is termed the *Samuelson rule* in honour of its discoverer.

The basis for deriving the Samuelson rule is to observe that in Figure 8.5 the locus of Pareto efficient allocations has the property that the indifference curves of the two consumers are tangential. The gradient of these indifference curves is given by the rate at which g^2 can be traded for g^1 keeping utility constant. The tangency conditions can then be expressed by requiring that the gradients are equal so

$$\frac{dg^2}{dg^1}|_{U^1 const.} = \frac{dg^2}{dg^1}|_{U^2 const.}. \tag{8.2}$$

Calculating the derivatives using the utility functions (8.1), the efficiency condition (8.2) can be written as

$$\frac{U_x^1 - U_G^1}{U_G^1} = \frac{U_G^2}{U_x^2 - U_G^2}. \tag{8.3}$$

The marginal rate of substitution between the private and the public good for consumer h is defined by $MRS^h = \frac{U_G^h}{U_x^h}$. This can be used to re-arrange (8.3) in the form

$$\left[\frac{1}{MRS^1} - 1\right]\left[\frac{1}{MRS^2} - 1\right] = 1. \tag{8.4}$$

Multiplying across by $MRS^1 \times MRS^2$, (8.4) can be solved to give the final expression

$$MRS^1 + MRS^2 = 1. \tag{8.5}$$

This is the two-consumer version of the Samuelson rule.

To interpret this rule, the marginal rate of substitution should be viewed as a measure of the marginal benefit of another unit of the public good. The marginal cost of a unit of public good is one unit of private good. Therefore the rule says that an efficient allocation is achieved when the total marginal benefit of another unit of the public good, which is the sum of the individual benefits, is equal to the marginal cost of another unit. The rule can easily be extended to incorporate additional consumers: the total benefit remains the sum of the individual benefits.

Further insight into the Samuelson rule can be obtained by contrasting it with the corresponding rule for efficient provision of two private goods. For two consumers, 1 and 2, and two private goods this is

$$MRS^1 = MRS^2 = MRT, \tag{8.6}$$

where MRT denotes the marginal rate of transformation, the number of units of one good the economy has to given up to obtain an extra unit of the other good (The MRT between public and private good was assumed to be equal to 1 in the derivation of the Samuelson rule). The difference between (8.5) and (8.6) arises because an extra unit of the public good increases the utility of all consumers, so that the social benefit of this extra unit is found by summing the marginal benefits. This does not require equalization of the marginal benefit of all consumers. In contrast, an extra unit of private good can only be given to one consumer or another. Efficiency then occurs when it does not matter who the extra unit is given to so that the marginal benefits of all consumers are equalized.

The Samuelson rule provides a very simple description of the efficient outcomes but this does not mean that efficiency is easily achieved. It has already been shown that it will not be if there is no government intervention and agents act non-cooperatively (*i.e.* adopt Nash behavior). But what form should government intervention take? The most direct solution would be for the government to take total responsibility for provision of the public good and to finance it through lump-sum taxation. Because lump-sum taxes do not cause any distortions, this would ensure satisfaction of the rule. However, the difficulties of using lump-sum taxation have been explored in Chapter 7. The same shortcomings apply here. The use of other forms of taxation would introduce their own distortions, and these would prevent efficiency being achieved. In addition, to apply the Samuelson rule the government must know individual benefits from public good provision. In practice, this information is not readily available and the government must rely on what individuals choose to reveal.

The consequence of these observations is that efficiency will not be attained through direct public good provision with the use of any of the forms of taxation discussed so far. This finding provides the motivation for considering alternative allocation mechanisms that can provide the correct level of public good by eliciting preferences from consumers.

8.5 Voting

The failure of private actions to provide a public good efficiently suggests that alternative allocation mechanisms need to be considered. There are a range of responses that can be adopted to counteract the market failure, ranging from intervention with taxation through to direct provision by the government. In practice, the level of provision for public goods is frequently determined by the political process with competing parties in electoral systems differing in the level of public good provision they promise. The selection of one of the parties by voting then determines the level of public good provision.

We have already obtained a first insight into the provision of public goods by voting in Chapter 3. That analysis focused upon voting over the tax rate as a proxy for government size when people have different income levels. What we wish to do here is provide a contrast between the voting outcome and the efficient level of public good provision when people differ in tastes and income levels. Consider a population of consumers who determine the quantity of public good to be provided by a majority vote. The cost of the public good is shared equally between the consumers so, if G units of the public good are supplied, the cost to each consumer is $\frac{G}{H}$. With income M^h, the consumer can purchase private goods to the value of $M^h - \frac{G}{H}$ after paying for the public good. This provides an effective price of $\frac{1}{H}$ for each unit of the public good and a level of utility $U^h\left(M^h - \frac{G}{H}, G\right)$. The budget constraint, the highest attainable indifference curves and the most-preferred quantity of public good is shown in the upper part of Figure 8.6.

So that the Median Voter Theorem of Chapter 4 can be applied, assume that there is an odd number, H, of consumers where $H > 2$ and that each of the consumers has single-peaked preferences for the public good. This second assumption implies that when the level of utility is graphed against the quantity of public good there will be a single value of G^h that maximizes utility for consumer h. Such preferences are illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 8.6. The consumers are numbered so that their preferred levels of public good satisfy $G^1 < G^2 < ... < G^H$.

Under these assumptions, the Median Voter Theorem ensures that the consumer with the median preference for the public good will be decisive in the majority vote. The median preference belongs to the consumer at position $\frac{H+1}{2}$ in the ranking. We label the median consumer as m and denote their chosen quantity of the public good by G^m. A remarkable feature of the majority voting outcome is that nobody is able to manipulate the outcome to their advantage by misrepresenting their preference and so sincere voting is the best strategy. The reason is that anyone to the left of the median can only affect the final outcome by voting to the right of the median which would move the outcome further away from his preferred position, and vice versa for anyone to the right of the median.

Having demonstrated that voting will reveal preferences and that the voting outcome will be the quantity G^m, it now remains to ask whether the voting outcome is efficient. The value G^m is the preferred choice of consumer m so it solves

$$\max_{\{G\}} U^m\left(M^m - \frac{G}{H}, G\right). \tag{8.7}$$

where M^m denotes the income of the median voter which can differ from the median income with heterogenous preferences. Calculating the first-order condition for the maximization, this can be expressed in terms of the marginal rate of substitution to show that the voting outcome is described by

$$MRS^m = \frac{1}{H}, \tag{8.8}$$

In contrast, because the marginal rate of transformation is equal to 1, the efficient outcome satisfies the Samuelson rule

$$\sum_{h=1}^{H} MRS^h = 1. \tag{8.9}$$

Contrasting these, the voting outcome is efficient only if

$$MRS^m = \sum_{h=1}^{H} \frac{MRS^h}{H}. \tag{8.10}$$

Figure 8.6: Allocation through Voting

Therefore majority voting leads to efficient provision of the public good only if the median voter's MRS is equal to the mean MRS of the population of voters. There is no reason to expect that it will, so it must be concluded that majority voting will not generally achieve an efficient outcome. This is because the voting outcome does not take account of preferences other than those of the median voter: changing all the preferences except those of the median voter does not affect the voting outcome (although it would affect the optimal public good provision).

Can any comments be offered on whether majority voting typically leads to too much or too little public good? In general the answer has to be no, since no natural restrictions can be appealed to and the median voter's MRS may be lower or higher than the mean. If it is lower, then too little public good will provided. The converse holds if it is higher. The only approach that might give an insight is to note that the distribution of income has a very long right tail. If the MRS is higher for lower income voters, then the nature of the income distribution suggests that the median MRS is higher than the mean. Thus, voting will lead to an excess quantity of public good being provided. Alternatively, if the MRS is increasing with income, then voting would lead to underprovision.

8.6 Personalized Prices

We have now studied two allocation mechanisms that lead to inefficient outcomes. The private market fails because of free-riding and voting fails because the choice of the decisive median voter need not match the efficient choice. What these have in common is that the consumers face incorrect incentives. In both cases the decision makers take account only of the private benefit of the public good rather than the broader social benefit (*i.e.*, that public good contribution also benefits others). As a general rule, efficiency will only be attained by modifying the incentives to align private and social benefits.

The first method for achieving efficiency involves using an extended pricing mechanism for the public good. This mechanism uses prices which are "personalized", with each consumer paying a price that is designed to fit their situation. These personalized prices modify the actual price in two ways. Firstly, they adjust the price of the public good to align social and private benefits. Secondly, they further adjust the price to capture each consumer's individual valuation of the public good.

This latter aspect can be further understood by considering the differences between public and private goods. With private goods, consumers face a common price but choose to purchase different quantities according to their preferences. In contrast, with a pure public good, all consumers consume the same quantity. This can only be efficient if the consumers wish to purchase the same given quantity of the public good. They can be induced to do so by correctly choosing the price they face. For instance, a consumer who places a low value on the public good should face a low price whilst a consumer with a high valuation should face a high price. This reasoning is illustrated in Table 8.1.

	Private Good	Public Good
Price	Same	Different
Quantity	Different	Same

Table 8.1: Prices and Quantities

The idea of personalized pricing can be captured by assuming that the government announces the share of the cost of the public good that each consumer must bear. For example, it may say that each of two consumers must pay half the cost of the public good. Having heard the announcement of these shares, the consumers then state how much of the public good they wish to have supplied. If they both wish to have the same level, then that level is supplied. If their wishes differ, the shares are adjusted and the process repeated. The adjustment continues until shares are reached at which both wish to have the same quantity. This final point is called a *Lindahl equilibrium.* It can easily be seen how this mechanism overcomes the two sources of inefficiency. The fact that the consumers only pay a share of the cost reduces the perceived unit price of the public good. Hence the private cost appears lower and the consumers increase their demands for the public good. Additionally, the shares can be tailored to match the individual valuations.

To make this reasoning concrete, let the share of the public good that has to paid by consumer h be denoted τ^h. The scheme must be self-financing so, with two consumers, $\tau^1 + \tau^2 = 1$. Now let G^h denote the quantity of the public good that household h would choose to have provided when faced with the budget constraint

$$x^h + \tau^h G^h = M^h. \tag{8.11}$$

The Lindahl equilibrium shares $\left\{\tau^1, \tau^2\right\}$ are found when $G^1 = G^2$. The reason why efficiency is attained can be seen in the illustration of the Lindahl equilibrium in Figure 8.7. The indifference curves reflect preferences over levels of the public good and shares in the cost. The shape of these captures the fact that each consumer prefers more of the public good but dislikes an increased share. The highest indifference curve for consumer 1 is to the north west and the highest for consumer 2 to the north-east. Maximizing utility for a given share (which gives a vertical line in the figure), the highest level of utility is achieved where the indifference curve is vertical. Below this point the consumer is willing to pay a higher share for more public good and above it is just the other way around. Hence the indifference curves are backward-bending. The *Lindahl reaction functions* are then formed as the loci of the vertical points of the indifference curve. The equilibrium requires that both consumers demand the same level of the public good; this occurs at the intersection of the reactions functions. At this point, the indifference curves of the two consumers are tangential and the equilibrium is Pareto efficient.

To derive the efficiency result formally, note that utility is given by the function $U^h\left(M^h - \tau^h G^h, G^h\right)$. The first-order condition for the choice of the

Figure 8.7: The Lindahl Equilibrium

quantity of public good is

$$\frac{U_G^h}{U_x^h} = \tau^h, h = 1, 2. \tag{8.12}$$

Summing these conditions for the two consumers

$$\frac{U_G^1}{U_x^1} + \frac{U_G^2}{U_x^2} \equiv MRS^1 + MRS^2 = \tau^1 + \tau^2 = 1. \tag{8.13}$$

This is the Samuelson rule for the economy and establishes that the equilibrium is efficient. The personalized prices equate the individual valuations of the supply of public goods to the cost of production in a way that uniform pricing cannot. They also correct for the divergence between private and social benefits.

Although personalized prices seems a very simple way of resolving the public good problem, when considered more closely a number of difficulties arise in actually applying them. Firstly, there is the very practical problem of determining the prices in an economy with many consumers. The practical difficulties involved in announcing and adjusting the individual shares are essentially insurmountable. Secondly, there are also issues raised concerning the incentives for consumers to reveal their true demands.

The analysis assumed that the consumers were honest in revealing their reactions to the announcement of cost shares *i.e.* they simply maximize utility by taking the share of cost as given. However, there will in fact be a gain to any consumer who attempts to cheat, or *manipulate*, the allocation mechanism. By announcing preferences that do not coincide with their true preferences, it is possible for a consumer to shift the outcome in their favor, provided that the

Figure 8.8: Gaining by False Announcement

other does not do likewise. To see this, assume that consumer 1 acts honestly and that consumer 2 knows this and knows the reaction function of 1. In Figure 8.8, an honest announcement on the part of consumer 2 would lead to the equilibrium e_L where the two Lindahl reaction functions cross. However, by claiming their preferences to be given by the dashed Lindahl reaction function rather than the true function, the equilibrium can be driven to point e_M which represents the maximization of 2's utility given the Lindahl reaction function of 1. This improvement for consumer 2 reveals the incentive for dishonest behavior.

The use of personalized prices can achieve efficiency but only if the consumers act honestly. If a consumers acts strategically, they are able to manipulate the outcome to their advantage. This suggests that the search for a means of attaining the Samuelson rule should be restricted to allocation mechanisms that cannot be manipulated in this way. This is the focus of the next section.

8.7 Mechanism Design

The previous section has shown how consumers have an incentive to reveal false demand information when personalized prices are being determined. That a consumer will behave dishonestly if it is in their interests to do so follows from the consistent application of the assumption of utility maximization. This observation has lead to the search for allocation mechanisms that are immune from attempted manipulation. As will be shown, the design of some of these mechanisms leads households to reveal their true preferences. From this property is derived the description of these mechanisms as *preference revelation mechanisms.*

8.7.1 Examples of Preference Revelation

The general problem of preference revelation is now illustrated by considering two simple examples. In both of the examples both people are shown to gain by making false statements of their preferences. If they act rationally, then they will choose to make false statements. Since these situations have the nature of strategic games, we call the participants *players*.

Example 1: False Understatement

The decision facing the players is to choose either to produce or not produce a fixed quantity of a public good. If the public good is not produced then $G = 0$. If it is produced, $G = 1$. The cost of the public good is given by $C = 1$. The gross benefit of the public good for players 1 and 2 is given by $v^1 = v^2 = 1$. Since the social benefit of providing the good is $v^1 + v^2 = 2$, which is greater than the cost, it is socially beneficial to provide the public good.

Each player makes a report, r^h, of the benefit they receive from the public good. This report can either be false, in which case $r^h = 0$, or truthful so that $r^h = v^h = 1$. Given the reports, the public good is provided if the sum of announced valuations is at least as high as the cost. This gives the collective decision rule to choose $G = 1$ if $r^1 + r^2 \geq C = 1$, and to choose $G = 0$ otherwise. The cost of the public good is shared between the two players, with the shares proportional to the announced valuations. In detail,

$$\begin{aligned} c^h &= 1 \text{ if } r^h = 1 \text{ and } r^{h'} = 0, && (8.14) \\ c^h &= \frac{1}{2} \text{ if } r^h = 1 \text{ and } r^{h'} = 1, && (8.15) \\ c^h &= 0 \text{ if } r^h = 0 \text{ and } r^{h'} = 0 \text{ or } 1. && (8.16) \end{aligned}$$

The net benefit, the difference between true benefit and cost, which is termed the *payoff* from the mechanism, is then given by

$$\begin{aligned} U^h &= v^h - c^h \text{ if } r^1 + r^2 \geq 1, && (8.17) \\ &= 0 \text{ otherwise.} && (8.18) \end{aligned}$$

This information can be summarized in the payoff matrix in Figure 8.9.

From the payoff matrix it can be seen that the announcement $r^h = 0$ is a weakly-dominant strategy for both players. For instance, if player 2 chooses $r^2 = 1$, then player 1 will choose $r^1 = 0$. Alternatively, if player 2 chooses $r^2 = 0$, then player 1 is indifferent between the two strategies of $r^1 = 0$ and $r^1 = 1$. The Nash equilibrium of the game is therefore $\widehat{r}^1 = 0$, $\widehat{r}^2 = 0$.

In equilibrium both players will understate their valuation of the public good. As a result the public good is not provided despite it being socially beneficial to do so. The reason is that the proportional cost-sharing rule gives an incentive to under-report preferences for public good. With both players under-reporting, the public good is not provided. To circumvent this problem we can make contributions independent of the reports. This is our next example.

Figure 8.9: Announcements and Payoffs

Example 2: False Overstatement

The second example is distinguished from the first by considering a public good which is socially non-desirable with a cost greater than the social benefit. The possible announcements and the charging scheme are also changed.

It is assumed that the gross payoffs when the public good is provided are

$$v_1 = 0 < v_2 = \frac{3}{4}. \tag{8.19}$$

With the cost of the public good remaining at 1, these payoffs imply that

$$v_1 + v_2 = \frac{3}{4} < C = 1, \tag{8.20}$$

so the social benefit from the public good is less than its cost.

The possible announcements of the two players are given by $r^1 = 0$ or 1 and $r^2 = \frac{3}{4}$ or 1. These announcements permit the players to either tell the truth or overstate the benefit so as to induce public good provision. Assume that there is also a uniform charge for the public good if it is provided so $c^h = \frac{1}{2}$ if $r^1 + r^2 \geq c = 1$, and $c^h = 0$ otherwise. These valuations and charges imply the net benefits

$$\begin{aligned} U^h &= v^h - c^h \text{ if } r^1 + r^2 \geq 1, && (8.21) \\ U^h &= 0 \text{ otherwise.} && (8.22) \end{aligned}$$

These can be used to construct the payoff matrix in Figure 8.10.

The weakly-dominant strategy for player 1 is to play $r^1 = 0$ and the best response of player 2 is to select $r^2 = 1$ (which is also a dominant strategy). Therefore the Nash equilibrium is $r^1 = 0$, $r^2 = 1$ which results in the provision of a socially non-desirable public good. The combination of payoffs and charging scheme has resulted in overstatement and unnecessary provision. The explanation for this is that the player 2 is able to guarantee the good is provided by announcing $r^2 = 1$. Their private gain is $\frac{1}{4}$ but this is more than offset by the loss of $-\frac{1}{2}$ for player 1.

Figure 8.10: Payoffs and Overstatement

8.7.2 Clarke-Groves Mechanism

The examples have shown that true valuations may not be revealed for some mechanisms linking announcement to contribution. Even worse, it is possible that the wrong social decision is made. The question then arises as to whether there is a mechanism that will always ensure that true values are revealed (as for voting), and at the same time that the optimal public good level is provided (which voting cannot do).

The potential for constructing such a mechanism, and the difficulties in doing so, can be understood by retaining the simple allocation problem of the examples which involves the decision on whether to provide a single public good of fixed size. The construction of a length of road or the erection of a public monument both fit with this scenario. The cost of the project is known and it is also known how the cost is allocated between the consumers that make up the population. What needs to be found from the consumers is how much their valuation of the public good exceeds, or falls short of, their contribution to the cost.

Each consumer knows the benefit they will gain if the public good is provided and they know the cost they will have to pay. The difference between the benefit and the cost is called the *net benefit*. This can be positive or negative. The decision rule is that the public good is provided if the sum of reported net benefits is (weakly) positive.

Consider two consumers with true net benefits v^1 and v^2. The mechanism we consider is the following. Each consumer makes an announcement of their net benefit. Denote the report by r^h. The public good is provided if the sum of announced net benefits satisfies $r^1 + r^2 \geq 0$. If the public good is not provided, each consumer receives a payoff of 0. If the good is provided, then each consumer receives a *side payment* equal to the reported net benefit of the other consumer; hence if the public good is provided consumer 1 receives a total payoff of $v^1 + r^2$ and consumer 2 receives $v^2 + r^1$. It is these additional side payments that will lead to the truth being told by inducing each consumer to "internalize" the net benefit of the public good for the other. If the public good is not provided, no side payments are made.

Figure 8.11: Clarke-Groves Mechanism

Figure 8.12: Payoffs for Player 1

To see how this mechanism works, assume that the true net benefits and the reports can take the values of either -1 or $+1$. The public good will not be provided if both report a value of -1, but if at least one reports $+1$ it will be provided. The payoffs to the mechanism are summarized in the payoff matrix in Figure 8.11.

The claim we now wish to demonstrate is that this mechanism provides no incentive to make a false announcement of the net benefit. To do this it is enough to focus on player 1 and show that they will report truthfully when $v^1 = -1$ and when $v^1 = +1$. The payoffs relating to the true values are in the two payoff matrices in Figure 8.12.

Take the case of $v^1 = -1$. Then consumer 1 finds the true announcement to be weakly dominant - the payoff from being truthful (the top row) is greater if $r^2 = -1$ and equal if $r^2 = +1$. Next take the case of $r^1 = +1$. Consumer 1 is indifferent between truth and non-truth. But the point is that there is now no incentive to provide a false announcement. Hence truth should be expected.

The problem with this mechanism is the side payments that have to be made. If the public good is provided and $v^1 = v^2 = +1$, then the total side payments are equal to 2 - which amounts to the total net benefit of the public good. These side payments are money that has to be put into the system to support the telling of truth. Obtaining the truth is possible, but it is costly.

8.7.3 Clarke Tax

The problems caused by the existence of the side payments can be reduced, but they can never be eliminated. The reason it cannot be eliminated entirely is simply that the mechanism is extracting information and this can never be done for free. The way in which the side payments can be reduced is to modify the structure of the mechanism.

One way to do this is for side payments to be made only if the announcement of a player *changes* the social decision. To see what this implies, consider calculating the sum of the announced benefits of all players but one. Whether this is positive or negative will determine a social decision for those players. Now add the announcement of the final player. Does this change the social decision? If it does, then the final player is said to be *pivotal*, and a set of side payments are implemented that requires taxing the pivotal agent for the cost inflicted on the other agent through the changed social decision. This process is repeated for each player in turn. These side payments are the *Clarke taxes* which ensure that the correct decision is made so that the public good is produced if it is socially desirable and not otherwise. The use of Clarke taxes reduces the number of circumstances in which the side payments are made.

In a game with only two players, the payoffs for player 1 are when the Clarke taxes are used are

$$\begin{aligned}
v^1 &\text{ if } r^1 + r^2 \geq 0 \text{ and } r^2 \geq 0, && (8.23)\\
v^1 - t^1 &\text{ if } r^1 + r^2 \geq 0 \text{ and } r^2 < 0, \text{with } t^1 = -r^2 > 0, && (8.24)\\
-t^1 &\text{ if } r^1 + r^2 < 0 \text{ and } r^2 \geq 0, \text{with } t^1 = r^2 \geq 0, && (8.25)\\
0 &\text{ if } r^1 + r^2 < 0 \text{ and } r^2 < 0. && (8.26)
\end{aligned}$$

Only in the second and third cases is player 1 pivotal (respectively,, by providing and not providing the public good) and for these a tax is levied on him reflecting the cost to the other agent of changing public good provision ($t^1 = -r^2 > 0$ for the cost of imposing provision, and $t^1 = r^2 \geq 0$ for the cost of stopping provision).

The Clarke taxes induce truthtelling and guarantee that the public good is produced if and only if it is socially desirable. The explanation is that any misreport that changes the decision about the public good would induce the payment of a tax in excess of the benefit from the change in decision. Indeed, suppose the public good is socially desirable, so $v^1 + v^2 \geq 0$, but that player 1 dislikes it, so $v^1 < 0$. Then, given an honest announcement from player 2 with $r^2 = v^2$, by underreporting sufficiently to prevent provision of the public good (so $r^1 < -r^2$) player 1 becomes pivotal and will have to pay a tax of $t^1 = r^2 = v^2$ which is in excess of the gain from non provision, $-v^1$ (since

$v^1 + v^2 \geq 0 \Rightarrow v^2 \geq -v^1$). Hence player 1 is better off telling the truth and, given this truthtelling, player 2 is also better off telling the truth (although in this case he is the pivotal agent, inducing provision and paying a tax equal to the damage of public good provision for player 1, $t^2 = -r^1 = -v^1$).

The conclusion is that the Clarke tax induces preference revelation, and by restricting side payments to pivotal agents only, it lowers the cost of information revelation.

8.7.4 Further Comments

The theory of mechanism design shows that it is possible to construct schemes which ensure the truth will be revealed and correct social decision made. These mechanisms may work but they are undoubtedly complex to implement. Putting this objection aside, it can still be argued that such revelation mechanisms are not actually needed in practice. Two major reasons can be provided to support this contention.

Firstly, the mechanisms are built on the basis that the players will be rational and precise in their strategic calculations. In practice, many people may not act as strategically as the theory suggests. As in the theory of tax evasion in Chapter 18, non-monetary benefits may be derived simply from acting honestly. These benefits may provide a sufficient incentive that the true valuation is reported. In such circumstances, the revelation mechanism will not be needed.

Secondly, the market activities of consumers often indirectly reveal the valuation of public goods. To give an example of what is meant by this, consider the case of housing. A house is a collection of characteristics, such as the number of rooms, size of garden and access to amenities. The price that a house purchaser is willing to pay is determined by their assessment of the total value of these characteristics. Equally, the cost of supplying a house is also dependent upon the characteristics supplied. By observing the equilibrium prices of houses with different characteristics, it is possible to determine the value assigned to each characteristic separately. If one of the characteristics relates to a public good, for example the closeness to a public park, the value of this public good can then be inferred. Such implicit valuation methods can be applied to a broad range of public goods by carefully choosing the related private good. Since consumers have no incentive to act strategically in purchasing private goods, the true valuations should be revealed.

The fact that consumers may have an incentive to falsely reveal their valuations can also be exploited to obtain an approximation of the true value. This can be done by running two preference revelation mechanisms simultaneously. If one is designed to lead to an under-reporting of the true valuation and the other one to over-reporting, then the true value of the public good can be taken as lying somewhere between the over- and under-reports. The Swedish economist Bohm has conducted an experimental implementation of this procedure. In the experiment, 200 people from Stockholm had to evaluate the benefit of seeing a previously unshown TV program. The participants were divided into four groups which faced the following payment mechanisms: (i) pay stated valuation; (ii) pay a fraction of stated valuation such that costs are covered from all payments; (iii) pay a low flat fee and (iv) no payment. Although the first two provide an incentive to under-report and the latter two to over-report, the experiment found that there was no significant difference in the stated valuations, suggesting that misrevelation may not be as important as suggested by the theory.

8.8 More on Private Provision

The analysis of the private purchase of a public good in Section 8.3 focused upon the issue of efficiency. The analysis showed that a Pareto improvement could be made from the equilibrium point if both consumers simultaneously raised their contributions, so that the equilibrium could not be efficient. This finding was sufficient to develop the contrast with efficient provision and for investigating mechanism design.

Although useful, these are not the only results that emerge from the private purchase model. The model actually generates several remarkably precise predictions about the effect of income transfers and increases in the number of purchasers. These results are now described and then contrasted with empirical and experimental evidence.

8.8.1 Neutrality and Population Size

The first result concerns the effect of redistributing income. Consider transferring an amount of income Δ from consumer 1 to consumer 2, so the income of consumer 1 falls to $M^1 - \Delta$ and that of consumer 2 rises to $M^2 + \Delta$. We wish to calculate the effect that this transfer has upon the equilibrium level of public good purchases. To do this, notice that the equilibrium in Figure 8.5 is identified by the fact that it occurs where an indifference curve for consumer 1 crosses an indifference curve for consumer 2 at right angles. Hence the effect of the transfer upon the equilibrium can be found by determining how it affects the indifference curve.

Consider consumer 1 who has their income reduced by Δ. If we also reduce their public good purchase by Δ and raise that of consumer 2 by Δ, the utility of consumer 1 is unchanged because

$$U^1\left(M^1 - g^1, g^1 + g^2\right) = U^1\left(\left[M^1 - \Delta\right] - \left[g^1 - \Delta\right], \left[g^1 - \Delta\right] + \left[g^2 + \Delta\right]\right). \tag{8.27}$$

This determines that the transfer of income causes the indifference curves and the best-reaction function of consumer 1 to move as illustrated in Figure 8.13. The indifference curve through any point g^1, g^2 before the income transfer shifts to pass through the point $g^1 - \Delta, g^2 + \Delta$ after the income transfer. The transfer of income has the same effect upon the indifference curves and best-reaction function consumer 2. By considering the reduction in purchase of consumer 1

Figure 8.13: Effect of Income Transfer

and the increase by consumer 2 it follows that

$$U^2\left(M^2 - g^2, g^1 + g^2\right) = U^2\left(\left[M^2 + \Delta\right] - \left[g^2 + \Delta\right], \left[g^1 - \Delta\right] + \left[g^2 + \Delta\right]\right). \tag{8.28}$$

For consumer 2, the indifference curve through g^1, g^2 before the income transfer becomes that through $g^1 - \Delta, g^2 + \Delta$ after the transfer.

These shifts in the indifference curves result in the equilibrium moving as in Figure 8.14. The point where the indifference curves cross at right angles shifts in the same way as the individual indifference curves. If the equilibrium was initially at $\widehat{g}^1, \widehat{g}^2$ before the income transfer, it is located at $\widehat{g}^1 - \Delta, \widehat{g}^2 + \Delta$ after the transfer.

The important result now comes from noticing that in the move from the original to the new equilibrium, consumer 1 reduces their purchase of the public good by Δ but consumer 2 increases their by the same amount Δ. These changes in the value of purchases exactly match the change in income level. The net outcome is that the levels of private consumption remain unchanged for the two consumers and the total supply of the public good is also unchanged. As a consequence, the income transfer does not affect the levels of consumption in equilibrium - all it does is to redistribute the burden of purchase. Income redistribution is entirely offset by opposite redistribution of private contributions. This result, known as *income distribution invariance*, is a consequence of the fact that the utility levels of the consumers are linked via the quantity of public good.

The second interesting result is that the transfer of income leaves the utility

Figure 8.14: New Equilibrium

levels of the two consumers unchanged. This has to be so since we have just seen the consumption levels do not change. Therefore, the redistribution of income has not affected the distribution of welfare because the transfer is simply offset by the change in public good purchases. This is an example of *policy neutrality*: by changing their behavior the individuals in the economy are able to undo what the government is trying to do. Income redistribution will always be neutral until the point is reached at which one of the consumers no longer purchases the public good. Only then will further income transfers affect the distribution of utility.

A third result follows easily from income invariance. Let both consumers have the same utility function but possibly different income levels. Since the quantity of public good consumed by both must be the same, the first-order conditions require that both must also consume the same quantity of private good; hence $x^1 = x^2$. Further, these common levels of consumption imply that the consumers must have the same utility levels even if there is an initial income disparity. The private provision model therefore implies that, when the consumers have identical utilities, contribution behavior will equalize utilities even in the face of income differentials. The poor will cut their contributions relative to the rich to a sufficient extent to makes them equally well off.

This model can also be used to consider the consequence of variations in the number of households. Maintaining the assumption that all the consumers are identical in terms of both preferences and income, for an economy with H consumers the total provision of the public good is $G = \sum\limits_{h=1}^{H} g^h$ and the utility of h is

Figure 8.15: Additional Consumers

$$U^h = U\left(M - g^h, G\right) = U\left(M - g^h, \bar{G}^h + g^h\right). \tag{8.29}$$

Here $\bar{G}^h$ is the total contributions of all consumers other than h. Since all consumers are identical, it makes sense to focus on symmetric equilibria where all consumers make the same contribution. Hence let $g^h = g$ for all h. It follows that at at symmetric equilibrium

$$g = \frac{\overline{G}}{H-1}. \tag{8.30}$$

In a graph of g against $\bar{G}$ an allocation satisfying (8.30) must lie somewhere on a ray through the origin with gradient $H-1$ and, for each level of H, the equilibrium is given by the intersection of the appropriate ray with the reaction function. This is shown in Figure 8.15.

The important point is what happens to the equilibrium level of provision as the number of consumer tends to infinity (the idealization of a "large" population). What happens can be seen by considering the consequence of the ray in Figure 8.15 becoming vertical: the equilibrium will be at the point where the reaction function crosses the vertical axis. As this point is reached the provision of each consumer will tend to zero but aggregate provision will not since it is the sum of infinitely many zeros. This result can be summarized by saying that in a large population each consumer will effectively contribute nothing.

8.8.2 Experimental Evidence

The analysis of private provision demonstrated that the equilibrium will not be Pareto efficient and that, compared to Pareto-improving allocations, too little

Figure 8.16: Public Good Experiment

of the public good will be purchased. A simple explanation of this result can be given in terms of each consumer relying on others to purchase and hence deciding to purchase too little themselves. Each consumer is free-riding on others' purchases and, since all attempt to free-ride, the total value of purchases fails to reach the efficient level. This conclusion has been subjected to close experimental scrutiny.

The basic form of experiment is to give participants a number of tokens that can be invested in either a private good or a public good. Each participant makes a single purchase decision. The private good provides a benefit only for its purchaser while purchase of public good provides a benefit to all participants. These values are set so that the private benefit is less than the social benefit. The benefits are known to the participants and the total benefit from purchases is the payoff to the participant at the end of the experiment. It is therefore in the interests of each participant to maximize their payoff.

To see how this works in detail, assume that there are 10 participants in the game. Allow each participant to have 10 tokens to spend. A unit of the private good costs 1 token and provides a benefit of 5 units (private benefit=social benefit=5). A unit of the public good also costs 1 token but provides a benefit of 1 unit to *all* the participants in the game (private benefit=1<social benefit=10). The returns are summarized in Figure 8.16.

If the game is played once (a one-shot game), the Nash equilibrium strategy is to purchase only the private good since each token spent on the private good yields a return five times higher than for the public good. In equilibrium, the total return to each player is 50. In contrast, the socially-efficient outcome is for all players to purchase only the public good and to generate a payoff of 100 to each player. The fact that the Nash equilibrium differs from the efficient outcome is because the private benefits diverge from the social benefits. Thus, in the one-shot game, all tokens should be spent on the private good.

In experimental implementations of this game, the average value of purchases of the public good has been approximately 30% to 90% of tokens, with most observations falling in the 40%-50% range. (Among student participants, contributions have been lowest for those studying economics and fall with the number of years of economics taken! Clearly, instructors have some success in teaching how to play strategic games.) Since the purchase of public good is significantly different from 0, these results clearly do not support the predictions of the private-purchase model.

Some experiments have repeated the purchase decision over several rounds with the view that this should allow time for the participants to learn about free-riding and develop the optimal strategy. The results from such experiments are not as clear and a wider range of purchases occur. Free-riding is not completely supported, but instances have been reported in which it does occur. However, this finding should be treated with caution since having several rounds of the game introduces aspects of repeated game theory. While it remains true that the only credible equilibrium of the repeated game is the private-purchase equilibrium of the corresponding single-period game, it is possible that in the experiments some participants may have been attempting to establish cooperative equilibria by playing in a fashion that invited cooperation. Additionally, those not trained in game theory may have been unable to derive the optimal strategy even though they could solve the single-period game.

Other results show that increasing group size leads to increased divergence from the efficient outcome when accompanied by a decrease in marginal return from the public good but the results do not support a pure numbers-in-group effect. This finding is compatible with the theoretical finding that the effect of group size on the divergence from optimality was in general indeterminate.

These results indicate that there is little evidence of free-riding in single-period, or one-shot, games but in the repeated games the purchases fall towards the private-purchase level as the game is repeated. In total, these experiments do not provide great support for the equilibrium based on the private-purchase model with Nash behavior. In the single-period games free-riding is unambiguously rejected. Although it appears after several rounds in repeated games, the explanation for the strategies involved is not entirely apparent. Neither a strategic nor a learning hypothesis is confirmed. What seems to be occurring is that the participants are initially guided more by a sense of fairness than by Nash behavior. When this fairness is not rewarded, the tendency is then to move towards the Nash equilibrium. The failure of experimentation to support free-riding lends some encouragement to the views that although such behavior may be individually optimal, it is not actually observed in practice.

8.8.3 Modifications

The empirical and experimental evidence has produced a number of conflicts with the predictions of the theoretical model. The analysis of private-purchase has been based on two fundamental assumptions. The utility of consumers was assumed to depend only upon the consumption of the private good and the total supply of the public good. This ensures that consumers do not care directly about the size of their own contribution nor do they care about the behavior of other consumers except for how it affects the total level of the public good. The second assumption was that the consumers acted non-cooperatively and played according to the assumptions of Nash equilibrium.

The simplest modification that can be made to the model is to consider the game being played in a different way. The foundation of the Nash equilibrium is that each player takes the behavior of the others as given when optimizing.

One way to change this is to consider "conjectural variations" so that each players forms an opinion as to how their choice will affect that of others. If the conjectural variation is positive, each player predicts that the others will respond to an increase in purchase by also making additional purchases. Such a positive conjecture can be interpreted as being more cooperative than the zero conjecture that arises in the Nash equilibrium and leads to the equilibrium having greater total public good supply than the Nash equilibrium.

Moving to non-Nash conjectures may alter the equilibrium level of the public good but it does not eliminate the neutrality properties. Furthermore, the major objection to this approach is that it is entirely arbitrary. There are sensible reasons founded in game theory for focusing upon the Nash equilibrium and no other set of conjectures can appeal to similar justification. If the Nash equilibrium of the private purchase model does not agree with observations, it would seem that the objectives of the households and the social rules they observe should be reconsidered not the conjectures they hold when maximizing.

One approach to modified preferences is to assume that the consumer derives utility directly from the contribution they make. For instance, making a donation to charity can make a consumer feel good about themself; they are acting as a "good citizen". This is often referred to as the "warm glow" effect. With a warm glow, a purchase of the public good provides a return from direct consumption of the public good and a further return from the warm glow. The private warm glow effect increases the value of the purchase and so raises the equilibrium level of total purchases. The equilibrium also no longer has the same invariance properties. This seems a significant advance were it not that the specification of the warm glow is entirely arbitrary.

A final modification is to remove the individualism and allow for social interaction by modifying the rules of social behavior. In the same way that social effects can arise with tax evasion, they can also occur with public goods. One way to do this is to introduce reciprocity under which each consumer considers the contributions of others and contrasts them to what they feel they should have made. If the contributions of others match, or exceed, what is expected then the consumer is assumed to feel under an obligation to make a similar contribution. This again raises the equilibrium level of contribution.

8.9 Fund-Raising Campaigns

The model of voluntary provision that we have considered so far has involved a single one-off contribution decision. It is easy to appreciate that once these contributions have been made the consumers may look again at the situation and realize it is inefficient. This could give them an incentive to conduct a second round of contribution which will move the equilibrium closer to efficiency. Repeatedly applying this argument suggests that it may be possible to eventually reach efficiency. We now assess this claim by addressing it within a simple fund-raising game.

The basis of the fund-raising game is that target level of funds must be achieved before a public good can be provided. For example, consider the target the minimum cost of construction for a public library. Subscribers to the campaign take it in turn to make either a contribution or a pledge to contribute. Only when the target is met does the process cease. The basic question is whether such a fund-raising campaign can be successful given the possibility of free-riding.

We model a campaign as a game with an infinite horizon, meaning that solicitation for donations can continue until the goal is met. There is one public good (or joint project) whose production cost is C and two identical players X and Y. These players derive the same benefit, B, from public good, so the total benefit is $2B$. Both also have the same discount rate δ, $0 < \delta < 1$, for delaying completion of the project by one period.

The players alternate in making contributions. The sequential (marginal) contributions are denoted $(..., x_{t-1}, y_t, x_{t+1}, ...)$ where x_{t-1} denotes the contribution of player X at time $t-1$ and y_t denotes the contribution of player Y at time t. The game ends, and the public good is provided, only when the total contributions cover the cost of the public good. Individuals derive no benefits from the public good before completion of the fund raising so the marginal contributions yield no return until the cost is met. It follows that the incentive of each player to wait for the other one to contribute (free riding) must be balanced against the cost of delaying completion of the project. We suppose that the public good is "socially desirable", so $C < 2B$, but that no single player values the public good enough to bear the full cost, so $B < C$. We now contrast two different forms of fund-raising campaigns. In the first, the *contribution campaign*, the contributions are paid at the time they are made. In the second, the *subscription campaign*, players are asked in sequence to make donation pledges that are not be paid until the cost is met.

8.9.1 The Contribution Campaign

In the contribution campaign, contributions are sunk at the time they are made because a credible commitment cannot be made to make contributions later. The lack of commitment leads each player to back his contribution to assure that the other player contributes their share. This is because past contributions are sunk and cannot influence the division of the remaining cost between the players. As a result, we show that it is never possible to raise the money even though the project is worthwhile.

The two players are asked in sequence to make a contribution. While there is no natural end period, there is a total contribution level that is close enough to the cost C that the contributor whose turn it is should complete the fund-raising rather than waiting for the other one to make up the difference. Suppose that it is player X's turn to make a contribution offer at that final round T. There exists a deficit $C - x_T$ sufficiently small that player X is indifferent between making up the difference and getting a payoff of $B - x_T$ or waiting in the expectation (at best) that player Y will make up the difference in the next round and producing a payoff with delayed completion of δB. Hence, the maximal contribution of player 1 in the final round T is

$$x_T = (1 - \delta)B, \tag{8.31}$$

so the contribution is equal to the benefit of speeding up completion of the project. We suppose that $(1-\delta)B < C$ so that such a contribution cannot cover the full cost and a donation from player Y must be solicited. Working backward, it is now player Y's turn to make a contribution at time $T-1$. Player Y anticipates that in bringing (total) contributions up to $C - x_T$ at date $T-1$, player X will complete the project the next period. So there exists a sufficiently small deficit such that player Y is indifferent between bringing total contributions up to that level giving a payoff $\delta B - y_{T-1}$or waiting for the other player to make such contribution while making himself the final contribution x_T which produces a payoff $\delta^2 [B - x_T]$ (*i.e.*, two periods later you get the completed project benefit B and pay the last contribution x_T). Hence, substituting for x_T, the contribution at time $T-1$ that makes player Y indifferent is

$$y_{T-1} = \delta(1 - \delta^2)B. \tag{8.32}$$

Proceeding backward to date $T-2$, it is now the turn of player X to make a contribution. Using the same line of argument, there exists a total contribution level at date $T-2$ such that player X is indifferent between bringing total contribution up to that level to get a payoff $\delta^2 [B - x_T] - x_{T-2}$ from completion in two periods or waiting and delaying completion to get a payoff $\delta^3 B - \delta^2 y_{T-1}$(in which from the switching position it becomes worthwhile to contribute y_{T-1}). Substituting for x_T and y_{T-1} gives

$$x_{T-2} = \delta^3(1 - \delta^2)B. \tag{8.33}$$

Moving back to round $T-3$ and following the same reasoning, the potential contribution at time $T-3$ from player Y is

$$y_{T-3} = \delta^5(1 - \delta^2)B, \tag{8.34}$$

and the potential contribution at time $T-4$ is

$$x_{T-4} = \delta^7(1 - \delta^2)B, \tag{8.35}$$

Going back further it is possible to calculate how much each player is willing to contribute at each stage. This is illustrated in Figure 8.17.

Summing these contributions starting from the end of the campaign, the total potential for contributions is

$$(1-\delta)B+\delta(1-\delta^2)B+\delta^3(1-\delta^2)B+\delta^5(1-\delta^2)B+\delta^7(1-\delta^2)B+... = B, \tag{8.36}$$

where we have used the geometric progression fact that $1 + \delta^2 + \delta^4 + \delta^6 + ... = 1/(1 - \delta^2)$. The remarkable feature is that the total potential for contributions never exceeds the individual benefit from the project and thus it cannot be possible to raise sufficient contributions for a successful campaign because $B < C$.

Figure 8.17: A Contribution Campaign

8.9.2 The Subscription Campaign

In the subscription game, agents alternate in making donation pledges and bear the cost of their contribution only *when* and *if* enough contributions are pledged to complete the project. In a sense, agents are able to make certain conditional commitments to contribute in the future. This possibility to commit modifies the strategic structure of the game and alters the total amount that can be raised. As we now show, in this case it becomes possible to raise an amount equal to the total valuation of all the contributors.

Once again, we start when the fund-raising operation is over and work backward. Fix an arbitrary end-point T with player X's turn to make a donation pledge at date T. There must exists a contribution deficit sufficiently small to make player X indifferent between financing the deficit himself to obtain a payoff $B - x_T$, or waiting for player Y to make up the difference in the next period with a delayed completion payoff of δB. So, the potential pledge of player X at date T is

$$x_T = (1 - \delta)B. \tag{8.37}$$

We continue to assume that $(1 - \delta)B < C$ so that we must solicit player Y's donation. Working back it is then player Y to pledge at date $T - 1$. Player Y anticipates that in bringing the total amount pledged up to $C - x_T$ at date $T - 1$, player X will complete the project in the next period. So there exists a sufficiently small deficit such that player Y is indifferent between making up the difference to get a payoff $\delta \left[B - y_{T-1}\right]$, or leaving player X to make up the difference and thereby delaying completion to get a payoff of $\delta^2 \left[B - x_T\right]$ (in which case it becomes worthwhile for Y to pledge himself x_T at date T). Hence, substituting for x_T , we obtain

$$y_{T-1} = (1 - \delta^2)B. \tag{8.38}$$

Going back to date $T-2$, it is then player X to pledge. Again, there exists a total amount pledged close enough to $C - x_T - y_{T-1}$ such that player X is indifferent between bringing the total contribution up to that level anticipating completion in two rounds with a payoff $\delta^2 \left[B - x_T - x_{T-2}\right]$, or waiting for Y to pledge instead with a payoff from switching position of $\delta^3 \left[B - y_{T-1}\right]$. Substituting for x_T and y_{T-1} gives

$$x_{T-2} = \delta(1 - \delta^2)B. \tag{8.39}$$

Proceeding likewise we can go back further and calculate how much player Y will pledge at date $T - 3$ as

$$y_{T-3} = \delta^2(1 - \delta^2)B, \tag{8.40}$$

and player X will pledge at date $T - 4$ the amount

$$x_{T-4} = \delta^3(1 - \delta^2)B.$$

Going back further, calculating how much each player is willing to pledge at each stage and summing up potential pledges we get

$$(1-\delta)B + (1-\delta^2)B + \delta(1-\delta^2)B + \delta^2(1-\delta^2)B + \delta^3(1-\delta^2)B + ... = 2B. \tag{8.41}$$

This maximum amount that can be raised is just equal to the total valuations of all the contributors. Hence it is always possible to raise enough money for any worthwhile project because $C < 2B$.

These results have shown how allowing contributions to be repeated may lead to efficient private provision of the public good. But this conclusion is sensitive to the assumptions made upon the ability of contributors to make binding commitments.

8.10 Conclusions

This chapter has reviewed the standard analysis of the efficient level of provision of a public good leading to the Samuelson rule and the fact that private contributions do not achieve this outcome. The efficiency rule describes an allocation that can only be achieved if the government is unrestricted in its policy tools or, as the Lindahl equilibrium demonstrates, using prices that are personalized for each consumer.

One aspect of public goods that prevents the government from making efficient decisions is the government's lack of knowledge of households' preferences and their willingness to pay for public goods. Mechanisms were constructed that provide the right incentives for households to correctly reveal their true valuation of the public good. Experimental evidence suggests that household behavior when confronted with decision problems involving public goods does not fully conform with the theoretical prediction and that the private provision equilibrium may not be as inefficient as theory suggests. Furthermore, misrevelation has not been confirmed as the inevitable outcome.

Further reading

The classic paper on the efficient provision of public goods is:

Samuelson, P.A. (1954) "The pure theory of public expenditure", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, **36**, 387 - 389.

The private provision model is developed fully in:

Bergstrom, T.C., L. Blume and H. Varian (1986) "On the private provision of public goods", *Journal of Public Economics*, **29**, 25 - 49.

Itaya, J.-I., D. de Meza and G.D. Myles (2002) "Income distribution, taxation and the private provision of public goods", *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, **4**, 273 – 297.

Mechanism design for public goods was first described in:

Groves, T. and J. Ledyard (1977) “Optimal allocation of public goods: a solution to the “free rider“ problem“, *Econometrica*, **45**, 783 - 809.

The sequential private provision is based on:

Admati, A.R. and M. Perry (1991) "Joint projects without commitment", *Review of Economic Studies, **58**, 259 - 276.*

Experimental results are surveyed in:

Bohm, P. (1972) “Estimating demand for public goods: an experiment“, *European Economic Review*, **3**, 55 - 66.

Isaac, R.M., K.F. McCue and C.R. Plott (1985) "Public goods in an experimental environment", *Journal of Public Economics*, **26**, 51 - 74.

Chapter 9

Club Goods and Local Public Goods

9.1 Introduction

One of the defining features of the public goods of Chapter 8 was non-rivalry: once the good was provided, its use by one consumer did not affect the quantity available for any other. This is clearly an extreme assumption. Many commodities, such as parks, roads and sports facilities, satisfy non-rivalry to a point but are eventually subject to congestion. Although not pure public goods, these goods cannot be classed as private goods either.

A good which has some degree of non-rivalry but for which excludability is possible is called a *club good.* The name is intended to reflect the fact that there are benefits to groups of consumers forming a club to coordinate provision and that the group size may be less than the total population. The name also captures the fact that the clubs we observe in practice are formed by groups of consumers to coordinate the provision of such goods. For instance, a tennis club provides courts which are excludable and non-rival for users at different times. International bodies, such as NATO, can also be interpreted as clubs: NATO provides defence for its members which is again partly non-rivalrous and partly excludable (only partly because if the existence of NATO deters aggression generally, non-members will also benefit).

The description of economic activity that we have employed in the previous chapters has not paid any attention to the geography of trade. In effect, we have been assuming that there is either a single market place with consumers located close to it or that travel to markets is costless. It is a fact of actual economic activity that consumers and markets are dispersed, and that travel costs can be significant. As a consequence, public goods provided in a particular geographical location need not be available except for those in the close vicinity. For instance, radio and television signals can only be received within range of the transmitter and a police service may only patrol a limited jurisdiction. Provided a consumer is located within the relevant area, they can benefit from the public good, otherwise the public good is unavailable to them because the cost of travelling to enjoy it exceeds the benefit. Such goods are again not pure public goods as defined in Chapter 8 and are termed *local public goods*, with the name capturing the idea of geographical restriction. The geographical restriction on availability can also be accompanied by congestion within the region.

The issues that the chapter addresses are similar to those involved with pure public goods. It begins by defining club goods and local public goods and investigating the relationships between them. The efficiency question is then addressed for single-product clubs, and is related to the charging scheme required to support efficiency. The clubs are then placed within an economy to consider whether efficiency is achieved at this level. Local public goods are introduced and the efficiency question is again addressed. The extension is then made to consider heterogeneous consumers which leads into a discussion of the influential Tiebout hypothesis of preference matching for local public goods. The chapter is completed by a review of the empirical evidence on this hypothesis.

9.2 Definitions

The purpose of this section is to provide precise definitions of the classes of goods under discussion. Once this is done, it is possible to describe how these classes are related.

The essential aspect of a club good is that it is possible for those who pay for its provision to exclude those who do not. This is in contrast to the pure public good which was defined by the impossibility of exclusion. In addition, club goods are often assumed to suffer from congestion but this is not strictly necessary. However, congestion provides a motive for exclusion and for the forming of a club to supply the good.

A formal definition can be given as follows.

Definition 2 *(Club good) A club good is a good which is either non-rivalrous or partly rivalrous but for which exclusion by the providers is possible.*

The exclusion aspect of a club good can be taken literally, such as a check on membership credentials at the door to the club, or taken as representing some more general legal authority to bar non-members. Its consequence is that issues of preference revelation are not important for club goods. The benefits of the club can only be obtained by voluntarily choosing to become a member and doing so immediately reveals preferences. This observation is clearly important for the potential attainment of efficiency by the market.

The defining feature of a local public good is one of geography and the need to locate within a specific geographical area in order to benefit from the good. Once outside this area, the benefit of the good is no longer obtained. This geographical constraint may also be linked with congestion which causes partial rivalry.

Definition 3 *(Local public good) A local public good can only benefit those within a given geographical area. It may be non-rivalrous within that area or it may be partially rivalrous.*

This definition of a local public good makes clear that the unique feature is the geographic restriction. It leaves open the question of whether a local public good is excludable or not. This is important for the following reason. As will be seen, the focus of local public good theory is the analysis of local government and decisions on taxation and expenditure. Whether the local public goods provided are excludable or not then becomes a matter of policy rather than an inherent feature of the good. By this it is meant that local governments can use a variety of regulations to control access to the public goods they offer. As examples, registration at schools can be restricted by policy choice to pupils in the local area and the size of the local population can be controlled by prohibition on new building.

Consequently, there are large overlaps between clubs and local public goods and the terms have often been used interchangeably. What has mostly distinguished the two in the literature has been the issues that have been addressed using each concept. The discussion of club goods has focussed more upon issues of efficiency with homogeneous populations. In contrast, local public goods have found their most prominent use in the analysis of heterogeneous populations and preference revelation. Furthermore, local public goods have been used to understand the role and structure of local government whereas club goods have been more about the market. Even these distinctions are not always binding.

9.3 Single Product Clubs

The analysis of efficiency for a pure public good involved determining how much of it should be provided. With a club good, it is not just the quantity of the good that needs to be decided but also the size of the club membership. The latter is important because of the effect of congestion. Adding a new member allows the cost of providing a given quantity of public good to be spread amongst more members but reduces the benefit obtained by each existing member. With a club good that suffers from congestion there is a second efficiency condition involved concerning the correct level of membership.

9.3.1 Fixed Utilization

Consider now the simplest model of a club. There is a homogeneous population of consumers who are identical in terms of tastes and of income. One private good is available and one club good. The club good can potentially suffer from congestion. The focus of attention is on the decision of a single club. It is assumed that a club has formed with the intention of supplying the club good (imagine a small committee of founder members setting out its constitution) and is now in the process of deciding how much of the good to supply and how many member to admit.

To complete the description of the decision problem, it is necessary to consider the financing of the club. Since the club has the ability to exclude non-members, it is able to charge members for the privilege of membership. Unlike a pure public good, there is then no barrier to financing provision of the club good provided enough potential members are willing to pay for membership. The most natural assumption to make on the method of charging is that the cost of the club is divided equally amongst the members. This charging policy will ensure the club just breaks even.

Let each consumer have the utility function $U(x, G, n)$, where x is the consumption of a private good, G provision of the club good and n the number of club members. Utility increases in x and G, and decreases in n if there is congestion. If the cost of providing G units of the club good is $C(G)$, then the budget constraint of a member with income M when the cost of the club is shared equally between members will be

$$M = x + \frac{C(G)}{n}. \tag{9.1}$$

The decision problem for those in charge of the club involves choosing G and n to maximize the welfare of a typical member. Putting together the budget constraint and the utility function, this can be expressed as

$$\max_{\{G,n\}} U(M - \frac{C(G)}{n}, G, n). \tag{9.2}$$

The first-order conditions for this optimization produce the following pair of equations that characterize efficiency:

$$nMRS_{G,x} \equiv n\frac{U_G}{U_x} = C_G, \tag{9.3}$$

and

$$MRS_{n,x} \equiv \frac{U_n}{U_x} = -\frac{C}{n^2}. \tag{9.4}$$

The first of these conditions, (9.3), is the version of the Samuelson rule (8.5) and describes the level of public good, G, that the club should supply. It states that the sum of marginal rates of substitution between the public good and the private good for the n members of the club should be equated to the marginal rate of transformation (or the marginal cost), C_G, of another unit of the club good. What it is most important to observe from this condition is that the process of decision-making within the club ensures that this efficiency condition is satisfied. The ability to exclude non-members from consuming the club good permits the club to achieve the correct level of provision. A club therefore achieves efficient public good provision for its members.

To interpret (9.4) it should first be noted that $U_n \leq 0$, with $U_n < 0$ if there is congestion, and an increase in the number of club members for a given level of provision will reduce the utility of each through congestion effects. We can treat

$\frac{U_n}{U_x}$ as the marginal utility cost of another member of the club. This marginal utility cost is then equated to the extent to which another club member reduces the share of the cost for each existing member.

With $U_n < 0$, (9.4) will determine an efficient level of membership for the club which is positive and finite. Again, the club will achieve efficiency through its internal decision-making. In the absence of congestion $U_n = 0$ so the optimal club membership will be infinite. In practice this can be interpreted as the club encompassing the entire population. However, in contrast to the pure public good, the ability to exclude permits the levy of a membership fee which can finance the cost of the club. The club therefore achieves an efficient level of membership.

The arguments to this point can be summarized as follows. A club is able to exclude non-members from consumption of the public good and can levy a charge on members. If all consumers are identical, then the club will achieve an efficient level of the club good and an efficient level of membership. If the club good suffers from congestion, then the optimum membership will be finite. Without congestion, the entire population will be members of the club. The collection of membership fees by the club will ensure that it breaks even in its financing of the provision of the club good. This fundamental insight that clubs can attain efficiency in the provision of public goods is attributed to the seminal work of Buchanan who was the first to develop the theory of clubs. In terms of the earlier discussion, Buchanan observed that joining a club constitutes an act of preference revelation which permits the attainment of efficiency.

9.3.2 Variable Utilization

The model of the club used above does not probe too deeply into the nature of the good that the club supplies. When this is considered further, it becomes apparent that it is not the number of club members that matters for congestion but how frequently the facilities of the club are used. Retaining the assumption that all club members are identical, the total use of the club is equal to the product of the number of members and the number of visits that each member makes to the club. In determining its provision, a club will wish to optimize the number of visits in addition to the size of facility and the membership.

The model can be easily extended to incorporate a variable rate of visitation into the analysis. Let v be the number of visits that each member makes to the club. An increase in the number of visits raises the utility of the member making those visits, but causes congestion through the total number of visits of all members. Letting the total number of visits be $V = nv$, the utility function is written $U = U(x, G, v, V)$ with the marginal utility to a visit, U_v, positive and the marginal congestion effect, U_V, negative. The cost function for providing the club is also modified to make it dependent upon the total number of visits, nv.

With this extension, the optimization problem for the club becomes

$$\max_{\{x,G,v,n\}} U\left(x,G,v,V\right) \text{ subject to } M = x + \frac{C\left(G,nv\right)}{n}. \tag{9.5}$$

The necessary condition for optimal provision of the public good by the club is

$$n\frac{U_G}{U_x} = C_G, \tag{9.6}$$

which is again the Samuelson rule for the club equating the sum of marginal rates of substitution to the marginal cost of provision. The necessary condition for optimal club membership is

$$v\frac{U_V}{U_x} = -\frac{C}{n^2} + \frac{vC_V}{n}. \tag{9.7}$$

In this condition, $v\frac{U_V}{U_x}$ is the marginal loss of utility through the congestion caused by an additional club member. This is equated to the reduction in cost of membership, $-\frac{C}{n^2}$, offset by the increased cost of servicing the increased visits, $\frac{vC_V}{n}$. The third optimality condition determines the number of visits to the club that each member should make. This is given by

$$\frac{U_v}{U_x} = C_V - n\frac{U_V}{U_x}, \tag{9.8}$$

which equates the marginal benefit of an additional visit to the marginal maintenance cost plus the marginal congestion cost an extra visit imposes upon all members of the club.

As with the case of fixed visits, if the decision making of the club satisfies these three optimality conditions then it will ensure an efficient allocation of resources for its members. It will accept the correct number of members, provide the correct quantity of public good and set visit levels correctly. Therefore introducing a variable visitation rate does not affect the basic conclusion that clubs will supply excludable public goods efficiently.

However, there is a very important distinction between the cases of variable and fixed utilization. This analysis of variable utilization retained the assumption that there is a fixed charge for membership but no further charges for visits. Consequently, once someone has become a member of the club, the price for each additional visit is zero. In choosing visits, each member will only take account of the private cost of the increase in congestion and not the cost they impose on other members. Therefore, they will make an excessive number of visits to the club. In brief, the fixed charge does not impose the correct incentives on members to decentralize the efficient outcome. To implement the optimum defined, it is therefore necessary for a club charging a fixed fee to directly regulate the number of visits. This is rather strong restriction on the behavior of the club and motivates the study of an alternative pricing scheme.

9.3.3 Two-Part Tariff

To provide a starting point for the study of a more sophisticated pricing scheme, it is worth formalizing the final subsection of the previous subsection. Assume that the club has chosen its optimal provision, G^*, membership, n^*, and visits, v^*, and that its membership fee, which is based on all members abiding by the number of visits, is given by $F^* = \frac{C(G^*,n^*v^*)}{n^*}$. Now consider the incentives facing a member of the club who believes all other members will make v^* visits. Putting together the budget constraint, $M = x + F^*$, and the utility function, then the club member faces the optimization

$$\max_{\{v\}} U\left(M - F^*, G^*, v, [n^* - 1]\, v^* + v\right). \tag{9.9}$$

The choice of v, taking the choices of G^*, n^*v^* and F^* as given, then satisfies the necessary condition

$$U_v + U_V = 0. \tag{9.10}$$

Consequently, they will choose to make visits to the point at which the marginal utility of visits is completely offset by the marginal disutility of congestion. This is not the optimal condition as given by (9.8) and in fact leads to a higher number of visits. This demonstrates how the membership fee fails to place the correct incentives in place, so that it can only be optimal if visits are directly regulated.

Assume that instead of a membership fee, the club charges a price per visit. If the price is denoted p and the membership fee is set at $F = 0$, then the number of visits is chosen to solve

$$\max_{\{x,v\}} U\left(x, G^*, v, [n^* - 1]\, v^* + v\right) \text{ subject to } M = x + pv. \tag{9.11}$$

The necessary conditions for this is that

$$p = \frac{U_v}{U_x} + n\frac{U_V}{U_x}.$$

Given the price, visits will be made up to the point at which the price is equal to the marginal benefit of another visit less the additional congestion cost it causes. Contrasting this to (9.8) shows that the optimal number of visits will be sustained if the price is set so

$$p = C_V. \tag{9.12}$$

However, it follows from optimal membership condition (9.7) that at this price the total revenue raised falls short of the cost of the club since

$$vnC_V = C + n^2 v\frac{U_V}{U_x} < C, \tag{9.13}$$

using the fact that $U_V < 0$. This inequality shows the important result that a membership fee alone cannot both generate the correct number of visits and allow the club to break-even.

The charging scheme that is required to finance the club and control visits is a two-part tariff consisting of a membership fee and a charge for each visit. Let the fixed part of the two-part tariff be given by F and the charge for each visit be p. With this tariff the club solves

$$\max_{\{x,v,G,n\}} U\left(x,G,v,nv\right) \text{ subject to } M = x + F + pv, \text{and } nF + pnv = C\left(G,nv\right), \tag{9.14}$$

where both the individual budget constraint and the break-even constraint for the club have been imposed. The necessary conditions for this optimization readily yield the efficiency conditions (9.6) and (9.8), while the charging condition becomes

$$F + pv = vC_V - nv\frac{U_V}{U_x},$$

which is the analogue of (9.7). Taken together, these observations show that the two-part tariff allows the club to break-even and attain efficiency.

This section has addressed the issue of charging when the number of visits to the club cannot be controlled directly. It has shown that with variable utilization a two-part tariff is required. The cost-per-visit is used to control the number of visits whilst the fixed fee covers any residual payment needed for the club to break even.

9.4 Clubs and the Economy

The analysis of the decision process of an individual club demonstrated that the club will ensure efficiency of provision for its membership. It is tempting to conclude from this observation that the argument can be extended to the economy as a whole, with efficiency in public good provision attained by the population of consumers separating themselves into a series of efficient clubs. This was the conclusion reached by Buchanan. We now argue that although this may sometimes be so, it is by no means guaranteed.

There are two settings in which in which the issue of economy-wide efficiency can be considered. The first setting, and the analytically simpler of the two, is to consider an economy where the efficient size of club is small relative to the total population. This situation applies when the club suffers from significant congestion, so its optimal size is relatively small, and population size is large. The second setting is when the efficient size of the club is large relative to the total population. This can arise either through limited congestion or through having a small population. Either of these settings can potentially occur, and they give very different perspectives upon the efficiency of clubs at the level of the economy.

9.4.1 Small Clubs

Consider first an economy in which the size of the efficient membership of a club is small relative to the size of the total population. This allows some very clear conclusions to be obtained.

To understand the effect of this assumption, consider what happens as population size increases. Initially, with a small population, there will either be some of the population who are not in an optimal-sized club or else every club will differ slightly in size from the optimum. In the first case, as the size of the population increases, the number of those not in an optimal size clubs becomes trivial compared to the total population, so the deviation from efficiency tends to zero. In the second case, as the population increases the deviation of each club from the optimum size becomes less and less, so again the inefficiency tends to zero. Therefore, increases in population size eventually wipe out the deviation from efficiency.

The limiting interpretation of a large population is one which is infinite in number. Assuming an infinite population allows the standard "tricks" that can be played with an infinity In particular, if the population size is infinite then it can be divided exactly into an infinite number of optimal size clubs. The provision of public goods by clubs is then efficient for each club and for the economy as a whole.

The conclusion of this analysis is that if the efficient membership of each club is small relative to the total population, then the outcome for the economy will be that a very large number of clubs will form each with the correct number of members and each providing the efficient level of service. Hence efficiency will be attained for the economy as a whole. In this case, the efficiency of each individual club is reflected at the aggregate level.

9.4.2 Large Clubs

The second and more interesting case, from both a practical and an analytical perspective, arises when the optimal membership of each club is relatively large compared to the total population. In this case the population size can support only a limited number of optimally-sized clubs.

Two outcomes are then possible. It may be that the total population size is an integer multiple of the number of clubs. The population is then divided neatly between the clubs and efficiency is achieved. However, such a neat match between club size and population is very unlikely. The more likely outcome is that there will be some remainder when the total population is divided by optimum club size. The outcome in this situation requires some careful analysis.

To focus the analysis, assume that the total population is more than the optimum size of a club but less than twice the optimum. Denoting the total population by N and the optimum club size by n^*, utility as a function of the size of the club can be graphed as in Figure 9.1.

To determine the equilibrium, it is necessary to be clear about what is possible and what is not in terms of membership fees. For reasons that will become clear, it is necessary to distinguish between cases in which all members of a club must pay the same fee and cases in which fees can be different between members. The latter case can also be interpreted as all club members paying the same fee

Figure 9.1: Utility and Club Size

but making transfers, or “compensation“ payments, between themselves. If this occurs the fees net of transfers will differ.

Equal Fees

Assume that all members of each club must pay the same fee. In this case it is easy to show that two clubs of size $\frac{N}{2}$ cannot be an equilibrium. To do this, start from such a position and consider the individual motives involved. Each member would rather be in a larger club since this raises their utility. Assuming all the other individuals stay in the same clubs, which is the application of the concept of Nash equilibrium, then an individual will have an incentive to change club. This raises the size of the one they move to and, because existing members will also benefit from larger club, they will be welcomed as a new member. Since there is an incentive to change club, the initial position cannot have been an equilibrium. In fact, the equilibrium must have two clubs, with one of efficient size n^* and the other of size $N - n^*$. In this position, the members of the largest club have a higher level of utility. Consequently, they have no motive to move to the smaller club. All the members of the smaller club would like to move but cannot do so because they are excluded by the members of the larger club.

The next question is whether this outcome is efficient from the viewpoint of society. The actual outcome will be dependent upon the precise situation but for the example in Figure 9.1 the possibilities can be grouped into four categories. To see this, note that the social decision must be to choose between having either one club or two clubs. When there is a single club, it may be beneficial to exclude some individuals from the club altogether. Alternatively, the single club may contain the entire population. If it is optimal to have two clubs, these may be equally sized or may be dissimilar. Summarizing this discussion gives the following breakdown of potential optimum configurations:

- A single club, some of the population excluded;
- A single club containing the entire population;
- Two equally-sized clubs;
- Two unequal clubs.

Outcome 1 will occur if it is too costly to form a new club for a small number of members and additional membership of the single club reduces the benefit of existing members significantly. The contrast between outcomes 2, 3 and 4 depends on the costs of congestion relative to the gains from being closer to optimality. For instance in outcome 2, with two equally-sized clubs, both must have less than the optimum membership. The question then has to be asked whether it is better to take one closer to the optimum (moving to outcome 3). Those in the larger club will gain while those left in the smaller club will lose. Contrasting option 4 to option 2, the question has to be asked whether the smaller club in option 4 should be closed completely and the population all placed in a single club. This will cause a congestion cost for those initially in the larger club, but may benefit those who were in the smaller club since the per capita cost will be lower and public good provision higher.

At this level of generality it is not possible to proceed to identify the nature of the optimal allocation without being completely specific about the relationships (the utility function and congestion function) that underlie the model. What can be concluded is that there is no necessity for the equilibrium position with two dissimilar sized clubs to be the efficient outcome. So, from the perspective of the entire economy, the actions of the clubs though individually efficient do not guarantee social efficiency. The reason is that both clubs are competing to become larger and so when one club attracts new members in order to grow, it does not take into account the cost inflicted upon the members of the other club which is becoming smaller.

To illustrate this point consider the following example. The total population, N, is normalized to have size one ($N = 1$) and this population has to be allocated between two clubs in proportions n and $1 - n$ (with $0 \leq n \leq 1$). The utility of being in a club of size n is given by

$$U(n) = n^3 (1 - n), \tag{9.15}$$

so that the utility maximizing club size is $\frac{3}{4}$ of the population (which is greater than half the population, so giving the situation illustrated in Figure 9.1). Clubs with either the entire population as members or with no members provide zero utility.

We graph the utility of each club member for each partition of the population between the two clubs in Figure 9.2. The figure measures the membership n in club A from the left-corner and the population $1 - n$ in the club B from the

Figure 9.2: Optimum with Unequally-Sized Clubs

right-corner. The width of the figure is the total population which is normalized to one. Utility in club A begins at 0 when $n = 0$ and rises to a maximum when $n = \frac{3}{4}$. Reading from the right-corner, utility in club B begins at 0 when $n = 1$ and rises to a maximum at $n = \frac{1}{4}$. The equilibrium outcome occurs when one club is optimal, with $\frac{3}{4}$ of the population, and the other is inefficient with just $\frac{1}{4}$.

The key feature of this example is that population is too small to allow both clubs to reach their utility maximizing size of $\frac{3}{4}$. The efficient outcome is obtained by maximizing total welfare

$$W(n) = nU(n) + (1 - n)U(1 - n). \tag{9.16}$$

The necessary condition for efficiency is then

$$U(n) + nU'(n) = U(1 - n) + (1 - n)U'(1 - n), \tag{9.17}$$

which requires that the marginal the gains of another member are the same for both clubs. The average level of welfare, $\frac{W(n)}{n}$, is depicted by twin-peaked curve in Figure 9.2. It is then readily seen that efficiency is achieved at one of the two peaks where there are two unequally-sized clubs. Furthermore, the membership allocation at either of these peaks has one club that exceeds the optimal membership and another club falls below. The attainment of efficiency requires that the size of the larger club is pushed beyond the size that maximizes the utility of each member. The reason for this is that welfare is concerned with the product of n and $U(n)$, so that there is always an incentive to raise the membership of the club generating the higher utility for its members.

Although this incentive always exists, it is not always the dominant effect. Changing the utility function can affect the efficient outcome, but it will preserve



Figure 9.3: Optimum with Equally-Sized Clubs

the fundamental inefficiency of the equilibrium outcome. Figure 9.3 depicts the situation for the utility function

$$U(n) = n^2 (1 - n). \tag{9.18}$$

The equilibrium involves two-unequal clubs, one with $\frac{2}{3}$ of the population and the other with $\frac{1}{3}$. The resulting average welfare function is single-peaked with its maximum occurring with two equally sized clubs of size $n = 1 - n = \frac{1}{2}$. Hence efficiency is attained when both clubs are below the efficient membership.

Unequal Fees

The case where equal fees were paid by all members of a club was complex in terms of possible outcomes, but that where fees can be unequal is much more so. To gain some insight into this statement, we begin with a consideration of the determination of the equilibrium division of members between clubs.

As a starting point, let the allocation of members be the equilibrium found for the no-transfer case where there is one club of size n^* and one of $N - n^*$. It was previously argued that there was no incentive for those in the optimal club to move and no possibility of those in the smaller club being allowed to move. With unequal fees allowable neither of these claims need be true. Consider first a member of the smaller club. If they were to move to the larger club, they would obtain a utility gain of $U(n^* + 1) - U(N - n^*)$. Their presence makes the previously-optimal club too large so the welfare of its existing members will fall. However, it is a possibility that the gain of the new member is sufficiently great that they can more than compensate the existing members for their losses and yet still be better off. In other words, the new member pays a fee greater than that of the existing members and the fee of existing members is reduced more than sufficiently to compensate them for the additional crowding. If this is compensation is possible, then the move between clubs will be allowed and the initial position cannot be an equilibrium.

Now consider reversing the argument and considering the incentive for a member of the optimal club to move to the smaller club. With equal fees, this would never happen. Now let unequal fees be allowed. If the move did occur, the club member moving would lose utility of value $U(n^*) - U(N - n^* + 1)$ but the existing members of the smaller club would each gain $U(N - n^* + 1) - U(N - n^*)$. If they could collectively agree to pay compensation to the new member (meaning let them pay a lower membership fee), then it is possible that the existing members could more than compensate the new member for the loss incurred in their move whilst still remaining better-off themselves.

These arguments reveal that members of the optimal club may be enticed to the smaller club and that members of the smaller club may be able to "buy" themselves into the optimal club. Both of these mechanisms may even be functioning simultaneously. The outcome of this reasoning is that it may not be possible to find any equilibrium and, even if an equilibrium exists, it is not easy to characterize. Furthermore, there is even less reason to expect any equilibrium that is achieved to be efficient. All of this occurs because the population cannot be allocated to a set of clubs each with optimal membership except in unlikely cases when population size is a integer multiple of the optimal membership level. This problem does not diminish even when population size increases.

There is one situation in which this argument does not apply. Consider again the graph of utility as a function of club size drawn in Figure 9.1. The problems of dividing the population into optimal clubs resulted from the fact that there was a unique value for optimal club membership. If the graph were instead like Figure 9.4, with a flat section at its peak, then there would be a range of optimal sizes. To see the effect of this, let the optimal club size range from 2 to 3. Then a population of 11 consumers could be divided into three clubs of size 3 and one of size 2 and the economy would achieve efficiency. Of course, with a population of size 11, this could not be done if optimal club size was unique (unless it was 11). Furthermore, any population size greater than 11 can be divided into optimal size clubs.

The general version of this argument is illustrated in Figure 9.5. For a single club, the range of optimal memberships is between n' and n''. When there are two clubs, optimality can occur for the range $2n'$ to $2n''$. This extension of the range continues as additional clubs are introduced. Eventually, if the total population is large enough, the ranges of values of total population for which optimality cannot be achieved shrinks to zero (alternatively, the ranges of optimal size overlap) and all consumers can be placed in optimal clubs.

9.4.3 Conclusion

The conclusion of this section has to be that the efficiency of the individual club does not always translate into efficiency for the economy. In a large population, approximate efficiency will be achieved and individual utility will be virtually

Figure 9.4: Non-Unique Club Size

Figure 9.5: Achieving Efficiency

equal to maximal attainable utility. However, when there are small-number problems efficiency will not be achieved by the equilibrium allocation of members between clubs. This should not be surprising since small numbers introduce problems akin to those found in oligopoly problems. What occurs is that small groups of consumers are able to affect their own utility levels by choosing to form optimal size clubs. Therefore they possess market power and this is reflected in the inefficiency. These problems are eliminated if there are a range of optimal club sizes.

9.5 Local Public Goods

The concept of a local public good has already been introduced in Section 9.2. A local public good has the feature that its benefits are restricted to a particular geographical area and it cannot be enjoyed outside of that area. Relating this idea to the analysis of club goods, one can think of local communities as clubs which are formed to provide local public goods. To become a member of a local community, a consumer must move into the area (*i.e.* join the club) and pay whatever local taxes are levied in that community (*i.e.* pay the membership fee). Once they have done this, they can then enjoy the local public goods that are provided.

An important feature of the club good was that exclusion was possible and it is interesting to discuss whether this is the case with local public goods. There are two points at which exclusion may be possible. Firstly, a consumer must become resident in an area in order to benefit from the local public good. Although few (if any) local authorities have the right to prevent the resale of houses or to forcibly evict existing occupants, they do have the power to prevent additional new building. Consequently, reductions in population may be hard to achieve (unlike expulsions in an ordinary club), exclusion of additional members is possible. Secondly, there is the payment of taxes. Any resident who refuses to pay local taxes can be either forced to pay or excluded from the club since local authorities have legal authority to collect taxation. If we impose the possibility of exclusion, then the analysis of local public goods becomes exactly that of the clubs we have already considered. However, the analysis of non-exclusion is also of interest with local public goods since this captures the idea of a freely-operating market in which individuals have the freedom to select their preferred residential location. We now focus upon non-exclusion.

The concept of local public goods can be applied to the provision of public services by local regions in order to understand the allocation of a population between different localities. Intuitively, we can think of localities competing for population by setting the package of public good provision and taxation they offer. Members of the population look at what is offered in different localities and selects the one that offers the highest utility level. This will cause population flows until no-one can gain by moving locality. This is similar to the adjustment process for club goods except for the fact that there is free access (*i.e.*, no possibility of barring access to new migrants even if the existing population would lose from the migration).

In this framework it is natural to question whether an efficient equilibrium will be attained. The localities are competing for population and no restrictions are imposed upon the freedom of the population to move between regions. With clubs, efficiency was achieved at least within the clubs. To see whether the same is true for local public goods, it is necessary to consider a model of the situation.

Consider a total population of H consumers that is to be divided between two localities with h being the population of a locality (we use different notation to avoid confusion with club membership). Each locality provides a local public good financed through a charge on the population. As the population increases, the unit cost of the public good per resident is reduced. This is the benefit from increased population. There is also a cost to increasing population. This can be motivated by assuming that there is a fixed resource in each region so that income per person falls as the population rises and this resource has to be shared between a greater number.

These assumptions imply that income can be written as a decreasing function, $M(h)$, of the population of a locality. Think of wages or welfare benefits reducing with increased migration. If the locality provides G units of the public good, the charge per resident is $\frac{G}{h}$. Combining these, the income left to spend on private goods is $M(h) - \frac{G}{h}$, and the resulting level of utility $U(M(h) - \frac{G}{h}, G)$.

It is assumed that localities choose the level of public good optimally given their population. This eliminates the possibility of inefficiency through a level of provision that does not satisfy the Samuelson rule. Given a population h, the level of public good provision satisfies the Samuelson rule

$$h\frac{U_G}{U_x} = 1. \tag{9.19}$$

This condition can be solved to find the level of public good, $G(h)$, which depends upon the population of the locality. Substituting the level of the public good into the utility function determines the level of utility as a function of population. This relationship is written in brief as $U(h)$. The implications of the model follow from the fact that an increase in h can increase or decrease utility. Differentiating $U(h)$ with respect to h shows that

$$U' = U_x M' + U_x \left(\frac{G}{h^2}\right). \tag{9.20}$$

The first term of this is negative, since an increase in population reduces income M, while the second term is positive because the cost of the public good is reduced. It is therefore unclear what the net effect will be. To analyze the model further, assume that utility initially increases with the population until it reaches a maximum and then decreases. In addition, let $U(H) > U(0)$, so that having all the population leads to higher utility than having no population. This can be motivated by the fact that a small number of people find it very expensive to provide the public good but the income is not reduced too far when the entire population is in one locality.

Figure 9.6: Stability of the Symmetric Equilibrium

Assume that the population always flows from the locality with the lower utility to the locality with the higher utility. An equilibrium is then reached when both localities offer the same utility level or else all the population is in one region. Consequently, equilibrium can result in all the population locating in one region, which occurs if $U(H) \geq U(0)$, or with the population divided between the two localities with utilities equalized, so $U(h^1) = U(h^2)$. The outcomes that can arise in this model can be illustrated by graphing the utility against the population in the two regions.

A possible structure of the utility function is shown in Figure 9.6. This figure measures the population in locality 1 from the left corner and the population in locality 2 from the right corner. The width of the figure is the total population. The essential feature of this figure is that the population level that maximizes utility is less than half the total population. There are five potential equilibria at a, b, c, d and e. The equilibrium at c is symmetric with both regions having a population of $\frac{H}{2}$. This equilibrium is also stable and will arise from any starting point between b and d. The two asymmetric equilibria at b and e are unstable. For instance, starting just above b, the population will adjust to c. Starting just below b, the population will adjust to a. The two extremes points, a and e, where all the population are located within one of the two localities are stable but inefficient.

An alternative structure of utility is shown in Figure 9.7. The change made is that the utility-maximizing population of a locality is now greater than one half of the total population. There is still a symmetric and efficient equilibrium at b. But this equilibrium is now unstable: starting with a population below b the flow of population will lead to the extreme outcome at a, whereas starting

Figure 9.7: Inefficient Stable Equilibria

above b will lead to c. The two extreme equilibria are stable but inefficient. All consumers would prefer the symmetric equilibrium to either of the extreme equilibria.

What this simple model shows is that there is no reason why flows of population between localities will achieve efficiency. It is possible for the economy to get trapped in an inefficient equilibrium. In this case, the market economy does not function efficiently. The reasons for this is that the movement between localities of one consumer affects both the population they leave and the population they join. These non-market linkages lead to the inefficiency.

9.6 The Tiebout Hypothesis

The previous section has shown that inefficiency can arise when the population divides between two regions on the basis of their provision of local public goods. From this result it would be natural to infer that inefficiency will always be an issue with local public goods. It is therefore surprising that the Tiebout hypothesis asserts instead that efficiency will always be obtained with local public goods.

Tiebout observed that pure public goods lead to market failure because of the difficulties connected with information transmission. Since the true valuation by a consumer of a public good cannot be observed, and since a pure public good is non-excludable, free-riding occurs and private provision is inefficient. All these statements were explored in the previous chapter. Now assume that there are a number of alternative communities in which a consumer can choose to live and that these differ in their provision of local public goods. In contrast to the pure public good case, a consumer's choice of which location to live in provides a very clear signal of preferences. The chosen location is obviously the one offering the provision of local public goods closest to the consumer's ideal. Hence, through community choice, preference revelation takes place. Misrepresenting preference cannot help a consumer here since the choice of a non-optimal location merely reduces their welfare level. The only rational choice is to act honestly.

The final step in the argument can now be constructed. Since preference revelation is taking place, it follows that if there are enough different types of community and enough consumers with each kind of preference, then all consumers will allocate themselves to a community that is optimal for themselves and each community will be optimally sized. Thus, the market outcome will be fully efficient and the inefficiencies discussed in connection with pure public goods will not arise. Phrased more prosaically, consumers reveal their preferences by voting with their feet and this ensures the construction of optimal communities. This also shows why the analysis of the previous section failed to find efficiency. The existence of at most two localities violated the large-number assumption of the Tiebout hypothesis.

The significance of this efficiency result, which is commonly called the Tiebout hypothesis, has been much debated. Supporters view it as another demonstration of the power of the market in allocating resources. Critics denounce it as simply another empty demonstration of what is possible under unrealistic assumptions. Certainly, the Tiebout hypotheses has much the same foundations as the Two Theorems of Welfare Economics since both concern economies with no rigidities and large numbers of participants. But there is one important contrast between the two: formalizing the Tiebout hypothesis proves a difficult task.

To obtain an insight into these difficulties, some of the steps in the previous argument need to be retraced. It was assumed that consumers could move between communities or at least choose between them with no restrictions on their choice. If housing markets function efficiently there should not be a problem in terms of actually finding accommodation. Where problems do arise is in the link between income and location. An assumption that can justify the previous analysis is that consumers obtain all their income from "rents" *e.g.* from the ownership of land, property or shares. In this case it does not matter where they choose to reside since the rents will accrue regardless of location. Once some income is earned from employment, then the Tiebout hypothesis only holds if all employment opportunities are also replicated in all communities. Otherwise communities with better employment prospects will appear more attractive even if they offer a slightly less appealing set of local public goods. If the two issues become entangled in this way then the Tiebout hypothesis will naturally fail.

Further difficulties with the hypothesis arise when the numbers of communities and individuals is considered. When these are both finite the problems already discussed above with achieving efficiency through market behavior arise again. These are compounded when individuals of different types are needed to make communities work. For example, assume that community A needs 10 doctors and 20 teachers to provide the optimal combination of local public goods whilst community B requires 10 policemen and 20 teachers. If doctors, teachers and policemen are not found in the proportions $1:4:1$ then efficiency in allocation between the communities cannot be achieved. Furthermore, if all teachers have different tastes to doctors and to policemen, then none of the communities can supply the ideal local public good combination to meet all tastes.

The efficiency of the allocation can then be recovered in two steps. Firstly, if we appeal again to the large population assumption the issue of achieving the precise mix of different types is eliminated - there will always be enough people of each type to populate the localities in the correct proportions. Secondly, even if tastes are different it is still possible to obtain agreement upon the level of demand through the use of personalized prices. This issue has already been discussed for public goods in connection with the Lindahl equilibrium. The same idea can be applied to local public goods in which case it would be the local taxes which are differentiated between residents to equalize the level of public good demand and to attain efficiency with a heterogeneous population.

The Tiebout hypothesis depends upon the freedom of consumers to move to preferred locations. This is only possible if there are no transactions costs involved in changing location. In practice such transactions costs arise in the commission that has to be paid to estate agents, legal fees and in the physical costs of shipping furniture and belongings. These can be significant and will cause friction in the movement of consumers to the extent that non-optimal levels of provision will be tolerated to avoid paying these costs.

To sum up, the Tiebout hypothesis provides support for allowing the market, by which is meant the free movement of consumers, to determine the provision of local public goods. By choosing communities, consumers reveal their tastes. They also abide to local tax law so free-riding is ruled out. Hence efficiency is achieved. Although apparently simple, there are a number of difficulties when the practical implementation of this hypothesis is considered. The population may not partition neatly into the communities envisaged and employment ties may bind consumers to localities whose local public good supply is not to their liking. Transactions costs in housing markets are significant and these will limit the freedom of movement that is key to the hypothesis. The hypothesis provides an interesting insight into the forces at work in the formation of communities but it does not guarantee efficiency.

9.7 Empirical Tests

The Tiebout hypothesis provides the reassuring conclusion that efficiency will be attained by local communities providing public goods efficiently. If correct, the forces of economics and local politics can be left to work unrestricted by government intervention. Given the strength of this conclusion, and some of the doubts cast upon whether the Tiebout argument really works, it is natural to conduct empirical tests of the hypothesis.

In testing any hypothesis it is first necessary to determine what the observational implications of the hypothesis will be. For Tiebout, this means isolating what will be different between an economy in which the Tiebout hypothesis applies and one in which it does not. Empirical testing has been handicapped by the difficulty of establishing quite what this difference will be.

The earlier empirical studies focussed upon property taxes, public good provision and house prices. The reason for this was made clear by Oates who initiated this line of research in 1969: local governments fund their activities primarily through property taxes and the manner in which these taxes are reflected in house prices provides evidence on the Tiebout hypothesis. Assume that all local governments provide the same level of public goods. Then the jurisdictions with higher property tax rates will be less attractive and have lower house prices. Now let the provision of public goods vary. Holding tax rates constant, house prices should be higher in areas with more public good provision. These effects offset each other, and if the public good effect is sufficiently strong jurisdictions with higher tax rates will actually have higher property prices. Oates considered evidence on house prices, property tax rates and educational provision for 53 primarily residential municipalities in New Jersey. These municipalities were chosen because the majority of residents commuted to work and hence were not tied by employment to a particular location. The analysis of the house prices were reduced by high property taxes but increased by greater public good provision.

Whether these results were evidence in favor of the Tiebout hypothesis became the subject of a debate which focused on the implications of the theory. Whereas Oates took differences in property prices as an indication of the Tiebout hypothesis at work (on the grounds that more attractive locations would witness increased competition for the housing stock), an alternative argument suggested that a given quality of house would have the same price in all jurisdictions if Tiebout applied. The argument for uniform prices is based on the view that property taxes are the price paid for the bundle of public goods provided by the local government. If this price reflects the benefit enjoyed from the public goods, as it should if the Tiebout hypothesis is functioning, then it should not impact upon property prices. Uniform property prices should therefore be expected if the Tiebout hypothesis applies - an observation that lead to a series of studies looking for uniform house prices across jurisdictions with different levels of public good provision. Unfortunately, as Epple, Zelenitz and Visscher show, the same conclusion is true even when the Tiebout hypothesis does not hold so that net-of-tax property prices should be uniform in all jurisdictions in all circumstances. Instead, they argue that when the Tiebout hypothesis applies housing demand is not affected by the property tax rate but when Tiebout does not apply it is affected. Looking at prices, which are equilibrium conditions, cannot then provide a test of Tiebout. Instead, a test has to be based on the structural equations of the demand for quantity of housing and of location demand and their dependence, or otherwise, upon tax rates. This conclusion undermines the earlier work on property values but does not provide and easily implementable test.

As a response to these difficulties, alternative tests of the hypothesis have been constructed. One approach to determining whether the Tiebout hypothesis applies is to consider the level of demand for public goods from the residents of each locality. If the Tiebout hypothesis applies, residents should have selected a residential location that provides a level of public goods in line with their preferences. Hence, within each locality, there should be a degree of homogeneity in the level of demand for public goods. Note carefully that this does not assert that all residents have the same preferences, but only that given the taxes and other local charges they pay, their demands are equalized. The test of the hypothesis is then to consider the variance in demand within regions relative to the variance in demand across regions. Such a test was conducted by Gramlich and Rubinfeld who studied households in Michigan suburbs and provided compelling evidence that there was less variation within regions than across regions.

It is necessary to note that these results do not confirm that the Tiebout hypothesis is completely operating, but only that some sorting of residents is occurring. It is supportive evidence for the hypothesis but not complete confirmation. This conclusion is only to be expected since, given the extent of frictions in the housing market, the freedom of movement necessary for the hypothesis to hold exactly is lacking.

Overall, the empirical work is suggestive that the right forces are at work to push the economy towards the efficient outcome of Tiebout but that there are residual frictions that prevent the complete sorting required for the efficiency. Having said this, the tests have been limited to data from suburban areas which have the highest chance of producing the right outcome. In other locations, where the separation between work and location is not so simple, the hypothesis would have less chance of applying.

9.8 Conclusions

The chapter has discussed the nature of club goods and local public goods, and drawn the distinction between these and pure public goods. For a club good, the essential feature is the possibility of exclusion and it has been shown how exclusion allows an individual club to attain efficiency. Although it is tempting to extend this argument to the economy as a whole, a series of new issues arise when the allocation of a population between clubs is analyzed. Efficiency may be attained, but it is not guaranteed.

Many of these same issues arise with local public goods whose benefits are restricted to a given geographical area. We have treated local public goods as a model of provision by localities where each locality is described by the package of public good and taxation that it offers. When there is no exclusion from membership, there is no implication that efficiency will be attained when residential choice can be made from only a small number of localities.

In contrast to this, the Tiebout hypothesis evokes a large-number assumption to argue that the population will be able to sort itself into a set of localities, each of which is optimal for its residents. At the heart of this argument is that choice of locality reveals preferences about public goods so efficiency becomes attainable. The Tiebout hypothesis has been subjected to empirical testing but the evidence is at best inconclusive. It shows some degree of sorting and is certainly not a rejection of Tiebout but it does not go as far as confirming that the promised efficiency is delivered.

Reading

The potential for clubs to achieve efficiency in the provision of public goods was first identified in:

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A more extensive discussion of many of these issues can be found in:

Cornes, R.C. and Sandler, T. (1996) *The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Sandler, T, and Tschirhart, J. (1980) "The economic theory of clubs: an evaluative survey", *Journal of Economic Literature*, **18**, 1481 - 1521.

The problems of attaining efficiency in a club economy are explored by:

Wooders, M.H. (1978) "Equilibria, the core and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good", *Journal of Economic Theory*, **18**, 328 - 348.

The influential Tiebout hypothesis was first stated in:

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Chapter 10

Externalities

10.1 Introduction

An externality is a link between economic agents that lies outside the price system of the economy. Everyday examples include the pollution from a factory which harms a local fishery and the envy that is felt when a neighbor proudly displays a new car. Such externalities are not controlled directly by price - the fishery cannot choose to buy less pollution nor can you choose to buy your neighbor a worse car. This prevents the efficiency theorems described in Chapter 7 from applying. Indeed, the demonstration of market efficiency was based on the following two presumptions:

(a) the welfare of each consumer depended solely on her own consumption decision;

(b) the production of each firm depended only on its own input/output choice.

In reality a consumer or a firm may be directly affected by the actions of other agents in the economy; that is, there may be external effects from the actions of other consumers or firms. In the presence of such externalities the outcome of a competitive market is unlikely to be Pareto efficient because agents will not take account the external effects of their (consumption/production) decisions. Typically, the economy will display too great a quantity of “bad” externalities and too small a quantity of “good” externalities.

The control of externalities is an issue of increasing practical importance. Global warming and the destruction of the ozone layer are two of the most significant examples but there are numerous others, from local to global environmental issues. Some of these may not appear immediately to be economic problems but economic analysis can expose why they occur and investigate the effectiveness of alternative policies. It can generate surprising conclusions and challenge presumptions. In particular, economic analysis shows how government intervention that induces agents to internalize the external effects of their decisions can achieve a Pareto improvement.

The starting point for the chapter is to provide a working definition of an externality. Using this it is shown why market failure arises and the nature of the resulting inefficiency. The design of the optimal set of corrective, or *Pigouvian*, taxes is then addressed and related to missing markets for externalities. The use of taxes are then contrasted with direct control through tradable licences. Internalization as a solution to externalities is then considered. Finally, these methods of solving the externality problem are contrasted to the claim of the Coase theorem that efficiency will be attained by trade even when there are externalities.

10.2 Externalities Defined

An externality has already been described as an effect upon one agent caused by another. This section expresses this description as a formal definition and then uses this to classify the various forms of externality. The way of representing these forms of externalities in economic models is then introduced.

There have been several attempts at defining externalities, and of providing classifications of various types of externality. From amongst these, the following definition is the most commonly adopted. Its advantages are that it places the emphasis on recognizing externalities through their effects and it leads to a natural system of classification.

Definition 4 *(Externality) An externality is present whenever some economic agent's welfare (utility or profit) is* ***directly*** *affected by the action of another agent (consumer or producer) in the economy.*

By "directly" we exclude any effects that are mediated by prices. That is, an externality is present if a fishery's productivity is affected by the river pollution of an upstream oil refinery, but not if the fishery's profitability is affected by the price of oil (which may depend on the oil refinery's output of oil). The latter type of effect (also called a *pecuniary externality*) is present in any competitive market but creates no inefficiency (since price mediation through competitive markets leads to a Pareto efficient outcome). We shall present later an illustration of a pecuniary externality.

The definition of externality implicitly distinguishes between two broad categories of externality. A *production externality* occurs when the effect of the externality is upon a profit relationship and a *consumption externality* whenever a utility level is affected. Clearly, an externality can be both a consumption and a production externality simultaneously. For example, pollution from a factory may affect the profit of a commercial fishery and the utility of leisure anglers.

Using this definition of an externality, it is possible to move on to how they can be incorporated into the analysis of behavior. Denote, as in Chapter 6, the consumption levels of the households by $x = \left\{x^1, ..., x^H\right\}$ and the production plans of the firms by $y = \left\{y^1, ..., y^m\right\}$. It is assumed that consumption externalities enter the utility functions of the households and that production externalities enter the production sets of the firms. At the most general level, this assumption implies that the utility functions take the form

$$U^h = U^h(x, y), \ h = 1, ..., H, \tag{10.1}$$

and the production set is described by

$$Y^j = Y^j(x, y), \ j = 1, ..., m. \tag{10.2}$$

In this formulation the utility functions and the production sets are possibly dependent upon the entire arrays of consumption and production levels. The expressions in (10.1) and (10.2) represent the general form of the externality problem and in some of the discussion below a number of further restrictions will be employed.

It is immediately apparent from (10.1) and (10.2) that the actions of the agents in the economy will no longer be independent or determined solely by prices. The linkages via the externality result in the optimal choice of each agent being dependent upon the actions of others. Viewed in this light, it becomes apparent why the efficient functioning of the competitive economy will generally not be observed in an economy with externalities.

10.3 Market Inefficiency

It has been accepted throughout the discussion above that the presence of externalities will result in the competitive equilibrium failing to be Pareto efficient. The immediate implication of this fact is that incorrect quantities of goods, and hence externalities, will be produced. It is also clear that a non-Pareto efficient outcome will never maximize welfare. This provides scope for economic policy to raise welfare. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how inefficiency can arise in a competitive economy. Cases where externalities do not lead to inefficiency will also be described. The results are developed in the context of a simple two-consumer model since this is sufficient for the purpose and also makes the relevant points as clear as possible.

Consider a two-household two-good economy where the households have utility functions

$$U^1 = x^1 + u_1(z^1) + v_1(z^2), \tag{10.3}$$

and

$$U^2 = x^2 + u_2(z^2) + v_2(z^1). \tag{10.4}$$

The externality effect in (10.4) and (10.4) is generated by consumption of good z by households. The externality will be *positive* if $v_h(\cdot)$ is increasing in the consumption level of the other consumer and *negative* if it is decreasing.

To complete the description of the economy, it is assumed that the supply of good x comes from an endowment ω_h to the household h whereas good z is produced from good x by a competitive industry that uses one unit of good x to produce one unit of good z. Normalizing the price of good x at 1, the structure of production ensures that the equilibrium price of good z must also be one. Given this, all that needs to be determined for this economy is the division of the initial endowment into quantities of the two goods.

Incorporating this assumption into the maximization decision of the households, the competitive equilibrium of the economy is described by the equations

$$u_h'(z^h) = 1, \quad h = 1, 2, \tag{10.5}$$

$$x^h + z^h = \omega^h, \quad h = 1, 2, \tag{10.6}$$

and

$$x^1 + z^1 + x^2 + z^2 = \omega^1 + \omega^2. \tag{10.7}$$

It is equations (10.5) that are of primary importance at this point. For household h these state that the private marginal benefit from each good, determined by the marginal utility, is equated to the of private marginal cost. The external effect does not appear directly in the determination of the equilibrium. The question we now address is whether this competitive market equilibrium is efficient.

The Pareto efficient allocations are found by maximizing the total utility of household 1 and 2, subject to the production possibilities. The equations that result from this will then be contrasted to (10.5). In detail, a Pareto efficient allocation solves

$$\max_{\{x^h, z^h\}} U^1 + U^2 = \left[x^1 + u_1(z^1) + v_1(z^2)\right] + \left[x^2 + u_2(z^2) + v_2(z^1)\right], \tag{10.8}$$

subject to

$$\omega^1 + \omega^2 - x^1 - z^1 - x^2 - z^2 \geq 0. \tag{10.9}$$

The solution is characterized by the conditions

$$u_1'(z^1) + v_2'(z^1) = 1, \tag{10.10}$$

and

$$u_2'(z^2) + v_1'(z^2) = 1. \tag{10.11}$$

In (10.10) and (10.11) the externality effect can be seen to affect the optimal allocation between the two goods via the derivatives of utility with respect to the externality. If the externality is positive then $v_h' > 0$ and the externality effect will raise the value of the left-hand terms. It will decrease them if there is a negative externality with $v_h' < 0$. It can then be concluded that at the optimum with a positive externality the marginal utilities of both households are below their value in the market outcome. The converse is true with a negative externality. It can be seen that the externality leads to a divergence between the private valuations of consumption given by (10.5) and the corresponding social valuations in (10.10) and (10.11). This observation has the implication that the market outcome is not Pareto efficient.

In general, it can also be concluded that if the externality is positive then more of good z will be consumed at the optimum than under the market outcome. The converse holds for a negative externality. This situation is illustrated

Figure 10.1: Deviation of Private from Social Benefits

in Figure 10.1. The market outcome is represented by the equality between private marginal benefit of the good and its marginal cost. The Pareto efficient outcome equates the sum of the private marginal benefit and the marginal external effect of the good to its marginal cost. The market failure is characterized by too much consumption of a good causing a negative externality and too little consumption of a good generating a positive externality .

10.4 Externality Examples

The previous section has discussed externalities at a somewhat abstract level. We now consider some more-concrete examples of externalities. These will illustrate the range of situations that fall under the general heading of externalities.

10.4.1 River Pollution

This is one of the simplest examples that can be described using only two agents. Assume that two firms are located along the same river. The upstream firm, u, pollutes the river which reduces the production (say the output of fish) of the downstream firm, d. Both firms produce the same output which they sell at a constant unit price of 1.

Labor and water are used as inputs. Water is free but a wage w is paid for each unit of labor. The labor market is competitive so w is the equilibrium price of labor. The production technologies of the firms are given by $F^u\left(L^u\right)$ and $F^d\left(L^d, L^u\right)$, with $\frac{\partial F^d}{\partial L^d} < 0$ to reflect that the pollution reduces downstream output. Decreasing returns to scale is assumed with respect to own labor input.

Figure 10.2: Equilibrium with River Pollution

Each firm acts independently and seeks to maximize it own profit $\pi^i = F^i(\cdot) - wL^i$ taking prices as given.

The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 10.2. The total stock of labor is allocated between the two firms. Each point on the horizontal axis then represents a different allocation between the firms. The labor input of the upstream firm is measured from the left, that of the downstream from the right. The upstream firm's profit maximization process is represented in the upper part of the diagram and the downstream firm's in the lower part. As the input of the upstream firm increases the production function of the downstream firm moves progressively in towards the horizontal axis. Given the profit maximizing input level of the upstream firm, denoted L^{u*}, the downstream firm can do no better than choose L^{d*}. At these choices, the firms earn profits π^u and π^d respectively. This is the competitive equilibrium We now show that this is inefficient and that reallocating labor between the firms can increase total profit and reduce pollution.

Consider starting at the competitive equilibrium and make a small reduction in the labor input to the upstream firm. Since the choice was optimal for the upstream firm, the change has no effect on profit for the upstream firm (recall that $\frac{\partial \pi^u}{\partial L^u} = 0$). However, it leads to an outward shift of the downstream firm's production function. This raises its profits. Hence the change raises aggregate profit. This demonstrates that the competitive equilibrium is not efficient and that the externality results in the upstream firm using too much labor and the downstream too little.

Figure 10.3: Choice of Commuting Mode

10.4.2 Traffic Jams

The next example considers the externalities imposed by drivers on each other. Let there by N commuters who have the choice of commuting by train or by car. Commuting by train always takes 40 minutes regardless of the number of travellers. The commuting time by car increases as the number car users increases. This congestion effect which raises the commuting time is the externality between travellers. Each individual makes their decision to minimize their own transportation time.

The equilibrium is depicted in Figure 10.3. The number of car users will adjust until the travel time by car is exactly equal to the travel time by train. For the car travel time depicted in the figure, the equilibrium occurs when 40% of commuters travel by car. The optimum occurs when the aggregate time saving is maximized. This occurs when only 20% of commuters use a car.

The externality in this situation is that each car driver takes into account only their own travel time but not the fact that they will increase the travel time for all other drivers. As a consequence, too many commuters choose to drive.

10.4.3 Pecuniary externality

Consider a set of students who must decide whether to be an economist or a lawyer. Being an economist is great when there are few economists, and not so great when the labor market becomes crowded with economists (due to price competition). If the number of economists grows high enough, they will eventu-

Figure 10.4: Job Choice

ally earn less than their lawyer counterparts. Suppose each person chooses the profession with the best earnings prospects. The externality (a pecuniary one!) comes from the fact that when one more person decides to become a economist, he lowers all other economists' incomes (through competition), imposing a cost on the existing economists. When making his decision, he ignores this external effect imposed on others. The question is whether the invisible hand will lead to the correct allocation of students across different jobs.

The equilibrium is depicted in Figure 10.4. The number of economists will adjust until the earnings prospect for an economist is exactly equal to the earnings of a lawyer. The equilibrium is given by the percentage of economists at point E. To the right of point E, lawyers would earn more and the number of economists would decrease. Alternatively, to the left of point E economists are relatively few in number and will earn more than lawyers, attracting more economists into the profession.

The laissez-faire equilibrium is efficient because the external effect is a change in price and income so that the economists' cost of a lower income is a benefit to employers. Employers' benefit equals employees' cost. There is zero net effect. The policy implication is that there is no need for government intervention to regulate the access to some professions. It follows that any public policy that aims to limit the access to some profession (like the *numerus claususis*) is not justified. Market forces will correctly allocate the right number of people to each of the different professions.

Figure 10.5: The Rat Race

10.4.4 The Rat Race Problem

The rat race problem is a contest for relative position. It can help to explain why students work too hard when final marking takes the form of a ranking. It can also explain the intense competition for a promotion in the workplace when candidates compete with each other and only the best will be promoted. We take the classroom example here. Assume that performance is judged not in *absolute* terms but in *relative* terms so that what matters is not how much is known but how much is known compared to what other students know.

In this situation an advantage over other students can only be gained by working harder than they do. Since this applies to all students, all must work harder. But since performance is judged in relative terms, all the extra effort cancels out. The result of this is an inefficient rat race in which each student works too hard to no ultimate advantage. If all could agree to work less hard, the same grades would be obtained with less work. Such an agreement to work less hard cannot be self-supporting since each student would then have an incentive to work harder.

A simple variant of the rat race with two possible effort levels is shown in Figure 10.5. In this figure, c, $0 < c < \frac{1}{2}$ denotes the cost of effort. For both students high effort is a dominant strategy. In contrast, the Pareto efficient outcome is low effort. This game is an example of the Prisoners' Dilemma in which a Pareto improvement could be made if the players could make a commitment to the low effort strategy.

Another example of rat race is the use of performance-enhancing drugs by athletes. In the absence of effective drug regulations, many athletes will feel compelled to enhance their performance by using anabolic steroids and the failure to use these hormones might seriously reduce their success in competition. Since the rewards in athletics are determined by performance relative to others, anyone that use such drug to increase his chance of winning must necessarily reduce the chances of others (an externality effect). The result is that when the competition stakes are high, unregulated contests almost always lead to a race for using more and more performance enhancing drugs. However when everyone do so, the use of such drugs yield no real benefits for the contestants as a whole: the performance-enhancing actions cancel each other. At the same time the race imposes substantial risks. Anabolic steroids have been shown to cause cancer of the liver and other serious health problems. Given what is at stake, voluntary restraint is unlikely to be an effective solution and public intervention now requires strict drug testing of all competing athletes.

The rat race problem is present in almost every contest where something important is at stake and rewards are determined by relative position. In an electoral competition race, contestants spend millions on advertising and governing bodies have now put strict limit on the amount of campaign advertising. Similarly, a ban on cigarette advertising has been introduced in many countries. Surprisingly enough this ban turned out to be beneficial to cigarette companies. The reason is that the ban helped them out of the costly rat race in defensive advertising where a company must advertises because the others do.

10.4.5 The Tragedy of the Commons

The *Tragedy of the Commons* arises from the common right of access to a resource. It results again from the divergence between the individual and social incentives that characterizes all externality problems.

Consider a lake which can be used by fishermen from a village located on its banks. The fishermen do not own boats but instead can rent them for daily use at a cost c. If B boats are hired on a particular day, the number of fish caught by each boat will be $F(B)$ which is decreasing in B. A fisherman will hire boat to fish if they can make a positive profit from doing so. Let w be the wage if they choose to undertake paid employment rather than fish and let $p = 1$ be the price of fish so that total revenue coincide with fish catch $F(B)$. Then the number of boats that fish will be such as to ensure that profit from fishing activity is equal to the opportunity cost of fishing which is the forgone wage w from the alternative job (if it were greater, more boats would be hired and the converse if it were smaller). The equilibrium number of boats, B^*, then satisfies

$$\pi = F(B^*) - c = w \tag{10.12}$$

The optimal number of boats for the community, B°, must be that which maximizes the total profit for the village, net of the opportunity cost from fishing. Hence B° satisfies

$$\max_{\{B\}} B\left[F(B) - c - w\right]. \tag{10.13}$$

This gives the necessary condition

$$F\left(B^{\circ}\right) - c - w + BpF'\left(B^{\circ}\right) = 0. \tag{10.14}$$

Figure 10.6: Tragedy of the Commons

Since an increase in the number of boats reduces the quantity of fish caught by each, $F'\left(B^{\circ}\right) < 0$. Therefore contrasting (10.12) and (10.14) shows that $B^{\circ} < B^{*}$ so the equilibrium number of boats is higher than the optimal number.

This situation is illustrated in Figure 10.6. The externality at work in this example is that each fisherman is concerned only with their own profit. When deciding whether to hire a boat they do not take account of the fact that they will reduce the quantity of fish caught by every other fisherman. This negative externality ensures that in equilibrium too many boats are operating in the lake. Public intervention can take two forms. There is the price-based solution consisting of a tax per boat so as to internalize the external effect of sending a boat on the lake. As indicated on the figure the tax if correctly chosen will reduce the number of boats so as to restore the optimal outcome. Alternatively, the quantity-based solution consists of setting a quota of fishing equal to the optimal outcome.

10.4.6 Bandwagon Effect

The bandwagon effect studies the question of how standards are adopted and, in particular, how it is possible for the wrong standard to be adopted. The standard application of this is the choice of arrangement of the keys on a keyboard.

The current standard, QWERTY, was designed in 1873 by Christopher Scholes in order to deliberately slow down the typist by maximizing the distance between the most used letters. The motivation for this was the reduction of key-jamming problems (remember this would be for mechanical typewriters in

Figure 10.7: Equilibrium Keyboard Choice

which metal keys would have to strike the ink ribbon). By 1904 the QWERTY keyboard was mass produced and became the accepted standard. The key-jamming problem is now irrelevant and a simplified alternative keyboard (Dvorak's keyboard) has been devised which reduces typing time by 5-10%.

Why has this alternative keyboard not been adopted? The answer is that there is a switching cost. All users are reluctant to switch and bear the cost of retraining and manufacturers see no advantage in introducing the alternative. It has therefore proved impossible to switch to the better technology.

This problem is called a *bandwagon effect* and is due to a *network externality.* The decision of a typist to use the QWERTY keyboard makes it more attractive for manufacturers to produce QWERTY keyboards and hence for others to learn QWERTY. No individual has any incentive to switch to Dvorak. The nature of the equilibrium is displayed in Figure 10.7. This shows the intertemporal link between the percentage using QWERTY at time t and the percentage at time $t + 1$. The natural advantage of Dvorak is captured in the diagram by the fact that the number of QWERTY users will decline over time starting from a position where 50% use QWERTY at time t. There are 3 equilibria. Either all will use QWERTY or Dvorak or else a proportion p^*, $p^* > 50\%$, will use QWERTY and $1 - p^*$ Dvorak However, this equilibrium is unstable and any deviation from it will lead to one of the corner equilibria. The inefficient technology, QWERTY, can dominate in equilibrium if the initial starting point is to the right of p^*.

Figure 10.8: Pigouvian Taxation

10.5 Pigouvian Taxation

The description of market inefficiency has shown that its basic source is the divergence between social and private benefits (or between private costs and social costs). This fact has been reinforced by the examples. A natural means of eliminating such divergences is to employ appropriate taxes or subsidies. By modifying the decision problems of the firms and consumers these can move the economy closer to an efficient position.

To see how a tax can enhance efficiency consider the case of a negative consumption externality. With a negative externality the private marginal benefit of consumption is always in excess of the social marginal benefit. These benefits are depicted by the PMB and $SMBcurves$ respectively in Figure 10.8. In the absence of intervention, the equilibrium occurs where the PMB intersects the private marginal cost (PMC). This gives a level of consumption x^m. The efficient consumption level equates the PMC with the SMB; this is at point x^o. As already noted, with a negative externality the market outcome involves more consumption of the good than is efficient.

The market outcome can be improved by placing a tax upon consumption. What it is necessary to do is to raise the PMC so that it intersects the SMB vertically above x^o. This is what happens for the curve PMC' which has been raised above PMC by a tax of value t. This process, often termed Pigouvian taxation, allows the market to attain efficiency for the situation shown in Figure 10.8

Based on arguments like that exhibited above, Pigouvian taxation has been proposed as a simple solution to the externality problem. The logic is that the consumer or firm causing the externality should pay a tax equal to the marginal damage the externality causes (or a subsidy if there is a marginal benefit). Doing so makes them take account of the damage (or benefit) when deciding how much to produce or consume. In many ways, this is a compellingly simple conclusion.

The previous discussion is informative but leaves a number of issues to be resolved. Foremost amongst these is the fact that the figure implicitly assumes there is a single agent generating the externality whose marginal benefit and marginal cost are exhibited and that there is a single externality. The single tax works in this case, but will it still do so with additional externalities and agents? This is an important question to be answered if Pigouvian taxation is to be proposed as a serious practical policy.

To address these issues, we use our example from the market failure section again. There are two consumers 1 and 2 and two goods x and z. The utility of consumer 1 is given by

$$U^1 = x^1 + u_1(z^1) + v_1(z^2), \tag{10.15}$$

and that of 2 by

$$U^2 = x^2 + u_2(z^2) + v_2(z^1). \tag{10.16}$$

The interpretation of these utilities is that the consumption of good z can potentially cause an externality for the other consumer. Thus, 1 is affected by the consumption of 2 and 2 by the consumption of 1. It is assumed that the supply of good x comes from an endowment ω^h to the household h (with $h = 1, 2$) whereas good z is produced from good x by a competitive industry that uses one unit of good x to produce one unit of good z. Normalizing the price of good x at 1, the structure of production ensures that the equilibrium price of good z must also be one. Given this, all that needs to be determined for this economy is the division of the initial endowment into quantities of the two goods.

The optimal structure of Pigouvian taxes is best determined by characterizing the social optimum and inferring from that what the taxes must be. The social optimum solves

$$\underset{\{x^h, z^h\}}{Max}\ W = U^1 + U^2. \tag{10.17}$$

subject to

$$x^1 + z^1 + x^2 + z^2 \leq \omega^1 + \omega^2. \tag{10.18}$$

The solution is characterized by the conditions

$$u_1'(z^1) + v_2'(z^1) = 1, \tag{10.19}$$

and

$$u_2'(z^2) + v_1'(z^2 = 1. \tag{10.20}$$

It is from conditions (10.19) and (10.20) that the optimal taxes can be derived.

Utility maximization by consumer 1 will equate their marginal private benefit, $u_1'(z^1)$, to the consumer price q_1. Given that the producer price is equal to 1 in this example, (10.19) says is that efficiency will be achieved if the price, q_1, facing consumer 1 satisfies

$$q_1 = 1 - v_2'(z^1). \tag{10.21}$$

Similarly, (10.20) says is that efficiency will be achieved if the price facing consumer 2 satisfies

$$q_2 = 1 - v_1'(z^2). \tag{10.22}$$

These identities reveal that the taxes that ensure the correct difference between consumer and producer prices are given by

$$t_1 = -v_2'(z^1), \tag{10.23}$$

and

$$t_2 = -v_1'(z^2). \tag{10.24}$$

Therefore the tax on consumer 1 is the negative of the externality effect on consumer 2 caused by the consumption of good z by consumer 1. Hence if the good causes a negative externality ($v_2'(z^1) < 0$), the tax is positive. The converse holds if it is a positive externality. The same construction and reasoning can be applied to the tax facing consumer 2, t_2, to show that this is the negative of the externality effect caused by the consumption of good z by consumer 2.

The argument is now completed by noting that these externality effects will generally be different and so the two sets of prices will usually be different. Another way of saying this is that efficiency can only be achieved if the consumers face personalized prices which fully capture the externalities that they generate.

So what does this say for Pigouvian taxation? Put simply, the earlier conclusion that a single tax rate could achieve efficiency was misleading. In fact, the general outcome is that there must be a different tax rate for each externality-generating good for each consumer. Achieving efficiency needs taxes to be differentiated across consumers. Naturally, this finding immediately shows the practical difficulties involved in implementing Pigouvian taxation. The same arguments concerning information that were placed against the Lindahl equilibrium for public good provision with personalized pricing are all relevant again here. In conclusion, Pigouvian taxation can achieve efficiency but needs an unachievable degree of differentiation.

If the required degree of differentiation is not available, for instance information limitations require that all consumers must pay the same tax rate, then efficiency will not be achieved. In such cases the chosen taxes will have to achieve a compromise. They cannot entirely correct for the externality but can go some way towards doing so. Since the taxes do not completely offset the externalities, there also becomes a role for intervening in the market for goods related to that causing the externality. For instance, pollution from car use may be lessened by subsidizing alternative mode of transports. These observations are meant to indicate that once the move is made from full efficiency many new factors become relevant and there is no clean and general answer as to how taxes should be set.

A final comment is that the effect of the tax or subsidy is to put a price (respectively positive or negative) on the externality. This leads to the conclusion, which will be discussed in detail below, that if there are competitive markets for the externalities efficiency will be achieved. In other words, efficiency does not require intervention but only the creation of the necessary markets.

10.6 Licences

The reason why Pigouvian taxation can raise welfare is that the unregulated market will produce incorrect quantities of externalities. The taxes alter the cost of generating an externality and, if correctly set, will ensure that the optimal quantity of externality is produced. An apparently simpler alternative is to control externalities directly by the use of licences. This can be done by legislating that externalities can only be generated up to the quantity permitted by licences held. The optimal quantity of externality can then be calculated and licences totalling this quantity distributed. Permitting these licences to be traded will ensure that they are eventually used by those who obtain the greatest benefit.

Administratively, the use of licences has much to recommend it. As was argued in the previous section the calculation of optimal Pigouvian taxes requires considerable information. The tax rates will also need to be continually changed as the economic environment evolves. Despite these apparently compelling arguments in favour of licences, when the properties of licences and taxes are considered in detail the advantage of the former is not quite so clear.

The fundamental issue involved in choosing between taxes and licences revolves around information. There are two sides to this. The first is what must be known to calculate the taxes or determine the number of licences. The second is what is known when decisions have to be taken. For example, does the government know costs and benefits for sure when its decisions have to be taken?

Considering the first of these, although licences may appear to have an informational advantage this is not really the case. Consider what must be known to calculate the Pigouvian taxes. The construction of Section 10.5 showed that taxation required the knowledge of preferences of consumers and, if the model had included production, the production technologies of firms. Such extensive information is necessary to achieve the personalization of the taxes. But what of licences? The essential feature of licences is that they must total to the optimal level of externality. To determine the optimal level requires precisely the same information as is necessary for the tax rates. Consequently, taxes and licences are equivalent in their informational demands.

Now consider the issue of the information that is known when decisions must be made. When all costs and benefits are known with certainty by both the

Figure 10.9: Uncertain Costs

government and individual agents, licences and taxation are equivalent in their effects. This result is easily seen by reconsidering Figure 10.8. The optimal level of externality is x^o which was shown to be achievable with tax t. The same outcome can also be achieved by issuing z^o licences. This simple and direct argument shows there is equivalence with certainty.

In practice, it is more likely that the government must take decisions before the actual costs and benefits of an externality are known for sure. Such uncertainty brings with it the question of timing: who chooses what and when? The natural sequence of events is the following. The government must make its policy decision (the quantity of licences or the tax rate) before costs and benefits are known. In contrast, the economic agents can act after the costs and benefits are known. For example, in the case of pollution by a firm, the government may not know the cost of reducing pollution for sure when it sets the tax rate but the firm makes its abatement decision with full knowledge of the cost.

The effect of this difference in timing is to break the equivalence between the two policies. This can be seen by considering Figure 10.9 which illustrates the pollution abatement problem for an uncertain level of cost. In this case the level of private marginal cost can take two values PMC_L and PMC_H, with equal probability. Benefits are known for sure. When the government chooses its policy it is not known whether private marginal cost is high or low so it must act on the expected value, PMC_E. This leads to pollution abatement z^* being required (which can be supported by licences equal in quantity to present pollution less z^*) or a tax rate t^*.

Under the licence scheme, the level of pollution abatement will be z^* for sure - there is no uncertainty about the outcome. With the tax, the level of abatement will depend upon the realized level of cost since the firm chooses after this is known. Therefore if the cost turns out to be PMC_L the firm will choose abatement level z_L. If its is PMC_H, abatement is z_H. This is shown in Figure 10.9. Two observations emerge from this. Firstly, the claim that licences and taxation will not be equivalent when there is uncertainty is confirmed. Secondly, when cost is realized to be low, taxation leads to abatement in excess of z^*. The converse holds when cost is high.

The analysis of Figure 10.9 may be taken as suggesting that licences are better since they do not lead to the variation in abatement that is inherent in taxation. However, it should also be realized that the choices made by the firm in the tax case are responding to the actual cost of abatement so there is some justification for what the firm is doing. In general, there is no simple answer to which is better.

Some insight into the factors which are relevant can be obtained from the following analysis. Let the cost of abatement be given by

$$C_L = [c_1 - \theta]\, z + c_2 z^2, \tag{10.25}$$

with probability 1/2 and

$$C_H = [c_1 + \theta]\, z + c_2 z^2, \tag{10.26}$$

with probability 1/2.Assuming that $c_1 > 0$ and $c_2 > 0$ and $\theta < c_1$, the marginal cost is increasing $MC = [c_1 \pm \theta] + 2c_2 z$.

Similarly, benefits are with probability 1/2

$$B_L = [b_1 - \eta]\, z - b_2 z^2, \tag{10.27a}$$

or with probability 1/2

$$B_H = [b_1 + \eta]\, z - b_2 z^2, \tag{10.28}$$

Assuming that $b_1 > 0$, $b_2 > 0$ and $\eta < b_1$ the marginal benefit is decreasing $MB = [b_1 \pm \eta] - 2b_2 z$.

The optimal licence is chosen to maximize the expected value of benefits minus costs. Hence it solves

$$\max_{\{z\}} E\,[B - C] = \frac{1}{2}\,[B_H + B_L - C_H - C_L]\,. \tag{10.29}$$

Substituting in from (10.25) - (10.28) the optimization problem is

$$\max_{\{z\}} E\,[B - C] = (b_1 - c_1)z - (b_2 + c_2)z^2, \tag{10.30}$$

and carrying out the maximization shows that

$$z^* = \frac{b_1 - c_1}{b_2 + c_2}. \tag{10.31}$$

For simplicity it is assumed that $z^* = 0$, which implies that $b_1 = c_1$.

With taxation, the firm optimizes by choosing the level of abatement that equates the marginal cost of abatement MB with the tax rate t. Hence, with a low cost

$$z_L = \frac{t - c_1 + \theta}{2c_2}, \tag{10.32}$$

and with a high cost

$$z_H = \frac{t - c_1 - \theta}{2c_2}. \tag{10.33}$$

The government therefore chooses the rate of tax to maximize expected benefits less costs taking account of the decision of the firm captured in (10.32) and (10.33). The government decision is

$$\max_{\{t\}} E\left[B - C\right] = \frac{\theta z_L}{2} - \frac{\theta z_H}{2} - \frac{1}{2}\left[b_2 + c_2\right]\left[z_H^2 + z_L^2\right]. \tag{10.34}$$

After substituting for z_L and z_H, it follows from (10.34) that the optimal tax rate is

$$t^* = c_1. \tag{10.35}$$

Using these solutions, the level of $E\left[B - C\right]$ with the optimal quantity of licence is

$$E\left[B - C\right](z^*) = 0, \tag{10.36}$$

and with taxation

$$E\left[B - C\right](t^*) = \frac{\theta^2}{2c_2} - \frac{\left[b_2 + c_2\right]\theta^2}{4c_2^2}. \tag{10.37}$$

Hence taxation is preferable to the licence if

$$c_2 > b_2. \tag{10.38}$$

When there is uncertainty, taxes and licenses will not be equivalent in their effects. This analysis has established that neither licenses nor taxes are always superior - there are situations where each may be better. Factors such as the slope of the marginal cost and benefit curves are relevant to the choice between the two.

10.7 Internalization

Consider the example of a bee keeper located next door to an orchard. The bees pollinate the trees and the trees provide food for the bees, so a positive production externality runs in both directions between the two producers. According to the theory developed above, the producers acting independently will not take account of this externality. This leads to too few bees being kept and too few trees being planted.

The externality problem could be resolved by using taxation or insisting that both producers raise their quantities. Although both these would work, there is another simpler solution. Imagine the two producers merging and forming a single firm. If they were to do so, profit maximization for the combined enterprise would naturally take into account the externality. By so doing, the inefficiency is eliminated. This method of controlling externalities by forming single units out of the parties affected is called *internalization* and it ensures that private and social costs become the same. It works for both production and consumption externalities whether they are positive or negative.

Internalization seems a simple solution but it is not without its difficulties. To highlight the first of these, consider an industry in which the productive activity of each firm in the industry causes an externality for the other firms in the industry. In this situation the internalization argument would suggest that the firms become a single monopolist. If this were to occur, welfare loss would then arise due to the monopolistic behavior and this may actually be greater than the initial loss due to the externality. Although this is obviously an extreme example, the internalization argument always implies the construction of larger economic agents and a consequent increase in market power. The welfare loss due to market power then has to be offset against the gain from eliminating the effect of the externality.

The second difficulty is that the economic agents involved may simply not wish to be amalgamated into a single unit. This objection is particularly true when applied to consumption externalities since if a household generates an externality for their neighbor it is not clear that they would wish to form a single household unit, particularly if the externality is a negative one.

In summary, internalization will eliminate the consequences of an externality in very direct manner by ensuring that private and social costs are equated. However it is unlikely to be a practical solution when many distinct economic agents contribute separately to the total externality and has the disadvantage of leading to increased market power.

10.8 The Coase Theorem

After identifying externalities as a source of market failure, this chapter has taken the standard approach of then discussing policy remedies. In contrast to this, there has developed a line of reasoning that questions whether such intervention is necessary. The focal point for this is the Coase Theorem which suggests that economic agents may resolve externality problems themselves without the need for government intervention. This conclusion runs against the standard assessment of the consequences of externalities and explains why the Coase Theorem has been of considerable interest.

The Coase Theorem asserts that if the market is allowed to function freely then it will achieve an efficient allocation of resources. This claim can be stated formally as follows.

Theorem 9 *(The Coase Theorem) In a competitive economy with complete information and zero transaction costs, the allocation of resources will be efficient and invariant with respect to legal rules of entitlement.*

The legal rules of entitlement, or property rights, are of central importance to the Coase Theorem. Property rights are the rules which determine ownership within the economy. For example, property rights may be state that all agents are entitled to unpolluted air or the right to enjoy silence (they may also state the opposite). Property rights also determine the direction in which compensation payments will be made if a property right is violated.

The implication of the Coase theorem is that there is no need for policy intervention with regard to externalities except to ensure that property rights are clearly defined. When they are, the theorem presumes that those affected by an externality will find it in their interest to reach private agreements with those causing it to eliminate any market failure. These agreements will involve the payment of compensation to the agent whose property right is being violated. The level of compensation will ensure that the right price emerges for the externality and a Pareto efficient outcome will be achieved. These compensation payments can be interpreted in the same way as the personalized prices discussed in Section 10.5.

As well as claiming the outcome will be efficient, the Coase Theorem also asserts the equilibrium will be invariant to the how property rights are assigned. This is surprising since a natural expectation would be, for example, that the level of pollution under a polluter-pays system (*i.e.* giving property rights to pollutees) will be less than that under a pollutee-pays (*i.e.* giving property rights to the polluter). To show how the invariance argument works, consider the example of a factory that is polluting the atmosphere of a neighboring house. When the firm has the right to pollute, the householder can only reduce the pollution by paying the firm a sufficient amount of compensation to make it worthwhile to stop production or to find an alternative means of production. Let the amount of compensation the firm requires be C. Then the cost to the householder of the pollution, G, will either be greater than C, in which case they will be willing to compensate the firm and the externality will cease, or it will be less than C and the externality will be left to continue. Now consider the outcome with the polluter pays principle. The cost to the firm stopping the externality now becomes C and the compensation required by the household is G. If C is greater than G the firm will be willing to compensate the household and continue producing the externality, if it is less than G it stops the externality. Considering the two cases, it can be seen the outcome is determined only by G relative to C and not by the assignment of property rights' which is essentially the content of the Coase theorem.

There is a further issue before invariance can be confirmed. The change in property rights between the two cases will cause differences in the final distribution of income due to the direction of compensation payments. Invariance can only hold if this redistribution of income does not cause a change in the level of demand. This requires there to be no income effects or, to put it another way, the marginal unit of income must be spent in the same way by both parties.

When the practical relevance of the Coase Theorem is considered, a number of issues arise. The first lies with the assignment of property rights in the market. With commodities defined in the usual sense it is clear who is the purchaser and who is the supplier and, therefore, the direction in which payment should be transferred. This is not the case with externalities. For example, with air pollution it may not be clear that the polluter should pay, with the implicit recognition of the right to clean air, or whether there is a right to pollute, with clean air something that should have to be paid for. This leaves the direction in which payment should go unclear. Without clearly specified property rights, the bargaining envisaged in the Coase Theorem does not have a firm foundation: neither party would willingly accept that they were the party that should pay.

If the exchange of commodities would lead to mutually beneficial gains for two parties, the commodities will be exchanged unless the cost of doing so outweighs the benefits. Such transactions costs may arise from the need for the parties to travel to a point of exchange or from the legal costs involved in formalizing the transactions. They may also arise due to the search required to find a trading partner. Whenever they arise, transactions costs represent a hindrance to trade and, if sufficiently great, will lead to no trade at all taking place. The latter results in the economy having a missing market.

The existence of transactions costs is often seen as the most significant reason for the non-existence of markets in externalities. To see how they can arise, consider the problem of pollution caused by car emissions. If the reasoning of the Coase Theorem is applied literally, then any driver of a car must purchase pollution rights from all of the agents that are affected by the car emissions each time, and every time, that the car is used. Obviously, this would take an absurd amount of organization and, since considerable time and resources would be used in the process, transactions costs would be significant. In many cases it seems likely that the welfare loss due to the waste of resources in organizing the market would outweigh any gains from having the market.

When external effects are traded, there will generally only be one agent on each side of the market. This thinness of the market undermines the assumption of competitive behavior needed to support the efficiency hypothesis. In such circumstances, the Coase theorem has been interpreted as implying that bargaining between the two agents will take place over compensation for external effects and that this bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome. Such a claim requires substantiation.

Bargaining can be interpreted as taking the form of either a cooperative game between agents or as a non-cooperative game. When it is viewed as cooperative, the tradition since Nash has been to adopt a set of axioms which the bargain must satisfy and to derive the outcomes that satisfy these axioms. The requirement of Pareto efficiency is always adopted as one of the axioms so that the bargained agreement is necessarily efficient. If all bargains over compensation payments were placed in front of an external arbitrator, then the Nash bargaining solution would have some force as descriptive of what such an arbitrator should try and achieve. However, this is not what is envisaged in the Coase theorem which focuses on the actions of markets free of any regulation. Although appealing as a method for achieving an outcome agreeable to both parties, the fact that Nash bargaining solution is efficient does not demonstrate the correctness of the Coase theorem.

The literature on bargaining in a non-cooperative context is best divided between games with complete information and those with incomplete information, since this distinction is of crucial importance for the outcome. One of the central results of non-cooperative bargaining with complete information is due to Rubinstein who considers the division of a single object between two players. The game is similar to the fund raising game presented in the public good chapter. The players take it in turns to announce a division of the object and each period an offer and an acceptance or rejection are made. Both players discount the future so are impatient to arrive at an agreed division. Rubinstein shows that the game has a unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium with agreement reached in the first period. The outcome is Pareto efficient.

The important point is the complete information assumed in this representation of bargaining. The importance of information for the nature of outcomes will be extensively analyzed in Chapter 12, and it is equally important for bargaining. In the simple bargaining problem of Rubinstein the information that must be known are the preferences of the two agents, captured by their rates of time discount. When these discount rates are private information the attractive properties of the complete information bargain are lost and there are many potential equilibria with the equilibria being dependent upon the precise specification of the structure of bargaining.

In the context of externalities it seems reasonable to assume that information will be incomplete since there is no reason why the agents involved in bargaining an agreement over compensation for an external effect should be aware of the other's valuation of the externality. When they are not, there is always the incentive to try to exploit a supposedly weak opponent or to pretend to be strong and make excessive demands. This results in the possibility that agreement may not occur even when it is in the interests of both parties to trade.

To see this most clearly, consider the following bargaining situation. There are two agents: a polluter and a pollutee. They bargain over the decision to allow or not the pollution. The pollutee cannot observe the benefit of pollution B but knows that it is drawn from a distribution $F(B)$. On the other hand, the polluter cannot observe the cost of pollution C but knows that it is drawn from a distribution $G(C)$. Obliviously, the benefit is known to the polluter and the cost is known to the pollutee. Let us give the property rights to the pollutee, so that he has the right to a pollution free environment. Pareto efficiency requires that pollution be allowed whenever $B \geq C$. Now the pollutee (with all the bargaining power) can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the polluter. What will be the bargaining outcome?

The pollutee will ask a compensation $T > 0$ (since $C > 0$) for permission to pollute. The producer will only accept to pay T if his benefit from polluting exceeds the compensation he has to pay $B \geq T$. Hence the probability that the polluter will accept the offer is equal to $1 - F(T)$; that is the probability that $B \geq T$. The best deal for the pollutee is to ask for compensation that maximizes her expected payoff defined as the probability that the offer is accepted times the net gain if the offer is accepted. Therefore the pollutee asks for compensation T^* which solves

$$\max_{\{T\}} \ (1 - F(T)) \left[T - C\right],$$

clearly

$$T^* > C.$$

But then bargaining can result (with strictly positive probability) in an inefficient outcome. This is the case for all realizations of C and B such that $C < B < T^*$ which implies that the offer is rejected (since the compensation demanded exceeds the benefit) and thus pollution is not allowed, while Pareto efficiency requires permission to pollute to be granted (since its cost is less than its benefit).

The efficiency thesis of the Coase theorem relies on agreements being reached on the compensation required for external effects. The results above suggest that when information is incomplete, bargaining between agents will not lead to an efficient outcome.

10.9 Non-Convexity

One of the basic assumptions that supports economic analysis is that of convexity. Convexity gives indifference curves their standard shape, so consumers always prefer mixtures to extremes. It also ensures that firms have non-increasing returns so that profit-maximization is well defined. Without convexity, many problems arise with both the decisions of individual decisions of firms and consumers, and with the aggregation of these decisions to find an equilibrium for the economy.

Externalities can be a source of non-convexity. Consider the case of a negative production externality. The left-hand part of Figure 10.10 displays a firm whose output is driven to zero by an externality regardless of the level of other inputs. An example would be a fishery where sufficient pollution of the fishing ground by another firm can kill all the fish. In the right-hand diagram a zero output level is not reached but output tends to zero as the level of the externality is increased. In both these case the production set of the firm is not convex.

In either case the economy will fail to have an equilibrium if personalized taxes are employed in an attempt to correct the externality. Suppose the firm were to receive a subsidy for accepting externalities. Its profit-maximizing choice would then be to produce an output level of zero and to offer to accept an arbitrarily large quantity of externalities. Since its output is zero, the externalities can do it no further harm so this plan will lead to unlimited profits. If the price

Figure 10.10: Non-Convexity

for accepting externalities were zero, the same firm would not accept any. The demand for externalities is therefore discontinuous and an equilibrium need not exist.

There is also a second reason for non-convexity with externalities. It is often assumed that once all inputs are properly accounted for, all firms will have constant returns to scale since behavior can always be replicated. That is, if a fixed set of inputs (*i.e.* a factory and staff) produce output y, doubling all those inputs must produce output $2y$ since they can be split into two identical subunits (*e.g.* two factories and staff) producing an amount y each. Now consider a firm subject to a negative externality and assume that it has constant returns to all inputs including the externality. From this view, there are constant returns from the perspective of society. Now consider the firm doubling all its inputs but with the externality held at a constant level. Since the externality is a negative one, it becomes diluted by the increase in other inputs and output must more than double. The firm therefore faces private increasing returns to scale. With such increasing returns, the firm's profit maximizing decision may not have a well-defined finite solution and market equilibrium may again fail to exist.

These arguments provide some fairly powerful reasons why an economy with externalities may not share some of the desirable properties of economies without. The behavior that follows from non-convexity can prevent some of the pricing tools that are designed to attain efficiency from functioning in a satisfactory manner. At worst, non-convexity cause even cause there to be no equilibrium in the economy.

10.10 Conclusions

Externalities are a prevalent feature of economic life and their existence can lead to inefficiency in an unregulated competitive economy. Although the Coase theorem suggests that such inefficiencies will be eliminated by private trading in competitive markets, number objections can be raised to this conclusion. Amongst these are the lack of well-defined property rights, the thinness of markets and the incomplete information of market participants. Each of these impediments to efficient trading undermines the practical value of the Coase theorem.

The obvious policy response to the externality problem is the introduction of a system of corrective Pigouvian taxes with the tax rates being proportional to the marginal damage inflicted by externality generation. When sufficient differentiation of these taxes is possible between different agents, the first-best outcome can be sustained but such a system is not practical due to its informational requirements. Restricting the taxes to be uniform across agents allows the first-best to be achieved in some special cases but, generally, leads to a second-best outcome. An alternative system of control is to employ marketable licences. These have administrative advantages over taxes and lead to an identical outcome in conditions of certainty. With uncertainty, licences and taxes have different effects and combining the two can lead to a superior outcome.

Further reading

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Chapter 11

Imperfect Competition

11.1 Introduction

The analysis of economic efficiency in Chapter 7 demonstrated the significance of the competitive assumption that no economic agent has the ability to affect market prices. Under this assumption, prices reveal true economic values and act as signals that guide agents to mutually consistent decisions. As the Two Theorems of Welfare Economics showed, they do this so well that Pareto efficiency is attained. Imperfect competition arises whenever an economic agent has the ability to influence prices. To be able to do so requires that the agent must be large relative to the size of the market in which they operate. It follows from the usual application of economic rationality that those agents who can affect prices will aim to do so to their own advantage. This must be detrimental to other agents and to the economy as a whole. This basic feature of imperfect competition, and its implications for economic policy, will be explored in this chapter.

Imperfect competition can take many forms. It can arise due to monopoly in product markets and through monopsony in labor markets. Firms with monopoly power will push price above marginal cost in order to raise their profits. This will reduce the equilibrium level of consumption below what it would have been had the market been competitive and will transfer surplus from consumers to the owners of the firm. Unions with monopoly power can ensure that the wage rate is increased above its competitive level and secure a surplus for their members. The increase in wage rate reduces employment and output. Firms (and even unions) can engage in non-price competition by choosing the quality and characteristics of their products, undertaking advertising and blocking the entry of competitors.

Each of these forms of behavior can be interpreted as an attempt to increase market power and obtain a greater surplus. When they can occur the assumption of price-taking behavior used to prove the Two Theorems is violated and an economy with imperfect competition will not achieve an efficient equilibrium (with one special exception which is detailed later). It then becomes possible that policy intervention can improve upon the unregulated outcome. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how the conclusions derived in earlier chapters need to be modified and to look at some additional issues specific to imperfect competition.

The first part of the chapter focuses upon imperfect competition in product markets. After categorizing types of imperfect competition, defining the market structure and measuring the intensity of competition, the failure of efficiency is demonstrated when there is a lack of competition. This is followed by a discussion of tax incidence in competitive and imperfectly competitive markets. The effects of specific and *ad valorem* taxes are then distinguished and their relative efficiency is assessed. The policies used to regulate monopoly and oligopoly in practice are also described. There is also a discussion of the recent European policy on the regulation of mergers. The final part of the chapter focuses on market power on the two sides of the labor market. Market power from the supply side (monopoly power of a labor union) is contrasted with monopsony power from the demand side. It is shown that both cases lead to underemployment with wages, respectively above and below competitive wages.

11.2 Concepts of Competition

Imperfect competition arises whenever an economic agent exploits the fact that he has the ability to influence the price of a commodity. If the influence upon price can be exercised by the sellers of a product then there is *monopoly power*. If it is exercised by the buyers then there is *monopsony power*, and if by both buyers and sellers there is *bilateral monopoly*. A single seller is a *monopolist* and a single buyer a *monopsonist*. *Oligopoly* arises with two or more sellers who have market power, with *duopoly* being the special case of two sellers.

An agent with market power can set either the price at which they sell, with the market choosing quantity, or can set the quantity they supply with the market determining price. When there is either monopoly or monopsony, it does not matter whether price or quantity is chosen: the equilibrium outcome will be the same. If there is more than one agent with market power, then the choice variable does make a difference. *Cournot* behavior refers to the use of quantity as the strategic variable and *Bertrand* behavior to the use of prices. Typically, Bertrand behavior is more competitive in that it leads to a lower market price. Entry by new firms may be impossible, so that an industry is composed of a fixed number of firms, it may be unhindered or incumbent firms may be following a policy of entry deterrence.

Forms of imperfect competition also vary with respect to the nature of products sold. These may be homogeneous, so that the output of different firms is indistinguishable by the consumer, or differentiated, so that each firm offers a different variant. With homogeneous products, at an equilibrium there must be a single price in the market. Differentiation of products can either be vertical (so products can be unambiguously ranked in terms of quality) or horizontal (so consumers differ in which specification they prefer). Equilibrium prices can vary across specifications in markets with differentiated products. The notion of product differentiation captures the idea that consumers make choices between competing products on the basis of factors other than price. The exact nature of the differentiation is very important for the market outcome. What differentiation implies is that the purchases of a product do not fall off to zero when its price is raised above that of competing products. The greater the differentiation, the lower the willingness of consumers to switch among sellers when one seller changes its price. The theory of *monopolistic competition* relates to this competition between many differentiated sellers who can enjoy some limited monopoly power if tastes differ markedly from one consumer to the next.

When products are differentiated, firms may engage in non-price competition. This is the use of variables other than price to gain profit. For example, firms may compete by choosing the specification of their product and the quantity of advertising used to support it. The level of investment can also be a strategic variable if this can deter entry by making credible a threat to raise output.

To limit the number of cases to be considered, this chapter will focus upon Cournot behavior, so quantity is the strategic variable, with homogeneous products. Although only one of many possible cases, this perfectly illustrates most of the significant implications of imperfect competition. It also has monopoly as a special case (when there is a single firm) and competition as another (when the number of firms tends to infinity).

11.3 Market structure

The structure of the market describes the number and size of firms that compete within it and the intensity of this competition. To describe the structure of the market, it is first necessary to define the market.

11.3.1 Defining the Market

A market consists of the buyers and sellers whose interactions determine the price and quantity of the good that is traded. Generally, two sellers will be considered to be in the same market if their products are close substitutes. Measuring the own-price elasticity of demand for a product tells us whether there are close substitutes available, but it does not identify what those substitutes might be. To identify the close substitutes one must study cross-price elasticities of demand between products. When the cross-price elasticity is positive, it indicates that consumers increase their demand for one good when the price of the other good increases. The two products are thus close substitutes. Another approach to defining markets is to use the standard industry classification that identifies products as close competitors if they share the same product characteristics. Although products with the same classification number are often close competitors this is not always true. For example, all drugs share the same classification number but not all drugs are close substitute for each other.

Markets are also defined by geographic areas, since otherwise identical products will not be close substitutes if they are sold in different areas and the cost of transporting the product from one area to another is large. Given this reasoning, one would expect close competitors to locate as far as possible from each other and it therefore seems quite peculiar to see them located close to one another in some large cities. This reflects a common trade-off between market size and market share. For instance, antique stores in Brussels are located next to one another around the Place du Grand Sablon. The reason is that the bunching effect helps to attract customers in the first place (market size), even if they become closer competitors in dividing up the market (market sharing). By locating close together, Brussels' antique stores make it more convenient for shoppers to come and browse around in search of some antiques. In other words the bunching of sellers creates a critical mass that makes it easier to attract shoppers.

11.3.2 Measuring Competition

We now proceed on the basis that the market has been defined. What does it then mean to say that there is "more" or "less competition" in this market? Three distinct dimensions are widely used and need to be clearly distinguished.

The first dimension is *contestability* that represents the freedom of rivals to enter an industry. It depends on legal monopoly rights (*e.g.*, patent protection, operating licenses, ...) or other barriers to entry (such as economies of scale and scope, the marketing advantage of incumbents, and entry-deterring strategies). Entry barriers protect the market leader from serious competition from newcomers. Contestability theory shows how the threat of entry can constrain incumbents from raising prices even if there is only one firm currently operating on the market. However when markets are not perfectly contestable, the threat of potential competition is limited which allows the incumbents to reap additional profits.

A second dimension is the degree of *concentration* that represents the number and distribution of rivals currently operating in the same market. As we will see, the performance of a market depends on whether it is concentrated (having few sellers) or unconcentrated (having many sellers). A widespread measure of market concentration is the *n-firm concentration ratio*. This is defined as the consolidated market share of the n largest firms in the market. For example, the four-firm concentration index ratio in the US cigarette industry is 0.92 which means that the four largest cigarette firms have a total market share of 92 percent (with the calculation of market share usually based on sales revenue). Table 11.1 shows the four-firm concentration ratios for some U.S. industries in 1987.

The problem with the n-firm concentration index is that it is insensitive to the distribution of market shares between the largest firms. For example a four-firm concentration index does not change if the first largest firm increases its market share at the expense of the second largest firm. To capture the relative size of the largest firms, another commonly used measure is the *Herfindahl index*. This index is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of all the firms in the market. Letting s_i be the market share of firm i, the Herfindahl index is given by $H = \sum_i s_i^2$. Notice that the Herfindahl index in a market with two equal-size firms is $\frac{1}{2}$ and with n equal-size firms is $\frac{1}{n}$. For this reason a market with Herfindahl index of 0.20 is also said to have a numbers-equivalent of 5. As an example, if there is one dominant firm with a market share of 44% and 100 identical small firms with a total market share of 56%, the Herfindahl is

$$H = \sum_i s_i^2 = (0.44)^2 + 100(\frac{0.56}{100})^2 = 0.197. \tag{11.1}$$

This market structure is then interpreted as being equivalent to one with 5 identical firms. Herfindahls associated to some U.S. industries are indicated in Table 11.1. These numbers show that the market for laundry firms, which has a numbers-equivalent less than 4, is more concentrated that the book publishing which has a numbers-equivalent of 38.

The third dimension of the market structure is *collusiveness*. This is related to the degree of independence of firms' strategies within the market or its reciprocal which is the possibility for sellers to agree to raise prices in unison. Collusion can be either explicit (such as a cartel agreement) or tacit (when it is in each firm's interest to refrain from aggressive price cutting). Explicit collusion is illegal and more easily detected than the tacit collusion. However tacit collusion is more difficult to sustain. Experience has shown that it is unusual for more than a handful of sellers to raise prices much above costs for a sustained period. One common reason is that a small firm may view the collusive bargain among larger rivals as an opportunity to steal their market shares by undercutting the collusive price which in turn triggers a price war. The airline industry is a good example in recent years of frequent price wars. The additional problem with the airline industry is that fixed cost is high relative to variable cost. This means that once a flight is scheduled, airlines face tremendous pressure to fill their planes and they are willing to fly passengers at prices close to marginal costs but far below average costs. Thus with such pricing practices, airlines can make large financial losses during price wars.

The three dimensions of market structure and the resulting intensity of competition may be related. The freedom to enter on a market may result in a larger number of firms operating and thus a less concentrated market which in turn may lead to the breakdown of collusive agreement to raise prices.

Industry	Number of firms	4-firm concentration ratio	Herfindahl index
Cereal breakfast foods	33	0.87	0.221
Pet food	130	0.61	0.151
Book publishing	2,182	0.24	0.026
Soap and detergents	683	0.65	0.170
Petroleum refining	200	0.32	0.044
Electronic computers	914	0.43	0.069
Refrigerators/freezers	40	0.85	0.226
Laundry machines	11	0.93	0.286
Greeting cards	147	0.85	0.283

(Source: Concentration ratios in Manufacturing, 1992, U.S. Bureau of the Census)

Table 11.1: Market concentration in US Manufacturing, 1987

11.4 Welfare

Imperfect competition, along with public goods, externalities and asymmetric information, is one of the standard cases of market failure that lead to the inefficiency of equilibrium. It is the inefficiency that provides the motivation for studying taxation and economic policy in relation to imperfect competition. To provide the context for the discussion of policy, this section demonstrates the source of the inefficiency and reports measures of its extent.

11.4.1 Inefficiency

The most important fact about imperfect competition is that it invariably leads to inefficiency. The cause of this inefficiency is now isolated in the profit-maximizing behavior of firms who have an incentive to restrict output so that price is increased above the competitive level.

In a competitive economy, equilibrium will involve the price of each commodity being equal to its marginal cost of production. This results from applying the argument that firms will always wish to increase supply whenever price is above marginal cost since price is taken as given, so additional supply will raise profitability. Since all firms raise supply, price must fall until there is no incentive for further supply increases. From this perspective, the profit-maximizing behavior of competitive firms drives price down to marginal cost. If marginal cost is constant at value c, then competition results in a price, p, satisfying

$$p = c. \tag{11.2}$$

To see the cause of inefficiency with imperfect competition, consider first the case of monopoly. Assume that the monopolist produces with a constant marginal cost, c, and chooses its output level, y, to maximize profit. The market power of the monopolist is reflected in the fact that as their output is increased, the market price of the product will fall. This relationship is captured by the inverse demand function, $p(y)$, which determines price as a function of output. As y increases, $p(y)$ decreases. Using the inverse demand function which the monopolist is assumed to know, the profit level of the firm is

$$\pi = [p(y) - c]\, y. \tag{11.3}$$

The first-order condition describing the profit-maximizing output level is

$$p + y\frac{dp}{dy} - c = 0, \tag{11.4}$$

which, since $\frac{dp}{dy} < 0$ (price falls as output increases), implies that $p > c$. The condition in (11.4) shows that the monopolist will set price above marginal cost and that the monopolist's price does not satisfy the efficiency requirement of being equal to marginal cost. The fact that the monopolist perceives that their output choice affects price, so $\frac{dp}{dy}$ is not zero, results directly in the divergence of price and marginal cost.

The condition describing the choice of output can be re-arranged to provide further insight into degree of divergence between price and marginal cost. Using the elasticity of demand, $\varepsilon = \frac{dy}{dp}\frac{p}{y} < 0$, the profit-maximization condition can be written as

$$\frac{p-c}{p} = \frac{1}{|\varepsilon|} \tag{11.5}$$

This equilibrium condition of the monopoly is called the inverse elasticity pricing rule. In words, this condition says that the percentage deviation between the price and the marginal cost is equal to the inverse elasticity of demand. The expression $\frac{p-c}{p}$ is the *Lerner index* and will be shown shortly to be strictly between zero and one (*i.e.* $|\varepsilon| > 1$). The monopoly pricing rule can also be written as

$$p = \mu c, \tag{11.6}$$

where $\mu = \frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{|\varepsilon|}} > 1$ is called the *monopoly mark-up* and measures the extent to which price is raised above marginal cost. This pricing rule shows that the deviation of price from marginal cost is inversely related to the absolute value of the elasticity of demand. The higher is the absolute value of the elasticity, the smaller is the monopoly mark-up.

In the extreme case, if demand were perfectly elastic, which equates to the firm having no market power, then price would be equal to marginal cost. For the mark-up μ to be finite, so price is well-defined, it must be the case that $|\varepsilon| > 1$ so the monopolist locates on the elastic part of the demand curve. If demand is inelastic, with $|\varepsilon| \leq 1$, then the monopolist makes maximum profit by selling the smallest possible quantity at an arbitrarily high price. Since the monopolist operates on the elastic part of the demand curve with $|\varepsilon| > 1$, the Lerner index $\frac{p-c}{p} = \frac{1}{|\varepsilon|} \in (0,1)$ provides a simple measure of market power ranging from zero for a perfectly competitive market to one for maximal market power. Therefore a firm might have a monopoly but its market power might still be low because it is constrained by competition from substitute products outside the market. By differentiating its product a monopolist can insulate its product from the competition of substitute products and thereby expands its market power.

This relation of the monopoly mark-up to the elasticity of demand can be easily extended from monopoly to oligopoly. Assume that there are m firms in the market and denote the output of firm j by y_j. The market price of output is now dependent upon the total output of the firms, $y = \sum_{j=1}^{m} y_j$. With output level y_j, the profit level of firm j is

$$\pi^j = [p - c]\, y_j. \tag{11.7}$$

Adopting the Cournot assumption that each firms regards its competitors' outputs as fixed when it optimizes, the choice of output for firm j satisfies

$$p + y_j \frac{dp}{dy} - c = 0. \tag{11.8}$$

Now assume that the firms are identical and each produces the same output level, $\frac{y}{m}$. The first-order condition for choice of output (11.8) can then be rearranged to obtain the Lerner index

$$\frac{p-c}{p} = \frac{1}{m}\frac{1}{|\varepsilon|}$$

and the oligopoly pricing is given by

$$p = \mu^\circ c,$$

where $\mu^\circ = \frac{m}{m - \frac{1}{|\varepsilon|}} > 1$ is the *oligopoly mark-up.* Thus, in the presence of several firms on the market, the Lerner index of market power is deflated according to the market share. As for monopoly, the value of the mark-up is related to the inverse of the elasticity of demand. The Lerner index can be used to show that an oligopoly becomes more competitive as the number of firms in the industry increases. This claim follows from the fact that$\frac{p-c}{p}$ must tend to 0 as m tends to infinity. Hence, as the number of firms increases, the Cournot equilibrium becomes more competitive and price tends to marginal cost. The limiting position with an infinite number of firms can be viewed as the idealization of the competitive model.

There is one special case of monopoly for which the equilibrium is efficient. Let the firm be able to charge each consumer the maximum price that they are able to pay. To do so obviously requires the firm to have considerable information about its customers. The consequence is that the firm extracts all consumer surplus and translates it into profit. It will keep supplying the good whilst price is above marginal cost, so total supply will be equal to that under the competition. This scenario, known as *perfect price discrimination*, results in all the potential surplus in the market being turned into monopoly profit. No surplus is lost due to the monopoly, but all surplus is transferred from the consumers to the firm. Of course, this scenario can only arise with an exceedingly well-informed monopolist.

11.4.2 Incomplete Information

Monopoly inefficiency can also arise from the firm having incomplete information, even in situations where there would be efficiency with complete information. To see this, suppose a monopolist with constant marginal cost c faces a buyer whose willingness to pay for a unit of the firm's output is v. If there was complete information, the firm and buyer would agree a price between c and v and the product would be traded. The surplus from the transaction would be shared between the two.

The difference that imperfect competition can make is that trade will sometimes not take place even though both parties would gain if they did trade. Assume now that the monopolist cannot observe v but knows from experience that it is drawn from a distribution $F(v)$ which is the probability that the buyer's valuation is less or equal to v. The function $(1 - F(v))$ is analogous to the expected demand when a purchaser buys at most one unit because the probability that there is a demand at price v is the probability that the buyer's valuation is higher than the price. Assume that there are potential gains from trade so $v > c$ for at least a range of v. Pareto efficiency requires trade to occur if and only if $v \geq c$.

The monopolist's problem is to offer a price p that maximizes its expected profit (anticipating that the buyer will not accept the offer if $v < p$). This price must fall between c and v for trade to occur. The monopolist sets a price p^* that solves

$$\underset{p}{Max}\ \underbrace{[1 - F(p)]}_{\text{prob trade}}\ \underbrace{[p - c]}_{\text{profit if trade}}$$

From the assumption that there is a potential gain from trade, there must be a range of values of v higher than c and thus it is possible for the monopolist to charge a price in excess of the marginal cost with the offer being accepted. Clearly, the price that maximizes expected profit must be $p^* > c$, so the standard conclusion of monopoly holds that price is in excess of marginal cost. When trade takes place (so a value of v occurs with $c < p^* < v$), the outcome is an efficient trade. However, when a value of v occurs with $c < v < p^*$ trade does not take place. This is inefficient since trade should occur because the benefit exceeds the cost ($v > c$). The effect of the monopolist setting price above marginal cost is to eliminate some of the potential trades.

For instance, assume the willingness to pay v is uniformly distributed on the interval $[0, 1]$ with the marginal cost $0 < c < 1$. Then the probability that trade takes place at price p (expected demand) is $1 - F(p) = 1 - p$ which gives expected revenue $[1 - F(p)]\,p = (1 - p)p$ and marginal revenue $MR = 1 - 2p$. The expected profit is $\pi = (1 - p)(p - c)$ and the profit maximizing pricing satisfies the first-order condition $(1 - 2p) + c = 0$ which can be re-arranged to

Figure 11.1: Monopoly Pricing

give monopoly price of $p^* = \frac{1+c}{2} > c$. The parallel between this monopoly choice under incomplete information and the standard monopoly problem is illustrated in Fig 11.1.

11.4.3 Measures of Welfare Loss

It has been shown that the equilibrium of an imperfectly competitive market is not Pareto efficient, except in the special case of perfect price discrimination. This makes it natural to consider what the degree of welfare loss may actually be. The assessment of monopoly welfare loss has been a subject of some dispute in which calculations have provided a range of estimates from the effectively insignificant to considerable percentages of potential welfare.

The inefficiency of monopoly has already been described in Chapter 5 and part of that argument is now briefly repeated. Figure 11.2 assumes that the marginal cost of production is constant at value c and that there are no fixed costs. The equilibrium price if the industry were competitive, p^c, would be equal to marginal cost so $p^c = c$. This price leads to output level y^c and generates consumer surplus ADc. The inverse demand function facing the firm, $p(y)$, determines price as a function of output and is also the average revenue function for the firm. This is denoted by AR . The marginal revenue function is denoted MR. The monopolist's optimal output, y^m, occurs where marginal revenue and marginal cost are equal. At this output level, the price with monopoly is p^m. Consumer surplus is ABp^m and profit is $p^m BEc$.

Figure 11.2: Deadweight Loss with Monopoly

Contrasting the competitive and the monopoly outcomes shows that some of the consumer surplus under competition is transformed into profit under monopoly. This is the area $p^m BEc$ and represents a transfer from consumers to the firm. However, some of the consumer surplus is simply lost. This loss is the area BDE which is termed the *deadweight loss of monopoly.* Since the total social surplus under monopoly ($ABp^m + p^m BEc$) is less than that under competition (ADc), the monopoly is inefficient. This inefficiency is reflected in the fact that consumption is lower under monopoly than competition.

If the demand function is linear, so the AR curve is a straight line, then the welfare loss area BDE is equal to half of the area $p^m BEc$. The area $p^m BEc$ is monopoly profit which is equal to $(p^m - c)\, y^m$. This implies that the loss BDE is $\frac{1}{2}(p^m - c)\, y^m$. From the first-order condition for the choice of monopoly output, (11.5), $p^m - c = -\frac{1}{\varepsilon} p^m$. Using this result, it follows that the deadweight loss is

$$\text{Deadweight loss} = -\frac{1}{2}\frac{p^m y^m}{\varepsilon} = -\frac{1}{2}\frac{R^m}{\varepsilon}, \tag{11.9}$$

where R^m is the total revenue of the monopolist. This formula is especially simple to evaluate to obtain an idea of the size of the deadweight loss. For example, if the elasticity of demand is -2, then the welfare loss is 25% of sale revenue and is therefore quite large.

From the rent-seeking perspective, the deadweight loss triangle is only one component of the total social cost of monopoly. The rent-seeking literature argues that all the costs of maintaining the monopoly position should be added to deadweight loss to arrive at the total social loss. The Complete Dissipation Theorem of Chapter 5 showed that these additional costs can be equal to the value of monopoly profit. The total social loss can therefore be as great as the area $p^m BEc + BDE$.

Numerous studies have been published that provide measures of the degree of monopoly welfare loss. A selection of these results is given in Table 11.2. The smaller values are obtained by calculating only the deadweight loss triangle. If these were correct, then we could conclude that monopoly power is not a significant economic issue. This was the surprising conclusion of the initial study of Harberger in 1954 which challenged the conventional wisdom that monopoly must be damaging to the economy. In contrast, the larger values of loss are obtained by following the rent-seeking approach and including the additional components of welfare loss. These values reveal monopoly loss to be very substantial.

Author	Sector	Welfare Loss (%)	Comments
Harberger	US Manufacturing	0.08	
Gisser	US Manufacturing	0.11 - 1.82	Cournot - price leadership
Peterson and Connor	US Food Manufacturing	0.16 - 5.15	Variety of markets structures
Masson and Shaanan	37 US Industries	3	Deadweight loss
		16	Including monopoly profit
McCorriston	UK Agricultural Inputs	1.6 - 2.5	Deadweight loss
		20 - 40	Including monopoly profit
Cowling and Mueller	US	4 - 13	Includes advertising
	UK	3.9 - 7.2	Includes advertising

Table 11.2: Monopoly Welfare Loss

It can be appreciated from Table 11.2 that a broad range of estimates of monopoly welfare loss have been produced. Some studies conclude welfare loss is insignificant, others conclude that it is very important. What primarily distinguishes these differing estimates is whether it is only the deadweight loss that is counted, or the deadweight loss plus the cost of rent seeking. Which is one correct is an unresolved issue that involves two competing perspectives on economic efficiency.

There is one further point that needs to be made. The calculations above have been based upon a *static* analysis in which there is a single time period. The demand function, the product traded and the costs of production are all given. The firm makes a single choice and then the equilibrium is attained. What this ignores are all the *dynamic* aspects of economic activity such as investment and innovation. When these factors are taken into account, as Schumpeter forcefully argued, it is even possible for monopoly to generate dynamic welfare gains rather than losses. This claim is based on the argument that investment and innovation will only be undertaken if firms can expect to earn a sufficient return. In a competitive environment, any gains will be competed away so the incentives are eliminated. Conversely, holding a monopoly position allows gains to be realized. This provides the incentive to undertake investment and innovation. Furthermore, the incentive is strengthened by the intention of maintaining the position of monopoly. The dynamic gains can more than offset the static losses, giving a positive argument for the encouragement of monopoly. We return to this issue in the discussion of regulation in Section **??**.

11.5 Tax Incidence

The study of tax incidence is about determining the changes in prices and profits that follow the imposition of a tax. The *formal* or *legal incidence* of a tax refers to who is legally responsible for paying the tax. The legal incidence can be very different to the *economic incidence* which relates to who ultimately has to alter their behavior because of the tax.

To see this distinction, consider the following. A tax of \$1 is levied on a commodity that costs \$10 and this tax must be paid by the retailer. The legal incidence is simple: for each unit sold the retailer must pay \$1 to the tax authority. The economic incidence is much more complex. The first question has to be: what does the price of the commodity become after the tax? It may change to \$11, but this would be an exception rather than the norm. Instead, it may for example rise only to \$10.50. If it does, \$0.50 of the tax falls upon the consumer to pay. What of the other \$0.50? This depends on how the producer responds to the tax increase. They may lower the price at which they sell to the retailer from \$9 to \$8.75. If they do, then they bear \$0.25 of the tax. The remaining \$0.25 of the tax is then paid by the retailer. The economic incidence of a tax can therefore be very distinct from the legal incidence.

This example raises the question of what determines the economic incidence. The answer to this is found in the demand and supply curves for the good that is taxed. Economic incidence will first be determined for the competitive case and then it is shown how the conclusions are modified by imperfect competition. In fact, imperfect competition can result in very interesting conclusions concerning tax incidence.

Tax incidence analysis is at its simplest when there is competition and the marginal cost of production is constant. In this case, the supply curve in the absence of taxation must be horizontal at a level equal to marginal cost; see Figure 11.3. This gives the pre-tax price $p = c$. The introduction of a tax of amount t will raise this curve by exactly the amount of the tax. The post-tax price, q, is at the intersection of demand and the new supply curve. It can be seen that $q = p + t$ so price will rise by an amount equal to the tax. Hence the tax is simply passed forward by the firms onto consumers since price is always set equal to tax-inclusive marginal cost.

When marginal cost is not constant and the supply curve slopes upward, the introduction of a tax still shifts the curve vertically upwards by the amount equal to the tax. The extent to which price rises is then determined by the slopes of the supply and demand curve. If the demand curve is vertical, price rises by the full amount of the tax; otherwise it will rise by less. See Figure 11.4.

In summary, if the supply curve is horizontal (so supply is infinitely elastic)

Figure 11.3: Tax Incidence with Perfectly Elastic Supply

Figure 11.4: Tax Incidence in the General Case

Figure 11.5: Tax Under-Shifting

or the demand curve is vertical (so demand is completely inelastic), then price will rise by exactly the amount of the tax. In all other cases it will rise by less, with the exact rise being determined by the elasticities of supply and demand. When the price increase is equal to the tax, the entire tax burden is passed by the firm onto the consumers. Otherwise the burden of the tax is shared between firms and consumers. Consequently, the extent to which the price is shifted forwards from the producer onto the consumers is dependent upon the elasticities of supply and demand.

There are two reasons why tax incidence with imperfect competition is distinguished from the analysis for the competitive case. Firstly, prices on imperfectly competitive markets are set at a level above marginal cost. Secondly, imperfectly competitive firms may also earn non-zero profits so taxation can also affect profit. To trace the effects of taxation it is necessary to work through the profit-maximization process of the imperfectly competitive firms. Such an exercise involves characterizing the optimal choices of the firms and then seeing how they are affected by a change in the tax rate.

The incidence of a tax upon output can be demonstrated by returning to the diagram for monopoly profit maximization. A tax of value t on output changes the tax-inclusive marginal cost from c to $c + t$. In Figure 11.5 this is shown to move the intersection between the marginal revenue curve and the marginal cost curve from a to b. Output falls from y^o to y^t and price rises from p to q. In this case, price rises by less than the tax imposed - the difference between q and p is less than t. This is called the case of tax *under-shifting.* What it means is that the monopolist is absorbing some of the tax and not passing it on to the consumer.

Figure 11.6: Tax Over-Shifting

With competition, the full value of the tax may be shifted on to consumers but never more. With monopoly, the proportion of the tax that is shifted onto consumers is determined by the shape of the AR curve (and hence the MR curve). In contrast to competition, for some shapes of AR curve it is possible for the imposition of a tax to be met by a price increase that exceeds the value of the tax. This is called the case of tax *over-shifting* and is illustrated in Figure **??**. The imposition of the tax, t, leads to a price increase from p to q. As is clear in the figure, $q - p > t$. This outcome could never happen in the competitive case.

The feature that distinguishes between the cases of over-shifting and under-shifting is the shape of the demand functions. Figure 11.5 has a demand function that is convex - it becomes increasingly steep as quantity increases. In contrast, Figure **??** involves a concave demand function with a gradient that decreases as output increases. Either of these shapes for the demand function is entirely consistent with the existence of monopoly.

The over-shifting of taxation is also a possibility with oligopoly. To illustrate this, consider the constant elasticity demand function $X = p^{\varepsilon}$, where $\varepsilon < 0$ is the elasticity of demand. Since the elasticity is constant, so must be the mark-up at $\mu^o = \frac{m}{m-\frac{1}{|\varepsilon|}}$. Furthermore, because $\varepsilon < 0$, it follows that $\mu^o > 1$. Applying the mark-up to marginal cost plus tax, the equilibrium price of the oligopoly is $q = \mu^o \left[c + t\right]$. The effect of an increase in the tax is then

$$\frac{\partial q}{\partial t} = \mu^o > 1, \tag{11.10}$$

so there is always over-shifting with the constant elasticity demand function.

This holds for any value of $m \geq 1$, and hence applies to both monopoly ($m = 1$) and oligopoly ($m \geq 2$). In addition, as m increases and the market becomes more competitive μ^o will tend to 1, as will $\frac{\partial q}{\partial t}$, so the competitive outcome of complete tax shifting will arise.

Some estimates of the value of the tax-shifting term are given in Table 11.3 for the beer and tobacco industries. Both of these industries have a small number of dominant firms and an oligopolistic market structure. The figures show that although under-shifting arises in most cases, there is evidence of over-shifting in the tobacco industry.

Baker and Brechling	UK Beer 0.696	UK Tobacco 0.568
Delipalla and O'Donnell, Tobacco	"Northern" EU 0.92	"Southern" EU 2.16
Tasarika, Beer	UK 0.665	

Table 11.3: Calculations of Tax Shifting

There is an even more surprising effect that can occur with oligopoly: an increase in taxation can lead to an increase in profit. The analysis of the constant elasticity case can be extended to demonstrate this result. Since the equilibrium price is $q = \mu^o [c + t]$, using the demand function the output of each firm is

$$x = \frac{[\mu^o]^\varepsilon [c + t]^\varepsilon}{m}. \tag{11.11}$$

Using these values for price and output results in a profit level for each firm of

$$\pi_i = \frac{[\mu^o - 1] [\mu^o]^\varepsilon [c + t]^{\varepsilon+1}}{m}. \tag{11.12}$$

The effect of an increase in the tax upon the level of profit is then given by

$$\frac{\partial \pi_i}{\partial t} = \frac{[\mu^o - 1] [\mu^o]^\varepsilon [\varepsilon + 1] [c + t]^\varepsilon}{m}. \tag{11.13}$$

The possibility of the increase in tax raising profit follows by observing that if $\varepsilon > -1$, then $[\varepsilon + 1] > 0$, so $\frac{\partial \pi_i}{\partial t} > 0$. When the elasticity satisfies this restriction, an increase in the tax will raise the level of profit. Put simply, the firms find the addition to their costs to be profitable.

It should be observed that such a profit increase cannot occur with monopoly, because a monopolist must produce on the elastic part of the demand curve with $\varepsilon < -1$. With oligopoly, the mark-up remains finite provided $m - \frac{1}{|\varepsilon|} > 0$ or $\varepsilon < -\frac{1}{m}$. Therefore profit can be increased by an increase in taxation if there is oligopoly.

The mechanism that makes this outcome possible is shown in Figure 11.7 which displays the determination of the Cournot equilibrium for a duopoly. The figure is constructed by first plotting the isoprofit curves. The curves denote sets of output levels for the two firms that give a constant level of profit. The profit of firm 1 is highest on the curves closest to the horizontal axis and it reaches its maximum at the output level, m_1, which is the output firm 1 would produce

Figure 11.7: Possibility of a Profit Increase

if it were a monopolist. Similarly, the level of profit for firm 2 is higher on the isoprofit curves closest to the vertical axis and is maximized at its monopoly output level, m_2. The assumption of Cournot oligopoly is that each firm takes the output of the other as given when they maximize. So for any fixed output level for firm 2, firm 1 will maximize profit on the isoprofit curve which is horizontal at the output level of firm 2. Connecting the horizontal points gives the best-reaction function. Similarly, setting a fixed output level for firm 1, firm 2 maximizes profit on the isoprofit curve which is vertical at this level of 1's output. Connecting the vertical points gives its best reaction function.

The Cournot equilibrium for the duopoly is where the best reaction functions cross, and the isoprofit curves are locally horizontal for firm 1 and vertical for firm 2. This is point c in the figure. The Cournot equilibrium is not efficient for the firms and a simultaneous reduction in output by both firms, which would be a move from c in the direction of b, would raise both firms' profits. Further improvement in profit can be continued until the point that maximizes joint profit, $\pi_1 + \pi_2$, is reached. Joint profit maximization occurs at a point of tangency of the isoprofit curves, which is denoted by point b in Figure 11.7. The firms could achieve this point if they were to collude but such collusion would not be credible because both the firms would have an incentive to deviate from point b by increasing output.

It is this inefficiency that opens the possibility for a joint increase in profit to be obtained. Intuitively, how taxation raises profit is by shifting the isoprofit curves in such a way that the duopoly equilibrium moves closer to the point of joint profit maximization. Although total available profit must fall as the tax increases, the firms secure a larger fraction of that profit. Unlike collusion, the tax is binding on the firms and produces a credible reduction in output.

11.6 Specific and *Ad Valorem* Taxation

The analysis of tax incidence has so far considered only *specific* taxation. With specific taxation, the legally-responsible firm has to pay a fixed amount of tax for each unit of output. The amount that has to be paid is independent of the price of the commodity. Consequently, the price the consumer pays is the producer price plus the specific tax. This is not the only way in which taxes can be levied. Commodities can alternatively be subject to *ad valorem* taxation, so that the tax payment is defined as a fixed proportion of the producer price. Consequently, as price changes, so does the amount paid in tax.

The fact that incidence has been analyzed only for specific taxation in not a limitation when firms are competitive since the two forms are entirely equivalent. The meaning of equivalence here is that a specific tax and an *ad valorem* tax that lead to the same consumer price will raise the same amount of tax revenue. Their economic incidence is therefore identical.

This equivalence can be shown as follows. Let t be the specific tax on a commodity. Then the equivalent *ad valorem* tax rate τ must satisfy the equation

$$q = p + t = [1 + \tau] p. \tag{11.14}$$

Solving this equation, shows $\tau = \frac{t}{p}$ is the *ad valorem* tax rate that leads to the same consumer price as the specific tax. In terms of the incidence diagrams, both taxes would shift the supply curve for the good in exactly the same way. The demonstration of equivalence is completed by showing that the taxes raise identical levels of tax revenue. The revenue raised by the *ad valorem* tax is $R = \tau pX$. Using the fact that $\tau = \frac{t}{p}$, this revenue level can be written as $\frac{t}{p}pX = tX$, which is the revenue raised by the specific tax. This completes the demonstration that the specific and *ad valorem* taxes are equivalent.

With imperfect competition this equivalence between the two forms of taxation breaks down: specific and *ad valorem* taxes that generate the same consumer price generate different levels of revenue. The reason for this breakdown of equivalence, and its consequences, are now explored.

The fact that specific and *ad valorem* taxes have different effects can be seen very easily in the monopoly case. Assume that the firm sells at price q and that each unit of output is produced at marginal production cost, c. With a specific tax, the consumer price and producer price are related by $q = p + t$. This allows the profit level with a specific tax to be written as

$$\pi = [q - t] x - cx = qx - [c + t] x. \tag{11.15}$$

The definition of this profit levels shows that the specific tax acts as an addition to the marginal cost for the firm. Now consider instead the payment of an *ad valorem* tax at rate τ. Since an *ad valorem* tax is levied as a proportion of the producer price, the consumer price and producer price are related by

Figure 11.8: Contrasting Taxes

$q = [1+\tau]\,p$; hence the consumers pay price q and the firm receives $p = \frac{1}{1+\tau}q$. The profit level with the *ad valorem* tax is then

$$\pi = \frac{1}{1+\tau}qx - cx. \tag{11.16}$$

The basic difference between the two taxes can be seen by comparing these alternative specifications of profit. From the perspective of the firm, the specific tax raises marginal production cost from c to $c+t$. In contrast, the *ad valorem* tax reduces the revenue received by the firm from qx to $\frac{1}{1+\tau}qx$. Hence the specific tax works via the level of costs whereas the *ad valorem* tax operates via the level of revenue. With competition, this difference is of no consequence. But the very basis of imperfect competition is that the firms recognize the effect their actions has upon revenue - so the *ad valorem* tax interacts with the expression of monopoly power.

The consequence of this difference is illustrated in Figure 11.8. In the left-hand figure the effect of a specific tax is shown. In the right-hand figure the effect of an *ad valorem* tax is shown. The specific tax leads to an upward shift in the tax-inclusive marginal cost curve. This moves the optimal price from p to q. The *ad valorem* tax leads to a downward shift in marginal revenue net of tax as shown in Figure 11.8. The *ad valorem* tax leads from price p in the absence of taxation to q with taxation. The resulting price increase is dependent on the slope of the marginal revenue curve.

What is needed to make a firm comparison between the effects of the tax is some common benchmark. The benchmark chosen is to choose values of the specific and *ad valorem* taxes which lead to the same consumer price and determine which raises the most tax revenue. This comparison is easily conducted by returning to the definition of profit in (11.16). With the *ad valorem* tax, the profit level can be expressed as

$$\pi = \frac{1}{1+\tau}qx - cx = \frac{1}{1+\tau}\left[qx - [c+\tau c]\,x\right]. \tag{11.17}$$

The second term of (11.17) shows that the *ad valorem* tax is equivalent to the combined use of a specific tax of value τc plus a profits tax at rate $\frac{1}{1+\tau}$. Since a profits tax has no effect upon the firm's choices but does raise revenue, if the firm is making a positive profit level an *ad valorem* tax with its rate set so that

$$\tau c = t, \tag{11.18}$$

must lead to the same post-tax price as the specific tax. However, the *ad valorem* tax must raise more revenue. This is because the component τc collects the same revenue as the specific tax t but the *ad valorem* tax also collects revenue from the profit-tax component. Hence the *ad valorem* tax must collect more revenue for the same consumer price. This result can alternatively be expressed as the fact that for a given level of revenue, an *ad valorem* tax leads to lower consumer price than a specific tax.

In conclusion, *ad valorem* taxation is more effective than specific taxation when there is imperfect competition. The intuition behind this conclusion is that the *ad valorem* tax lowers marginal revenue and this reduces the perceived market power of the firm. Consequently, the *ad valorem* tax has the helpful effect of reducing monopoly power, thus offsetting some of the costs involved in raising revenue through commodity taxation.

11.7 Regulation of Monopoly

Up until this point the focus has been placed upon the welfare loss caused by imperfect competition and upon tax incidence. As we have shown, there are two competing views about the extent of the welfare loss but even if the lower values are accepted, it would still be beneficial to reduce the loss as far as possible. This raises the issue of the range of policies that are available to reduce the adverse effects of monopoly.

When faced with imperfect competition, the most natural policy response is to try to encourage an enhanced degree of competition. There are several ways in which this can be done. The most dramatic example is US anti-trust legislation which has been used to enforce the division of monopolies into separate competing firms. This policy was applied to the Standard Oil Company which was declared a monopoly and broken-up into competing units in 1911. More recently, the Bell System telephone company was broken up in 1984. This policy of breaking-up monopolists represents extreme legislation and, once enacted, leaves a major problem of how the system should be organized following the break-up. Typically the industry will require continuing regulation, a theme to which we return below.

Less dramatic than directly breaking-up firms is to provides aids to competition. A *barrier to entry* is anything that allows a monopoly to sustain its position and prevent new firms from competing effectively. Barriers to entry can be legal restrictions such as the issue of a single licence permitting only one firm to be active. They can also be technological in the sense of superior knowledge, the holding of patents or the structure of the production function. Furthermore, some barriers can be erected deliberately by the incumbent monopolist specifically to deter entry. For a policy to encourage competition, it must remove or at least reduce the barriers to entry. The appropriate policy response depends upon the nature of the barrier

If a barrier to entry is created by a legal restriction it can equally be removed by a change to the law. But here it is necessary to enquire as to why the restriction was created initially. One possible answer returns us to the concept of rent-creation discussed in Chapter 5 where the introduction of a restriction was seen as a way of generating rent. An interesting example of the creation of such restrictions are the activities of MITI (the Ministry of International Trade and Industries) in Japan. In 1961 MITI produced its "Concentration Plan" which aimed to concentrate the mass-production automakers into 2 to 3 groups. The intention behind this was to cope with the international competition that ensued after the liberalization of auto imports into Japan and to place the Japanese car industry in a stronger position for exporting. These intentions were never fully realized and the plan was ultimately undermined by developments in the auto industry, especially the emergence of Honda as a major manufacturer. Despite this, the example still stands of a good example of a deliberate policy attempt to restrict competition.

If barriers to entry relate to technological knowledge, then it is possible for the government to insist upon the sharing of this knowledge. Both the concern over the bundling of Internet Explorer with Windows in the US and the bundling of Media Player with Windows in Europe are pertinent examples. In the US the outcome has been that Microsoft will be obliged to provide rival software firms with information that allows them to develop competing products, and to ensure that these products work with the Windows operating system. Microsoft's rivals are pushing for a similar solution in the EU. The existence of patents to protect the use of knowledge is also a barrier to entry. The reasoning behind patents is that they allow a reward for innovation: new discoveries are only valuable if the products in which they are embedded can be exploited without competitors immediately copying them. The production of generic drugs is one of the better-known examples of product copying. Without patents, the incentive to innovate would be much reduced and aggregate welfare would fall. The policy issue then becomes the choice of the length of a patent. It must be long enough to allow innovation to be adequately rewarded but not so long that it stifles competition. Current practice in the US is that the term of a patent is 20 years from the date at which the application is filed.

Barriers to entry can also be erected as a deliberate part of a corporate strategy designed to deter competitors. Such barriers can be within the law, such as sustained advertising campaigns to build brand loyalty or the building of excess capacity to deter entry, or they can be illegal such as physical intimidation, violence and destruction of property. Obviously the latter category can be controlled by recourse to the law if potential competitors wish to do so. Potentially, limitations could be placed on advertising. The limitations on tobacco advertisements is an example of such a policy, but this has been motivated on health grounds not competition reasons. The role of excess capacity is to provide a credible threat that the entry of a competitor will be met by an increase in output from the incumbent with a consequent reduction in market price. The reduction in price can make entry unprofitable, so sustaining the monopoly position. Although the economic reasoning is clear, it is difficult to see how litigation could ever demonstrate that excess capacity was being held as an entry deterrent which limits any potential policy response.

The enhancement of competition only works if it is possible for competitors to be viable. The limits of the argument that monopoly should be tackled by the encouragement of competition are confronted when the market is characterized by *natural monopoly.* The essence of natural monopoly is that there are increasing returns in production and that the level of demand is such that only a single firm can be profitable.

This is illustrated in Figure 11.9. This considers two firms each with a production technology that involves a substantial fixed cost but a constant marginal cost. Consequently, the average cost curve, denoted AC, is decreasing while the marginal cost curve, MC, is horizontal. When there is a monopoly, the single firm faces the demand curve AR^1. Corresponding to this average revenue curve is the marginal revenue curve MR^1. The profit-maximizing price for the monopoly is p and output is y^1. It should be observed that the price is above the level of average cost at output y^1 so the monopolist earns a profit.

Now consider the outcome of a second firm entering the market. The cost conditions do not change so the AC and MC curves are unaffected. Demand conditions do change since the firms will have to share the market. The simplest assumption to make is that the two firms share exactly half the market each. This would hold if the total market consists of two geographical areas each of which could be served by one firm. Furthermore, this is the most beneficial situation for the firms since it avoids them competing. Any other way of sharing the market will lead to them earning less profit. With the market shared equally, the demand facing each firm becomes AR^2 and marginal revenue MR^2. The profit maximizing price remains at p, but now at output y^2 this is below average cost. The two firms must therefore both make a loss. Since this market sharing is the most profitable way for the two firms to behave, any other market behavior must lead to an even greater loss.

What this argument shows is a market in which one firm can be profitable but which cannot support two firms. The problem is that the level of demand does not generate enough revenue to cover the fixed costs of two firms operating. The examples that are usually cited of natural monopolies involve utilities such as water supply, electricity gas, telephones and railways where a large infrastructure has to be in place to support the market and which would be very costly to replicate. If these markets do conform to the situation in the figure,

Figure 11.9: Natural Monopoly

then without government intervention only a single firm could survive in the market. Furthermore, any policy to encourage competition will not succeed unless the government can fundamentally alter the structure of the industry. It is not enough just to try to get another firm to operate.

The two policy responses to natural monopoly most widely employed have been public ownership and private ownership with a regulatory body controlling behavior. When the firm is run under public ownership, its price should be chosen to maximize social welfare subject to the budget constraint placed upon the firm - the resulting price is termed the *Ramsey price*. The budget constraint may require the firm to break-even or to generate income above production cost. Alternatively, the firm may be allowed to run a deficit which is financed from other tax revenues. Assume all other markets in the economy are competitive. The Ramsey price for a public firm subject to a break-even constraint will then be equal to marginal cost if this satisfies the constraint. If losses arise at marginal cost, then the Ramsey price will be equal to average cost. The literature on public sector pricing has extended this reasoning to situations in which marginal cost and demand vary over time such as in the supply of electricity. Doing this leads into the theory of *peak-load pricing*. When other markets are not competitive, the Ramsey price will reflect the distortions elsewhere in the economy.

Public ownership was practiced extensively in the UK and elsewhere in Europe. All the major utilities including gas, telephones, electricity, water and trains were taken into public ownership. This policy was eventually undermined by the problems of the lack of incentive to innovate, invest or contain costs. Together, these produced a very poor outcome with the lack of market forces producing industries that were over-manned and inefficient. As a consequence, in the UK all have these industries have now been returned to private sector.

The treatment of the various industries illustrates different responses to the regulation of natural monopoly. The water industry is broken into regional suppliers which do not compete directly but are closely regulated. With telephones, the network is owned by British Telecom but other firms are permitted access agreements to the network. This can allow them to offer a service without the need to undertake the capital investment. In the case of the railways, the ownership of the track, which is the fixed cost, has been separated from the rights to operate trains, which generates the marginal cost. Both the track owner and the train operators remain regulated. With gas and electricity, competing suppliers are permitted to supply using the single existing network.

The most significant difference between public ownership and private ownership with regulation is that under public ownership the government is as informed as the firm about demand and cost conditions. This allows the government to determine the behavior of the firm using the best available information. Although this information may not be complete, so policy can only maximize the objective function in an expected sense, the best that is possible will be achieved. In contrast, when the firm is in private ownership, the government, via the regulatory body, may well be far less informed about the operating conditions of the firm than the firm itself. Information about cost structures and market conditions are likely to remain private and the firm may have strategic reasons for not revealing this accurately.

As an alternative to public ownership, a firm may remain under private ownership but be made subject to the control of a regulatory body. This introduces possible asymmetries in information between the firm and the regulator. Faced with limited information, one approach considered in the theoretical literature is for the regulator to design an incentive mechanism that achieves a desirable outcome. An example of such a regulatory scheme is the two-part tariff in which the payment for a commodity involves a fixed fee to permit consumption followed by a price per unit of consumption, with these values being set by the regulator. Alternatively, the regulator may impose a constraint on some observable measure of the firm's activities such as that it must not exceed a given rate of return upon the capital employed. Even more simple are the regulatory schemes in the UK which involve restricting prices to rise at a slower rate than an index of the general price level.

The analysis has looked at a range of issues concerned with dealing with monopoly power and how to regulate industries. The essence of policy is to move the economy closer to the competitive outcome but there can be distinct problems in achieving this. Monopoly can arise because of the combination of cost and demand conditions and this can place limitations on what policies are feasible. Natural monopoly results in the need for regulation.

11.8 Regulation of Oligopoly

11.8.1 Detecting Collusion

In oligopolistic markets firms can collectively act as a monopolist and are consequently able to increase their prices. The problem for a regulatory agency is that such collusion is often tacit and so difficult to detect. However, from an economic viewpoint, there is no real competition and a high price is the *prima facie* evidence of collusion. The practical question for the regulator is whether a high price is the natural outcome of competition in a market in which there is significant product differentiation (and so little pricing constraint from substitute products) or whether it reflects price collusion.

Nevo (2001) studied this question for the Breakfast Cereal industry in which the four leaders Kellogg, Quaker, General Mills and Post were accused by Congressman Schumer (March 1995) of charging "caviar prices for corn flakes quality". After estimating price elasticities of demand for each brand of cereal, Nevo used these price elasticities to calculate the Lerner index for each brand, $\frac{p-c}{p}$, that would prevail in the industry if producers were colluding and acting as a monopolist. Nevo then calculated the Lerner index of each brand if producers were really competing with each other.

Given the estimated demand elasticities, Nevo found that with collusion the Lerner index of each brand would be on average around 65 to 75 percent. When firms are competing, the Lerner index would be on average around 40 to 44 percent. The next step was to compare these estimations of the Lerner index for the hypothetical collusive and competing industry with the actual Lerner index for the Breakfast Cereal industry to see which hypothesis is the most likely. According to Nevo, the actual Lerner index for the Breakfast Cereal market was about 45 percent in 1995. This market power index is far below the 65-75 percent hypothetical Lerner index that would prevail in a colluding industry and much closer to the Lerner index in the competing hypothesis. Nevo concludes that market power is significant in this industry not because of collusion, but because of product differentiation that limits competition from substitute products (after all, what is the substitute for a "healthy" cereal breakfast?).

11.8.2 Merger Policy

In its recent reform of Merger Regulation, the European Commission has recognized that, in oligopolistic markets, a merger may harm competition and consequently increase prices. Under the original European Commission Merger Regulation (ECMR) a merger was incompatible with the common market if and only if it "creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which competition would be significantly impeded". The problem with this two-part cumulative test was that unless a merger was likely to create or strengthen a dominant position, the question of whether it could lessen competition did not arise and so could not be used to challenge a merger. However one can easily think of oligopoly situations where a merger would substantially lessen competition without giving any individual firm a dominant position. Moreover the concept of dominance is not easily established especially in the presence of tacit collusion. In practice, the concept of dominance had different meanings depending on the circumstances. In particular when there was some presumption of collusion the EC could use the concept of "collective" dominance taking as a single unit a group of sellers suspected to collude in their pricing policy. Just as Alice said in *Through the Looking Glass*, the question comes to "whether you *can* make words mean so many different things".

In the 2004 reform of merger policy the European Commission shifted the attention to the second part of the original regulation. The key article in the new ECMR says that "a concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common market" (Article 2). Thus the European Commission has recognized that reducing competition is not necessarily dominance which is rather a result of how much competition is left. The fundamental idea is that, in oligopolistic markets, a merger of two or more rivals raises competitive concerns if the merging firms sell products that are close substitutes. By removing the competitive constraints, merging firms would be able to increase their prices. This is the "unilateral effect" theory of competitive harm that has been commonly used in the US merger regulation.

Economists have developed a large number of simulation methods, mostly based on estimated demand elasticities, to determine the possible change in price resulting from a merger. Simulation models combine market data on market shares, the own- and cross-price elasticities of demand together with a model of firm behavior and anticipated reductions in cost from the merger to predict the likely price effects. A practical example will be useful to illustrate the method. The example is drawn from Hausman and Leonard (1997) and concerns the market for bath tissue. In 1995 the producer of the Kleenex brand acquired the producer of two competing brands (Cottonelle and ScotTissue). The market shares for these products and other brands are shown in Table 11.4.

Bath Tissue Brand	Market share	Own-price elasticity	price change [cost change]
Kleenex	7.5%	-3.38	+1.0% [-2.4%]
Cottonelle	6.7	-4.52	-0.3 [-2.4]
ScotTissue	16.7	-2.94	-2.6 [-4.0]
Charmin	30.9	-2.75	
Northern	12.4	-4.21	
Angel Soft	8.8	-4.08	
Private Label	7.6	-2.02	
Other	9.4	-1.98	
Market demand		-1.17	

(Source: Data from Tables 1 and 2 in Hausman and Leonard (1997))

Table 11.4: Estimating the Effect of Merger in the Bath Tissue Market

Using weekly retail scanner data that tracks household purchases in retail stores in major US cities, it was possible to estimate own-price elasticities as shown in Table 11.4. The key cross-price elasticities were estimated to be 0.19 (Kleenex relative to Cotonelle); 0.18 (Kleenex relative to ScotTissue); 0.14 (Cottonelle relative to Kleenex); and 0.06 (ScotTissue relative to Kleenex). In addition, it was anticipated that the acquisition would reduce the marginal cost of production for ScotTissue, Cottonelle, and Kleenex by 4 percent, 2.4 percent and 2.4 percent respectively. With these estimates of demand elasticities, information about market shares and the anticipated cost saving from the acquisition of Cottonelle and ScotTissue by the Kleenex brand, it was possible to evaluate the price effects of the merger. A simulation model based on these market estimations and other assumptions about firm and market behavior (Nash equilibrium and constant marginal costs) produced the following prices changes. The acquisition would lead to a reduction in the price of ScotTissue and Cottonelle by 2.6 percent and 0.3 percent, respectively, and an increase in the price of Kleenex by 1.0 percent. Not surprisingly the Antitrust did not challenge the merger.

11.9 Unions and Taxation

As well as monopoly on product markets, it is possible to have unions creating market power for their members on input markets. By organizing labor into a single collective organization, unions are able to raise the wage above the competitive level and generate a surplus for their members. The issue of tax incidence is also of interest when there are unions since they can employ their market power to reduce the effect of a tax on the welfare of members.

The role of trade unions is to ensure that they secure the best deal possible for their members. In achieving this, the union faces a trade-off between the wage rate and the level of employment since a higher wage will invariably lead to lower employment. This trade-off has to be resolved by the union's preferences.

A standard way of representing the preferences of a union is to assume that it has a fixed number, m, of members. Each employed member receives a wage $w\left[1-t\right]$, where t is the tax on wage income. The unemployed members receive b, which can represent either unemployment benefit or the payment in a non-unionized occupation. The level of employment is determined by a labor demand function $n\left(w\right)$, with higher values of w leading to lower values of employment. If the wage rate is w, the probability of any particular member being employed and receiving $w\left[1-t\right]$ is $\frac{n(w)}{m}$. Consequently, if all members are assumed to have the same preferences, the expected utility of a typical union member is

$$U=\frac{n\left(w\right)}{m}u\left(w\left[1-t\right]\right)+\frac{m-n\left(w\right)}{m}u\left(b\right). \qquad (11.19)$$

Since all union members have identical preferences, this utility function can also be taken to represent the preferences of the union.

The union chooses the wage rate to maximize utility, so that the chosen wage satisfies the first-order condition

$$n'(w)\left[u\left(w\left[1-t\right]\right)-u\left(b\right)\right]+n\left(w\right)\left[1-t\right]u'\left(w\left[1-t\right]\right)=0. \tag{11.20}$$

The interpretation of this condition is that the optimal wage rate balances the marginal utility of a higher wage against the value of the marginal loss of employment. Now define the elasticity of labor demand by $\varepsilon_n = \frac{\Delta n}{\Delta w}\frac{w}{n} < 0$ and the elasticity of utility by $\varepsilon_u = \frac{\Delta u}{\Delta w[1-t]}\frac{w[1-t]}{u} > 0$. The first-order condition (11.20) can then be written as

$$u\left(w\left[1-t\right]\right)=\mu^u u\left(b\right), \tag{11.21}$$

where $\mu^u = \frac{1}{1-\frac{\varepsilon_u}{|\varepsilon_n|}} > 1$ is the union mark-up relating the utility of an employed member to that of an unemployed member. This mark-up is a measure of the unions market power. Given a value for the utility elasticity, ε_u, the mark-up increases the lower is the elasticity of labor demand ε_n. At the other extreme as labor demand becomes perfectly elastic, as it does if the labor market is perfectly competitive, then μ^u tends to 1 and the union can achieve no advantage for its members.

The incidence of taxation can now be determined. To simplify, assume that the two elasticities - and hence the mark-up - are constant. Then the utility of the post-tax wage must always bear the same relation to the utility of unemployment benefit. Consequently, $w[1-t]$ must be constant whatever the tax rate. This can only be achieved if the union negates any tax increase by securing an increase in the wage rate that exactly offsets the tax change. Consequently, those who retain employment are left unaffected by the tax change but, since the wage has risen, employment must fall. Overall, the union members must be worse-off. This argument can easily be extended to see that if the elasticities are not constant there is the potential for over-shifting of the tax, or under-shifting, of any tax increase. In this respect, tax incidence with trade unions has very similar features to incidence with monopoly.

11.10 Monopsony

A monopsony market is a market consisting of a single buyer who can purchase from many sellers. The single buyer (or monopsonist) could be a firm that constitutes the only potential buyer of an input. It could also be an individual or public organization that is the only buyer of a product. For example, in many countries the government is the monopsonist in the teaching and nursing markets. In local markets with only one large employer, the local employer might literally be the only employment option in the local community (*e.g.*, a coal mine, supermarket, government agency ...) so it might make sense that the local employer would act as a monopsonist in reducing the wage below the competitive level. In larger markets with more than one employer, employers association often have opportunities to coordinate their wage offers. This wage coordination allows employers to act as a "demand" cartel in the labour market and thus replicate the monopsony outcome.

Just as monopoly results in supply reduction with a price or wage *above* competitive levels, monopsony will result in demand reduction with price or wage *below* competitive levels.

In a perfectly competitive market in which many firms purchase labor services, each firm takes the price of labor as given. Each firm maximizes its profits by choosing the employment level that equates the marginal revenue product of labor with the wage rate. In contrast, in a monopsony labor market, the monopsony firm pays a wage below the competitive wage. The result is a shortage of employment relative to the competitive level. The idea is that since the marginal revenue product from additional employment exceeds the wage cost in a monopsony labour market, the monopsonist employer might want to hire more people at the prevailing wage. However, it would not want to increase the wage to attract more workers because the gain from hiring additional workers (the marginal revenue product) is outweighed by the higher wage bill it would face for its existing workforce.

Figure 11.10 shows the equilibrium in a monopsony labor market. The competitive equilibrium occurs at a market clearing wage w^c, where the labor supply curve intersects the demand curve. Suppose now there is a single buyer on this labor market. The marginal revenue of labor is the additional revenue that the firm gets when it employs an additional unit of labor. Suppose that the firm's output as a function of its labor use is $Q(L)$ and that the firm is a price taker on the output market so its output price p is independent of the amount of output Q. Then the marginal revenue of labor is $MR_L = p\frac{\Delta Q}{\Delta L}$ which is decreasing due to decreasing returns to labor. This marginal revenue is depicted in Figure 11.10 as the downward sloping labor demand curve. The supply of labor is described by the "inverse" supply curve. The inverse supply curve $w(L)$ describes the wage required to induce any given quantity of labor to be supplied. Since the supply curve is upward sloping $\frac{\Delta w}{\Delta L} > 0$. The total labor cost of the monopsonist is $Lw(L)$ and the marginal cost of labor is the extra cost that comes from hiring one more worker $MC_L = w + L\frac{\Delta w}{\Delta L}$. This additional cost can be decomposed into two parts; the cost from employing more workers at the existing wage (w) and the cost from raising the wage for all workers ($L\frac{\Delta w}{\Delta L}$). Since $\frac{\Delta w}{\Delta L} > 0$, the marginal labor cost curve lies everywhere above the labor supply curve, as indicated on Figure 11.10. The monopsonist will maximize profit $\pi = pQ(L) - w(L)L$ at the point at which marginal revenue of labor is equal to marginal cost $p\frac{\Delta Q}{\Delta L} = w + \ L\frac{\Delta w}{\Delta L}$

The choice that gives maximum profit occurs in Figure 11.10 at the intersection between the marginal cost curve and the labor demand curve yielding employment level L^m and wage rate w^m. Therefore in a monopsony labor market the monopsony firm pays a wage that is less than the competitive wage with employment level below the competitive level. The monopsony equilibrium condition can also be expressed as an inverse elasticity pricing rule. Indeed, the elasticity of labor supply is $\varepsilon_L = \frac{\Delta L}{\Delta w}\frac{w}{L}$ and the profit maximization condition

Figure 11.10: Monopsony in the Labor Market

$MR_L = MC_L$ can be re-arranged to give

$$\frac{MR_L - w}{w} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_L}. \tag{11.22}$$

This inverse pricing rule says that the percentage deviation from the competitive wage is inversely proportional to the elasticity of labor supply. By contrast with the monopoly, the key elasticity is the *supply* elasticity. Just as monopoly results in a deadweight loss, so does monopsony leading to underemployment and under-pricing of the input (in this case labor) relative to the competitive outcome.

11.11 Conclusions

This chapter has shown how imperfect competition leads to a failure to attain Pareto efficiency. As with all such failures, this opens a potential role for government intervention to promote efficiency. Estimates of the welfare loss due to imperfect competition vary widely from the almost insignificant to considerable proportions of welfare, depending on the perspective taken upon rent-seeking. These static losses have to be set against the possible dynamic gains.

Economic tax incidence relates to whom ultimately has to change their behavior as a consequence of taxation. With competition the outcome is fairly straightforward: the cost of a commodity tax is divided between producers and consumers with the division depending on the elasticities of supply and demand.

Imperfect competition introduces two additional factors. Taxes may be overshifted so that price rises by more than the value of the tax. In addition, an increase in taxation may even raise the profits of firms. In contrast to the competitive case, specific and *ad valorem* taxation are not equivalent with imperfect competition. In a choice between the instruments, *ad valorem* taxation is more effective since it has the effect of reducing perceived monopoly power.

To reduce the welfare loss, policy should attempt to encourage competition. In some circumstances this can work, but when there is natural monopoly this policy has to be carefully considered. A natural monopoly could be taken into public ownership or run as a private firm with regulation. Recent policy has concentrated upon the latter.

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Chapter 12

Asymmetric Information

12.1 Introduction

A key feature of the real world is asymmetric information. Most people want to find the right partner, who is caring, kind, healthy, intelligent, attractive, trustworthy and so on. While attractiveness may be easily verified at a glance, many other traits people seek in a partner are difficult to observe, and people usually rely on behavioral signals that convey partial information. There may be good reasons to avoid a potential mate who is too eager to start a relationship with you, as this may suggest unfavorable traits. Similarly, it is hard not to infer that people who participate in dating services must be on average less worth meeting, and the consensus appears to be that these services are a bad investment. The reason is that the decision to resort to a dating agency identifies people who have trouble initiating their own relationships, which is indicative of other unwelcome traits.

In economics asymmetric information arises when the two sides of the market have different information about the goods and services being traded. In particular, sellers typically know more about what they are selling than buyers do. This can lead to adverse selection where bad-quality goods drive out good-quality goods, at least if other actions are not taken. Adverse selection is the process by which buyers or sellers with "unfavorable" traits are more likely to participate in the exchange. Adverse selection is important in economics because it often eliminates exchange possibilities that would be beneficial to both consumers and sellers alike. There might seem some easy way to resolve the problem of information asymmetry: let everyone tells what he knows. Unfortunately, individuals do not necessarily have the incentive to tell the truth (think about the mating example or the market identification of high- and low-ability people).

Information imperfections are pervasive in the economy and in some sense it is an essential feature of a market economy that different people know different things. While such information asymmetries inevitably arise, the extent to which they do so and their consequences depend on how the market is organized, and the anticipation that they will arise affects market behavior. In this chapter we discuss the ways by which information asymmetries affect the market functioning and how they can be partially overcome though policy intervention. We do not consider how the agents can *create* information problems, for example in an attempt to exploit market power by differentiating products or by taking actions to increase information asymmetries as in the general governance problem.

One fundamental lesson of information imperfections is that *actions convey information.* This is a commonplace observation in life but it took some time for economists to fully appreciate its profound effects on how markets function. Many examples can be given. A willingness to purchase insurance at a given price conveys information to an insurance company, because those most likely to decide the insurance is not worthwhile are those who are least likely to have an accident. The quality of a guarantee offered by a firm conveys information about the quality of its products as only firms with reliable products are willing to offer a good guarantee. The years of schooling may also convey information about the ability of an individual. More able people may go to school longer and the higher wage associated with more schooling may simply reflect the sorting that occurs rather than the ability-augmenting effect of schooling itself. The willingness of an investor to self-finance a large fraction of the cost of a project conveys information about his belief in the project. The size of deductibles and co-payments that an individual chooses in an insurance contract may convey information that he is less risk prone. The process by which individuals reveal information about themselves through the choices that they make is called *self-selection.*

Upon recognizing that actions convey information, two important results follow. First, when making decisions, agents will not only think about what they prefer, but they will also think about how their choice will affect others' beliefs about them. So, I may choose longer schooling not because I value what is being taught, but because it changes others' beliefs concerning my ability. Secondly, it may be possible to design a set of choices which would induce those with different characteristics to effectively reveal their characteristics through their choices. As long as some actions are more costly for some types than others, it is an easy matter to construct choices which separate individuals into classes: self-selection mechanisms could, and would, be employed to screen. For example, insurance companies may offer a menu of transaction terms that will separate out different classes of risk into preferring different parts of the menu.

In equilibrium both sides of the market are aware of the informational consequences of their actions. In the case where the insurance company or employer takes the initiatives, self-selection is the main *screening* device. In the case where the insured, or the employee, takes the initiative to identify himself as a better type, then it is usually considered as *signalling* device. So the differences between screening and signalling lies in whether the informed or uninformed side of the market moves first.

Whatever the actions taken, the theory predicts that the types of transactions that will arise in practice will be different from those that would emerge in a perfect-information context. The fact that actions convey information affects equilibrium outcomes in a profound way. Since quality increases with price in adverse selection models, it may be profitable to pay a price in excess of the market clearing price. In credit market the supply of loans may be rationed. In the labor market, the wage rate may be higher than the market clearing wage, leading to unemployment. There may exist multiple equilibria. Two forms of equilibria are possible: *pooling* equilibria in which the market cannot distinguish among the types, and *separating* equilibria in which the different types separate out by taking different actions. On the other hand, under plausible conditions, equilibrium might not exist (in particular if the cost of separation is to great).

Another set of issues arise when actions are not easily observable. An employer would like to know how hard his employee is working; a lender would like to know the actions which borrower undertake that might affect the chance of reimbursement. These asymmetries of information about *actions* are as important as the situations of hidden knowledge. They lead to what is referred to as the *moral hazard problem*. This term originates from the insurance industry which recognized early that more insurance reduces precaution from insured (and not taking appropriate risk was viewed to be immoral, hence the name). One way to solve this problem is to try to induce desired behavior through the setting of contract terms. Borrower's risk taking behavior may be controlled by the interest rate charged by the lender. The insured can exert more care when facing contracts with large deductibles. But in competing for risk averse customers, the insurance companies face an interesting trade-off. The insurance has to be complete enough so that the individual will buy insurance. At the same time, deductibles have to be significant enough to provide adequate incentives for insured parties to take care.

This chapter will explore the consequences of asymmetric information in a number of different market situations. It will describe the inefficiencies that arise and discuss possible government intervention to correct these. Interpreted in this way, asymmetric information is one of the classic reasons for market failure and will prevent trading partners from realizing all the gains of trade. In addition to asymmetric information between trading parties, it can also arise between the government and the consumers and firms in the economy. When it does, it restricts the policies that the government can implement. Some aspects of how this affects the effectiveness of the government will be covered in this chapter, others will become apparent in later chapters. The main implication that will emerge for public intervention is that even if the government too faces informational imperfections, the incentives and constraints facing government differ from those facing the private sector. Even when government faces exactly the same informational problems, welfare could be improved by market intervention. There are interventions in the market that could make all parties better off.

12.2 Hidden Knowledge and Hidden Action

There are two basic forms of asymmetric information that can be distinguished. Hidden knowledge refers to a situation in which one party has more information than the other party on the quality (or "type") of a traded good or contract variable. Hidden action is when one party can affect the "quality" of a traded good or contract variable by some action and this action cannot be observed by the other party.

Examples of *hidden knowledge* abound. Workers know more about their own abilities than the firm does; doctors know more about their own skills, the efficacy of drugs and what treatment the patients need than do either the patients themselves or the insurance companies; the person buying life insurance knows more about his health and life expectancy, than the insurance firm; when an automobile insurance company insures an individual, the individual may know more than the company about her inherent driving skill and hence about her probability of having an accident; the owner of a car kbnows more about the quality of the car than potential buyers; the owner of a firm knows more about the firm than a potential investor; the borrower knows more about the riskiness of his project than the lender does; and not least, in the policy world, the policymakers know more about their competence than the electorate.

Hidden knowledge leads to the *adverse selection* problem. To introduce this, suppose a firm knows that there are high productivity and low productivity workers and that it offers a high wage with the intention of attracting high-productivity workers. Naturally, this high wage will also prove attractive to low-productivity workers so the firm will attract a combination of both types. If the wage is above the average productivity, the firm will make a loss and be forced to lower the wage. This will result in high-productivity workers leaving and average productivity falling. Consequently, the wage must again be lowered. Eventually, the firm will be left with only low-productivity workers. The adverse selection problem is that the high wage attracts the workers the firm wants (the high productivity) and the ones it does not (the low productivity). The observation that the firm will eventually be left with only lowproductivity workers reflects the old maxim that "The bad drives out the good".

There are also plenty of examples of *hidden action.* The manager of a firm does not seek to maximize the return for shareholders but instead trades off her remuneration for less work effort, when it does not simply divert some profit. Firms may find most profitable to make unsafe products when quality is not easily observed. Employers also want to know how hard their workers work. Insurers want to know what care their insured take to avoid an accident. Lenders want to know what risks their borrowers take. Patients want to know if doctors do the right things or if, in an attempt to protect themselves from malpractice suits, they choose conservative medicine, ordering tests and procedures that may not be in the patient's best interests, and surely not worth the costs. The tax authority wants to know if taxing more may induce people to work less or to conceal more income. Government wants to know if more generous pension replacement rates may induce people to retire earlier. A welfaristic government will worry about the recipient of welfare spending too much and investing too little, thus being more likely in need in the future. This concern will also be present among altruistic parents who cannot commit not to help out their children when needy and government who cannot commit not to bail out firms with financial difficulties.

From hidden actions arises the *moral hazard* problem. This refers to the inefficiency that arises due to the difficulties in designing incentive schemes that ensure the right actions are taken. For instance, the price charged for insurance must take into account of the fact that an insured person may become more careless once they have the safety net of insurance cover.

12.3 Actions or Knowledge?

Although the definitions given above make moral hazard and adverse selection seem quite distinct, in practice it may be quite difficult to determine which is at work. The following example, due to Milgrom and Roberts, serves to illustrate this point.

A radio story in the summer of 1990 reported a study on the makes and models of cars that were observed going through intersections in the Washington, D.C. area without stopping at the stop signs. According to the story, Volvos were heavily over-represented: the fraction of cars running stop signs that were Volvos was much greater than the fraction of Volvos in the total population of cars in the D.C. area. This is initially surprising because Volvo has built a reputation as an especially safe car that appeals to sensible, safety-conscious drivers. In addition, Volvos are largely bought by middle-class couples with children. How then is this observation explained?

One possibility is that people driving Volvos feel particularly safe in this sturdy, heavily built, crash-tested car. Thus they are willing to take risks that they would not take in another, less safe car. This implies that driving a Volvo leads to a propensity to run stop signs. This is essentially a moral hazard explanation: the car is a form of insurance, and having the insurance alters behavior in a way that is privately rational but socially undesirable.

A second possibility is that the people who buy Volvos know that they are bad drivers who are apt, for example, to be paying more attention to their children in the back seat than to stop signs. The safety that a Volvo promises is then especially attractive to people who have this private information about their driving, and so they buy this safe car in disproportionately large numbers. Hence, a propensity for running stop signs leads to the purchase of a Volvo. This is essentially a self-selection story: Volvo buyers are privately informed about their driving habits and abilities and choose the car accordingly.

This self-selection is not necessarily adverse selection. It only becomes adverse selection if it imposes costs on Volvo. Quite the opposite may in fact be true and the self-selection of customers can be very profitable.

It is also typically difficult to disentangle the moral hazard problem from the adverse selection problem in anti-poverty programmes because it is difficult to decide whether poverty is due to a lack of productivity skill (adverse selection) or rather to a lack of effort from the poor themselves who know they will get welfare assistance anyway (moral hazard).

12.4 Market Unravelling

The Introduction noted that asymmetric information could lead to a breakdown in trade as the less-informed party began to realize that the less desirable potential partners are those who are more willing to exchange with him. This possibility is now explored more formally in a model of the insurance market in which individuals differ in their accident probabilities. The basic conclusion to emerge is that in equilibrium some consumers do not to purchase insurance even though they could profitably be sold by insurance companies if accident probabilities were observable to them.

Assume that there is a large number of insurance companies and that the insurance market is competitive. The insurance premium is based on the level of expected risk among those who accept insurance offers. Competition ensures that profits are zero in equilibrium through entry and exit. Furthermore, if there is any new insurance contract that can be offered which will make a positive profit given the contracts already available, then one of the companies will choose to offer it.

The demand for insurance comes from a large number of individuals. These can be broken down into many different types of individual who differ in their probability of incurring damage of value $d = 1$. The probability of damage for an individual is given by θ. Different individuals have different values of θ, but all values lies between 0 and 1. If $\theta = 1$ the individual is certain to have an accident. Asymmetric information is introduced by assuming that each individual knows their own value of θ but that it is not observable by the insurance companies. The insurance companies do know (correctly) that risks are uniformly distributed in the population over the interval $[0, 1]$.

All of the individuals are risk averse, meaning that they are willing to pay an insurance premium to avoid facing the cost of damage. For each type the maximal insurance premium that they are willing to pay, $\pi(\theta)$, is given by

$$\pi(\theta) = (1 + \alpha)\theta, \tag{12.1}$$

where $\alpha > 0$ measures the level of risk aversion.

The assumption of competition for the insurance companies implies that in equilibrium they must earn zero profits. Now assume that insurance companies just offer a single insurance policy to all customers. Given the premium (or price) of the policy, π, the policy will be purchased by all the individuals whose expected value of damage is greater than or equal to this. That is, an individual will purchase the policy if

$$\pi(\theta) \geq \pi. \tag{12.2}$$

If a policy is to breakeven with zero profits, the premium for this policy must just equal the average value of damage for those who choose to purchase the policy. Hence (12.2) can be used to write the breakeven condition as

$$\pi = E(\theta : \pi(\theta) \geq \pi), \tag{12.3}$$

which is just the statement that the premium equals expected damage. Returning to (12.1), the condition that $\pi(\theta) \geq \pi$ is equivalent to $[1+\alpha]\,\theta \geq \pi$ or $\theta \geq \frac{\pi}{1+\alpha}$. Using the fact that the θ is uniformly distributed gives

$$E(\theta : \pi(\theta) \geq \pi) = E\left(\theta : \frac{\pi}{1+\alpha} \leq \theta \leq 1\right) = \frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{\pi}{1+\alpha} + 1\right]. \tag{12.4}$$

The equilibrium premium then satisfies

$$\pi = \frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{\pi}{1+\alpha} + 1\right], \tag{12.5}$$

or

$$\pi = \frac{1+\alpha}{1+2\alpha}. \tag{12.6}$$

This equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 12.1. It occurs where the curve $E(\theta : \pi(\theta) \geq \pi)$ crosses the 45^o line - this intersection is the value given in (12.6). It can be seen from the figure that insurance is only taken by those with high risks, namely all those with risk $\theta \geq \frac{1}{1+2\alpha}$. This reflects the process of market unravelling through which only a small fraction of the potential consumers are actually served in equilibrium. The level of the premium is too high for the low risk to find it worthwhile to take out the insurance. This outcome is clearly inefficient since the first-best outcome requires insurance for all consumers. To see this, note that the premium a consumer of type θ is willing to pay satisfies

$$\pi(\theta) = (1+\alpha)\theta > \theta \text{ for all } \theta. \tag{12.7}$$

Therefore, everyone is willing to pay more than the price the insurance companies need to break even if they could observe probabilities of accident.

This finding of inefficiency is a consequence of the fact that the insurance companies cannot distinguish the low-risk consumers from the high-risk. When a single premium is offered to all consumers, the high-risk consumers force the premium up and this drives the low-risk out of the market. This is a simple example of the mechanism of adverse selection in which the bad types always find it profitable to enter the market at the expense of the good. Without any intervention in the market, adverse selection will always lead to an inefficient equilibrium.

12.4.1 Government Intervention

There is a simple way the government can avoid the adverse selection process by which only the worst risks purchase private: it is by forcing all individuals to purchase the insurance. *Compulsory insurance* is then a policy that can make many consumers better-off. With this, high-risk consumers benefit from a lower

Figure 12.1: Equilibrium in the Insurance Market

premium than the actual risk they face and lower than the level in (12.6) - it will actually be $\pi = \frac{1}{2} < \frac{1+\alpha}{1+2\alpha}$. The benefit for some of the low-risk is that they can now purchase a policy at a more favorable premium than that offered if only high-risk people purchased it. This benefits those close to the average who, although paying more for the policy than level of their expected damage, prefer to have insurance at this price than no insurance at all. Only the very low-risk are made worse off - they would prefer to have no insurance than pay the average premium.

The imposition of compulsory insurance may seem a very strong policy since in few circumstances are consumers forced by the government to make specific purchases. But it is the policy actually used for many insurance markets. For instance, both automobile insurance and employee protection insurance are compulsory. Health care insurance and unemployment insurance also are compulsory. Aircraft also have to be insured. Pleasure boats have to be compulsorily insured in some countries (*e.g.* France) but not in others (*e.g.* the UK), despite them representing a much greater capital investment than automobiles. One argument that could be advanced to explain this difference is the operation of self-selection into boating as a leisure activity: those who choose to do it are by their nature either low probability of accident or sufficiently cautious to insure without compulsion.

There is another role for government intervention. So far, the arguments have concentrated upon one of the simplest cases. Particularly restrictive was the assumption that the probability of damage was uniformly distributed across the population. It was this assumption (together with the proportional reservation premium) that ensured the curve $E\left(\theta : \pi(\theta) \geq \pi\right)$ was a straight line with a

Figure 12.2: Multiple Equilibria

single intersection with the 45^o line. When the uniform distribution assumption is relaxed, $E\left(\theta : \pi(\theta) \geq \pi\right)$ will have a different shape and the nature of equilibrium may be changed. In fact, there exist distribution functions $F(\theta)$ for the distribution of types that lead to multiple equilibria. Such a case is illustrated in Figure 12.2. In this figure $E\left(\theta : \pi(\theta) \geq \pi\right)$ crosses the 45^o line three times so that there are three equilibria which differ in the size of the premium. At the low premium equilibrium, E_1, most of the population is able to purchase insurance but at the high premium equilibrium, E_3, very few can.

Each of these equilibria is based on correct but different self-fulfilling beliefs. For example, if the insurance companies are pessimistic and expect that only high-risk consumers will take out insurance, they will set a high premium. Given a high premium, only the high-risk will choose to accept the policy. The beliefs of the insurance companies are therefore confirmed and the economy becomes trapped in a high-premium equilibrium with very few consumers covered by insurance. This is clearly a bad outcome for the economy since there are also equilibria with lower premiums and wider insurance coverage.

When there are multiple equilibria, the one with the lowest premium is Pareto preferred - it gives more consumers insurance cover and at a lower price. Consequently, if one of the other equilibria is achieved, there is a potential benefit from government intervention. The policy the government should adopt is simple: it can induce the best equilibrium (that with the lowest premium) by imposing a limit on the premium that can be charged. If we are at the wrong equilibrium the corresponding premium reduction (from $E_2 \to E_1$ or $E_3 \to E_1$) will attract the good risks making the cheaper insurance policy E_1 sustainable. This policy is not without potential problems. To see these, assume that the government slightly miscalculates and sets the maximum premium below the premium of policy E_1. No insurance company can make a profit at this price and all offers of insurance will be withdrawn. The policy will then worsen the outcome. If set too high, one of the other equilibria may be established. To intervene successfully in this way requires considerable knowledge on the part of the government.

This analysis of the insurance market has shown how asymmetric information can lead to market unravelling with the bad driving out the good, eventually leading to a position where fewer consumers participate in the market than is efficient. In addition, asymmetric information can lead to multiple equilibria. These equilibria can also be Pareto ranked. For each of these problems, a policy response was suggested. The policy of making insurance compulsory is straightforward to implement and requires little information on the part of the government. Its only drawback is that it cannot benefit all consumers since the very low risk are forced to purchase insurance they do not find worthwhile. In contrast the policy of a maximum premium requires considerable information and has significant potential pitfalls.

12.5 Screening

If insurance companies are faced with consumers whose probabilities of having accidents differ, then it will be to their advantage if they can find some mechanism that allows them to distinguish between the high risk and low risk. Doing so allows them to tailor insurance policies for each type and hence avoid the pooling of risks that causes market unravelling.

The mechanism that can be used by the insurance companies is to offer a menu of different contracts designed so that each risk type self-selects the contract designed for it. By self-select we mean that the consumers find it in their own interest to select the contract aimed at them. As we will show, self-selection will involve the bad risks being offered full insurance coverage at a high premium while the low risks are offered partial coverage at a low premium requiring them to bear part of the loss. The portion they have to bear consists of a deductible (an initial amount of the loss) and coinsurance (an extra fraction of the loss beyond the deductible). An equilibrium like this where different types purchase different contracts is called a *separating* equilibrium. This should be contrasted to the *pooling* equilibrium of the previous section in which all consumers purchasing insurance purchased the same contract. Obviously the bad risks will lose from this separation since they will no longer benefit from the lower premium resulting from their pooling with the low risks.

To model self-selection, we again assume the insurance market is competitive, so that in equilibrium insurance companies will earn zero profits. Rather than have a continuous range of different types, we now simplify by assuming there are just two types of agents. The high-risk agents have a probability of an accident occurring of p_h, and the low-risks probability p_ℓ, with $p_h > p_\ell$. The two types form proportions λ_h and λ_ℓ of the total population, where $\lambda_h + \lambda_\ell = 1$.

Both types have the same fixed income, r, and, in the event of an accident suffer the same fixed-damage, d, in the case of accident.

If a consumer of type i buys an insurance policy with a premium π and payout (or coverage) δ , their expected utility is given by

$$V_i(\delta, \pi) = p_i u(r - d + \delta - \pi) + (1 - p_i)u(r - \pi). \tag{12.8}$$

When they purchase no insurance (so $\pi = 0$ and $\delta = 0$), expected utility is

$$V_i(0, 0) = p_i u(r - d) + (1 - p_i)u(r). \tag{12.9}$$

It is assumed that the consumer is risk averse, so the utility function, $u(\cdot)$, is concave.

The timing of the actions in the model is described by the following two stages:

Stage 1: firms simultaneously choose a menu of insurance contracts $S_i = (\delta_i, \pi_i)$ with contract i intended for consumers of type i.

Stage 2: agents choose their most preferred contract (not necessarily the one the insurance companies intended for them!).

We now analyze the equilibrium of this insurance market under a number of different assumptions on information.

12.5.1 Perfect Information Equilibrium

The perfect information equilibrium assumes that the insurance companies can observe the type of each consumer; that is they know exactly the accident probability of each customer. This case is used as a benchmark to isolate the consequences of the asymmetric information that is soon to be introduced.

Figure 12.3 illustrates the equilibrium with perfect information. The curved lines are indifference curves - one curve is drawn for each type. The steeper curve is that of the high risk. The indifference curves are positively sloped because consumers are willing to trade-off greater coverage for a higher premium. They are concave because of risk aversion. It is assumed that willingness to pay for extra coverage increases with the probability of having an accident. This makes the indifference curves of the high-risk steeper at any point than those of the low-risk so that the indifference curves satisfy the single-crossing property. With full information, the insurance companies know the accident probability. They can then offer contracts which trade off a higher premium for increased coverage at the rate of the accident probability. That is, low risk types can be offered any contract $\{\pi, \delta\}$ satisfying $\pi = p_\ell \delta$ and the high risk contracts satisfying $\pi = p_h \delta$. These equations give the two straight lines in Figure 12.3. These are the equilibrium contracts that will be offered. To see this, note that if an insurance company offers a contract which is more generous (charges a lower premium for the same coverage) this contract must make a loss and will be withdrawn. Conversely, if a less generous contract is offered (so a higher premium for the same coverage), other companies will be able to better it without making a loss. Therefore it will never be chosen.

Figure 12.3: Perfect Information Equilibrium

Given this characterization of the equilibrium contracts, the final step is to observe that when these contracts are available, both types will choose to undertake full insurance cover. They will choose $\delta = d$ and pay the corresponding premium. Hence the competitive equilibrium when types are observable by the companies is a pair of insurance contracts S_h^*, S_ℓ^*, where

$$S_h^* = (d, p_h d)\,, \tag{12.10}$$

and

$$S_\ell^* = (d, p_\ell d)\,, \tag{12.11}$$

so there is full coverage and actuarially-fair premia are charged. As for any competitive equilibrium with full (hence symmetric) information, this outcome is Pareto efficient.

12.5.2 Imperfect Information Equilibrium

Imperfect information is introduced by assuming that the insurance companies cannot distinguish a low-risk consumer from a high-risk. We also assume that it cannot employ any methods of investigation to elicit further information. As we will discuss later, insurance companies routinely do try to obtain further information. The reasons why they do and the consequences of doing so will become clear once it is understood what happens if they don't.

Given these assumptions, the insurance companies cannot offer the contracts that arose in the full-information competitive equilibrium. The efficient contract for the low risk provides any given degree of coverage at a lower premium than the contract for the high risk. Hence both types will prefer the contract intended for the low risk (this is adverse selection again!). If offered, it will charge a premium based on the low-risk accident probability but have to pay claims at the population average probability. It will therefore make a loss and have to be withdrawn. This argument suggests what the insurance companies have to do: if they wish to offer a contract that will attract the low-risk type, it must be designed in such a way that it does not also attract the high risk. This requirement places constraints upon the contracts that can be offered and is what prevents the attainment of the efficient outcome.

Assume now that insurance companies offer a contract S_h designed for the high risk and a contract S_ℓ designed for the low risk. To formally express the comments in the previous paragraph, we say that when types are not observable, the contracts S_h and S_ℓ have to satisfy the self-selection (or incentive-compatibility) constraints. These constraints require the low risk to find that the contract S_ℓ offers them at least as much utility as the contract S_h, with the converse holding for the high risk. If these constraints are satisfied, the low risk will choose the contract designed for them, as will the high risk. The self-selection constraints can be written as

$$V_\ell(S_\ell) \geq V_\ell(S_h) \qquad (IC_u), \tag{12.12}$$

and

$$V_h(S_h) \geq V_h(S_\ell) \qquad (ICd). \tag{12.13}$$

(These are labelled IC_u and IC_d because the first has the low-risk types looking "up" at the contract of the high risk, the second has the high-risk looking "down" at the contract of the low-risk. This becomes clear in Figure 12.4.) As we have already remarked, the contracts S_h^*, S_ℓ^* arising in the full information equilibrium do not satisfy (IC_d): the high-risk will always prefer the low-risk's contract S_ℓ^*.

There is only one undominated pair of contracts that achieve the desired separation. By undominated we mean that no other pair of separating contracts can be introduced that make a positive profit in competition with . The properties of the pair are that the high-risk type receives full insurance at an actuarially fair rate. The low-risk do not receive full insurance. They are restricted to partial cover with the extent of the cover determined by where the indifference curve of the high risk crosses the actuarially-fair insurance line for the low risk. In addition the constraint (12.13) is binding while the constraint (12.12) is not. This feature, that the "good" type (here the low-risk) are constrained by the "bad" type (here the high-risk) is common to all incentive problems of this kind.

It can easily be seen that the insurance contracts are undominated by any other pair of separating contracts and make zero profit for the insurance companies. To see that no contract can be introduced which will appeal to only one type and yield positive profit, assume on one hand that such a contract were aimed at the high risk. Then it must be more favorable than the existing contract otherwise it will never be chosen. But is actuarially fair so any contract which is more favorable must make a loss. On the other hand, a contract aimed at the low risk will either attract the high risk too, and so not separate, or, if it attracts only low risk, will be unprofitable. There remains though the

Figure 12.4: Separating Contracts

possibility that a pooling contract can be offered which will attract both types and be profitable.

To see how this can arise, consider Figure 12.5. A pooling contract will appeal to both types if it lies below the indifference curves attained by the separating contracts (lower premium and possibly greater coverage). Since the population probability of an accident occurring is $p = \lambda_h p_h + \lambda_\ell p_\ell$, an actuarially-fair pooling contract $\{\pi, \delta\}$ will relate premium and coverage by $\pi = p\delta$. When λ_h is too large, then the pooling contract will lie close to the actuarially fair contract of the high risk and hence will be above the indifference curve attained by the low risks in the separating equilibrium. In this case, the separating contracts will form an equilibrium. Conversely, when λ_ℓ is large, the pooling contract will lie close to the actuarially fair contract for the low risk. It will therefore be below the indifference curves of both types in the separating equilibrium and, when offered, will attract both low and high risk types. When this arises, the separating contracts cannot constitute an equilibrium since an insurance company can offer a contract marginally less favorable than the actuarially fair pooling contract , attract all consumers and make a profit.

To summarize, there exists a pair of contracts which separate the population and are not dominated by any other separating contracts. They constitute an equilibrium if the proportion of high-risk consumers in the population is sufficiently large (so that the low-risks prefer to separate in choosing partial coverage rather than being pooled with so many high-risks and pay a higher premium). On the other hand, if the proportion of high-risk is sufficiently large, there will be a pooling contract which is preferred by both types and profitable for an insurance company. In this latter case there can be no separating equilibrium.

By using the same kind of argument, it can be shown that there is no pooling

Figure 12.5: Separating and Pooling Contracts

equilibrium. Consider a pooling contract S with full coverage and average risk premium. Any contract $S^\circ = (\delta^\circ, \pi^\circ)$ in the wedge formed by the two indifference curves in Figure 12.6 attracts only low-risks and makes a positive profit. It will therefore be offered and attract the low risk away from the pooling contract. Without the low risk the pooling contract will make a loss.

In conclusion, there is no pooling equilibrium in this model of the insurance market. There may be a separating equilibrium, but this depends upon the population proportions. When there is no separating equilibrium, there is no equilibrium at all. Asymmetric information either causes inefficiency by leading to a separating equilibrium in which the low risk have too little insurance cover or it results in there being no equilibrium at all. In the latter case, we cannot predict what the outcome will be.

12.5.3 Government Intervention

Government intervention in this insurance market is limited by the same information restriction that affects firms: they cannot tell who is low risk or high risk directly but can only make inferences from their choices. This has the consequence that it restricts policy intervention to be based on the same information as the one available to the insurance companies. Even under these restrictions, the government can achieve a Pareto improvement by imposing a cross-subsidy from low-risks to high-risks. It does this by subsidizing the premium of the high-risk and taxing the premium of the low-risk. It can do that without observing risk by imposing a minimal coverage for all at the average risk premium.

The reason that this policy works is that the resulting transfer from the low-risks to the high-risks relaxes the incentive constraint (IC_d). This makes

Figure 12.6: Non-Existence of Pooling Equilibrium

the set of insurance policies that satisfies the constraints larger and so benefits both types. This equilibrium cannot be achieved by the insurance companies because it would require them all to act simultaneously. This is an example of a coordination failure which prevents the attainment of a better outcome.

This policy is illustrated in Figure 12.7. Let the subsidy to the high-risk be given by t_h and the tax on the low risk be t_ℓ. The tax and subsidy are related to the transfer, t, by the relationship $t_h = t/\lambda_h = t/\lambda_h = t_\ell$. The premium for the low risk then becomes $p_\ell + t_\ell$ and for the high risks $p_h - t_h$. As Figure 12.7 shows, the high risks are strictly better-off and the low risks are as well as before because higher coverage is now incentive compatible. The policy intervention has therefore engineered a Pareto improvement. It should be noted that the government has improved the outcome even though it has only the same information as the insurance companies. It achieves this through its ability to coordinate the transfer - something the insurance companies cannot do.

12.6 Signalling

The fundamental feature at the heart of asymmetric information is the inability to distinguish the good from the bad. This is to the detriment of both the seller of a good article, who fails to obtain its true value, and to the purchaser who would rather pay a higher price for something that is known to be good. It seems natural that this situation would be improved if the seller could convey some information that convinces the purchaser of the quality of the product. For instance, the seller may announce the names of previous satisfied customers (employment references can be interpreted in this way) or provide an independent

Figure 12.7: Market Intervention

guarantee of quality (such as a report on the condition of a car by a motoring organization). Warranties can also serve as signals of quality of durable goods because if a product is of higher quality it is less costly for the seller to offer a longer warranty on it. Such information, generally termed *signals*, can be mutually beneficial.

It is worth noting the difference between screening and signalling. The less-informed players (like the insurance companies) use screening (different insurance contracts) to find out what the better-informed players (insurance customer) know (their own risk). In contrast, more-informed players use signals to help the less-informed players find out the truth.

For a signal to work it must satisfy certain criteria. Firstly, it must be verifiable by the receiver (*i.e.*, the less-informed agent). Being given the name of a satisfied customer is not enough - it must be possible to check back that they are actually satisfied. Secondly, it must be credible. In the case of an employment reference this is dependent partly upon the author of the reference having a reputation to maintain and partly upon the possibility of legal action if false statements are knowingly made. Finally, the signal must also be costly for the sender (*i.e.*, the better-informed agent) to obtain and the cost must differ between various qualities of sender. In the case of an employment reference, this is obtained by a record of quality work. Something which is either costlessly obtainable by both the senders of low- and high-quality or equally costly cannot have any value in distinguishing between them. We now model such signals and see the effect that they have on the equilibrium outcome.

The modelling of signalling revolves around the timing of actions. The basic assumption is that the informed agent moves first and invests in acquiring a costly signal. The uninformed party then observes the signals of different agents and forms inferences about quality on the basis of these signals. An equilibrium is reached when the chosen investment in the signal is optimal for each informed agent and the inferences of the uninformed about the meaning of signals are justified by the outcomes. As we will see, the latter aspect involves self-supporting beliefs: they may be completely irrational but the equilibrium they generate does not provide any evidence to falsify them.

12.6.1 Educational Signalling

To illustrate the consequences of signalling, we shall consider a model of productivity signalling in the labor market. The model has two identical firms who compete for workers through the wages they offer. The set of workers can be divided into two types according to their productivity levels. Some of the workers are innately low-productivity in the form of employment offered by the firms, whilst the others are high-productivity. Without any signalling, the firms are assumed to be unable to judge the productivity of a worker.

The firms cannot directly observe a worker's type before hiring, but high-productivity workers can signal their productivity by getting educated. Education itself does not alter productivity but it is costly to acquire. Firms can observe the level of education of a potential worker and condition their wage offer upon this. Hence, education is a signal. Investment in education will be worthwhile if it earns a higher wage. To make it an effective signal, it must be assumed that obtaining education is more costly for the low productivity than it is for the high productivity otherwise both will have the same incentive for acquiring it.

Formally, let θ_h denote the productivity of a high-productivity worker and θ_ℓ that of a low-productivity worker, with $\theta_h > \theta_\ell$. The workers are present in the population in proportions λ_h and λ_ℓ, so $\lambda_h + \lambda_\ell = 1$. The average productivity in the population is given by

$$E(\theta) = \lambda_h \theta_h + \lambda_\ell \theta_\ell. \tag{12.14}$$

Competition between the two firms ensures that this is the wage that would be paid if there were no signalling so the firms could not distinguish between workers. For a worker of productivity level θ, the cost of obtaining education level e is

$$C(e, \theta) = \frac{e}{\theta}, \tag{12.15}$$

which satisfies the property that any given level of education is more costly for a low productivity worker to obtain.

The firms offer wages that are (potentially) conditional upon the level of education; potentially is added since there may be equilibria in which the firms ignore the signal. The wage schedule is denoted by $w(e)$. Given the offered wage schedule, the workers aim to maximize utility which is defined as wages less the cost of education. Hence their decision problem is

$$\max_{\{e\}} w\left(e\right) - \frac{e}{\theta}. \tag{12.16}$$



Figure 12.8: The Single-Crossing Property

As shown in Figure 12.8, the preferences in (12.16) satisfy the single-crossing property when defined over wages and education. Here V_ℓ denotes an indifference curve of a low productivity worker and V_h that of a high productivity. At any point, the greater marginal cost of education for the low-productivity type implies that they have a steeper indifference curve.

An equilibrium for this economy is a pair $\{e^*(\theta), w^*(e)\}$ where $e^*(\theta)$ determines the level of education as a function of productivity and $w^*(e)$ determines the wage as a function of education. In equilibrium, these functions must satisfy:

(a) No worker wants to change his education choice given the wage schedule $w^*(e)$;

(b) No firm wants to change its wage schedule given its beliefs about worker types and education choices $e^*(\theta)$;

(c) Firms have correct beliefs given the education choices.

The first candidate for an equilibrium is a separating equilibrium in which low- and high-productivity workers choose different levels of education. Any separating equilibrium must satisfy

(i) $e^*(\theta_\ell) \neq e^*(\theta_h)$;

(ii) $w^*(e^*(\theta_\ell)) = \theta_\ell$;

$w^*(e^*(\theta_h)) = \theta_h$;

(iiia) $w^*(e * (\theta_\ell)) - \frac{e^*(\theta_\ell)}{\theta_\ell} \geq w^*(e^*(\theta_h)) - \frac{e^*(\theta_h)}{\theta_\ell}$;

(iiib) $w^*(e^*(\theta_h)) - \frac{e^*(\theta_h)}{\theta_h} \geq w^*(e^*(\theta_\ell)) - \frac{e^*(\theta_\ell)}{\theta_h}$.

Condition (i) is the requirement that low- and high-productivity workers choose different education levels, (ii) that the wages are equal to the marginal products and (iii) that the choices are individually rational for the consumers. The values of the wages given in (ii) are a consequence of signalling and competition between firms. Signalling implies workers of different productivities are paid different wages. If either paid a wage above the marginal product, it would make a loss on each worker employed. This cannot be profit maximizing. Alternatively, if one paid a wage below the marginal productivity, the other would have an incentive to set its wage incrementally higher. This would capture all the workers of that productivity level and would be the more profitable strategy. Therefore, the only equilibrium values for wages when signalling occurs are the productivity levels. This leaves only the levels of education to be determined.

The equilibrium level of education for the low-productivity workers is found by noting that if they choose not to act like the high-productivity, then there is no point in obtaining any education - education is simply a cost which does not benefit them. Hence $e^*(\theta_\ell) = 0$. Using this fact and that wages are equal to productivities, the level of education for the high-productivity workers can be found from the incentive compatibility constraints. From (iiia)

$$\theta_\ell \geq \theta_h - \frac{e^*(\theta_h)}{\theta_\ell}, \tag{12.17}$$

or

$$e^*(\theta_h) \geq \theta_\ell [\theta_h - \theta_\ell]. \tag{12.18}$$

Condition (12.18) provides the minimum level of education that will ensure the low-productivity choose not to be educated. Now using (iiib), it follows that

$$\theta_h - \frac{e * (\theta_h)}{\theta_h} \geq \theta_\ell, \tag{12.19}$$

or

$$\theta_h [\theta_h - \theta_\ell] \geq e * (\theta_h). \tag{12.20}$$

Hence a complete description of the separating equilibrium is

$$\begin{aligned} e^*(\theta_\ell) &= 0, \theta_\ell [\theta_h - \theta_\ell] \leq e^*(\theta_h) \leq \theta_h [\theta_h - \theta_\ell], & (12.21) \\ w(e^*(\theta_\ell)) &= \theta_\ell, w(e^*(\theta_h)) = \theta_h, & (12.22) \end{aligned}$$

so the low-productivity workers obtain no education, the high-productivity have education somewhere between the two limits and both are paid their marginal products. An equilibrium satisfying these conditions is illustrated in Figure **??**.

Since there is a range of possible values for $e^*(\theta_h)$, there is not a unique equilibrium but a set of equilibria differing in the level of education obtained by the high-productivity. This set of separating equilibria can be ranked according to criterion of Pareto preference. Clearly, changing the level of education $e^*(\theta_h)$ within the specified range does not affect the low-productivity workers. On the other hand, the high-productivity workers always prefer a lower level of education since education is costly. Therefore, equilibria with lower $e^*(\theta_h)$ are Pareto-preferred and the most preferred equilibrium is that with $e^*(\theta_h) = \theta_\ell [\theta_h - \theta_\ell]$. The Pareto-dominated separating equilibria are supported by the high-productivity worker's fear choosing less education will give an unfavorable impression of her productivity to the firm and thus lead to a lower wage.

Figure 12.9: Separating Equilibrium

There are arguments (called refinements of equilibrium) to suggest that this most-preferred equilibrium will actually be the one that emerges. Let the equilibrium level of education for the high-productivity type, $e^*(\theta_h)$, be above the minimum required to separate. Denote this minimum e^0. Now consider the firm observing a worker with an education level at least equal to e^0 but less than $e^*(\theta_h)$. What should a firm conclude about this worker? Clearly, the worker cannot be low ability since such a choice is worse for them than choosing no education. Hence the firm must conclude that the worker is of high productivity. Realizing this, it then pays the worker to deviate since it would reduce the cost of their education. This argument can be repeated until $e^*(\theta_h)$ is driven down to e^0.

Signalling allows the high-productivity to distinguish themselves from the low-productivity. It might be thought that this improvement in information transmission would make signalling socially beneficial. However, this need not be the case since the act of signalling is costly and does not add to productivity. The alternative to the signalling equilibrium is pooling where both types purchase no education and are paid a wage equal to the average productivity. The low-productivity would prefer this equilibrium as it raises their wage from θ_ℓ to $E(\theta) = \lambda_h\theta_h + \lambda_\ell\theta_\ell$. For the high-productivity pooling is preferred if

$$E(\theta) = \lambda_h\theta_h + \lambda_\ell\theta_\ell > \theta_h - \frac{\theta_\ell\left[\theta_h - \theta_\ell\right]}{\theta_h}. \tag{12.23}$$

Since $\lambda_\ell = 1 - \lambda_h$, this inequality will be satisfied if

$$\lambda_h > 1 - \frac{\theta_\ell}{\theta_h}. \tag{12.24}$$

Hence when there are sufficiently many high-productivity workers, so that the average wage is close the high productivity level, the separating equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the pooling equilibrium. In these cases, signalling is individually rational but socially unproductive. Again, the Pareto-dominated separating equilibrium is sustained by the high-productivity workers' fear that lowering their education would give a bad impression of their ability to the firms and thus lead to lower wage. Actually the no-signalling pooling equilibrium is not truly available to the high-productivity workers. If they get no education, firms will believe they are low-productivity workers and then offer a wage of θ_ℓ. So we get this paradoxical situation that high-productivity workers choose to signal although they are worse off when signalling.

If the government were to intervene in this economy, it has two basic policy options. The first is to allow signalling to occur but to place an upper limit on the level of education equal to $\theta_\ell\left[\theta_h - \theta_\ell\right]$. It might choose to do this in those cases where the pooling equilibrium does not Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium. There is though, one problem with banning signalling and enforcing a pooling equilibrium. The pooling equilibrium requires the firms to believe that all workers have the same ability. If the firms were to "test" this belief by offering a higher wage for a higher level of education, they would discover that the belief

Figure 12.10: Unreasonable Beliefs

was incorrect. This is illustrated in Figure 12.10. A low-productivity worker would be better off getting no education than she would getting education above e whatever the firm's belief and the resulting wage. Therefore the firm should believe that any worker choosing education level above e has high productivity and should be offered a wage θ_h. But if this is so, the high-productivity worker could do better than the pooling equilibrium by deviating to an education level slightly in excess of e to get a wage θ_h. Therefore the pooling equilibrium is unlikely since it involves unreasonable beliefs from the firms.

12.6.2 Implications

The model of educational signalling shows how an unproductive but costly signal can be used to distinguish between quality levels through a set of self-supporting beliefs. There will be a set of Pareto-ranked equilibria with the lowest level of signal the most preferred. Although there is an argument that the economy must achieve the Pareto-dominating signalling equilibrium, it is possible that this may not happen. If it does not, the economy may become settled in a Pareto-inferior separating equilibrium. Even if it does not, it is still possible for the pooling equilibrium to Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium. This will occur when the high productivity workers are relatively numerous in the population since in that case almost every worker is getting unproductive but costly education to separate themselves from few bad workers.

There are several policy implications of these results. In a narrow interpretation, they show how the government can increase efficiency and make everyone better off by restricting the size of signals that can be transmitted. Alternatively the government could improve the welfare of everyone by organizing a cross-subsidy from the good to the bad workers. This can take the form of a minimum wage for the low-productivity workers in excess of their productivity financed by wage limit for the high-productivity workers which is below their productivity. Notice that a ban on signalling is an extreme form of such cross-subsidization since it forces a same wage for all. When the pooling equilibrium is Pareto-preferred, they should be eliminated entirely. More generally, the model demonstrated how market solutions may endogenously arise to combat the problems of asymmetric information. These solutions can never remove the problems entirely - someone must be bearing the cost of improving information flows - and can even exacerbate the situation.

The basic problem for the government in responding to these kinds of problems is that it does not have a natural informational advantage over the private agents. In the model of education there is no reason to suppose the government is any more able to tell the low-productivity workers from the high-productivity (in fact, there is every reason to suspect that the firms would be better equipped to do this). Faced with these kinds of problems, the government may have little to offer beyond the cross-subsidization we have just mentioned.

12.7 Moral Hazard (Hidden Action)

A moral hazard problem arises when an agent can affect the “quality” of a traded good or contract variable by some action which is not observed by other agents. For instance, a houseowner once insured may become lax in their attention to security (such as leaving windows open) in the knowledge that if burgled they will be fully compensated. Or a worker, once in employment, may not fully exert themself reasoning that their lack of effort may be hidden amongst the effort of the workforce as a whole. Such possibilities provide the motive for contracts to be designed that embody incentives to lessen these effects.

In the case of the worker, the employment contract could provide for a wage that is dependent upon some measure of the worker’s performance. Ideally, the measure would be their exact productivity but, except for the simplest cases, this can be difficult to measure. Difficulties can arise because production takes place in teams (a production line can often be interpreted as a team) with the effort of the individual team member impossible to distinguish from the output of the team as a whole. They can also arise through randomness in the relation between effort and output As examples, agricultural output is driven by the weather, maintenance tasks can depend upon the (variable) condition of the item being maintained, and production can be dependent upon the random quality of other inputs.

We now consider the design of incentive schemes in a situation with moral hazard. The model we choose embodies the major points of the previous discussion: effort cannot be measured directly so a contract has to be based on some observable variable which roughly measures effort.

12.7.1 Moral Hazard in Insurance

The moral hazard problem that can arise in an insurance market is that effort on accident prevention is reduced when consumers become insured. If accident-prevention effort is costly, for instance driving more slowly is time consuming or eating a good diet is less enjoyable, then a rational consumer will seek to reduce such effort when it is beneficial to do so (and the benefits are raised once insurance is offered). Insurance companies must counteract this tendency through the design of their contracts.

To model this situation, assume an economy populated by many identical agents. The income of an agent is equal to r with probability 1 - p and r - d with probability p. Here p is interpreted as the probability of an accident occurring and d the monetary equivalent of the accident damage. Moral hazard is introduced by assuming that the agents are able to affect the accident probability through their prevention efforts.

To simplify, it is assumed that effort, e, can take one of two values. If $e = 0$ an agent is making no effort at accident prevention and the probability of an accident is $p\left(0\right)$. Alternatively, if $e = 1$, the agent is making maximum effort at accident prevention and the probability is $p\left(1\right)$. In line with these interpretations, it is assumed that $p\left(0\right) > p\left(1\right)$, so the probability of the accident is higher when no effort is undertaken. The cost of effort for the agents, measured in utility terms, is $c\left(e\right) \equiv ce$.

In the absence of insurance, the preferences of the agent are described by the expected utility function

$$U^o\left(e\right) = p\left(e\right) u\left(r - d\right) + \left(1 - p\left(e\right)\right) u\left(r\right) - ce. \tag{12.25}$$

where $u(r-d)$ is the utility if there is an accident and $u(r)$ is the utility if there is no accident. It is assumed that the agent is risk averse, so the utility function $u\left(\cdot\right)$ is concave.

The value of e, either 0 or 1, is chosen to maximize this utility. Effort to prevent the accident will be undertaken ($e = 1$) if

$$U^o\left(1\right) > U^o\left(0\right). \tag{12.26}$$

Evaluating these and rearranging shows $e = 1$ if

$$c \leq c_0 \equiv \left[p\left(0\right) - p\left(1\right)\right]\left[u\left(r\right) - u\left(r - d\right)\right]. \tag{12.27}$$

Here c_0 is the critical value of effort cost. If effort cost is below this value, effort will be undertaken. Therefore, in the absence of insurance, effort will be undertaken to prevent accidents if the cost of doing so is sufficiently small.

Consider now the introduction of insurance contracts. A contract consists of a premium π paid by the consumer and an indemnity δ, $\delta \leq d$, paid to the consumer if they are subject to an accident. The consumers preferences over insurance policies (meaning different combinations of π and δ) and effort are given by

$$U(e,\delta,\pi) \equiv p(e)\,u(r-\pi+\delta-d) + [1-p(e)]\,u(r-\pi) - ce, \qquad (12.28)$$

with $U(e,0,0) = U^{o}(e)$.

12.7.2 Effort Observable

To provide a benchmark from which to measure the effects of moral hazard, we first analyze the choice of insurance contract when effort is observable by the insurance companies. In this case there can be no efficiency failing since there is no asymmetry of information.

If the insurance company can observe e, it will offer an insurance contract that is conditional upon it. The contract will therefore be of the form $\{\delta(e), \pi(e)\}$, (with $e = 0,1$). Competition between the insurance companies ensures that the contracts on offer maximize the utility of a representative consumer subject to constraint that the insurance companies at least break even. To meet this latter requirement the premium must be no lower than the expected payment of indemnity. For a given e (recall this is observed) the policy therefore solves

$$\max_{\{\delta,\pi\}} U(e,\delta,\pi) \text{ subject to } \pi \geq p(e)\,\delta. \qquad (12.29)$$

The solution to this is a policy

$$\{\delta^{*}(e) = d, \pi^{*}(e) = p(e)\,d\}, \qquad (12.30)$$

so that the damage is fully covered and the premium is fair given the effort level chosen. This is illustrated in Figure 12.11. The straight line is the set of contracts that are fair (so $\pi = p(e)\,\delta$), I is the highest indifference curve that can be achieved given these contracts. (Note that utility increases with a lower premium and greater coverage.) The first-best contract is therefore full insurance with $\delta^{*}(e) = d$ and $\pi^{*}(e) = p(e)d$.

At the first-best contract, the resulting utility level is

$$U^{*}(e) = u(r - p(e)\,d) - ce. \qquad (12.31)$$

Effort will be undertaken ($e = 1$) if

$$U*(1) \geq U*(0), \qquad (12.32)$$

which holds if

$$c \leq c_1 \equiv u(r - p(1)\,d) - u(r - p(0)\,d). \qquad (12.33)$$

That is, the cost of effort is less than the utility gain resulting from the lower premium.

An interesting question is whether the first-best contract encourages the supply of effort, *i.e.* whether the level of effort cost below which effort is supplied

Figure 12.11: First-Best Contract

in the absence of the contract, c_0, is less than that with the contract, c_1. Calculations show that the outcome may go in either direction depending on the accident probabilities associated with effort and no effort.

12.7.3 Effort Unobservable

When effort is unobservable, the insurance companies cannot condition the contract upon it. Instead, they must evaluate the effect of the policies upon the choices of the consumers and choose the policy taking this into account.

The preferences of the consumer over contracts are determined by the highest level of utility they can achieve with that contract given that they have made the optimal choice of effort. Formally, the utility $V(\delta, \pi)$ arising from contract (δ, π) is determined by

$$V(\delta, \pi) \equiv \max_{e=\{0,1\}} U(e, \delta, \pi). \tag{12.34}$$

The basic analytical difficulty in undertaking the determination of the contract is the non-convexity of preferences in the contract space (δ, π). This non-convexity arises at the point in the contract space where the consumers switch from no effort ($e = 0$) to full effort ($e = 1$). When supplying no effort their preferences are determined by $U(0, \delta, \pi)$ and when they supply effort by $U(1, \delta, \pi)$. At any point $(\hat{\delta},\ \hat{\pi})$ where $U\left(0, \hat{\delta}, \hat{\pi}\right) = U\left(1, \hat{\delta}, \hat{\pi}\right)$, the indifference curve of $U\left(0, \hat{\delta}, \hat{\pi}\right)$ is steeper than that of $U\left(1, \hat{\delta}, \hat{\pi}\right)$ because the willingness to pay for extra coverage is higher when there is no effort and thus a high risk of accident. This is illustrated in Figure **??**, where $\delta^*(\pi)$ denotes the locus of points where

Figure 12.12: Switching Line

the consumer is indifferent to e = 0 and e = 1. This locus has the properties described in Lemma 1.

Lemma 1 *For each premium π, there exists an indemnity level $\delta^* (\pi)$ such that:*
(i) if $\delta < \delta^* (\pi)$, $e = 1$;
(ii)if $\delta \geq \delta^* (\pi)$, $e = 0$.
where $\delta^* (\pi)$ is increasing.

In words, if the coverage rate for any given premium is too high, agent will no longer find profitable to undertake effort.

12.7.4 Second-Best Contract

The second-best contract maximizes the consumer's utility subject to the constraint that it must at least break even. The optimization problem describing this can be written as max $V (\delta, \pi)$ subject to
i. $\pi \geq p (1) \delta$ for $\delta < \delta^* (\pi)$,
ii. $\pi \geq p (0) \delta$ for $\delta^* (\pi) \leq \delta < d$.

The first constraint applies if the consumer chooses to supply effort $(e = 1)$ and requires that the contract break even. The second constraint is the break even condition if the consumer chooses to supply no effort $(e = 0)$.

The problem is solved by calculating the solution under the first constraint and evaluating the resulting level of utility. The solution is then found under the second constraint and utility again evaluated. The two levels of utility are then compared and the one yielding the highest utility is the optimal second-best contract. This reasoning provides two contracts that are candidates for



Figure 12.13: Second-Best Contract

optimality. These are illustrated in Figure 12.13 by E_0 and E_1 and have the following properties:

Contract E_0 : no effort and full coverage at high price;

Contract E_1 : effort and partial coverage at low price.

Which of these contracts is optimal will depend upon the cost, c, of effort. When this cost is low, contract E_1 will be optimal and partial coverage will be offered to consumers. Conversely, when the cost is high then it will be optimal to have no effort and contract E_0 will be optimal. From this reasoning it follows that there must be some value of the cost of effort at which the switch is made between these E_0 and E_1 . This is stated as Proposition 1.

Proposition 1 *There exists a value of effort, c_2, with $c_2 < c_1$, such that:*
i. $c \leq c_2$ implies the second-best contract is E_1;
ii. $c > c_2$ implies the second-best contract is E_0.

It can now be shown that the second-best contract is inefficient. Since the critical level of cost, c, determining when effort is supplied satisfies $c < c_1$, the outcome has to be inefficient relative to the first-best. Furthermore, there is too little effort if $c_2 < c < c_1$ and too little coverage if $c < c_2$. These results are summarized in Table 8.1.

Cost of Effort	c_2	c_1
1st best	Effort, Full Coverage	No Effort, Full Coverage
2nd best	Effort, Partial Coverage	No Effort, Full Coverage

Table 8.1: Categorization of outcomes

12.7.5 Government Intervention

The market failure associated with moral hazard is very profound. The moral hazard problem arises from the non-observability of the level of care. When individuals are fully insured they tend to exert too little precaution but also to overuse insurance. Consider, for instance, a patient who may be either sick with probability 0.09 or very sick with probability 0.01. In the two events, his medical expenses will be \$1000 and \$10000. At a fair premium of \$190 the patient will not have to pay anything if he gets sick and would buy such insurance if risk averse. But then suppose that when he is a little sick, there is some chance, however small, that he can be very sick. Then he would choose the expensive treatment given that there is no extra cost to the patient and all the extra cost is borne by the insurance company. Each individual ignores the effect of his reckless behavior and overconsumption on the premium; but when they all act like that, the premium increases. The lack of care by each inflates the premium which generates a negative externality on others. An important implication is that market cannot be efficient. Another way to see this generic market inefficiency is that the provision of insurance in the presence of moral hazard causes the insured individual to receive less than the full social benefit of his care. As a result, not only will the individual expend less than the socially optimal level of care, but also there will be an insurance-induced externality. This implies that the potential scope for government intervention with moral hazard is substantial. Can the government improve efficiency by intervention when moral hazard is present? In answering this question it is important to specify what information is available to the government. For a fair evaluation of government intervention it is natural to assume that the government has the same information as private sector. In this case it can be argued that efficient government intervention is still possible. The beneficial effects of government intervention stem from the government's capacity to tax and subsidize. To take an example, the government cannot monitor smoking which has an adverse effect on health, any better than the insurance company. But the government can impose taxes, not only on cigarettes, but also on commodities that are complements and subsidize substitutes which have less adverse effect. Also the taxation of insurance induces firms to offer insurance at less than fair price. As a consequence, individuals buy less insurance and expend more effort (as efficiency requires).

12.8 Public provision of Health care

12.8.1 Efficiency Arguments

Economists do not expect private insurance market for health care to function well. Our previous discussion suggests that informational problems would leave the private provision of health insurance coverage incomplete and inefficient. The existence of asymmetric information between insurers and insured leads to adverse selection, which can result in the market break down, and the non-existence of certain types of insurance. The moral hazard problem can lead to incomplete insurance in the form of copayments and deductibles for those who have insurance. Another problem caused by the presence of moral hazard is that the insured who get sick will want to overconsume and doctors will want to oversupply health care since it is a third party who pays. It is not surprising, therefore, that the government may usefully intervene in the provision of health care.

There is strong evidence that in the OECD countries the public sector plays an important role in the provision of insurance for health care. Following OECD Health data, in 1994 the proportion of publicly provided health expenses was 44 percent in the US, 70 percent in Germany, 73 percent in Italy, 75 percent in France, 83 percent in Sweden and the UK. The question is why the government intervenes so extensively in the health care field. In answering the question one must bear in mind that the government faces many of same informational problems that the private sector would. Like a private insurance, it faces the moral hazard where the patients who get insurance exert too little risk-reducing activities and overconsume health services; and the doctors have the incentive to oversupply health services at too high of a cost.

One advantage of public provision is to prevent the adverse selection problem by making health coverage compulsory and universal. It is tempting to believe that the actual provision of insurance need not be public to accomplish this effect. Indeed the actual provision of health insurance could remain private and the government could have a mandate requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance and requiring private insurers to insure anyone who applies for insurance. However mandates may be difficult to enforce at the individual level and incentive for private firms to accept only the good risks is a permanent concern. Another advantage of public provision is that as a predominant insurer, it can exert monopsony power with considerable leverage over health suppliers in influencing the prices they set or the amount of services they prescribe.

The fact that private insurance is subject to the problem of moral hazard is less helpful in explaining government provision. Indeed it is questionable that government has any advantage in dealing with the problem of moral hazard since it cannot observe (hidden) activities of the insured any better than can the private insurers. One possible form of advantageous government intervention is by taxing and subsidizing consumption choices that influence the insured's demand of health care (like subsidy for health club membership and taxes for smoking). This argument, as noticed by Prescott and Townsend (1984), is based on a presumption that government can monitor these consumption choices better than private market, otherwise private insurance could condition contracts on their clients' consumption choices and government would have no advantage over markets. So the potential scope for government provision with moral hazard is seemingly limited.

However there is a more subtle form of moral-hazard which provides a reason for direct government delivery of health care: the time consistency problem. Imagine that health insurance is provided by the private sector only. Each individual must decide how much insurance to purchase. In a standard insurance situation, risk averse individuals would fully insure if they can get fair price. However, in this case, they may recognize that if they do not fully insure, a welfaristic cannot commit government to provide for them if they become ill and uninsured. They have thus an incentive to buy to little insurance and to rely on the government to finance their health care should they become sick. This phenomenon is called the *Samaritan's Dilemma* and implies that people would underinvest any resources he has available in the present, knowing that the truly welfaristic government will come to his rescue in the future. The problem is particularly acute for life-threatening diseases where denial of insurance is tantamount to a death sentence for the patient.

A similar time-consistency problem arises from the insurer side: insurance companies cannot commit to guaranteeing that the rate will not change as they discover progressively more about the health condition of their clients. Competition will force insurance companies to update their rate to reflect any new information about an individual's medical condition. Insurance could then become so expensive for some individuals that they could not afford to pay it. With recent advances in genetic testing and other long-range diagnoses, this uninsured problem is likely to grow on future. With no insurance against unfavorable test results or for renewing insurance when a policy terminates, those more desperate to get insurance will find it increasingly harder to get it from the private market. The supply and demand-side time-consistency problem were explicitly recognized in the US by President Clinton, and used as a reason to make participation in health insurance compulsory. In response to the uninsured problem, government provides a substitutes for insurance by directly funding health care to the poor and long term sick (Medicaid in the US).

Another advantage of public provision of insurance is to achieve pooling on a much larger scale with improved risk sharing. By including every person in a nation-wide insurance scheme and pooling health insurance with other forms of insurance (unemployment, pension, etc) public insurance comes closer to the "ideal" optimal insurance which requires to pool all the risks faced by individuals and defining a single contract covering them jointly (with a single deductible against all risks).

Both adverse selection and moral hazard have been central in the debates over health care reform in Europe and North America. Consider for example the debate about medical savings accounts (MSA) in the US. They were intended to encourage people to buy insurance with more deductibles and co-payments, thereby reducing the risk of moral hazard. But critics argued that it will trigger a process of adverse selection where those less likely to need medical care will avail themselves of MSA. So those opting for the MSA with larger deductibles might indeed face higher total medical cost in spite of improved incentives (they take more care), simply because of the self-selection process. Another response to moral hazard problems in the US is the mandatory pre-admission referral by Peer Review Organizations before hospitalization. The increasing popularity of Health Maintenance Organization can also be viewed as a response to moral hazard by attracting cost-conscious patients who wish to lower the cost of insurance. Finally the increasing use of co-payments in many countries appears to be the effective method of cost-containment.

12.8.2 Redistributive Politics Argument

Government provision not only requires mandatory insurance to eliminate the adverse selection problem; but it also involves socializing insurance. Once insurance is compulsory and financed (at least partly) by taxation, redistributive consideration plays a central role to explain the extensive public provision of insurance. Government programmes which provide the same amount of public services to all households may still be redistributive. In fact, the amount of redistribution depends on how the programmes are financed, and how valuable the services are to individuals with different income levels.

First, a public health care programme offering services available to all financed by a proportional income tax will redistribute income form the rich to the poor. If there is no too much diversity of tastes and if consumption of health care is independent of income, all those with income below the average are subsidized by those above the average. Given the empirical fact that a majority of voters has income below the average, a majority of voters would approve public provision. With diversity of tastes, different individuals prefer different levels of consumption even when income is the same and the "one-size-fit-all" public provision may no longer be desirable for the majority. So the trade-off is between income redistribution and preference-matching. However in so far as consumption of medical care is mostly the responsibility of doctors, reflecting standard medical practices, the preference matching concern is likely to be negligible.

The second way redistribution occurs is from the healthy to the sick (or the young to the aged). Tax payments of any particular individual do not depend on that individual's morbidity. It follows that higher morbidity individuals receive an insurance in the public system that is less expensive that the insurance they would get in the private market. So if a taxpayer has either high morbidity or low income then his tax price of insurance is lower than the price of private insurance. This taxpayer will vote for public provision. The negative correlation between morbidity and income suggests that the majority below average income is also more likely to be in relatively poor health and so to favour public insurance.

The third way of redistribution is through opting out. Universal provision of health care by the government can redistribute welfare from the rich to the poor because the rich refuse the public health care and buy a higher quality private health services financed by private insurance. For example, individuals may have to wait to receive treatment in the public system, whereas private treatment is immediate. In opting out, they lose the value of the taxes they pay towards public insurance, and the resources available for those who remain in the public sector increases and the overall pressure on the system decreases (i.e. waiting list). So redistribution is taking place because the rich are more likely to use private health care even though free public health care is available. This redistribution will arise even if everyone was contributing the same amount to the public health insurance.

Fourth, a redistribution via health care is more effective to target some needy groups than redistribution in cash. The majority may wish to redistribute from those who inherit good health to those who inherit poor health, which can be thought of as a form of social insurance. If individual health status could be observed, the government would simply redistribute in cash and no reason for public health insurance would arise. But because it cannot observe an individual's poor state of health, providing health care in kind is a better way to target those individuals. The healthy individuals are less likely to pretend to be unhealthy when health care is provided in kind, than if government were to offer cash compensation to everyone claiming to be in poor health. This is the self-selection benefit of in kind redistribution.

12.9 Evidence

Information asymmetries have profound implications for the working of competitive markets and the scope for government intervention. Detailed policy recommendations for alleviating these problems also differ depending on whether we face the adverse selection or moral hazard problems. It is crucial to test in different markets the empirical relevance either of adverse selection or moral hazard. Such a test is surprisingly simple in the insurance market because both adverse selection and moral hazard predict a positive correlation between the frequency of accident and the insurance coverage. This prediction turns out to be very general and to extent to a variety of more general contexts (imperfect competition, multidimensional heterogeneity, ...). The key problem is that such correlation can be given two different interpretations (depending on the direction of the causality). Under adverse selection high risk agents, knowing they are more likely to have an accident, self-select by choosing more extensive coverage. Alternatively, under moral hazard,agents facing more extensive coverage are also less motivated to exert precaution, which may result in higher accident rates. The difference matters a lot for health insurance if we want to assess the impact of co-payments and deductibles on consumption and its welfare implications. Indeed it is well-documented fact that better coverage is correlated with higher medical expenses. If moral hazard is the main reason, deductibles and co-payments are likely to be desirable, since they reduce overconsumption. But if adverse selection is the main explanation, then limiting coverage can only reduce the amount of insurance available to risk averse agents with little welfare gains. Evidence on election versus incentives can be tested in a number of ways and we briefly describe some of them.

Manning et al. (1987) separate moral hazard from adverse selection by using a random experiment in which individuals are exogenously allocated to different contracts. This is the Rand Health Insurance Experiment. Between 1974 and 1977, households in the US were randomly assigned to one out of 14 different insurance plans with different coinsurance rates and upper limits on annual out-of-pocket expenses. Compensation were paid in order to guarantee that no household would lose by participating in the experiment. Since individuals are randomly assigned to contracts, differences in observed behavior can be interpreted as response to the different incentive structure of the different contracts. This experiment has provided some of the most interesting and robust test of moral hazard about the sensitivity of the consumption of medical services to out-of-pocket expenditures. The demand of medical services was found to be respond significantly to changes in the amount paid by the insuree. The largest decrease in the use of services arises between a free service and a contract involving a 25 percent copayment rate.

Chiappori et al (1998) exploit a 1993 change in French regulation, to which health insurance companies responded by modifying their coverage rates in a non uniform way. Some companies increased the level of deductibles, while other did not. They test for moral hazard by using groups of patients belonging to different companies, who where confronted to different changes in copayments and whose use for medical services was observed before and after the regulation change. They find that the number of general practitioner home visits significantly decreased for the patients who experienced the increase in copayments but not for those whose coverage remains constant.

Another interesting study is Cardon and Hendel (2001) who test for moral-hazard versus adverse selection in the US employer-provided health insurance. As argued before, a contract with larger co-payments is likely to involve less health expenditures, either because of the incentive effect of co-payments or because high risk self-select by choosing contract with less co-payments. The key identifying argument is that agents do no select their employer on the basis of the health insurance coverage. As a consequence, the differences in behavior across employer plans can be attributed to incentive effects. They find strong evidence that incentives matter.

Another way to circumvent the difficulty to distinguish empirically between adverse selection and moral hazard is to consider the annuity market. Annuity market provides insurance against the risk of outliving accumulated resources. It is more valuable to those who expect to live longer. In this market we can safely expect that individuals will not substantially modify their behavior in response to annuity income (like exerting more effort to extend length of life). It follows that differential mortality rates for annuitants who purchase different types of annuities is convincing evidence that selection occurs. Finkesltein and Poterba (2004) obtain evidence of the following selections patterns. First, those who buy back-loaded annuities are longer-lived (controlling for all observables) than other annuitants; which is consistent with the fact that an annuitant with a longer life expectancy is more likely to be alive in later years when the back-loaded annuity pays out more than the flat annuity. Second, those who buy annuities making payments to the estate are shorter-lived than other annuitants, which is consistent with the fact that the possibility of payments to the annuitant's estate in the event of early death is more valuable to a short-lived annuitant.

12.10 Conclusions

The efficiency of competitive equilibrium is based on the assumption of symmetric information (or the very strong requirement of perfect information). This chapter has explored some of the consequences of relaxing this assumption. The basic points are that asymmetric information leads to inefficiency and that the inefficiency can take a number of different forms. Under certain circumstances appropriate government intervention can make everyone better off even though the government does not have better information than the private sector. Moreover, the role of the government may also be limited by restrictions on its information. Welfare and public policy implications of the two main forms of information asymmetries are not the same and it has been an empirical challenge to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. Health insurance is a good illustration of the problem with extensive public intervention.

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Part V

Equity and Distribution

Chapter 13

Optimality and Comparability

13.1 Introduction

The Second Theorem of Welfare Economics has very strong policy implications. These were touched upon in Chapter 7 but were not developed in detail at that point. This was because the primary value of the theorem is what it says about issues of equity and distribution. To fully appreciated the Second Theorem it is necessary to develop the argument from an equity perspective and to assess it in the light of its distributional implications.

This chapter will first investigate the implications of the Second Theorem for economic policy. This is initially undertaken accepting that a social planner is able to make judgements between different allocations of utility. The concept of an optimal allocation is developed and the Second Theorem is employed to show how this can be achieved. Once this has been accomplished, questions will be raised about the applicability of lump-sum taxes and the value of Pareto efficiency as a criterion for social decision-making. This provides a basis for re-assessing the interpretation of the First Theorem of Welfare Economics.

The major deficiency of Pareto efficiency is identified as its inability to trade utility gains for one consumer against losses for another. To proceed further the informational basis for making welfare comparisons has to be addressed. We describe different forms of utility and different degrees of comparability of utility between consumers. These concepts are then related to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the construction of social welfare functions.

13.2 Social Optimality

The importance of the Second Theorem for policy analysis is very easily explained. In designing economic policy, a policy maker will always aim to achieve a Pareto efficient allocation. If an allocation that was not Pareto efficient was selected, then it would be possible to raise the welfare of at least one consumer without harming any other. It is hard to imagine why any policy maker would want to leave such gains unexploited. Applying this argument, the set of allocations from which a policy maker will choose reduces to the Pareto efficient allocations.

Suppose that a particular Pareto efficient allocation has been selected as the policy-maker's preferred outcome. The Second Theorem shows that this allocation can be achieved by making the economy competitive and providing each household with the level of income needed to purchase the consumption bundle assigned to them in the chosen allocation. In achieving this, only two policy tools are employed: the encouragement of competition and a set of lump-sum taxes to ensure that each household has the required income. If this approach could be applied in practice, then economic policy analysis reduces to the formulation of a set of rules that guarantee competition and the calculation and redistribution of the lump-sum taxes. The subject matter of public economics, and economic policy in general, would then be closed.

Looking at this process in detail, the first point that arises is the question of selecting the most preferred allocation. There are a number of ways to imagine this being done. An obvious one would be to consider voting, either over the alternative allocations directly or else for the election of a body (a "government") to make the choice. Alternatively, the consumers could agree for it to be chosen at random or else they might hold unanimous views, perhaps via conceptions of fairness, about what the outcome should be. Rather then consider either of these, the method that is adopted here is to assume that there is a social planner (which could be the elected government). This planner forms preferences over the alternative allocations by taking into account the utility functions of the consumers. The most preferred allocation according to these preferences is the one that is chosen.

To see how this method functions, consider the set of Pareto efficient allocations described by the contract curve in the left-hand part of Figure 13.1. Each point on the contract curve is associated with an indifference curve for consumer 1 and an indifference curve for consumer 2. These indifference curves correspond to a pair of utility levels $\left\{U^1, U^2\right\}$ for the two consumers. As the move is made from the south-west corner of the Edgeworth box to the north-east corner, the utility of consumer 1 rises and that of 2 falls. Plotting these utility changes, the utility levels on the contract curve can be represented as a locus in utility space - usually called the *utility possibility frontier*. This is shown in the right-hand part of Figure 13.1 where the utility values corresponding to the points a, b, and c are plotted. Points such as a and b lie on the frontier: they are Pareto efficient so it is not possible to raise both consumers' utilities simultaneously. Point c is off the contract curve and is inefficient according to the Pareto criterion. It therefore lies inside the utility possibility frontier.

The utility possibility frontier describes the options from which the social planner will choose. It is now necessary to describe how the choice is made. To do this, it is assumed that the social planner measures the welfare of soci-



Figure 13.1: The Utility Possibility Frontier

ety by aggregating the individual consumers' welfare levels. Given the pair of welfare levels $\{U^1, U^2\}$, the function determining the aggregate level of welfare is denoted by $W\left(U^1, U^2\right)$. This is termed a *Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function.* Basically, given individual levels of happiness it imputes a social level of happiness. Embodied within it are the equity considerations of the planner.

Given this welfare function, the social planner considers the attainable allocations of utility described by the contract curve and chooses the one that provides the highest level of social welfare. Expressed alternatively, indifference curves of the welfare function can be drawn as in Figure 13.2. These curves show combinations of the two consumers' utilities that give constant levels of social welfare. The view on equity taken by the social planner translates into their willingness to trade-off the utility of one household against the utility of the other. This is determined by the shape of the indifference curves. The social planner then selects the outcome that achieves the highest indifference curve. This optimal point on the utility possibility locus, denoted by point o, can then be traced back to an allocation in the Edgeworth box. This allocation represents the socially optimal division of resources for the economy given the preferences captured by the social welfare function. If these preferences were to change, so would the optimal allocation.

Having chosen the socially optimal allocation, the reasoning of the Second Theorem is applied. Lump-sum taxes are imposed to ensure that the incomes of the consumers are sufficient to allow them to purchase their allocation conforming to point o. Competitive economic trading then takes place. The chosen socially optimal allocation is then achieved through trade as the equilibrium of the competitive economy. This process of using lump-sum taxes and competitive trade to reach a chosen equilibrium is called *decentralization.*

The interpretation of this construction shows that the use of the Second Theorem allows the economy to achieve the outcome most preferred by its social



Figure 13.2: Social Optimality

planner. Given the economy's limited initial stock of resources, the socially optimal allocation is both efficient and, relative to the social welfare function, equitable. In this way, the application of the Second Theorem can be said to solve the economic problem since the issues of both efficiency and equity are resolved to the greatest extent possible and there is no better outcome attainable. Clearly, if this reasoning is applicable, all that a policy maker need do is choose the allocation, implement the required lump-sum taxes and ensure that the economy is competitive. No further policy or action is needed. Once the incomes are set, the economy will take itself to the optimal outcome.

13.3 Lump-Sum Taxes

The role of lump-sum taxes has been made very explicit in describing the application of the Second Theorem. In the economic environment envisaged, lump-sum taxes are the only tool of policy that is required beyond an active competition policy. To justify the use of policies other than lump-sum taxes, it must be established that such taxes are either not feasible or else are restricted in the way in which they can be employed. This is the purpose of this section. The results described are important in their own right, but they also provide important insights into the design of other forms of taxation. The argument is developed further in Section 17.3.

In order for a tax to be lump-sum, the consumer on whom the tax is levied must not be able to affect the size of the tax by changing their behavior. Most tax instruments encountered in practice are not lump-sum. Income taxes cannot be lump-sum by this definition since a consumer can work more or less hard and vary income in response to the tax. Similarly, commodity taxes cannot be lump-sum since consumption patterns can be changed. Estate duties are lump-sum at the point at which they are levied (since by definition the person on which they are levied is dead and unable to choose any other action) but can be affected by changes in behavior prior to death (for instance by making gifts earlier in life).

There are some taxes though that are close to being lump-sum. For example, by taxing every consumer some fixed amount a lump-sum tax is imposed. Setting aside minor details, this was effectively the case of the United Kingdom Poll Tax levied in the late 1980s as a source of finance for local government. This tax was unsuccessful for two reasons. Firstly, taxpayers could avoid paying the tax by ensuring that their names did not appear on any official registers. Usually this was achieved by moving house and not making any official declaration of the new address. It appears large numbers of taxpayers did this (unofficial figures put the number as high as 1 million). This "disappearance" is a change in behavior that reduces the tax burden. Secondly, the theoretical efficiency of lump-sum taxes rests partly on the fact that their imposition is costless but this was far from the case with the Poll Tax. In fact, the difficulties of actually collecting and maintaining information on the residential address of all households made the imposition of a uniform lump-sum tax prohibitively expensive. The mobility of taxpayers proved to be much greater than had been expected. Therefore, although the structure of lump-sum taxes makes them appear deceptively simple to collect, this may not be the case in practice since the tax base, people, is highly mobile and keen to evade. Consequently, even a uniform lump-sum tax proved difficult and costly to administer in practice.

However, the costs of collection are only part of the issue. What is the primary concern here is the use of *optimal* lump-sum taxes. Optimal here means a tax which is chosen, via application of the Second Theorem, to achieve the income distribution necessary to decentralize a chosen allocation. The optimal lump-sum tax system is unlikely to be a uniform tax upon each consumer because the role of the taxes is fundamentally redistributive so they will be highly differentiated across consumers. Since uniform lump-sum taxes have difficulties in implementation, the use of differentiated taxes will be faced with even greater problems.

The extent of these problems can be seen by considering the information needed to calculate the taxes. First, the social planner must be able to construct the contract curve of Pareto-efficient allocations so that they can select the social optimum. Secondly, the planner needs to predict the equilibrium that will emerge for all possible income levels so that they can determine the incomes needed to decentralize the chosen allocation. Both of these steps require knowledge of the consumers' preferences. Finally, the social planner must also know the value of each consumer's endowment in order to calculate their incomes before tax and hence the lump-sum taxes that must be imposed. The fundamental difficulty is that these economic characteristics, preferences and endowments, are *private information.* As such, they are known only to the individual consumers and are not directly observed by the social planner. The characteristics may be partly revealed through market choices, but these choices can be changed if the consumers perceive any link with taxation. The fact that lump-sum taxes are levied on private information is the fundamental difficulty that hinders their use.

Some characteristics of the consumers are public information, or at least can be directly observed. Lump-sum taxes can then be levied upon these characteristics. For example, it may be possible to differentiate lump-sum taxes according to characteristics of the consumers such as sex, age or eye-color. However, these characteristics are not those which are directly economically relevant as they convey neither preference information nor relate to the value of endowment. Although we could differentiate taxes on this basis, there is no reason why we should want to do so.

This returns us to the problem of private information. Since the relevant characteristics such as ability are not observable, the social planner must either rely on consumers honestly reporting them or the characteristics must be inferred from the observed economic choices of consumers. If the planner relies upon the observation of choices, there is invariably scope for consumers to change their market behavior which then implies that the taxes cannot be lump-sum. When reports are the sole source of information, unobserved characteristics cannot form a basis for taxation unless the tax scheme is such that individuals are faced with incentives to report truthfully.

As an example of the interaction between taxes and reporting, consider the following: Let the quality of a consumer's endowment of labor be determined by their IQ level. Given a competitive market for labor, the value of the endowment is then related to IQ. Assume there are no economically-relevant variables other than IQ, so that any set of optimal lump-sum taxes must be levied on IQ. If the level of lump-sum tax was inversely related to IQ and if all households had to complete IQ tests, then the tax system would not be cheated since the incentive would always be to maximize the score on the test. In this case, the lump-sum taxes are said to be *incentive compatible*, meaning that they give incentives to behave honestly. In contrast, if the taxes were positively related to IQ, a testing procedure could easily be manipulated by the high-IQ consumers who would intentionally choose to perform poorly. If such a system were put into place, the mean level of tested IQ would be expected to fall considerably. This indicates the potential for misrevelation of characteristics and the system would not be incentive compatible. Clearly, if a high-IQ results in higher earnings and, ultimately, greater utility a redistributive policy would require the use of lump-sum taxes that increased with IQ. The tax policy would not be incentive compatible. Such problems will always be present in any attempt to base lump-sum taxes on unobservable characteristics.

The main points of the argument can now be summarized. To implement the Second Theorem as a practical policy tool it is necessary to employ optimal lump-sum taxes. Such taxes are unlikely to be available in practice or to satisfy all the criteria required of them. The taxes may be costly to collect and the characteristics upon which they need to be based may not be observable. When characteristics are not observable, the relationship between taxes and characteristics can give consumers the incentive to make false revelations. It is therefore best to treat the Second Theorem as being of considerable theoretical interest but of very limited practical relevance. The theorem shows us what *could* be possible, not what *is* possible.

It is the impracticality of lump-sum taxation that provides the motive for studying the properties of other tax instruments. The income taxes and commodity taxes which are analyzed in Chapters 15 and 16 are second-best solutions that are used because the first-best solution, lump-sum taxation, is not available. Lump-sum taxes are used as a benchmark from which to judge the relative success of these alternative instruments. They also help to clarify what it is that we are really trying to tax.

13.4 Aspects of Pareto Efficiency

The analysis of lump-sum taxation has raised questions about the practical value of the Second Theorem. The theorem shows how an optimal allocation can be decentralized but the means to achieve the decentralization may be missing. If the use of lump-sum taxes is restricted, then the government must resort to alternative policy instruments. All alternative instruments will be distortionary and will not achieve the first-best.

These criticisms do not extend to the First Theorem which states only that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Consequently, the First Theorem implies no policy intervention, so it is safe from the restrictions on lump-sum taxes. However, at the heart of the First Theorem is the use of Pareto efficiency as a method for judging the success of an economic allocation. The value of the First Theorem can only be judged once a deeper understanding of Pareto efficiency has been developed.

The Pareto criterion was introduced into economics by the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto at the beginning of the 20th century. This was during a period of reassessment in economics during which the concept of utility as a measurable quantity was rejected. Alongside this rejection of measurability, the ability to compare utility levels between consumers also had to be rejected. Pareto efficiency was therefore constructed explicitly to allow comparisons of allocations without the need to make any interpersonal comparisons of utility. As will be seen, this avoidance of interpersonal comparisons is both its strength and its main weakness.

To assess Pareto efficiency, it is helpful to develop the concept in three stages. The first stage defines the idea of making a *Pareto improvement* when moving from one allocation to another. From this can be constructed the *Pareto preference* order which judges whether one allocation is preferred to another. The final stage is to use Pareto preference to find the most preferred states which are then defined as *Pareto efficient.* Reviewing each of these steps then allows us to assess the meaning and value of the concept.

Consider a move from economic state s_1 to state s_2. This is defined as a Pareto improvement if it makes some consumers strictly better-off and none worse-off. If there are H consumers, this definition can be stated formally by saying a Pareto improvement is made in going from s_1 to s_2 if

$$U^h(s_1) > U^h(s_2) \text{ for at least one consumer, } h, \tag{13.1}$$

and

$$U^h(s_1) \geq U^h(s_2) \text{ for all consumers } h = 1, ..., H. \tag{13.2}$$

Pareto improvement can be used to construct a preference order over economic states. If a Pareto improvement is made in moving from s_1 to s_2, then state s_1 is defined as being *Pareto preferred* to state s_2.This concept of Pareto preference defines one state as preferred to another if all consumers are at least as well-off in that state and some are strictly better-off. What this stage of the construction has done is to convert the individual preferences of the consumers into social preferences over the states.

The final stage is to define Pareto efficiency. The earlier definition can be re-phrased as saying that an economic state is *Pareto efficient* if there is no state which is Pareto preferred to it. That is, no move can be made from that state which achieves a Pareto improvement. From this perspective, we can view Pareto efficient states as being the "best" relative to the Pareto preference order. The discussion now turns to assessing the usefulness of the Pareto preference in selecting an optimal state from a set of alternatives. By analyzing a number of examples, several deficiencies of the concepts will become apparent.

The simplest allocation problem is to divide a fixed quantity of a single commodity between two consumers. Let the commodity be a cake, and assume that both consumers prefer more cake to less. The first observation is that no cake should be wasted - it is always a Pareto-improvement to move from a state where some is wasted to one with the wasted cake given to one, or both, of the consumers. The second observation is that any allocation in which no cake is wasted is Pareto efficient. To see this, start with any division of the cake between the two consumers. Any alternative allocation must give more to one consumer and less to the other; therefore since one must lose no change can be a Pareto improvement.

From this simple example two deficiencies of Pareto efficiency can be inferred. Firstly, since no improvement can be made on an allocation where none is wasted, extreme allocations such as giving all of the cake to one consumer are Pareto efficient. This shows that even though an allocation is Pareto efficient there is no implication that it need be good in terms of equity. This illustrates quite clearly that Pareto efficiency is not a judge of equity. The cake example also illustrates a second point: there can be a multiplicity of Pareto efficient allocations. This was shown in the cake example by the fact that every non-wasteful allocation is Pareto efficient. This multiplicity of efficient allocations limits the value of Pareto efficiency as a tool for making allocative decisions. For the cake example, Pareto efficiency gives no guidance whatsoever in deciding how the cake should be shared other than showing that none should be thrown away. In brief, Pareto efficiency fails to solve even this simplest of allocation problems.

The points made in the cake division example are also relevant to allocations within a two-consumer exchange economy. The contract curve in Figure 13.3



Figure 13.3: Efficiency and Inequity

shows the set of Pareto efficient allocations and there is generally an infinite number of these. Once again the Pareto preference ordering does not select a unique optimal outcome. In addition, the competitive equilibrium may be as the one illustrated in the bottom left corner of the box. This has the property of being Pareto efficient but it is highly inequitable and may not find much favour using other criteria for judging optimality.

Another failing of the Pareto preference ordering is that it is not always able to compare alternative states. In formal terms, it does not provide a *complete ordering* of states. This is illustrated in Figure 13.4 where the allocations s_1 and s_2 cannot be compared although both can be compared to s_3 (s_3 is Pareto preferred to both s_1 and s_2). When faced with a choice between s_1 and s_2, the Pareto preference order is silent about which should be chosen. It should be noted that this incomparability is not the same as indifference. If the preference order were indifferent between two states, then they are judged as equally good. Incomparability means the pair of states simply cannot be ranked.

The basic mechanism at work behind this example is that the Pareto preference order can only rank alternative states if there are only gainers or losers as the move is made between the states. If some gain and some lose, as in the choice between s_1 and s_2 in Figure 13.4, then the preference order is of no value. Such gains and losses are invariably a feature of policy choices and much of policy analysis consists of weighing-up the gains and losses. In this respect, the Pareto efficiency is inadequate as a basis for policy choice.

To summarize these arguments, Pareto efficiency does not embody any concept of justice and highly inequitable allocations can be efficient under the criterion. In many situations, the number of Pareto efficient allocations is infinite in



Figure 13.4: Incompleteness of Pareto Ranking

which case the criterion then provides little guidance for policy choice. Finally, the Pareto efficiency may not provide a complete ordering of states so that some states will be incomparable under the criterion. The source of all these failing is that the Pareto criterion avoids weighing gains against losses but it is just such judgements that have to be made in most allocation decisions. To then make a choice of allocation the evaluation of the gains and losses have to be faced directly.

13.5 Social Welfare Functions

The social welfare function was employed in Section 13.2 to introduce the concept of a socially optimal allocation. At that point it was simply described as a means by which different allocations of utilities between consumers could be socially ranked. What was not done was to provide a convincing description of where such a ranking could come from or of how it could be constructed. Three alternative interpretations will now be given, each of which provides a different perspective upon the social welfare function.

The first possibility is that the social welfare function captures the distributive preferences of a central planner or dictator. Under this interpretation, there can be two meanings of the individual utilities that enter the function. One is that they are the planner's perception of the utility achieved by each consumer for their level of consumption. This provides a consistent interpretation of the social welfare function but problems arise in its relation to the underlying model. To see why this is so, recall that the Edgeworth box, and the contract curve within it, were based upon the actual preferences of the consumers. This leads to a potential inconsistency between this construction and the evaluation using the planner's preferences. For example, what is a Pareto optimum under the true preferences may not be one under the planner's (it need not even be an equilibrium). So, although this approach can justify the social welfare function it is not internally consistent with the other components of the model.

The alternative meaning of the utilities is that they are the actual utilities of the consumers. This leads directly into the central difficulty faced in the concept of social welfare. In order to evaluate all allocations of utility it must be possible to evaluate the social value of an increase in one consumer's utility against the loss in another's. This is only possible if the utilities are comparable across the consumers. More will be said about this below.

An alternative interpretation of the social welfare function is that it captures some ethical objective that society should be pursuing. Here the social welfare functions is determined by what is viewed as the just objective of society. There are two major examples of this. The *utilitarian philosophy* of aiming to achieve the greatest good for society as a whole translates into a social welfare function that is the sum of individual utilities. In this formulation, only the total sum of utilities counts, so it does not matter how utility is distributed between consumers in the society. Alternatively, the *Rawlsian philosophy* of caring only for the worst-off member of society leads to a level of social welfare determined entirely by the minimum of that in society. With this objective, the distribution of utility is of paramount importance. Gains in utility achieved by anyone other than the worst-off consumer do not improve social welfare.

Although this approach to the social welfare function is internally consistent it is still not entirely satisfactory. The utilitarian approach requires that the utilities of the consumers are added in order to arrive at the total sum of social welfare. The Rawlsian approach necessitates the utility levels being compared in order to find the lowest. The nature of comparability between utility may be different for the two approaches (being able to add utilities is different to being able to compare) but both do rely on some form of comparability. This again leads directly into the issue of utility comparisons.

The final view that can be taken of the social welfare function is that it takes the preferences of the individual consumers (represented by their utilities) and aggregates these into a social preference. This aggregation process would be expected to obey certain rules; for instance if all consumers prefer one state to another, it should be the case that the social preference also prefers the same state. The structure of the social welfare function then emerges as a consequence of the rules the aggregation must obey.

Although this arrives at the same outcome as the other two interpretations, it does so by a distinctly different process. In this case it is the set of rules for aggregation that are foremost rather than the form of social welfare. That is, the philosophy here would be that if the aggregation rules are judged as satisfactory then society should accept the social welfare function that emerges from their application, whatever its form. An example of this is that if the rules of majority voting are chosen as the method of aggregating preferences (despite the failings already identified in Chapter 4), then the minority must accept what the majority chooses.

The consequences of constructing a social welfare function by following this line of reasoning are of fundamental importance in the theory of welfare economics. In fact, doing so leads straight back into Arrow's Impossibility Theorem which was described in Chapter 4. The next section is dedicated to interpreting the theorem and its implications in this new setting.

13.6 The Impossibility

Although they appear very distinct in nature, both majority voting and the Pareto criterion are examples of procedures for aggregating individual preferences into a social preference. It has been shown that neither is perfect. The Pareto preference order can be incomplete and is unable to rank some of the alternatives. Majority voting always leads to a complete social preference order but this may not be transitive. What Arrow's theorem has shown is that such failings are not specific to these aggregation procedures. All methods of aggregation will fail to meet one or more of its conditions so it identifies a fundamental problem at the heart of generating social preferences from individual preferences.

The conditions of Arrow's theorem were stated in terms of the rankings induced by individual preferences. However, since individual preferences can usually be represented by a utility function, the theorem also applies to the aggregation of individual utility functions into a social welfare function. Applying the theorem, its implication is that a social welfare function does not exist that can aggregate individual utilities without conflicting with one, or more, of the conditions *I.N.P.U.T.* This means that whatever social welfare function is proposed, there will be some set of utility functions for which it conflicts with at least one of the conditions. An alternative way of looking at this is to view if as saying that no ideal social welfare function can be found. No matter how sophisticated the aggregation mechanism is, it cannot overcome this theorem.

Since the publication of Arrow's theorem there has been a great deal of research attempting to find a way out of the dead-end into which it leads. One approach that has been tried is to consider alternative sets of aggregation rules. For instance, transitivity of the social preference ordering can be relaxed to quasi-transitivity (only strict preference is transitive) or weaker versions of Condition I and Condition P can be used. Most such changes just lead to further impossibility theorems for these different sets of rules. Modifying the rules does not therefore really seem to be the way forward out of the impossibility.

What is at the heart of the impossibility is the limited information contained in individual utility functions. Effectively, all that is known are the individuals' rankings of the alternative - which is best, which is worst, and how they line up in between. What it does not give is any strength of feeling either between alternatives for a given individual or across individuals for a given option. Such strength of feeling is an essential art of any attempt to make social decisions. Consider, for instance, a group of people choosing where to dine. In this situation a strong preference in one direction (”I don’t really want to eat fish”) usually counts for more than a mild preference (”I don’t really mind, but I would prefer fish”). Arrow’s theorem rules out any information of this kind.

Using information on how strongly individuals feel about the alternatives can be successful in choosing where to dine. It is interesting that strength of preference comparisons can be used in informal situations, but this does not demonstrate that it can be incorporated within a scientific theory of social preferences. This issue is now addressed in detail.

13.7 Interpersonal Comparability

Earlier in this chapter it was noted that Pareto efficiency was originally proposed because it provided a means by which it was possible compare alternative allocations without requiring interpersonal comparisons of welfare. It is also from this avoidance of comparability that the failures of Pareto efficiency emerge. This point is also at the core of the impossibility theorem. To proceed further, this section first reviews the development of utility theory in order to provide a context and then describes alternative degrees of utility comparability.

Nineteenth century economists viewed utility, the level of happiness of an individual, as something that was potentially measurable. Advances in psychology were expected to deliver the machinery for conducting the actual measurement. If utility were measurable, it follows naturally that it would be comparable between individuals. This ability to measure utility, combined with the philosophy that society should aim for the greatest good, combined to provide the underpinnings of utilitarianism. The measurability of utility permitted social welfare to be expressed by the sum of individual utilities. Ranking states by the value of this sum they achieved then gave a means of aggregating individual preferences that satisfied all of the conditions of the impossibility theorem except for the information content. If the envisaged degree of measurability could be achieved then the restrictions of the impossibility theorem are overcome.

This concept of measurable and comparable utility began to be dispelled in the early Twentieth century. There were two grounds for this rejection. Firstly, no means of measuring utility had been discovered and it was becoming clear that the earlier hopes would not be realized. Secondly, advances in economic theory showed that there was no need to have measurable utility in order to deduce a coherent theory of consumer choice. In fact, the entire theory of the consumer could be derived by specifying only the consumer’s preference ordering. The role of utility then became strictly secondary - it could be invoked as a convenient functional representation of preferences if necessary, but was otherwise redundant. Since utility had no deeper meaning attached to it, any increasing monotonic transformation of a utility function representing a set of preferences would also be an equally valid utility function. Utility was simply an ordinal concept, with no natural zero or units of measurement. By the very construction of utility, comparability between different consumers’ utilities was a meaningless concept. This situation therefore left no scientific basis upon which to justify the comparability of different consumer's utility levels.

This perspective on utility, and the consequent prevention of utility comparisons between consumers, created the necessity of developing concepts for social comparisons, such as Pareto efficiency, that were free of interpersonal comparisons. However the weaknesses of these criteria soon became obvious. The analytical trend since the 1960's has been to explore the consequences of re-admitting interpersonal comparability into the analysis. The procedure adopted is basically to assume that comparisons are possible. This permits the derivation of results from which interpretations can be obtained. These are hoped to provide some general insights into policy which can be applied even though utility is not actually comparable in the way assumed.

There are even some economists who would argue that comparisons are actually possible. One basis for this is the claim that all consumers have very similar underlying preference orderings. All prefer to have more income to less, and consumers with equal incomes make very similar divisions of expenditures between alternative groups of commodities. That is, expenditure on food is similar, even those the actual foodstuffs purchased may be very different. In modelling such consumers it is possible to assert that they all have the same utility function guiding their choices. This makes their utilities directly comparable.

So far comparability has been used as a catch-all phrase for being able to draw some contrast between the utility levels of consumers. In fact, many different degrees of comparability can be envisaged. For instance, the claim that one household has a higher level of utility than another requires rather less comparability than claiming it has 15% more utility. Different degrees of comparability have implications for the way in which they can be aggregated into a social preference ordering.

The starting point is to define the two major forms of utility. The first is *ordinal utility* which is the familiar concept from consumer theory. Essentially, an ordinal utility function is no more than just a numbering of a consumer's indifference curves, with the numbering chosen so that higher indifference curves have higher utility numbers. These numbers can be subjected to any form of transformation without altering their meaning provided the transformation leaves the ranking of the numbers unchanged - higher indifference curves must still have larger utility numbers attached. Because they can be so freely transformed, there is no meaning to differences in utility levels between two situations for a single consumer except which of the two provides the higher utility.

The second form of utility is *cardinal utility.* Cardinal utility imposes restrictions beyond those of ordinal utility. With cardinal utility you can only transform utility numbers by multiplying by a constant and then adding a constant, so an initial utility function U becomes the transformed utility $\tilde{U} = a + bU$ where a and b are the constants. Any other form of transformation will affect the meaning of a cardinal utility function. The typical place in which cardinal utility is found is in the economics of uncertainty since an expected utility function is cardinal. This cardinal is a consequence of the fact that an expected utility function must provide a consistent ranking for different probability distributions of the outcomes and this consistency imposes cardinality. A second, non-economic, example of a cardinal scale is temperature. It is possible to convert Celsius to Fahrenheit by multiplying by $\frac{9}{5}$ and adding 32 (and the converse transformation from Fahrenheit to Celsius is to multiply by $\frac{5}{9}$ and subtract 32). With these definitions it now becomes possible to talk in detail about comparability and non-comparability.

Non-comparability can arise with both ordinal and cardinal utility. What non-comparability means is that we can apply different transformations to different consumers' utilities. To express this in formal terms, let U^1 be the utility function of consumer 1 and U^2 the utility function of consumer 2. Then non-comparability arises if the transformation f^1 can be applied to U^1 and a different transformation f^2 to U^2, with no relationship between f^1 and f^2. Why is this non-comparable? Because by suitably choosing f^1 and f^2 it is always possible to one ranking of the initial utilities and to arrive at a different ranking of the transformed utilities. The utility information therefore does not provide sufficient information to make a comparison of the two utility levels.

Comparability exists when the transformations that can be applied to the utility functions are restricted. With ordinal utility there is only one possible degree of comparability. This occurs when the ordinal utilities for different consumers can be subjected only to the same transformation. The implication of this is that the transformation preserves the ranking of utilities between different consumers, so if one consumer has a higher utility than the other before the transformation, they will have a higher utility after the transformation. Letting this transformation be denoted by f, then if $U^1 \geq U^2$ it must be the case that $f\left(U^1\right) \geq f\left(U^2\right)$. This form of comparability is called *ordinal level comparability.*

If the underlying utility functions are cardinal, then there are two forms of comparability that are worth discussing. The first form of comparability is to assume that the constant multiplying utility in the transformation must be the same for all consumers, but the constant that is added can differ. Hence, for two consumers the transformed utilities are $\tilde{U}^1 = a^1 + bU^1$ and $\tilde{U}^2 = a^2 + bU^2$, so the constant b is the same for both. This is called *cardinal unit comparability.* The implication of this transformation is that it now becomes meaningful to talk about the effect of changes in utility, meaning that gains to one consumer can be measured against losses to another - and whether the gain exceeds the loss is not affected by the transformation.

The second degree of comparability for cardinal utility is to further restrict the constant a in the transformation to be the same for both consumers. For all consumers the transformed utility becomes $\widetilde{U}^h = a + bU^h$. It is now possible for both changes in utility and levels of utility to be compared. This is form of comparability is called *cardinal full comparability.*

The next step is to explore the implications of these comparabilities for the construction of social welfare functions. It will be shown that each form of comparability implies different permissible social welfare functions.

13.8 Comparability and Social Welfare

The discussion of Arrow's Impossibility showed that the failure to successfully generate a social preference ordering from a set of individual preference orderings was the result of limited information. The information content of an individual's preference order involves nothing more than knowing how they rank the alternatives. A preference order does not convey any information on the strength of preferences or allow comparison of utility levels across consumers. When more information is available then it becomes possible to find social preference orderings that satisfy the conditions $I.N.P.U.T.$ Such information can be introduced by building social preferences upon individual utility functions that allow for comparability.

What this section shows is that for each form of comparability there is a specification of social welfare function that is consistent with the information content of the comparable utilities. To explain what is meant by consistent, recall that comparability is described by a set of permissible transformations of utility. A social welfare function is *consistent* if it ranks the set of alternative social states in the same way for all permissible transformations of the utility functions. Since increasing the degree of comparability reduces the number of permissible transformations, it has the effect of increasing the set of consistent social welfare functions.

Let the utility obtained by consumer h from allocation s be $U^h\left(s\right).$ A transformation of this basic utility function is denoted by $\tilde{U}^h\left(s\right) = f^h\left(U^h\left(s\right)\right).$ The value of social welfare at allocation s using the basic utilities is $W\left(s\right) = W\left(U^1\left(s\right),...,U^H\left(s\right)\right)$ and that from using the transformed utilities is $\tilde{W}\left(s\right) = W\left(\tilde{U}^1\left(s\right),...,\tilde{U}^H\left(s\right)\right).$ Given alternative allocations A and B, the social welfare function is consistent with the transformation (and hence the form of comparability) if $W\left(A\right) \geq W\left(B\right)$ implies $\tilde{W}\left(A\right) \geq \tilde{W}\left(B\right)$. In words, if A generates higher social welfare than B for the basic utilities, it will also do so for the transformed utilities.

To demonstrate these points, assume there are two consumers with the basic utility functions $U^1 = \left(x^1\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}\left(y^1\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}$ and $U^2 = x^2 + y^2$, where x^h and y^h are the consumption levels of goods x and y. Further assume that there are two allocations A and B with the consumption levels, and the resulting utilities, as shown in Table 13.1.

	x^1	y^1	U^1	x^2	y^2	U^2
A	4	9	6	3	2	5
B	16	1	4	2	5	7

Table 13.1: Allocations and Utility

The first point to establish is that it is possible to find a social welfare function that is consistent with ordinal level comparability but that none that is consistent with ordinal non-comparability. What level comparability allows is the ranking of consumers by utility level (think of placing the consumers in a line with the lowest utility level first). A position in this line (*e.g.* the first, or the tenth, or the nth) can be chosen, and the level of utility of the consumer in that position used as the measure of social welfare.This process generates a *positional* social welfare function. The best known example is the Rawlsian social welfare function

$$W = \min \left\{ U^h \right\}, \tag{13.3}$$

which judges social welfare by the minimum level of utility in the population. An alternative which shows other positions can be employed (though not one which is often used) is to measure social welfare measure by the maximum level of utility, $W = \max \left\{ U^h \right\}$.

That such positional welfare function are consistent with ordinal level comparability but not with ordinal non-comparability is shown in Table 13.2 using the allocations A and B introduced above. For the social welfare function $W = \min \left\{ U^h \right\}$, the welfare level in allocation A is 5 and that in allocation B is 4. Therefore allocation A is judged superior using the basic utilities. An example of a pair of transformations that satisfy ordinal non-comparability are $\tilde{U}^1 = f^1 \left(U^1 \right) = 3U^1$ and $\tilde{U}^2 = f^2 \left(U^2 \right) = 2U^2$. The levels of utility and resulting social welfare are displayed in the upper part of Table 13.2. The table shows that the preferred allocation is now B, so that the transformation has changed the preferred social outcome. With ordinal level comparability, the transformations $f^1 \left(U^1 \right)$ and $f^2 \left(U^2 \right)$ must be the same. As an example, let the transformation be given by $\tilde{U}^h = f \left(U^h \right) = \left(U^h \right)^2$. The values of the transformed utilities in the lower part of the table confirm that allocation A is preferred - as it was with the basic utilities. The positional social welfare function is therefore consistent with ordinal level comparability.

Non-Comparability	A	B
$\tilde{U}^1 = f^1 \left(U^1 \right) = 3U^1$	18	12
$\tilde{U}^2 = f^2 \left(U^2 \right) = 2U^2$	10	14
$\min \left\{ \tilde{U}^h \right\}$	10	12

Level Comparability	A	B
$\tilde{U}^1 = f \left(U^1 \right) = \left(U^1 \right)^2$	36	16
$\tilde{U}^2 = f \left(U^2 \right) = \left(U^2 \right)^2$	25	49
$\min \left\{ \tilde{U}^h \right\}$	25	16

Table 13.2: Non-Comparability and Level Comparability

Although cardinality utility is often viewed as stronger concept than ordinal utility, cardinality alone does not permit the construction of a consistent social welfare function. Recalling that transformations of the form $f^h = a^h + b^h U^h$ can be applied with non-comparability, it can be seen that even positional welfare functions will not be consistent since a^h can always be chosen to change the social ranking generated by the transformed utilities compared to that generated by the basic utilities. In contrast, if utility satisfies cardinal unit comparability, it is possible to use social welfare functions of the form

$$W = \sum_{h=1}^{H} \alpha^h U^h, \tag{13.4}$$

where the α^h are constants. To demonstrate this, and to show that social welfare function is not consistent with cardinal non-comparability, assume that $\alpha^1 = 2$ and $\alpha^2 = 1$. Then under the basic utility functions the social welfare levels in the two allocations are $W(A) = 2 \times 6 + 5 = 17$ and $W(B) = 2 \times 4 + 7 = 15$, so allocation A is preferred. The upper part of Table 13.3 displays two transformations satisfying non-comparability and the implied value of social welfare. This shows that allocation B will be preferred. Therefore, the social welfare function is not consistent with the transformations. With cardinal unit comparability, the transformations are restricted to have a common value for b^h, so $\tilde{U}^h = a^h + bU^h$. Selecting two transformations, the resulting utility levels are given in the lower part of the table. Calculating social welfare, the preferred allocation is A as it was with the basic utilities. Therefore with cardinal level comparability social welfare functions of the form (13.4) are consistent and provide a social ranking that is invariant for the permissible transformations.

Non-Comparability	A	B
$\tilde{U}^1 = f^1\left(U^1\right) = 2 + 2U^1$	14	10
$\tilde{U}^2 = f^2\left(U^2\right) = 5 + 6U^2$	35	47
$W = 2\tilde{U}^1 + \tilde{U}^2$	63	67
Level Comparability	A	B
$\tilde{U}^1 = f^1\left(U^1\right) = 2 + 3U^1$	20	14
$\tilde{U}^2 = f^2\left(U^2\right) = 5 + 3U^2$	20	26
$W = 2\tilde{U}^1 + \tilde{U}^2$	60	54

Table 13.3: Cardinal Utility

With cardinal full comparability the transformations must satisfy $\tilde{U}^h = a + bU^h$. One interesting example of the forms of social welfare function that are consistent with such transformations is

$$W = \bar{U} + \gamma \min\left\{U^h - \bar{U}\right\}, \ \bar{U} = \frac{\sum_{h=1}^{H} U^h}{H}. \tag{13.5}$$

This form of social welfare function is especially interesting because it is the utilitarian social welfare function when $\gamma = 0$ and Rawlsian when $\gamma = 1$. To show that this function is not consistent for cardinal unit comparability, assume $\gamma = \frac{1}{2}$. Then for the basic utilities it follows for allocation A that $\bar{U} = \frac{6+5}{2} = 5.5$ and for allocation B, $\bar{U} = \frac{4+7}{2} = 5.5$. The social welfare levels are then $W = 5.5 + \frac{1}{2}\min\{6 - 5.5, 5 - 5.5\} = 5$ for allocation A and $W = 5.5 + \frac{1}{2}\min\{4 - 5.5, 7 - 5.5\} = 4$ for allocation B. The social welfare function would select allocation A. The upper part of Table 13.4 displays the welfare levels for two transformations that satisfy cardinal level comparability.

With these transformed utilities the welfare function would select allocation B, so the social welfare function is not valid for these transformations. The lower part of the table displays a transformation that satisfies cardinal full comparability. For this transformation the social welfare function selects allocation A for both the basic and the transformed utilities. This demonstrates the consistency.

Level Comparability	A	B
$\tilde{U}^1 = f^1\left(U^1\right) = 7 + 3U^1$	25	19
$\tilde{U}^2 = f^2\left(U^2\right) = 1 + 3U^2$	16	22
$W = \bar{U} + \frac{1}{2}\min\left\{U^h - \bar{U}\right\}$	18.25	19.75
Full Comparability	A	B
$\tilde{U}^1 = f^1\left(U^1\right) = 1 + 3U^1$	19	13
$\tilde{U}^2 = f^2\left(U^2\right) = 1 + 3U^2$	16	22
$W = \bar{U} + \frac{1}{2}\min\left\{U^h - \bar{U}\right\}$	16.75	15.25

Table 13.4: Full Comparability

These calculations have demonstrated that if we can compare utility levels between consumers then a consistent social welfare function can be constructed. The resulting social welfare function must agree with the information content in the utilities, so each form of comparability leads to a different consistent social welfare function. As the information increases, so does the range of consistent social welfare functions. Expressed differently, for each of the cases of comparability the problem of aggregating individual preferences leads to a well-defined form of social welfare function. All of these social welfare functions will generate a social preference ordering that completely ranks the alternative states. They are obviously stronger in content than majority voting or Pareto efficiency. The drawback is that they are reliant on stronger utility information that may simply not exist.

13.9 Conclusions

This chapter has cast a critical eye over the efficiency theorems of Chapter 7. Although these theorems are important for providing a basic framework in which to think about policy, they are not an end in their own right. This perspective is based on the limited practical applicability of the lump-sum transfers needed to support the decentralization in the Second Theorem and the weakness of Pareto efficiency as a method of judging between economic states.

Although at first sight the theorems apparently have very strong implications, they become weakened when placed under critical scrutiny. But they are not without value. Much of the subject matter of public economics takes as its starting point the practical shortcomings of these theorems and attempts to find a way forward to something that is applicable. A knowledge of what could be achieved if the optimal lump-sum transfers were available provides a means of assessing the success of what can be achieved and shows ways in which improvements in policy can be made.

The other aspect involved in the Second Theorem is the selection of the optimal allocation to be decentralized. This choice requires a social welfare function that can be used to judge between different allocations of utility between consumers. Such a social welfare function can only be constructed if the consumers' utilities are comparable. The chapter described several different forms of comparability and the social welfare functions that are consistent with these.

Further reading

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem was first demonstrated in:

Arrow, K.J. (1950) “A difficulty in the concept of social welfare“, *Journal of Political Economy*, **58**, 328 - 346,

and further elaborated in:

Arrow, K.J. (1951) *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: Wiley).

A comprehensive textbook treatment is given by:

Kelly, J. (1987) *Social Choice Theory: An Introduction* (Berlin: Springer Verlag).

The concept of a social welfare function was first introduced by:

Bergson, A. (1938) “A reformulation of certain aspects of welfare economics“, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **68**, 233 - 252.

An analysis of limitations upon the use of lump-sum taxation is contained in:

Mirrlees, J.A. (1986) “The theory of optimal taxation“ in K.J. Arrow and M.D. Intrilligator (eds.), *Handbook of Mathematical Economics*, Amsterdam: North-Holland.

An economic assessment of the UK poll tax is conducted in:

Besley, T., I. Preston and M. Ridge (1997) ”Fiscal anarchy in the UK: modelling poll tax noncompliance”, *Journal of Public Economics,* **64**, 137 - 152.

Comparability of utility is discussed in:

Ng, Y.-K. (2003) *Welfare Economics*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan).

A discussion of the relation between social welfare functions and Arrow's theorem can be found in:

Samuelson, P.A. (1977) “Reaffirming the existence of “reasonable“ Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions“, *Economica*, **44**, 81 - 88.

Several of Sen's papers that discuss these issues are collected in:

Sen, A.K. (11982) *Choice, Welfare and Measurement*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Chapter 14

Inequality and Poverty

14.1 Introduction

A social welfare function permits the evaluation of economic policies that cause redistribution between consumers - a task that Pareto efficiency can never accomplish. Although the concept of a social welfare function is a simple one, previous chapters have identified numerous difficulties on the path between individual utility and aggregate social welfare. The essence of these difficulties is that if the individual utility function corresponds with what is theoretically acceptable, then its information content is too limited for social decision making.

The motivation for employing a social welfare function was to be able to address issues of equity as well as issues of efficiency. Fortunately, a social welfare function is not the only way to do this and, as this chapter will show, we can construct measures of the economic situation that relate to equity and which are based on observable and measurable information. This provides a set of tools which can be, and frequently are, applied in economic policy analysis. They may not meet some of the requirements of the ideal social welfare function but they have the distinct advantage of being practically implementable.

Inequality and poverty provide two alternative perspectives upon the equity of the income distribution. Inequality of income means that some households have higher incomes than others - which is a basic source for an inequity in welfare. Poverty exists when some households are too poor to achieve an acceptable standard of living. An inequality measure is a means of assigning a single number to the observed income distribution that reflects its degree of inequality. A poverty measure achieves the same for poverty. Although measures of inequality and poverty are not themselves social welfare functions, the chapter will reveal the closeness of the link between the two concepts.

The starting point of the chapter is a discussion of income. There are two aspects to this: the definition of income and the comparison of income across families with different compositions. In a setting of certainty, income is a clearly defined concept. When there is uncertainty, differences can arise between *ex ante* and *ex post* definitions. Given this, we look at alternative definitions and relate these to the treatment of income for tax purposes. If two households differ in their composition (for example, one household is a single person and the other is a family of four), a direct comparison of their income levels will reveal little about the standard of living they achieve. Instead the incomes must be adjusted to take account of composition and then compared. The tool use to make the adjustment is an equivalence scale. We review the use of equivalence scales and some of the issues that they raise.

Having arrived at a set of correctly defined income levels which have been adjusted for family composition using an equivalence scale, it becomes possible to evaluate inequality and poverty. A number of the commonly-used measures of each of these concepts are discussed and their properties investigated. Importantly, the link is drawn between measures of inequality and the welfare assumptions that are implicit within them. This leads into the idea of making the welfare assumptions explicit and building the measure up from these. To measure poverty it is necessary to determine who is "poor" which is achieved by choosing a level of income as the poverty line and labelling as poor all those who fall below it. As well as discussing measures of poverty, we also review issues concerning the definition of the poverty line and the concept of poverty itself.

Although the aim of this chapter was to move away from utility concepts towards practical tools, it is significant that we keep returning to utility in the assessment and improvement of the tools. In attempting to refine, for example, an equivalence scale or a measure of inequality it is found that it is necessary to comprehend the utility-basis of the measure. Despite intentionally starting in a direction away from utility, the theory returns us back to utility on every occasion.

14.2 Measuring Income

What is income? The obvious answer is that it is the additional resources a consumer receives over a given period of time. The reference to a time period is important here since income is a flow, so the period over which measurement takes place must be specified. Certainly, evaluating the receipt of resources is the basis of the definition used in the assessment of income for tax purposes. This definition works in a practical setting, but only in a backward-looking sense. What an economist needs in order to understand behavior, especially when choices are made in advance of income being received, is a forward-looking measure of income. If the flow of income is certain, then there is no distinction between backward- and forward-looking measures. It is when income is uncertain that differences emerge.

The relevance of this issue is that both inequality and poverty measures use income data as their basic input. The resulting measures will only be as accurate as the data that is employed to evaluate them. The data will be accurate when information is carefully collected and a consistent definition is used of what is to be measured. To evaluate the level of inequality or poverty, a necessary first step is to resolve the issues surrounding the definition of income.

The classic backward-looking definition of income was provided by Simons in 1938. This definition is "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question". The essential feature of this definition is that it makes an attempt to be inclusive so as to incorporate all income regardless of the source.

Although income definitions for tax purposes also adopt the backward-looking viewpoint, they do not precisely satisfy the Simons' definition. The divergence arises through the practical difficulties of assessing some sources of income especially those arising from capital gains. According to the Simons' definition, the increase in the value of capital assets should be classed as income. However, if the assets are not liquidated, the capital gain will not be realized during the period in question and will not be received as an income flow. For this reason, capital gains are taxed only upon realization. In the converse situation when capital losses are made, most tax codes place limits upon the extent to which they can be offset against income.

We have so far worked with the natural definition of income as the flow of additional resources. To proceed further it becomes more helpful to adopt a different perspective and to view the level of income by the benefits it can deliver. Since income is the means to achieve consumption, the flow of income during a fixed time period can be measured as the value of consumption that can be undertaken while leaving the household with the same stock of wealth at the end of the period as it had at the start of the period. The benefit of this perspective is that it extends naturally to situations where the income flow is uncertain. Building upon it, in 1939 Hicks provided what is generally taken as the standard definition of income with uncertainty. This definition states that "income is the maximum value which a man can consume during a week and still expect to be as well-off at the end of the week as he was at the beginning".

This definition can clearly cope with uncertainty since it operates in expectational terms. But this advantage is also its major shortcoming when a move is made towards applications. Expectations may be ill-defined or even irrational, so evaluation of the expected income flow may be unreasonably high or low. A literal application of the definition would not count windfall gains, such as unexpected gifts or lottery wins, as income because they are not expected despite such gains clearly raising the potential level of consumption. For these reasons, the Hicks definition of income is informative but not perfect.

These alternative definitions of income have highlighted the distinctions between *ex ante* and *ex post* measures. Assessments of income for tax purposes use the backward-looking viewpoint and measure income as all relevant payments received over the measurement period. Practical issues limit the extent to which some sources of income can be included, so the definition of income in tax codes does not precisely satisfy any of the formal definitions. This observation just reflects the fact that there is no unambiguously perfect definition of income.

14.3 Equivalence Scales

The fact that households differ in size and age distribution means that welfare levels cannot be judged just by looking at their income levels. A household of one adult with no children needs less income to achieve a given level of welfare than a household with two adults and one child. In the words of the economist Gorman, “When you have a wife and a baby, a penny bun costs threepence”. A larger household obviously needs more income to achieve a given level of utility but the question is how much more income? Equivalence scales are the economist’s way of answering this question and provide the means of adjusting measured incomes into comparable quantities.

Differences between households arise in the number of adults and the number and ages of dependants. These are called demographic variables. The general problem in designing equivalence scales is to achieve the adjustment of observed income to take account of demographic differences in household composition. Several ways exist to do this and these are now discussed.

The first approach to equivalence scales is based on the concept of *minimum needs*. A bundle of goods and services that is seen as representing the minimum needs for the household is identified. The exact bundle will differ between households of varying size but typically involves only very basic commodities. The cost of this bundle for families with different compositions is then calculated and the ratio of these costs for different families provides the equivalence scale. The first application of this approach was by Rowntree in 1901 in his pioneering study of poverty. The bundle of goods employed was just a minimum acceptable quantity of food, rent and a small allowance for “household sundries”. The equivalence scale was then constructed by assigning the expenditure for a two-adult household with no children the index of 100 and measuring costs for all other household compositions relative to this. The scale obtained from expenditures calculated by Rowntree are given in the first column of Table 14.1. The interpretation of these figures is that the minimum needs of a couple with one child cost 24% more than for a couple with no children.

A similar approach was taken by Beveridge in his construction of the expenditure requirements that provided the foundation for the introduction of social assistance in the UK. In addition to the goods in the bundle of Rowntree, Beveridge added fuel, light and a margin for “inefficiency” in purchasing. Also, the cost assigned to children increased with their age. The values of the Beveridge Scale in the second column of Table 14.1 are for children in the 5 - 10 age group.

The final column of the table is generated from the income levels that are judged to represent poverty in the US for families with different compositions. The original construction of these poverty levels was undertaken by Orshansky in 1963. The method she used was to evaluate the cost of food for the each family composition using the 1961 Economy Food Plan. Next, it was observed that if expenditure upon food, F, constituted θ% of the family’s budget then total needs would be $\frac{1}{\theta}F$. For a family of two, θ was taken as 3.7 and for a family of three or more θ was 3. The exception to this process was to evaluate the cost for a single person as 80% of that of a couple. The minimum expenditures obtained have been continually updated and the third column of the table gives the equivalence scale implied by the poverty line used in 2003.

	Rowntree (1901)	Beveridge (1942)	US Poverty Scale (2003)
Single Person	60	59	78
Couple	100	100	100
+1 child	124	122	120
+2 children	161	144	151
+3 children	186	166	178
+4 children	223	188	199

Table 14.1: Minimum Needs Equivalence Scales
Sources: B.S. Rowntree (1901) *Poverty: A Study of Town Life* (Macmillan)
W. H. Beveridge (1942) *Social Insurance and Allied Services* (HMSO)
US Bureau of the Census (2003) *www. census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh03.html*

Table 14.1 shows that these equivalence scales all assume that there are returns to scale in household size so that, for example, a family of two adults does not require twice the income of a single person. Observe also that the US Poverty Scale is relatively generous for a single person compared to the other two scales. The fact that the single-person value was constructed in a different way to the other values for the Poverty Scale (as a fixed percentage of that for a couple rather than as a multiple of food costs) has long been regarded as a contentious issue. Furthermore, only for the Beveridge scale is the cost of additional children constant. The fact that the cost of children is non-monotonic for the Poverty Scale is a further point of contention.

There are three major shortcomings of this method of computing equivalence scales. Firstly, by focusing on the cost of meeting a minimum set of needs they are inappropriate for applying to incomes above the minimum level. Secondly, they are dependent upon an assessment of what constitutes minimum needs - and this can be contentious. Most importantly, the scales do not take into account the process of optimization by the households. The consequence of optimization is that as income rises substitution between goods can take place and the same relativities need no longer apply. Alternative methods of constructing equivalence scales which aim to overcome these difficulties are now considered.

In a similar way to the Orshansky construction of the US Poverty Scale, the Engel approach to equivalence scales is based on the hypothesis that the welfare of a household can be measured by the proportion of its income that is spent on food. This is a consequence of Engel's law which asserts that the share of food in expenditure falls as income rises. If this is accepted, equivalence scales can be constructed for households of different compositions by calculating the income levels at which their expenditure share on food is equal. This is illustrated in Figure 14.1 in which the expenditure share on food, as a function of income, is shown for two households with family compositions d^1 and d^2. For example, d^1 may refer to a couple and d^2 to a couple with one child. Incomes M^1 and M^2



Figure 14.1: Construction of Engel Scale

lead to the same expenditure share, s, so are equivalent for the Engel method. The equivalence scale is then formed from the ratio $\frac{M^2}{M^1}$.

Although Engel's law may be empirically true, it does not necessarily provide a basis for making welfare comparisons since it leaves unexplored the link between household composition and food expenditure. In fact, there are grounds for believing that the Engel method overestimates the cost of additional children because a child is largely a food-consuming addition to a household. If this is correct, a household compensated sufficiently to restore the share of food in its expenditure to its original level after the addition of a child, would have been over-compensated with respect to other commodities. The approach of Engel has been extended to the more general iso-prop method in which the expenditure shares of a basket of goods, rather than simply food, becomes the basis for the construction of scales. However, considering a basket of goods does not overcome the basic shortcomings of the Engel method.

A further alternative is to select for attention a set of goods that are consumed only by adults, termed "adult goods", and such that the expenditure upon them can be treated as a measure of welfare. Typical examples of such goods that have been used in practice are tobacco and alcohol. If these goods have the property that changes in household composition only affect their demand via an income effect (so changes in household composition do not cause substitution between commodities), then the extra income required to keep their consumption constant when household composition changes can be used to construct an equivalence scale. The use of adult good to construct an equivalence scale is illustrated in Figure 14.2. On the basis that they generate the same level

Figure 14.2: Adult Good Equivalence Scale

of demand, $\bar{x}$, as family composition changes, the income levels M^1, M^2 and M^3 can be classed as equivalent and the equivalence scale can be constructed from their ratios.

There are also a number of difficulties with this approach. It rests upon the hypotheses that consumption of adult goods accurately reflects welfare and that household composition affects the demand for these goods only via an income effect. Furthermore, the ratios of M^1 to M^2 and M^3 will depend upon the level of demand chosen for the comparison except in the special case in which the demand curves are straight lines through the origin. The ratios may also vary for different goods. This leads into a further problem of forming some average ratio out of the ratios for the individual goods.

All of the methods described so far have attempted to derive the equivalence scale from an observable proxy for welfare. A general approach which can, in principal, overcome the problems identified in the previous methods is illustrated in Figure 14.3. To understand this figure, assume that there are just two goods available. The outer indifference curve represents the consumption levels of these two goods necessary for a family of composition d^2 to obtain welfare level U^* and the inner indifference curve the consumption requirements for a family with composition d^1 to obtain the same utility. The extent to which the budget line has to be shifted outward to reach the higher curve determines the extra income required to compensate for the change in family structure. This construction incorporates both the potential change in preferences as family composition changes and the process of optimization subject to budget constraint by the households.



Figure 14.3: General Equivalence Scale

To formalize this process, let the household have preferences described by the utility function $U(x_1, x_2; d)$ where x_i is the level of consumption of good i and d denotes information on family composition. For example, d will describe the number of adults, the number and ages of children and any other relevant information. The consumption plan needed to attain a given utility level, U, at least cost is the solution to

$$\min_{\{x_1,x_2\}} p_1x_1 + p_2x_2 \text{ subject to } U(x_1, x_2; d) \geq U^*. \tag{14.1}$$

Denoting the (compensated) demand for good i by $x_i(U^*, d)$, the minimum cost of attaining utility U with characteristics d is then given by

$$M(U^*, d) = p_1x_1(U^*, d) + p_2x_2(U^*, d). \tag{14.2}$$

The equivalent incomes at utility U^* for two households with compositions d^1 and d^2 are then given by $M\left(U^*, d^1\right)$ and $M\left(U^*, d^2\right)$. The equivalence scale is then derived by computing their ratio. The important point obtained by presenting the construction in this way is the observation that the equivalence scale will generally depend upon the level of utility at which the comparison is made. If it does, there can be no single equivalence scale which works at all levels of utility.

The construction of an equivalence scale from preferences makes two further issues become apparent. Firstly, the minimum needs and budget share approaches do not take account of how changes in family structure may shift the indifference map. For instance, the pleasure of having children may raise the utility obtained from any given consumption plan. With the utility approach it then becomes cheaper to attain each indifference curve, so that value of the equivalence scale falls as family size increases. This conclusion then conflicts with the basic sense that it is more expensive to support a larger family.

The second problem centres around the use of a household utility function. Many economists would argue that a household utility function cannot exist; instead they would observe that households are composed of individuals with individual preferences. Under the latter interpretation, the construction of a household utility function suffers from the difficulties of preference aggregation identified by Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Among the solutions to this problem now being investigated is to look within the functioning of the household and to model its decisions as the outcome of an efficient resource allocation process.

14.4 Inequality Measurement

Inequality is a concept which has immediate intuitive implications. The existence of inequality is easily perceived: differences in living standards between the rich and poor are only too obvious both across countries and, sometimes to a surprising extent, within countries. The obsession of the media with wealth and celebrity provides a constant reminder of just how rich the rich can be. An increase in inequality can also be understood at a basic level. If the rich become richer, and the poor become poorer, then inequality must have increased.

The substantive economic questions about inequality arise when we try to move beyond these generalizations to construct a quantitative measure of inequality. Without a quantitative measure it is not possible to provide a precise answer to questions about inequality. For example, a measure is required to determine which of a range of countries has the greatest level of inequality and to determine whether inequality has risen or fallen over time.

What an inequality measure must do is to take data on the distribution of income and generate a single number that captures the inequality in that distribution. A first approach to constructing such a measure is to adopt a standard statistical index. We describe the most significant of these indices. Looking at the statistical measures reveals that there are properties, particularly how the measure is affected by transfers of income between households, that we may wish an inequality measure to possess. These properties can also be used to assess the acceptability of alternative measures. It is also shown that implicit within a statistical measure are a set of welfare implications. Rather than just accept these implications, the alternative approach is explored of making the welfare assumptions explicit and building the inequality measure upon them.

14.4.1 The Setting

The intention of an inequality measure is to assign a single number to an income distribution that represents the degree of inequality. This section sets out the notation employed for the basic information that is input into the measure and defines precisely what is meant by a measure.

We assume that there are H households and label these $h = 1, ..., H$. The labelling of the households is chosen so that the lower is the label, the lower is the household's income. The incomes, M^h, then form an increasing sequence with

$$M^1 \leq M^2 \leq M^3 \leq \ldots \leq M^H. \tag{14.3}$$

The list $\left\{M^1, ..., M^H\right\}$ is the income distribution whose inequality we wish to measure. Given the income distribution, the mean level of income, μ, is defined by

$$\mu = \frac{1}{H}\sum_{h=1}^{H} M^h. \tag{14.4}$$

The purpose of an inequality measure is to assign a single number to the distribution $\left\{M^1, ..., M^H\right\}$. Let $I\left(M^1, ..., M^H\right)$ be an inequality measure. Then income distributions $\left\{\tilde{M}^1, ..., \tilde{M}^H\right\}$ has greater inequality than distribution $\left\{\hat{M}^1, ..., \hat{M}^H\right\}$ if $I(\tilde{M}^1, ..., \tilde{M}^H) > I(\hat{M}^1, ..., \hat{M}^H)$. Typically, the inequality measure is constructed so that a value of 0 represents complete equality (the position where all incomes are equal) and a value of 1 represents maximum inequality (all income is received by just one household).

The issues that arise in inequality measurement are encapsulated in determining the form that the function $I(M^1, ..., M^H)$ should take. We now investigate some alternative forms and explore their implications.

14.4.2 Statistical Measures

Under the heading of "statistical" fall inequality measures that are derived from the general statistical literature. That is, the measures have been constructed to characterize the distribution of a set of numbers without thought of any explicit economic application or motivation. Even so, the discussion will later show that these statistical measures make implicit economic value judgements. Accepting any one of these measures as the "correct" way to measure inequality means the acceptance of these implicit assumptions. The following measures are present in approximate order of sophistication. Each is constructed to take a value between 0 and 1, with a value of 0 occurring when all households have identical income levels.

Probably the simplest conceivable measure, the *range* calculates inequality as being the difference between the highest and lowest incomes expressed as a proportion of total income. As such, it is a very simple measure to compute.

The definition of the range, R, is

$$R = \frac{M^H - M^1}{H\mu}. \tag{14.5}$$

The division by $H\mu$ in (14.5) is a normalization that ensures the index is independent of the scale of incomes (or the units of measurement of income). Any index that has this property of independence is called a *relative index*.

As an example of the use of the range, consider the income distribution $\{1,3,6,9,11\}$. For this distribution $\mu = 6$ and

$$R = \frac{11-1}{5 \times 6} = 0.3333. \tag{14.6}$$

The failure of the range to take account of the intermediate part of the distribution can be illustrated by taking income from the second household in the example and giving it to the fourth to generate new income distribution $\{1,1,6,11,11\}$. This new distribution appears to be more unequal than the first yet the value of the range remains at $R = 0.3333$.

Given the simplicity of its definition, it is not surprising that the range has number of deficiencies. Most importantly, the range takes no account of the dispersion of the income distribution between the highest and the lowest incomes. Consequently it is not sensitive to any features of the income distribution between these extremes. For instance an income distribution with most of the households receiving close to the maximum income would be judged just as unequal as one in which most received the lowest income. An ideal measure should possess more sensitivity to the value of intermediate incomes than the range.

The relative mean deviation, D, takes account of the deviation of each income level from the mean so that it is dependent upon intermediate incomes. It does this by calculating the absolute value of the deviation of each income level from the mean and then summing. This summation process gives equal weight to deviations both above and below the mean and implies that D is linear in the size of deviations. Formally, D is defined by

$$D = \frac{\sum_{h=1}^{H} \left|\mu - M^h\right|}{2\left[H-1\right]\mu}. \tag{14.7}$$

The division by $2\left[H-1\right]\mu$ again ensures that D takes values between 0 and 1.

The advantage of the relative mean deviation over the range is that it takes account of the entire income distribution and not just the endpoints. Taking the example used for the range, the inequality in the distribution $\{1,3,6,9,11\}$ as measured by D is

$$D = \frac{|-5| + |-3| + |0| + |3| + |5|}{2 \times 4 \times 6} = 0.3333, \tag{14.8}$$

and the inequality of $\{1,1,6,11,11\}$ is

$$D = \frac{|-5| + |-5| + |0| + |5| + |5|}{2 \times 4 \times 6} = 0.4167. \tag{14.9}$$

Unlike the range, the relative mean deviation measures the second distribution as having more inequality.

Although it does take account of the entire distribution of income, the linearity of D has the implication it is insensitive to transfers from richer to poorer households, or vice versa, when the households involved in the transfer remain on the same side of the mean income level. To see an example of this, assume that the mean income level is $\mu = 20,000$. Now take two households with income $25,000$ and $100,000$. Transferring $4,000$ from the poorer of these two households to the richer, so the income levels become $21,000$ and $104,000$, does not change the value of D - one term in the summation rises by $4,000$ and the other falls by $4,000$. (Notice that if the two households were on different sides of the mean then a similar transfer would raise two terms in the summation by $4,000$ which would increase inequality.) The fact that D can be insensitive to transfers seems unsatisfactory since it is natural to expect that a transfer from a poorer household to a richer one should raise inequality.

This line of reasoning is enshrined in the *Pigou-Dalton Principle of Transfers* which is a central concept in the theory of inequality measurement. The basis of this principle is precisely the requirement that any transfer from a poor household to a rich one must increase inequality regardless of where the two households are located in the income distribution.

Definition 5 *(Pigou-Dalton Principle of Transfers) The inequality index must decrease if there is a transfer of income from a richer household to a poorer household which preserves the ranking of the two households in the income distribution and leaves total income unchanged.*

Any inequality measure that satisfies this principle is said to be *sensitive to transfers*. The Pigou-Dalton Principle is generally viewed as a feature that any acceptable measure of inequality should possess and is therefore expected in an inequality measure. Neither the range nor the relative mean deviation satisfy this principle.

The reason why D is not sensitive to transfers is its linearity in deviations from the mean. The removal of the linearity provides the motivation for considering the *coefficient of variation* which is defined using the sum of squared deviations. The procedure of forming the square places more weight on extreme observations and so introduces a sensitivity to transfers. The coefficient of variation, C, is defined by

$$C = \frac{\sigma}{\mu \left[H - 1\right]^{1/2}}, \tag{14.10}$$

where $\sigma^2 = \frac{\sum_{h=1}^{H} \left[M^h - \mu\right]^2}{H}$ is the variance of the income distribution so σ is its standard deviation. The division by $\mu \left[H - 1\right]^{1/2}$ ensures the C lies between 0 and 1. For the income distribution $\{1, 3, 6, 9, 11\}$, $\sigma^2 = \frac{[-5]^2 + [-3]^2 + [0]^2 + [3]^2 + [5]^2}{5} = 13.6$, so

$$C = \frac{[13.6]^{1/2}}{6\,[4]^{1/2}} = 0.3073, \tag{14.11}$$

and for $\{1,1,6,11,11\}, \sigma^2 = 20.0$ giving

$$C = \frac{[20]^{1/2}}{6\,[4]^{1/2}} = 0.3727. \tag{14.12}$$

To see that the coefficient of variation satisfies the Pigou-Dalton Principle, consider a transfer of an amount of income $d\epsilon$ from household i to household j, with the households chosen so that $M^i < M^j$. Then

$$\frac{dC}{d\epsilon} = \frac{1}{\mu\,[H-1]^{1/2}} \frac{d\sigma}{d\epsilon} = \frac{2\left[M^i - M^j\right]}{\sigma H \mu\,[H-1]^{1/2}} > 0, \tag{14.13}$$

so the transfer from the poorer household to the richer household decreases measured inequality as required by the Pigou-Dalton Principle. It should be noted that the value of the change in C depends upon the difference between the incomes of the two households. This has the consequence that a transfer of 100 units of income from a household with an income of 1,000,100 to one with an income of 999,900 produces the same change in C as a transfer of 100 units between households with incomes 1100 and 900. Most interpretations of equity would suggest that the latter transfer should be of greater consequence for the index since it involves two households of relatively low incomes. This reasoning suggests that satisfaction of the Pigou-Dalton Principle may not be a sufficient requirement for an inequality measure; the manner in which the measure satisfies it may also matter.

Before moving on to further inequality measures, it is worth describing the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve is a helpful graphical device for presenting a summary representation of an income distribution and it has played an important role in the measurement of inequality. Although not strictly an inequality measure as defined above, Lorenz curves are considered because of their use in illustrating inequality and the central role they play in the motivation of other inequality indices.

The Lorenz curve is constructed by arranging the population in order of increasing income and then graphing the proportion of income going to each proportion of the population. The graph of the Lorenz curve therefore has the proportion of population on the horizontal axis and the proportion of income on the vertical axis. If all households in the population had identical incomes the Lorenz curve would then be the diagonal line connecting the points $(0,0)$ and $(1,1)$. If there is any degree of inequality, the ordering in which the households are taken ensures that the Lorenz curve lies below the diagonal since, for example, the poorest half of the population must have less than half total income.

To see how the Lorenz curve is plotted consider a population of 10 with income distribution $\{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10\}$. The total quantity of income is



Figure 14.4: Construction of a Lorenz Curve

55, so the first household (who represents 10% of the population) receives $\frac{1}{55}$% of the total income. This is the first point plotted in the lower-left corner of Figure **??**. Taking the two lowest income households (who are 20% of the population), their combined income is $\frac{3}{55}$% of the total. Adding the third household, 30% of the population receives $\frac{6}{55}$% of total income. Proceeding in this way plots the 10 points in the figure. Joining them gives the Lorenz curve. Clearly, the larger the population the smoother is this curve.

The Lorenz curve can be employed to unambiguously rank some income distributions with respect to income inequality. This claim is based on the fact that a transfer of income from a poor household to a richer household moves the Lorenz curve further away from the diagonal. (This can be verified by re-plotting the Lorenz curve in Figure 14.4 for the income distribution $\{1, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 10\}$ which is the same is the original except for the transfer of one unit from household 2 to household 9). Because of this property, the Lorenz curve therefore satisfies the Pigou-Dalton Principle with the curve further from the diagonal indicating greater inequality.

Income distributions that can, and cannot, be ranked are displayed in Figure 14.5. In the left-hand figure, the Lorenz curve for income distribution B lies entirely outside that for income distribution A. In such a case, distribution B unambiguously has more inequality than A. One way to see this is to observe that distribution B can be obtained from distribution A by transferring income from poor households to rich households. Applying the Pigou-Dalton Principle, this raises inequality. If the Lorenz curves representing the distributions A and



A more equal then *B*

A and *B* incomparable

Figure 14.5: Lorenz Curves as an Incomplete Ranking

B cross, it is not possible to obtain an unambiguous conclusion using the Lorenz curve alone. The concept of Lorenz domination therefore provides only a partial ranking of income distributions. Despite this limitation, the Lorenz curve is still a popular tool in applied economics since it presents very convenient and easily interpreted visual summary of an income distribution.

The next measure, the *Gini*, has been the subject of extensive attention in discussions of inequality measurement and has been much used use in applied economics. The Gini , G, can be expressed by considering all possible pairs of incomes and out of each pair selecting the minimum income level. Summing the minimum income levels and dividing by $H^2\mu$ to ensure a value between 0 and 1, provides the formula for the Gini

$$G = 1 - \frac{1}{H^2\mu}\sum_{i=1}^{H}\sum_{j=1}^{H}\min\left\{M^i, M^j\right\}. \tag{14.14}$$

It should be noted that in the construction of this measure, each level of income is compared to itself as well all other income levels. For example, if there are three income levels $\{3, 5, 10\}$ then the value of the Gini is

$$\begin{aligned} G &= 1 - \frac{1}{3^2 \times 6}\left[\begin{array}{c} \min\{3,3\} + \min\{3,5\} + \min\{3,10\} \\ + \min\{5,3\} + \min\{5,5\} + \min\{5,10\} \\ \min\{10,3\} + \min\{10,5\} + \min\{10,10\} \end{array}\right] \\ &= 1 - \frac{1}{54}\left[\ 3+3+3+3+5+5+3+5+10\ \right] \\ &= 0.259. \end{aligned} \tag{14.15}$$

Counting the number of times each income level appears, the Gini can also be



Figure 14.6: Relating Gini to Lorenz

written as

$$G = 1 - \frac{1}{H^2\mu}\left[[2H-1]\,M^1 + [2H-3]\,M^2 + [2H-5]\,M^3 + ... + M^H\right]. \tag{14.16}$$

This second form of the Gini makes its computation simpler but hides the construction behind the measure.

The Gini also satisfies the Pigou-Dalton Principle. This can be seen by considering a transfer of income of size ΔM from household i to household j, with the households chosen so that $M^j > M^i$. From the ranking of incomes this implies $j > i$. Then

$$\Delta G = \frac{2}{H^2\mu}\,[j-i]\,\Delta M > 0, \tag{14.17}$$

as required. In the case of the Gini, the effect of the transfer of income upon the measure depends only on the locations of i and j in the income distribution. For example, a transfer from the household at position $i = 1$ to the household at position $j = 11$ counts as much as one from position $i = 151$ to position $j = 161$. It might be expected that an inequality should be more sensitive to transfers between households low in the income distribution.

There is an important relationship between the Gini and the Lorenz curve. As shown in Figure 14.6, the Gini is equal to the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of equality as a proportion of the area of the triangle beneath the line of equality. As the area of the box is 1, the Gini is twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the equality line. This definition of the Gini makes it clear that the Gini, in common with R, C and D, can be used to rank distributions when the Lorenz curves cross since the relevant area is always well defined. Since all these measures provide a stronger ranking of income distributions than the Lorenz curve, they must each impose additional restrictions which allow a comparison to be made between distributions even when their Lorenz curves cross.

A final statistical measure that displays a different form of sensitivity is the *Theil entropy measure.* This measure is drawn from information theory and is used in that context to measure the average information content of a system of information. The definition of the Theil entropy measure, T, is given by

$$\begin{aligned} T &= \frac{1}{\log H}\sum_{h=1}^{H}\frac{M^h}{H\mu}\left[\log\frac{M^h}{H\mu} - \log\frac{1}{H}\right] \\ &= \frac{1}{H\log H}\sum_{h=1}^{H}\frac{M^h}{\mu}\log\frac{M^h}{\mu}. \end{aligned} \tag{14.18}$$

In respect of the Pigou-Dalton Principle, the effect of an income transfer, $d\epsilon$, between households i and j upon the entropy index is given by

$$\frac{dT}{d\epsilon} = \frac{1}{H\log H}\log\frac{M^j}{M^i} < 0, \tag{14.19}$$

so that the entropy measure also satisfies the criterion. For the Theil entropy measure, the change is dependent upon the relative incomes of the two households involved in the transfer. This provides an alternative form of sensitivity to transfers.

14.4.3 Inequality and Welfare

The analysis of the statistical measures of inequality has made reference to "acceptable" criteria for a measure to possess. One of these was made explicit in the Pigou-Dalton Principle, whilst other criteria relating to additional desirable sensitivity properties have been implicit in the discussion. To be able to say something is acceptable or not implies that there is some notion of distributive justice or social welfare underlying the judgement. It is then interesting to consider the relationship between inequality measures and welfare.

The first issue to address is the extent to which income distributions can be ranked in terms of welfare with minimal restrictions imposed upon the social welfare function. To investigate this, let the level of social welfare be determined by the function $W = W\left(M^1, \ldots, M^H\right)$. It is assumed that this social welfare function is symmetric and concave. Symmetry means that the level of welfare is unaffected by changing the ordering of the households. This is just a requirement that all households are treated equally. Concavity ensures that the indifference curves of the welfare function have the standard shape with mixtures preferred to extremes. This assumption imposes a concern for equity upon the welfare function.

The critical theorem relating the ranking of income distributions to social welfare is now given.

Theorem 10 *Consider two distributions of income with the same mean. If the Lorenz curves for these distributions do not cross, every symmetric and concave social welfare function will assign a higher level of welfare to the distribution whose Lorenz curve is closest to the main diagonal.*

The proof of this theorem is very straightforward. Since the welfare function is symmetric and concave, it follows that $\frac{\partial W}{\partial M^i} \geq \frac{\partial W}{\partial M^j}$ if $M^i < M^j$. Hence the marginal social welfare of income is greater for a household lower in the income distribution. If the two Lorenz curves do not cross, the income distribution represented by the inner one (that closest to the main diagonal) can be obtained from that of the outer one by transferring income from richer to poorer households. Since the marginal social welfare of income to the poorer households is never less than that from richer, this transfer must raise welfare as measured by any symmetric and concave social welfare function.

The converse of this theorem is that if the Lorenz curves for two distributions cross, then two symmetric and concave social welfare functions can be found that will rank the two distributions differently. This is because the income distributions of two Lorenz curves that cross are not related by simple transfers from rich to poor. This permits the construction of the two social welfare functions, with different marginal social welfares, that will rank them differently. So, if the Lorenz curves do cross the income distributions cannot be unambiguously ranked without specifying the social welfare function.

Taken together, the theorem and its converse show that the Lorenz curve provides the most complete ranking of income distributions that is possible without making assumptions on the form of the social welfare other than symmetry and concavity. To achieve a complete ranking when the Lorenz curves cross requires restrictions to be placed upon the structure of the social welfare function. In addition, any measure of inequality is necessarily stronger than the Lorenz curve since it generates a complete ranking of distributions. This is true of all the statistical measures, which is why it can be argued that they all carry implicit welfare judgements.

This argument can be taken a stage further. It is in fact possible to construct the social welfare function that is implied by an inequality measure. To see how this can be done, consider the Gini. Assume that the total amount of income available is constant. Any redistribution of this that leaves the Gini unchanged must leave the implied level of welfare unchanged. A redistribution of income will not affect the Gini if the term $\left[\left[2H-1\right]M^1 + ... + M^H\right]$ remains constant. The welfare function must thus be a function of this expression. Furthermore, the Gini is defined to be independent of the total level of income, but a welfare function will increase if total income rises and distribution is unaffected. This can be incorporated by not dividing through by the mean level of income. Putting these arguments together, the welfare function implied by the Gini is given by

$$W_G\left(M\right) = \frac{1}{H^2}\left[\left[2H-1\right]M^1 + \left[2H-3\right]M^2 + ... + M^H\right]. \tag{14.20}$$

The form of $W_G\left(M\right)$ is interesting since it shows that the Gini implies a social welfare function that is linear in incomes. It also has a clear structure of increasing welfare weights for lower income consumers. Also, the welfare function has indifference curves which are straight lines above and below the line of equal incomes, but kinked on this line. This is illustrated in Figure 14.7.



Figure 14.7: The Gini Social Welfare Function

In the same way a welfare function can be constructed for all of the statistical measures. Therefore acceptance of the measure is acceptance of the implied welfare function. As shown by the linear social indifference curves and increasing welfare weights, the implied welfare functions can have a very restrictive form. Rather than just accept such welfare restrictions, the fact that each inequality measure implies a social welfare function suggests that the relationship can be inverted to move from a social welfare function to an inequality measure. By assuming a social welfare function at the outset, it is possible to make welfare judgements explicit and, by deriving the inequality measure from the social welfare function, ensure these are incorporated in the inequality measure.

To implement this approach, assume that the social welfare function is utilitarian with

$$W = \sum_{h=1}^{H} U\left(M^h\right). \tag{14.21}$$

The household utility of income function, $U(M)$, is taken to satisfy the conditions that $U'(M) > 0$ and $U''(M) < 0$. The utility function $U(M)$ can either be the households' true cardinal utility function or it can be chosen by the policy analyst as their evaluation of the utility of income to each household. In this second interpretation, since social welfare is obtained by summing the individual utilities, the importance given to equity can be captured in the choice of $U(M)$. This is because increasing the concavity of the utility function places a relatively higher weight on low incomes in the social welfare function.

A measure of inequality can be constructed from the social welfare function



Figure 14.8: The Equally Distributed Equivalent Income

by defining M_{EDE} as the solution to

$$\sum_{h=1}^{H} U\left(M^h\right) = HU\left(M_{EDE}\right). \tag{14.22}$$

M_{EDE} is called the *equally distributed equivalent* income and is that level of income that if given to all households would generate the same level of social welfare as the initial income distribution. Using M_{EDE}, the *Atkinson* measure of inequality is defined by

$$A = 1 - \frac{M_{EDE}}{\mu}. \tag{14.23}$$

For the case of two households the construction of M_{EDE} is illustrated in Figure 14.8. The initial income distribution is given by $\left\{M^1, M^2\right\}$ and this determines the relevant indifference curve of the social welfare function. M_{EDE} is found by moving around this indifference curve to the 45^o line where the two households' incomes are equal. The figure makes clear that because of the concavity of the social indifference curve M_{EDE} is less than the mean income, μ. This fact guarantees that $0 \leq A \leq 1$. Furthermore, for a given level of mean income, a more diverse income distribution will achieve a lower social indifference curve and be equivalent to a lower M_{EDE}.

The flexibility in this measure lies in the freedom of choice of the household utility of income function. Given the assumption of a utilitarian social welfare function, it is the household utility that determines the importance attached to inequality by the measure. One commonly used form of utility function is

$$U(M) = \frac{M^{1-\varepsilon}}{1-\varepsilon}, \varepsilon \neq 1, \tag{14.24}$$

which allow the welfare judgements of the policy analyst to be contained in the chosen value of the parameter ε. The value of ε determines the degree of concavity of the utility function: it becomes more concave as ε increases. An increase in concavity raises the relative importance of low incomes because it causes the marginal utility of income to decline at a faster rate. The utility function is isoelastic, and concave if $\varepsilon \geq 0$. When $\varepsilon = 1$, $U(M) = \log M$ and when $\varepsilon = 0$, $U(M) = M$.

The Atkinson measure can be illustrated using the example of the income distribution $\{1, 3, 6, 9, 11\}$. If $\varepsilon = \frac{1}{2}$ the household utility function is $U = \frac{M^{\frac{1}{2}}}{2}$ so the level of social welfare is

$$W = \frac{1^{\frac{1}{2}}}{2} + \frac{3^{\frac{1}{2}}}{2} + \frac{6^{\frac{1}{2}}}{2} + \frac{9^{\frac{1}{2}}}{2} + \frac{11^{\frac{1}{2}}}{2} = 5.7491. \tag{14.25}$$

The equally distributed equivalent income then solves

$$5 \times \frac{[M]^{\frac{1}{2}}}{2} = 5.7491, \tag{14.26}$$

so $M_{EDE} = 5.2883$. This gives the value of the Atkinson measure as

$$A = 1 - \frac{5.2883}{6} = 0.1186. \tag{14.27}$$

14.4.4 An Application

As has been noted in the discussion, these inequality measures are frequently used in practical policy analysis. Table 14.2 summarizes the results of an OECD study into the change in inequality over time in wide range of countries. This is undertaken by calculating inequality at two points in time and determining the percentage change in the measure. If the change is positive, then inequality has increased. The converse holds if it is negative. The study also calculates inequality for income before taxes and transfers and for income after taxes and transfers. The difference between the inequality of these two gives an insight into the extent to which the tax and transfer system succeeds in redistributing income.

Looking at the results, in all cases inequality is smaller after taxes and transfers than before so that the tax systems in the countries studied are redistributive. For instance, in Denmark inequality is .0420 when measured by Gini before taxes and transfers but only 0.0217 after. The second general message of the results is that inequality has tended to rise in these countries - only in three cases has it been reduced and in every case this is after taxes and transfers.

It is also interesting to look at the rankings of inequality and changes in inequality under the different measures. If there is general agreement for different measures then we can be reassured that the choice of measure is not too critical for what we observe. For the level of inequality, all four measures are in agreement for both before tax and after tax, except for the SCV which reverses the after taxes and transfers ranking of Denmark and Sweden, and the Atkinson which reverses the before taxes and transfers ranking of Denmark and the US. For these four measures there is a considerable degree of consistency in the rankings. Taking the majority opinion, observe that before taxes and transfers the ranking with the highest level of inequality first is Italy, Sweden, US, Denmark and Japan. After the operation of taxes and transfers this ranking becomes Italy, US, Japan, Sweden and Denmark. This change in rankings is evidence of the highly redistributive tax and transfer systems operated in the Nordic countries.

The rankings for the change in inequality are not quite as consistent across the four measures but there is still considerable agreement. The majority order for the before taxes and transfers case, with the greatest increase in inequality first, is Italy, Sweden, Japan, US and Denmark. The Atkinson measure places Japan at the top and reverses Denmark and the US. For the after taxes and transfers ranking, the Gini and the Atkinson measure produce the same ranking but the SCV places Sweden above the US and Japan. But what is clear is the general agreement upon an increase in inequality.

This review of application has shown that the different measure can produce a fairly consistent picture about ranking by inequality, about the changes in inequality and upon the effect of taxes and transfers. Despite the differences emphasized in the analysis of the measures, when put into practice in this way the differences need not lead to widespread disagreement between the measures. In fact, a fairly harmonious picture can emerge.

Measure	SCV		Gini		Atkinson	
	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
Denmark 1994	.671	.229	.420	.217	.209	.041
% Change 1983 - 1994	4.9	2.0	11.2	−4.9	25.3	−11.1
Italy 1993	1.19	.584	.570	.345	.299	.105
% Change 1984 - 1993	59.6	44.7	20.8	12.8	43.8	33.1
Japan 1994	.536	.296	.340	.265	.124	.059
% Change 1984 - 1994	33.7	21.7	14.0	4.9	47.3	10.9
Sweden 1995	.894	.217	.487	.230	.262	.049
% Change 1975 - 1995	49.1	36.9	17.2	−1.0	28.7	3.2
United States 1995	.811	.441	.455	.344	.205	.100
% Change 1974 - 1995	32.0	25.4	13.1	10.0	19.6	18.6

Table 14.2: Inequality Before and After Taxes and Transfers
Source: OECD ECO/WKP(98)2
Notes: 1. The Squared Coefficient of Variation (SCV) is defined by
$SCV = [H - 1]\, C.$

2. For the Atkinson measure, $\varepsilon = 0.5$.

14.5 Poverty

The essential feature of poverty is the possession of fewer resources than are required to achieve an acceptable standard of living. What constitutes poverty can be understood in the same intuitive way as what constitutes inequality, but similar issues about the correct measure arise again once we attempt to provide a quantification. This section first discusses concepts of poverty and the poverty line, and then proceeds to review a number of common poverty measures.

14.5.1 Poverty and the Poverty Line

Before measuring poverty, it is first necessary to define it. It is obvious that poverty refers to a situation involving a lack of income and a consequent low level of consumption and welfare. What is not so clear is the standard against which the level of income should be judged. Two possibilities arise in this context: an absolute conception of poverty and a relative one. The distinction between these has implications for changes in the level of poverty over time and the success of policy in alleviating poverty.

The concept of *absolute poverty* assumes that there is some fixed minimum level of consumption (and hence of income) that constitutes poverty and is independent of time or place. Such a minimum level of consumption can be a diet that is just sufficient to maintain health and limited housing and clothing. Under the concept of absolute poverty, if the incomes of all households rise, there will eventually be no poverty. Although a concept of absolute poverty was probably implicit in early studies of poverty, such as that of Rowntree in 1901, the appropriateness of absolute poverty has since generally been rejected. In its place has been adopted the notion of relative poverty.

Relative poverty is not a recent concept. Even in 1776 Adam Smith was defining poverty as the lack of necessities, where necessities are defined as “what ever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without“. This definition makes it clear that relative poverty is defined in terms of the standards of a given society at a given time and, as the income of that society rises, so does the level that represents poverty. Operating under a relative standard, it becomes much more difficult to eliminate poverty. Relative poverty has also been defined in terms of the ability to “participate” in society. Poverty then arises whenever a household possesses insufficient resources to allow it to participate in the customary activities of its society.

The starting point for the measurement of poverty is to set a poverty line which separates those in viewed as living in poverty from those who are not. Of course, this poverty line applies to the incomes levels after application of an equivalence scale. Whether poverty is viewed as absolute or relative matters little for setting a poverty line at any particular point in time (though advocates of an absolute poverty concept may choose to set it lower). Where the distinction matters is whether and how the poverty line is adjusted over time. If an absolute poverty standard were adopted, then there would be no revision. Conversely, with relative poverty the level of the line would rise or fall with in line with average incomes.

In practice, poverty lines have often been determined by following the minimum needs approach that was discussed in connection with equivalence scales. As noted in Section 14.3, this is the case with the US poverty line that was fixed in 1963 and has since been updated annually. As the package of minimum needs has not changed, the underlying concept is that of an absolute poverty measure. In the UK, the poverty line has been taken as the level of income which is 120% or 140% of the minimum supplementary benefit level. As this level of benefit is determined by minimum needs, this implies a minimum needs poverty line. In addition, benefits have risen with increases in average income so causing the poverty line to rise. This represents the use of a relative concept of poverty.

That there is a precise switch between poverty and non-poverty as the poverty line is crossed is a very strong assumption. Instead, it would seem much more natural for there to be a gradual move out of poverty as income increases. Such precision of the poverty line may also lead to difficulty in determining where it should lie if the level of poverty is critically dependent on the precise choice. Both of these difficulties can be overcome by observing that often it is not the precise level of poverty that matters but changes in the level of poverty over time and across countries. In these instances the poverty value is not too important but only the rankings. This suggest the procedure of calculating poverty for a range of poverty lines. If poverty is higher today for all poverty lines than it was yesterday, then it seems unambiguous that poverty has risen. In this sense, the poverty line may not actually be of critical importance for the uses to which poverty measurement is often put. An application illustrating this argument is given below.

14.5.2 Poverty Measures

The poverty line is now taken as given and we proceed to discuss alternative measures of poverty. The basic issue in this discussion is how best to combine two pieces of information (how many households are poor, and how poor they are) into a single quantitative measure of poverty. By describing a number of measures, the discussion will draw out the properties that it is desirable for a poverty measure to possess.

Throughout the discussion, the poverty line is denoted by the income level z, so that a household with an income level below or equal to z is classed as living in poverty. For a household with income M^h, income gap of household h measures how far their income is below the poverty line. Denoting the income gap for household h by g_h, it follows that $g_h = z - M^h$. Given the poverty line z and an income distribution $\left\{M^1, ..., M^H\right\}$, where $M^1 \leq M^2 \leq ... \leq M^H$, the number of households in poverty is denoted by q. The value of q is defined by the facts that the income of household q is on or below the poverty line, so

$M^q \leq z$, but that of the next household is above $M^{q+1} > z$.

The simplest measure of poverty is the *headcount ratio* which determines the extent of poverty by counting the number of households whose incomes are not above the poverty line. Expressing the number as a proportion of the population, the headcount ratio is defined by

$$E = \frac{q}{H}. \tag{14.28}$$

This measure of poverty was first used by Rowntree in 1901 and has been employed in many subsequent studies. The major advantage of the headcount ratio is its simplicity of calculation.

The headcount ratio is clearly limited because it is not affected by how far below the poverty line the household are. For example, with a poverty line of $z = 10$ the income distributions $\{1, 1, 20, 40, 50\}$ and $\{9, 9, 20, 40, 50\}$ would both have a headcount ratio of $E = \frac{2}{5}$. A policy maker may well see these income distributions differently since the income required to alleviate poverty in the second case (2 units) is much less then that required for the first (18 units). The headcount ratio is also not affected by any transfer of income from a poor household to one that is richer if both households remain on the same side of the poverty line. Even worse, observe that if we change the second distribution to $\{7, 11, 20, 40, 50\}$ the headcount ratio falls to $E = \frac{1}{5}$, so a regressive transfer has actually reduced the headcount ratio. This will happen whenever a transfer takes income of the recipient of the transfer above the poverty line.

The headcount uses only one of the two pieces on information on poverty. A measure that uses only information on how far below the poverty line are the incomes of the poor households is the *aggregate poverty gap.* This is defined as the simple sum of the income gaps of the households that are in poverty. Recalling that it is the first q households that are in poverty, the aggregate poverty gap is

$$V = \sum_{h=1}^{q} g_h. \tag{14.29}$$

The interpretation of this measure is that it is the additional income for the poor that is required to eliminate poverty. It provides some information but is limited by the fact that it does not sensitive to changes in the number in poverty. In addition, the aggregate poverty gap gives equal weight to all income shortfalls regardless of how far they are from the poverty line. It is therefore insensitive to transfers unless the transfer takes one of the households out of poverty. To see this latter point, for the poverty line of $z = 10$ the income distributions $\{5, 5, 20, 40, 50\}$ and $\{1, 9, 20, 40, 50\}$ have an aggregate poverty gap of $V = 10$. The distribution between the poor is somewhat different in the two cases.

One direct extension of the aggregate poverty gap is to adjust the measure by taking into account the number in poverty. The *income gap ratio* does this by calculating the aggregate poverty gap and then dividing by the number in poverty. Finally, the value obtained is divided by the value of the poverty line,

z, to obtain a measure whose value falls between 0 (the absence of poverty) and 1 (all households in poverty have no income).

$$I = \frac{1}{z}\frac{\sum_{h=1}^{q} g_h}{q}. \tag{14.30}$$

For the income distribution $\{1, 9, 20, 40, 50\}$, the income gap ratio when $z = 10$ is

$$I = \frac{1}{10}\frac{9+1}{2} = 0.5. \tag{14.31}$$

However, when this income distribution changes to $\{1, 10, 20, 40, 50\}$, so only one household is now in poverty, the measure become

$$I = \frac{1}{10}\frac{9}{1} = 0.9. \tag{14.32}$$

This example reveals that the income gap ratio has the unfortunate property of being able to report increased poverty when the income of household crosses the poverty line and the number in poverty is reduced.

These observations suggest that it is necessary to reflect more carefully upon the properties that a poverty measure should possess. In 1976 Sen suggested that a poverty measure should have the following properties:

- Transfers of income between households above the poverty line should not affect the amount of poverty.
- If a household below the poverty line becomes worse off, poverty should increase.
- The poverty measure should be anonymous *i.e.* should not depend on who is poor.
- A regressive transfer among the poor should raise poverty.

These are properties that have already been highlighted by the discussion. Two further properties were also proposed:

- The weight given to a household should depends on their ranking among the poor *i.e.* more weight should be given to those furthest from the poverty line.
- The measure should reduce to the headcount if all the poor have the same level of income.

On poverty measure that satisfies all of these conditions is the *Sen* measure

$$S = E\left[I + [1 - I]\, G_p \left[\frac{q}{q+1}\right]\right], \tag{14.33}$$

where G_p is the Gini measure of income inequality amongst the households below the poverty line. This poverty measure combines a measure of the number in poverty (the headcount ratio), a measure of the shortfall in income (the income gap ratio) and a measure of the distribution of income between the poor (the Gini). Applying this to the income distribution $\{1, 9, 20, 40, 50\}$, we have $E = \frac{2}{5}$ and $I = 0.5$. The Gini is calculated for the distribution of income of the poor $\{1, 9\}$, so $G_p = 1 - \frac{1}{2^2 \times 5}[3 \times 1 + 9] = \frac{4}{10}$. These values give

$$S = \frac{2}{5}\left[0.5 + [1 - 0.5]\frac{4}{10}\left[\frac{2}{2+1}\right]\right] = 0.2533. \qquad (14.34)$$

In contrast, for the distribution $\{1, 10, 20, 40, 50\}$ which was judged worse using the income gap ratio, there is no inequality among the poor (since there is a single poor person) so the Sen measure is

$$S = \frac{1}{5}\left[0.9 + [1 - 0.9]\, 0\left[\frac{1}{1+1}\right]\right] = 0.18, \qquad (14.35)$$

which is simply the headcount ratio and records a lower level of poverty.

There is a further desirable property that leads into an alternative and important class of poverty measures. Consider a population that can be broken down into distinct subgroups. For instance, imagine dividing the population into rural and urban dwellers. The property we want is for the measure to be able to assign a poverty level for each of the groups and to aggregate these group poverty levels into a single level of the total society. Further, we will also want the aggregate measure to increase if poverty rises in one of the subgroups and does not fall any of the others. So, if rural poverty rises while urban poverty remains the same, aggregate poverty must rise. Any poverty measures that satisfies this condition is termed *subgroup consistent.*

Before introducing a form of measure that is subgroup consistent, it is providing additional discussion of the effect of transfers. The measures discussed so far have all had the property that the effect of a transfer has been independent of the income levels of the loser and gainer (except when the transfer was between households on different sides of the poverty line or changed the number in poverty). In the same way that in inequality measurement we argued for magnifying the effect of deviations far from the mean, we can equally argue that the effect of a transfer in poverty measurement should be dependent upon the incomes of those involved in the transfer. For example, a transfer away from the lowest income household should have more effect on measured poverty than a transfer away from a household close to the poverty line. A poverty measure will satisfy this *sensitivity to transfers* if the increase in measured poverty caused by a transfer of income from a poor household to a poor household with a higher income is smaller the larger is the income of the lowest income household.

Let the total population remain at H. Assume that this population can be divided into Γ separate subgroups. Let g_h^γ be the income gap of a poor member of subgroup γ and q^γ be the number of poor in that subgroup. Using this notation, a poverty measure that satisfies the property of subgroup consistency is the Foster, Greer, Thorbecke (FGT) class given by

$$P_\alpha = \frac{1}{H}\sum_{\gamma=1}^{\Gamma}\left[\sum_{h=1}^{q^\gamma}\frac{g_h^\gamma}{z}\right]^\alpha . \tag{14.36}$$

The form of this measure depends upon the value chosen for the parameter α. If $\alpha = 0$ then

$$P_0 = \frac{\sum_{\gamma=1}^{\Gamma} q^\gamma}{H} = E, \tag{14.37}$$

the headcount ratio. If instead $\alpha = 1$ then

$$P_1 = \frac{1}{H}\sum_{\gamma=1}^{\Gamma}\left[\sum_{h=1}^{q^\gamma}\frac{g_h^\gamma}{z}\right] = EI, \tag{14.38}$$

the product of the headcount ratio and the income gap ratio. Note that P_0 is insensitive to transfers while the effect of a transfer for P_1 is independent of the incomes of the households involved. For higher values of α the FGT satisfies sensitivity to transfers and more wight is placed on the income gaps of lower income households.

14.5.3 Two Applications

The use of these poverty measures is now illustrated by reviewing two applications. The first application, taken from Foster, Greer and Thorbecke shows how subgroup consistency can give additional insight into the sources of poverty. The second application is extracted from and OECD working paper and illustrates how a range of poverty lines can be used as a check upon consistency. It also reveals that there can be a good degree of agreement between different measures of poverty.

Table 14.2 reports an application of the FGT measure. The data is from a household survey in Nairobi and groups the population according to their length of residence in Nairobi. The measure used is the P_2 measure, so $\alpha = 2$. As already discussed, the use of the FGT measure allows the contribution of each group to total poverty to be identified. For example, those living in Nairobi between 6 and 10 years have a level of poverty of .0343 and contribute 12.1% to total poverty - this is also the percentage by which total poverty would fall if this group were all raised above the poverty line. This division into groups also allows identification of where the major contribution to poverty arises. In this case the major contribution is made by those in the 21 - 70 group. Although the actual poverty level in this group is quite low, the number of households in this group causes them to have a major effect on poverty.

Years in Nairobi	Level of Poverty	% Contribution to Total Poverty
0	.4267	5.6
.01 − 1	.1237	6.5
2	.1264	6.6
3 − 5	.0257	5.1
6 − 10	.0343	12.1
11 − 15	.0291	9.4
16 − 20	.0260	6.6
21 − 70	.0555	23.8
Permanent Resident	.1659	8.7
Don't Know	.2461	15.5
Total	.0558	99.9

Table 14.2: Poverty using the FGT P_2 Measure
Source: Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1985)

The second application is reported in Table 14.3. This OECD analysis studies the change in poverty over (approximately) a ten-year period from the mid-980s to the mid-1990s. The numbers given are therefore the percentage change in the measure and not the value of the measure. What the results show is that the direction of change in poverty as measured by the headcount ratio is not sensitive to the choice of the poverty line - the only inconsistency is the value for Australia with the poverty line as 40% of median income. In detail, there has been a decrease in poverty in Australia, Belgium and the US but an increase in Germany, Japan and Sweden. The results in the three central columns report the calculations for three different poverty measures. These show that the Sen measure and the headcount are always in agreement about the direction of change. This is not true of the income gap which disagrees with the other two for Australia and the US.

Poverty Line (% of Median Income)	40%	50%	50%	50%	60%
Measure	Headcount	Headcount	Income Gap	Sen Index	Headcount
Australia 1984 - 1993/94	0.0	−2.7	5.0	−4.2	−1.4
Belgium 1983 - 1995	−1.4	−2.8	1.1	−27.1	−2.3
Germany 1984 - 1994	1.8	2.9	2.5	20.8	3.8
Japan 1984 - 1994	0.6	0.8	2.5	23.1	1.0
Sweden 1983 - 1995	0.9	0.4	7.9	23.7	0.4
United States 1985 - 1995	−1.2	−1.2	0.2	−4.9	−0.1

Table 14.3: Evolution of Poverty
(% Change in Poverty Measure)
Source: OECD ECO/WKP(98)2

14.6 Conclusions

The need to quantify is driven by the aim of making precise comparisons. What economic analysis contributes is an understanding of the bridge between intuitive concepts of inequality and poverty, and specific measures of these phenomena. Analysis can reveal the implications of alternative measures and provide principles that a good measure should satisfy.

The first problem we challenged in this chapter was the comparison of incomes between households of different compositions. It is clearly more expensive to support a large family than a small family, but exactly how much more expensive is more difficult to determine. Equivalence scales were introduced as the analytical tool to solve this problem. These scales were initially based upon the cost of achieving a minimum standard of living. Though simple, such an approach does not easily generalize to higher income levels nor does it take much account of economic optimization. In principle, equivalence scales could be built directly from utility functions but to do so issues must be addressed of how the preferences of the individual members of a household are aggregated into a household preference order.

Inequality occurs when some households have a higher income (after the incomes have been equivalized for household composition) than others. The Lorenz curve provides a graphical device for contrasting income distributions. Some income distributions can be ranked directly by the Lorenz curve, in which case there is no ambiguity about which has more inequality, but not all distributions can be. Inequality measures provide a quantitative assessment of inequality by imposing restrictions beyond those incorporated in the Lorenz curve. The chapter investigated the properties of a number of measures of inequality. Of particular importance was the observation that all inequality measures embody implicit welfare judgements. Given this, the Atkinson measure is constructed on the basis that the welfare judgements should be made explicit and the inequality measure constructed upon these judgements. In principle, alternative measures can generate different rankings of income distributions but, as the application showed, they can in practice yield very consistent rankings.

In many ways the measurement of poverty raises similar issues to that of inequality. The additional feature of poverty is the necessity to determine whether households can be classed as living in poverty or not. The poverty line which provides the division between the two groups plays a central role in poverty measurement. Where and how the to locate this poverty line is important, but more fundamental is how it should be adjusted over time. At stake here is the key question of whether poverty should be viewed in absolute or relative terms. The practice in developed countries is to use relative poverty. The chapter reviewed a number of poverty measures from the headcount ratio to the FGT measure. These measures are also distinguished by a range of sensitivity properties. The applications showed how they could be used and that the different measures could provide a consistent picture of the development of poverty despite their different conceptual bases.

The chapter has revealed how economic analysis is able to provide insights into what we are assuming when we employ a particular inequality or poverty measure. It has also revealed how we can think about the process of improving our measures. Inequality and poverty are significant issues and better measurement is a necessary starting point for better policy.

Further reading

The relationship between inequality measures and social welfare was first explored in:

Atkinson, A.B. (1970) “On the measurement of inequality“, *Journal of Economic Theory*, **2**, 244 - 263.

A comprehensive survey of the measurement of inequality is given by:

Sen, A.K. (1997) *On Economic Inequality*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

A textbook treatment is in:

Lambert, P. (1989) *The Distribution and Redistribution of Income: A Mathematical Analysis*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Issues surrounding the definition and implications of the poverty line are treated in:

Atkinson, A.B. (1987) “On the measurement of poverty“, *Econometrica*, **55**, 749 - 764.

Callan, T. and B. Nolan (1991) “Concepts of poverty and the poverty line“, *Journal of Economic Surveys*, **5**, 243 - 261.

The derivation of the Sen measure, and a general discussion of constructing measures from a set of axioms is given by:

Sen, A.K. (1976) “Poverty: an ordinal approach to measurement“, *Econometrica*, **44**, 219 - 231.

The FGT measure was first discussed in:

Foster, J.E., J. Greer and E. Thorbecke (1984) “A class of decomposable poverty measures“, *Econometrica*, **52**, 761 - 767.

An in-depth survey of poverty measure is:

Foster, J.E. (1984) “On economic poverty: a survey of aggregate measures”, *Advances in Econometrics*, **3**, 215 - 251.

Part VI

Taxation

Chapter 15

Commodity Taxation

15.1 Introduction

Commodity taxes are levied on transactions involving the purchase of goods. The necessity for keeping accounts ensures that such transactions are generally public information. This makes them a good target for taxation. The drawback, however, is that their use introduces distortions into the economy. The taxes drive a wedge between the price producers receive and the price consumers pay. This leads to inefficiency and reduces the attainable level of welfare compared to what could be achieved using lump-sum taxes. This is the price that has to be paid for implementable taxation.

The effects of commodity taxes are quite easily understood - the imposition of a tax raises the price of a good. On the consumer side of the market, the standard analysis of income and substitution effects predicts what will happen to demand. For producers, the tax is a cost increase and they respond accordingly. What is more interesting is the choice of the best set of taxes for the government. There are several interesting settings for this question. The simplest version can be described as follows: There is a given level of government revenue to be raised which must be financed solely by taxes upon commodities. How must the taxes be set so as to minimize the cost to society of raising the required revenue? This is the Ramsey problem of efficient taxation, first addressed in the 1920s. The insights its study gives are still at the heart of the understanding of choosing optimal commodity taxes. More general problems introduce equity issues in addition to those of efficiency.

The chapter begins by discussing the deadweight loss that is caused by the introduction of a commodity tax. A diagrammatic analysis of optimal commodity taxation is then presented. This diagram is also used to demonstrate the Diamond-Mirrlees Production Efficiency result. Following this, the Ramsey rule is derived and an interpretation of this is provided. The extension to many consumers is then made and the resolution of the equity/efficiency trade-off is emphasized. This is followed by a review of some numerical calculations of



Figure 15.1: Deadweight Loss

optimal taxes based on empirical data.

15.2 Deadweight Loss

Lump-sum taxation was described as the perfect tax instrument becuase it does not cause any distortions. The absence of disortions is due to the fact that a lump-sum tax is defined by the condition that no change in behaviour can affect the level of the tax. Commodity taxation does not satisfy this definition. It is always possible to change a consumption plan if commodity taxation is introduced. Demand can shift from goods subject to high taxes to goods with low taxes and total consumption reduced by earning less or saving more. It is these changes at the margin, which we call *substitution effects*, that are the tax-induced distortions.

The introduction of a commodity tax causes raises tax revenue but causes consumer welfare to be reduced. The *deadweight loss* of the tax is the extent to which the reduction in welfare exceeds the revenue raised. This concept is illustrated in Figure 15.1.

Before the tax is introduced, the price of the good is p and the quantity consumed is X^0. At this price the level of consumer surplus is given by the triangle *abc*. A specific tax of amount t is then levied on the good, so the price rises to $q = p + t$ and quantity consumed falls to X^1. This fall in consumption reduces consumer surplus to aef. The tax raises revenue equal to tX^1 which is given by the area $cdef$. The part of the original consumer surplus that is not turned into tax revenue is the deadweight loss, DWL, given by the triangle *bde*.

It is possible to provide a simple expression that approximates the deadweight loss. The triangle ebd is equal to $\frac{1}{2}tdX$, where dX is the change in demand $X^0 - X^1$. This formula could be used directly but it is unusual to have knowledge of the level of demand before and after the tax is imposed. Noting this, it is possible to provide an alternative form for the formula. This can be done by noting that the elasticity of demand is defined by $\varepsilon^d = \frac{p}{X}\frac{dX}{dp}$, so it implies that $dX = \varepsilon^d \frac{X^0}{p} dp$ (where the elasticity is given in absolute value).Substituting this into deadweight loss gives

$$DWL = \frac{1}{2}\varepsilon^d \frac{X^0}{p} t^2, \tag{15.1}$$

since the change in price $dp = t$. The measure in (15.1) is approximate because it assumes that the elasticity is constant over the full change in price from p to $q = p + t$.

The formula for deadweight loss reveals to important observations. Firstly, deadweight loss is proportion to the square of the tax rate. The deadweight loss will therefore rise rapidly as the tax rate is increased. Secondly, the deadweight loss is proportional to the elasticity of demand. For a given tax change, the deadweight loss will be larger the more elastic is demand for the commodity.

An alternative perspective on commodity taxation is provided in Figure 15.2. Point a is the initial position in the absence of taxation. Now consider the contrast between a lump-sum tax and a commodity tax on good 1 when the two tax instruments raise the same level of revenue. In the figure the lump-sum tax is represented by the move from point a to point b. The budget constraint shifts inwards but its gradient does not change. Utility falls from U_0 to U_1. A commodity tax on good 1 increases the price of good 1 relative to the price of good 2 and causes the budget constraint to become steeper. At point c the commodity raises the same level of revenue as the lump-sum tax. This is because the value of consumption at c is the same as that at b, so the same amount must have been taken off the consumer by the government in both cases. The commodity tax causes utility to fall to U_2, which is less than U_1. The difference between $U_1 - U_2$ is the deadweight loss measured directly in utility terms.

Figure 15.2 illustrates two further points to which it is worth drawing attention. Notice that commodity taxation produces the same utility level as a lump-sum tax that would move the consumer to point d. This is clearly a larger lump-sum tax than that which achieved point a. The difference in the size of the two lump-sum taxes provides a monetary measure of the deadweight loss. The effect of the commodity tax can now be broken-down into two separate components. First, there is the move from the original point a to point d. In line with the standard terminology of consumer theory, this is called an *income effect*. Second, there is a *substitution effect* due to the increase in the price of good 1 relative to good 2 represented by a move around an indifference curve. This shifts the consumer's choice from point d to point c.

This argument can extended to show that it is the substitution effect that is responsible for the deadweight loss. To do this, note that if the consumer's



Figure 15.2: Income and Substitution Effects

indifference curves are all L-shaped, so the two commodities are prefect complements, then is no substitution effect in demand - a relative price change with utility held constant just pivots the budget constraint around the corner of the indifference curve. As shown in Figure 15.3 the lump-sum tax and the commodity tax result in exactly the same outcome so the deadweight loss of the commodity tax is zero. The initial position without taxation is at a and both tax instruments lead to the final equilibrium at b. Hence, the deadweight loss is caused by substitution between commodities.

15.3 Optimal Taxation

The purpose of the analysis is to find the set of taxes which give the highest level of welfare whilst raising the revenue required by the government. The set of taxes that do this are termed optimal. In determining these taxes, consumers must be left free to choose their most preferred consumption plans at the resulting prices and firms to continue to maximize profits. The taxes must also lead to prices which equate supply to demand. This section will consider this problem for the case of a single consumer. This restriction ensures that only efficiency considerations arise. The more complex problem involving equity, as well as efficiency, will be addressed in Section 15.6.

To introduce a number of important aspects of commodity taxation in a simple way it is best to begin with a diagrammatic approach. Amongst the features that this makes clear are the second-best nature of commodity taxes relative to lump-sum taxes. In other words, their use leads to a lower level of welfare compared to the optimal set of lump-sum taxes. Despite this, the



Figure 15.3: Absence of Deadweight Loss

observability of transactions makes commodity taxes feasible whereas optimal lump-sum taxes are generally not for the reasons explored in Chapter 13.

Consider a two-good economy with a single consumer and a single firm (the Robinson Crusoe economy of Chapter 6). One of the goods, labor is used as an input (so it is supplied by the consumer to the firm) and the output is sold by the firm to the consumer. In Figure **??** the horizontal axis measures labor use and the vertical axis output. The shaded area is the firm's production set, which in this case is also the production set for the economy. This is displaced from the origin by the distance R which equals the tax revenue requirement of the government. The interpretation is that the government takes out of the economy R units of labor for its own purposes. After the revenue requirement has been met, the economy then has constant returns to scale in turning labor into output. The commodity taxes have to be chosen to attain this level of revenue.

Normalizing the wage rate to 1, the only output price for the firm that leads to zero profit is shown by p. This is the only level of profit consistent with the assumption of competitive behavior and p must be the equilibrium price for the firm. Given this price, the firm is indifferent to where it produces on the frontier of its production set.

Figure 15.5 shows the budget constraint and the preferences of the consumer. With the wage rate of 1, the budget constraint for the consumer is constructed by setting the consumer's price for the output to q. The difference between q and p is the tax upon the consumption good. It should be noticed that labor is not taxed. As will become clear, this is not a restriction on the set of possible taxes. With these prices, the consumer's budget constraint can be written



Figure 15.4: Revenue and Production Possibilities

$$qx = \ell, \tag{15.2}$$

where x denotes units of the output and ℓ units of labor. The important properties of this budget constraint are that it is upward sloping and must pass through the origin. The preferences of the consumer are represented by indifference curves. The form of these follows from noting that the supply of labor causes the consumer disutility so that an increase in labor supply must be compensated for by further consumption of output in order to keep utility constant. The indifference curves are therefore downward sloping. Given these preferences, the optimal choice is found by the tangency of the budget constraint and the highest attainable indifference curve. Varying the price, q, faced by the consumer gives a series of budget constraints whose slopes increase as q falls. Forming the locus of optimal choices determined by these budget constraints traces out the consumer's offer curve. Each point on this offer curve can be associated with a budget constraint that runs through the origin and an indifference curve tangential to that budget constraint. The interpretation given to the offer curve is that the points on the curve are the only ones consistent with utility maximization by the consumer in the absence of lump-sum taxation. It should also be noted that the consumer's utility rises as the move is made up the offer curve.

Figures 15.4 and 15.5 can be superimposed to represent the production and



Figure 15.5: Consumer Choice

consumption decisions simultaneously. This is done in Figure 15.6 which can be used to see the optimal tax rate on the consumption good. The only points that are consistent with choice by the consumer are those on the offer curve. The maximal level of utility achievable on the offer curve is at the point where it intersects the production frontier. Any higher than this and the choice is not feasible. This optimum is denoted by point e and here the consumer is on indifference curve I_0. At this optimum the difference between the consumer price and the producer price for the output, $t^* = q - p$, is the optimal tax rate. That is, it is the tax which ensures the consumer chooses point e. By construction, this tax rate must also ensure that the government raises its required revenue so $t^* x^* = R$, where x^* is the level of consumption at point e.

This discussion has shown how the optimal commodity tax is determined at the highest point of the offer curve in the production set. This is the solution to the problem of finding the optimal commodity taxes for this economy. The diagram also shows why labor can remained untaxed without affecting the outcome. The choices of the consumer and the firm are determined by the ratio of prices they face or the direction of the price vector. By changing the length (but not direction) of either p or q can introduce a tax on labor but does not alter the fact that e is the optimum. This reasoning can be expressed by saying that the zero tax on labor is a normalization, not a real restriction on the system

Figure 15.6 also illustrates the second-best nature of commodity taxation



Figure 15.6: Optimal Commodity Taxation

relative to lump-sum taxation. It can be seen that there are points above the indifference curve I_0 (the best achievable by commodity taxation) which are preferred to e and which are also productively feasible. The highest attainable indifference curve for the consumer given the production set is I_1 and utility is maximized at e^*. This point would be chosen by the consumer if they faced a budget constraint which was coincident with the production frontier. A budget constraint of this form would cross the horizontal axis to the left of the origin and would have the form

$$qx = \ell - R, \tag{15.3}$$

where R represents a lump-sum tax equal to the revenue requirement. This lump-sum tax would decentralize the first-best outcome at e^*. Commodity taxation can only achieve the second-best at e.

15.4 Production Efficiency

The diagrammatic illustration of optimal taxation in the one-consumer economy also shows another important result. This result, known as the Diamond-Mirrlees production efficiency lemma, states the production must be efficient when the optimal taxes are employed. In other words, the optimum with commodity taxation must be on the boundary of the production set. This provides a demonstration of the efficiency lemma and discusses its implications.

Production efficiency occurs when an economy is maximizing the output attainable from its given set of resources. This can only happen when the economy is on the boundary of its production possibility set. Starting at a boundary point, no reallocation of inputs amongst firms can increase the output of one good without reducing that of another (compare this with the Pareto efficiency criteria of Chapter 7). In the special case in which each firm employs some of all of the available inputs, a necessary condition for production efficiency is that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between any two inputs is the same for all firms. Such a position of equality is attained, in the absence of taxation, by the profit maximization of firms in competitive markets. Each firm sets the marginal rate of substitution equal to the ratio of factor prices and, since factor prices are the same for all firms, this induces the necessary equality in the MRSs. The same is true when there is taxation provided all firms face the same post-tax prices for inputs, that is, inputs taxes are not differentiated between firms.

To see that the optimum with commodity taxation must be on the frontier of the production set, consider interior points f and g. If the equilibrium were at f, the consumer's utility could be raised by reducing the use of the input whilst keeping output constant. Since this is feasible, f cannot be an optimum. From g, output could be increased without employing more labor so that g cannot be an optimum. Since this reasoning can be applied to any point that is interior to the production set, the optimum must be on the boundary.



Figure 15.7: Production Efficiency

Although Figure 15.7 was motivated by considering the input to be labor, a slight re-interpretation can introduce intermediate goods. Assume that there is an industry that uses one unit of labor to produce one unit of an intermediate good and that the intermediate good is then used to produce final output. Figure 15.7 then depicts the intermediate good (the input) being used to produce the output. Although the household actually has preferences over labor and final output and acts only on the markets for these goods, the direct link between units of labor and of intermediate good allows preferences and the budget constraint to be depicted as if they were defined directly on those variables. The production efficiency argument then follows directly as before and now implies that intermediate goods should not be taxed since this would violate the equalization of MRSs between firms.

The logic of the single-consumer economy can be adapted to show that the efficiency lemma still holds when there are many consumers. What makes the result so obvious in the single-consumer case is that a reduction in labor use or an increase in output raises the consumer's utility. With many consumers, such a change would have a similar effect if all consumer's supply labor or prefer to have more, rather than less, of the consumption good. This will be hold if there is some agreement in the tastes of the consumers. If this is so, a direction of movement can be from an interior point in the production set to an exterior point that is unanimously welcomed. The optimum must then be exterior.

In summary, the Diamond-Mirrlees lemma provides a persuasive argument for the non-taxation of intermediate goods and the non-differentiation of input taxes between firms. These are results of immediate practical importance since they provide a basic property that an optimal tax system must possess. As will become clear, it is rather hard to make precise statements about the optimal levels of tax but what the efficiency lemma provides is a clear and simple statement about the structure of taxation.

15.5 Tax Rules

The diagrammatic analysis has shown the general principle behind the determination of the optimal taxes. What is has not shown is how the tax burden should be allocated across different commodities. The optimal tax problem is to set the taxes upon the commodities to maximise social welfare subject to raising a required level of revenue. This section looks at tax rules that characterize the solution to this problem.

To derive the rules it is first necessary to precisely specify a model of the economy. Let there be n goods, each of which is produced with constant returns to scale by competitive firms. Since the firms are competitive, the price they sell at must be equal to the marginal cost of production. Under the assumption of constant returns, this marginal cost is also independent of the scale of production. Labor is assumed to be the only input into production.

With the wage rate as numeraire, these assumptions imply that the producer (or pre-tax) price of good i is determined by

$$p_i = c_i, i = 1, ..., n, \tag{15.4}$$

where c_i denotes the number of units of labor required to produce good i. The consumer (or post-tax) prices are equal to the pre-tax prices plus the taxes. For good i the consumer price q_i is

$$q_i = p_i + t_i, i = 1, ..., n. \tag{15.5}$$

Writing x_i for the consumption level of good i, the tax rates on the n consumption goods must be chosen to raise the required revenue. Denoting the revenue requirement by R, the revenue constraint can be written

$$R = \sum_{i=1}^{n} t_i x_i. \tag{15.6}$$

In line with this numbering convention, labor is denoted as good 0, so x_0 is the supply of labor.

This completes the description of the economy. The simplifying feature is that the assumption of constant returns to scale fixes the producer prices via (15.4) so that equilibrium prices are independent of the level of demand. Furthermore, constant returns also implies that whatever demand is forthcoming at these prices will be met by the firms. If the budget constraints (both government and consumer), any demand must be backed by sufficient labor supply to carry out the necessary production.

15.5.1 The Inverse Elasticity Rule

The first tax rule considers a simplified situation that delivers a very precise solution. This solution, the *inverse elasticity rule*, provides a foundation for proceeding to the more general case. The simplifying assumption is that the goods are independent in demand so that there are no cross-price effects between the taxed goods. This independence of demands is a strong assumption so that it is not surprising that a clear result can be derived. The way the analysis is set is to choose the optimal allocation and infer the tax rates from this. This is the argument used in the diagram to locate the intersection of the offer curve and the frontier of the production set and then work back to the tax rates.

Consider a consumer who buys the two taxed goods and supplies labor. Their preferences are $U(x_0, x_1, x_2)$ and the budget constraint is $q_1x_1 + q_2x_2 = x_0$. The process of utility maximization gives the first-order condtions $U_i = \alpha q_i$, where U_i is the marginal utility of good i and α is the marginal utility of income, and $U_0 = -\alpha$.

The government revenue constraint is $R = t_1x_1 + t_2x_2$ but since $t_i = q_i - p_i$, this can be written as

$$q_1x_1 + q_2x_2 = R + p_1x_1 + p_2x_2. \tag{15.7}$$

Using this the optimal tax rates are found from the Lagrangean

$$\max_{\{x_1,x_2\}} L = U(x_0, x_1, x_2) + \lambda [q_1x_1 + q_2x_2 - R - p_1x_1 - p_2x_2] \tag{15.8}$$

The basic assumption that demands are independent can be used to write $q_i = q_i(x_i)$. Using this and the consumer's budget constraint to replace ℓ, the first-order condition for the quantity of good i is

$$U_i + U_0 \left[q_i + x_i \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial x_i} \right] + \lambda \left[q_i + x_i \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial x_i} - p_i \right] = 0. \tag{15.9}$$

The conditions $U_i = \alpha q_i$ and $U_0 = -\alpha$ can be used to write this as

$$-\alpha x_i \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial x_i} + \lambda q_i + \lambda x_i \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial x_i} - \lambda p_i = 0. \tag{15.10}$$

Now note that $\frac{x_i}{q_i}\frac{\partial q_i}{\partial x_i} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_i^d}$, where ε_i^d is the elasticity of demand for good i. The first-order condition can then be solved to write

$$\frac{t_i}{p_i + t_i} = \left[\frac{\alpha - \lambda}{\lambda} \right] \frac{1}{\varepsilon_i^d}. \tag{15.11}$$

Equation (15.11) is the inverse elasticity rule. To interpret it must be noted that α is the marginal utility of another unit of income for the consumer and λ is the utility cost of another unit of government revenue. Since taxes are distortionary, $\lambda > \alpha$. Therefore $\alpha - \lambda$ is negative. Since ε_i^d is negative, this makes the tax rate positive.

This states that the proportional rate of tax on good k should be inversely related to its price elasticity of demand. Furthermore, the constant of proportionality is the same for all goods. Recalling the discussion of the deadweight loss of taxation, it can be seen that this places proportionately more of the tax burden on goods where the deadweight loss is low. Its implication is clearly that necessities, which by definition have low elasticities of demand, should be highly taxed.

Limitations of this is that it rules out any linkages across the demands of different commodities. Also not clear how this can be extended to many consumers to take account of equity effects.

15.5.2 The Ramsey Rule

The diagram has shown some of the features that the optimal set of commodity taxes will have. What the single-good formulation cannot do is give any insight into how that tax burden should be spread across different goods. For example, should all goods have the same rate of tax or should taxes be related to the characteristics of the goods? This section will provide a derivation of a formula that goes a long way to answering this question. This formula is called Ramsey rule and is one of the oldest results in the theory of optimal taxation. It provides a description of the optimal taxes for an economy with a single consumer in which there are no equity considerations.

To derive the Ramsey rule it is necessary to change from choosing the optimal quantities to choosing the taxes. Assume that there are just two consumption goods in order to simplify the notation and let the demand function for good i be $x_i = x_i(q)$ where $q = q_1, q_2$. The fact that the prices of all the commodities enter this demand function shows that the full range of interactions between the demands is allowed. Using these demand functions, the preferences of the consumer can be written

$$U = U(x_0(q), x_1(q), x_2(q)). \tag{15.12}$$

The optimal commodity taxes are those which give the highest level of utility to the consumer while ensuring that the government reaches its revenue target of $R > 0$. The government's problem in choosing the tax rates can then be summarized by the Lagrangean

$$\max_{\{t_1,t_2\}} L = U(x_0(q), x_1(q), x_2(q)) + \lambda\left[\sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i x_i(q) - R\right], \tag{15.13}$$

where it is recalled that $q_i = p_i + t_i$. Differentiating (15.13) with respect to the tax on good k, the first-order necessary condition is

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial t_k} \equiv \sum_{i=0}^{2} U_i \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial q_k} + +\lambda\left[x_k + \sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial q_k}\right] = 0 \tag{15.14}$$

This first-order condition needs some manipulation to place it in the form we want. The first step is to note that the budget constraint of the consumer is

$$q_1 x_1(q) + q_2 x_2(q) = x_0(q). \tag{15.15}$$

Any change in price of good k must result in demands that still satisfy this constraint so

$$q_1 \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial q_k} + q_2 \frac{\partial x_2}{\partial q_k} + x_k = \frac{\partial x_0}{\partial q_k}. \tag{15.16}$$

In addition, the conditions for optimal consumer choice are $U_0 = -\alpha$ and $U_i = \alpha q_i$. Using these optimality conditions and (15.16), the forst-order condition for the optimal tax, (15.14), becomes

$$\alpha x_k = \lambda\left[x_k + \sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial q_k}\right]. \tag{15.17}$$

Notice how this first-order condition involves quantities rather than the prices that appeared in the inverse elasticity rule. After rearrangement (15.17) becomes

$$\sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial q_k} = -\left[\frac{\lambda - \alpha}{\lambda}\right] x_k. \tag{15.18}$$

The next step in the derivation is to employ the Slutsky equation which breaks the change in demand into the income and substition effects. The effect of an increase in the price of good k upon the demand for good i is determined by the Slutsky equation as

$$\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial q_k} = S_{ik} - x_k \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial I}, \tag{15.19}$$

where S_{ik} is the substitution effect of the price change (the move around an indifference curve) and $-x_k \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial I}$ is the income effect of the price change (I denotes lump-sum income). Substituting from (15.19) into (15.18) gives

$$\sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i \left[S_{ik} - x_k \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial I} \right] = - \left[\frac{\lambda - \alpha}{\lambda} \right] x_k \tag{15.20}$$

(15.20) is now simplified by extracting the common factor x_k which yields

$$\sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i S_{ik} = - \left[1 - \frac{\alpha}{\lambda} - \sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial I} \right] x_k. \tag{15.21}$$

The substitution effect of a change in the price of good i on the demand for good k is exactly equal to the substitution effect of a change in the price of good k on the demand for good i because both are determined by movement around the same indifference curve. This symmetry property implies $S_{ki} = S_{ik}$ which can be used to rearrange (15.21) to give the expression

$$\sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i S_{ki} = -\theta x_k, \tag{15.22}$$

where $\theta = \left[1 - \frac{\alpha}{\lambda} - \sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial I} \right]$ is a positive constant. Equation (15.22) is the Ramsey rule describing a system of optimal commodity taxes and an equation of this form must hold for all goods, $k = 1, ..., n$.

The optimal tax rule described by (15.22) can be used in two ways. If the details of the economy are specified (the utility function and production parameters) then the actual tax rates can be calculated. Naturally, the precise values would be a function of the structure chosen. Although this is the direction that heads towards practical application of the theory (and more is said later), it is not the route that will be currently taken. The second use of the rule is to derive some general conclusions about the determinants of tax rates. This is done by analyzing and understanding the individual components of (15.22).

To provide with this, the focus upon the typical good k is maintained. Recall that a substitution term meausres the change in demand with utility held constant. Demand defined in this way is termed *compensated demand.* Now begin in an initial position with no taxes. From this point, the tax t_i is the change in the tax rate on good i. Then $t_i S_{ki}$ is a first-order approximation to the change in compensated demand for good k due to the introduction of the tax t_i. If the taxes are small, this will be a good approximation to the actual change. Extending this argument to take account of the full set of taxes, it follows that $\sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i S_{ki}$ is an approximation to the total change in compensated demand for good k due to the introduction of the tax system from the initial no-tax position. Employing this approximation, the Ramsey rule can be interpreted as saying that the optimal tax system should be such that the compensated demand for each good is reduced in the same proportion relative to the pre-tax position. This is the standard interpretation of the Ramsey rule.

The importance of this observation is reinforced when it is set against the alternative, but incorrect, argument that the optimal tax system should raise the prices of all goods by the same proportion in order to minimize the distortion caused by the tax system. This is shown be the Ramsey rule to be false. What the Ramsey rule says is that it is the distortion in terms of quantities, rather than prices, that should be minimized. Since it is the level of consumption that actually determines utility, it is not surprising that what happens to prices is secondary to what happens to quantities. Prices only matter so far as they determine demands.

Although the actual tax rates are only implicit in the Ramsey rule, some general comments can still be made. Employing the approximation interpretation, the rule suggests that as the proportional reduction in compensated demand must be the same for all goods, those goods whose demand is unresponsive to price changes must bear higher taxes in order to achieve this. Although broadly correct, this statement can only be completely justified when all cross-price effects are accounted for. One simple case that overcomes this difficulty is that in which there are no cross-price effects between the taxed goods. This special case, which leads to the inverse elasticity rule, will be considered in the next section.

Returning to the general case, goods that are unresponsive to price changes are typically necessities such as food and housing. Consequently, the implementation of a tax system based on the Ramsey rule would lead to a tax system that would bear most heavily on these necessities. In contrast, the lowest tax rates would fall on luxuries. If put into practice, such a tax structure would involve low income consumers paying disproportionately larger fractions of their incomes in taxes relative to rich consumers. The inequitable nature of this is simply a reflection of the single household assumption: the optimization does not involve equity and the solution reflects only efficiency criteria.

The single-household framework is not accurate as a description of reality and leads to an outcome that is unacceptable on equity grounds. The value of the Ramsey rule therefore arises primarily through the framework and method of analysis it introduces. This can easily be generalized to more relevant settings. It shows how taxes are determined by efficiency considerations and hence gives a baseline from which to judge the effects of introducing equity.

15.6 Equity Considerations

The lack of equity in the tax structure determined by the Ramsey rule is inevitable given its single-consumer basis. The introduction of further consumers with differences in incomes makes it possible to see how equity can affect the conclusions. Although the method that is now discussed can cope with any number of consumers, it is sufficient to consider just two. Restricting the number in this way has the merit of making the analysis especially transparent.

Consider, then, an economy which consists of two consumers. Each consumer h, $h = 1, 2$, is described by their utility function

$$U^h = U^h \left(x_0^h (q), x_1^h (q), x_2^h (q) \right). \tag{15.23}$$

These utility functions may vary amongst the households. Labor remains the untaxed numeraire and all households supply only the single form of labor service.

The government revenue constraint is now given by

$$R = \sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i x_i^1 (q) + \sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i x_i^2 (q). \tag{15.24}$$

The government's policy is guided by a social welfare function which aggregates the individual consumers' utilities. This social welfare function is denoted by

$$W = W \left(U^1 \left(x_0^1, x_1^1, x_2^1 \right), U^2 \left(x_0^2, x_1^2, x_2^2 \right) \right). \tag{15.25}$$

Combining (15.24) and (15.25) into a Lagrangean expression (as in (15.13)), the first-order condition for the choice of the tax on good k is

$$-\frac{\partial W}{\partial U^1} \alpha^1 x_k^1 - \frac{\partial W}{\partial U^2} \alpha^2 x_k^2 + \lambda \left[\sum_{h=1}^{2} \left[x_k^h + \sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i \frac{\partial x_i^h}{\partial q_k} \right] \right] = 0. \tag{15.26}$$

To obtain a result that is easily comparable to the Ramsey rule, define

$$\beta^h = \frac{\partial W}{\partial V^h} \alpha^h. \tag{15.27}$$

β^h is formed as the product of the effect of an increase in consumer h's utility on social welfare and their marginal utility of income. It measures the increase in social welfare that results from a marginal increase in the income of consumer h. Consequently, β^h is termed the *social marginal utility of income* for consumer h. Employing the definition of β^h and the substitutions used to obtain the Ramsey rule, the first-order condition (15.26) becomes

$$\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i S_{ki}^1 + \sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i S_{ki}^1}{x_k^1 + x_k^2} = \frac{1}{\lambda} \frac{\beta^1 x_k^1 + \beta^2 x_k^2}{x_k^1 + x_k^2} - 1 + \frac{\left[\sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i \frac{\partial x_i^1}{\partial I^1} \right] x_k^1 + \left[\sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i \frac{\partial x_i^2}{\partial I^2} \right] x_k^2}{x_k^1 + x_k^2}. \tag{15.28}$$

The tax structure that is described by (15.28) can be interpreted in the same way as the Ramsey rule. The left-hand side is approximately the proportional change in aggregate compensated demand for good k caused by the introduction of the tax system from an initial position with no taxes. When a positive amount of revenue is to be raised (so $R > 0$), the level of demand will be reduced by the tax system so this term will be negative.

The first point to observe about the right-hand side is that, unlike the Ramsey rule, the proportional reduction in demand is not the same for all goods. It then becomes possible to discuss the factors that influence the extent of the reduction and it is through doing this that the consequences of equity can be seen. The essential component in this regard is the first term on the right-hand side. The proportional reduction in demand for good k will be smaller the larger is the value of $\beta^1 \frac{x_k^1}{x_k^1+x_k^2} + \beta^2 \frac{x_k^2}{x_k^1+x_k^2}$. The value of this will be large if a high β^h is correlated with a high $\frac{x_k^h}{x_k^1+x_k^2}$. The meaning of this is clear when it is recalled that a consumer will have a high value of β^h when their personal marginal utility of income, α^h, is large and when that $\frac{\partial W}{\partial V^h}$ is also large so the social planner gives them a high weight in social welfare. If the social welfare function is concave, both of these will be satisfied by low utility consumers with low incomes. The term $\frac{x_k^h}{x_k^1+x_k^2}$ will be large when good k is consumed primarily by consumer h. Putting these points together, the proportional reduction in demand for a good will be reduced if it is consumed primarily by the poor household. This is the natural reflection of equity considerations.

The second term on the right-hand side shows that the proportional reduction in demand for good k will be smaller if its demand comes mainly from the consumer whose tax payments change most as income changes. This term is related to the efficiency aspects of the tax system. If taxation were to be concentrated on goods consumed by those whose tax payments fell rapidly with reductions in income, then increased taxation, and consequently greater distortion, would be required to meet the revenue target.

This has shown how the introduction of equity modifies the conclusions of the Ramsey rule. Rather then all goods having their compensated demand reduced in the same proportion, equity results in the goods consumed primarily by the poor facing less of a reduction. In simple terms, this should translate into lower rates of tax on the goods consumed by the poor relative to those determined solely by efficiency. Equity therefore succeeds in moderating the hard-edge of the efficient tax structure.

15.7 Applications

At this point in the discussion it should be recalled that fundamental motive for the analysis is to provide practical policy recommendations. The results that have been derived do give some valuable insights: the need for production efficiency and the non-uniformity of taxes being foremost amongst them. Accepting this, the analysis is only of real values if the tax rules are capable of being applied to data and the actual values of the resulting optimal taxes calculated. The numerical studies that have been undertaken represent the development of a technology for achieving this aim and also provide further insights into the structure of taxation.

Referring back to (15.28) it can be seen that two basic pieces of information are needed in order to calculate the tax rates. The first is knowledge of the demand functions of the consumers. This provides the levels of demand x_k^h and the demand derivatives $\frac{\partial x_k^h}{\partial q_i}$. The second piece of information are the social marginal utilities of income, β^h. Ideally, these should be calculated from a specified social welfare function and individual utility functions for the consumers. The problem with this is the same as that raised in previous chapters: the construction of some meaningful utility concept. The difficulties are further compounded in the present case by the requirement that the demand functions also be consistent with the utility functions.

In practice, the difficulties are circumvented rather than solved. The approach that has been adopted is to first ignore the link between demand and utility and then impose a procedure to obtain the social welfare weights. The demand functions are then estimated using standard econometric techniques. One common procedure to find the social welfare weights is to employ the utility function defined by (14.24) to measure the social utility of income to each consumer. That is, $U^h = K\frac{M^{h\,1-\epsilon}}{1-\epsilon}$. The social marginal utility is then given by

$$\beta^h = KM^{h\,-\epsilon}. \tag{15.29}$$

The value of the parameter K can then be fixed by, for instance, setting the value of β^h equal to 1 for the lowest income consumer. With $\epsilon > 0$ the social marginal utility declines as income rises. It decreases faster as ϵ rises so relatively more weight is given to low income consumers. In this way, the value of ϵ can be treated as a measure of the concern for equity.

15.7.1 Reform

The first application of the analysis is to consider marginal reforms of tax rates. By a marginal reform is meant a small change from the existing set of tax rates that moves the system closer to optimality. This should be distinguished from an optimization of tax rates which might imply a very significant change from the initial set of taxes.

Marginal reforms are much easier to compute than optimal taxes since it is only necessary to evaluate effect of changes not of the whole move. An analogy can be drawn with hill-climbing: to climb higher you only need to know which direction leads upwards and do not need to know where the top is. Essentially, studying marginal reforms reduces the informational requirement.

Return to the analysis of the optimal taxes in the economy with two consumers. Then the effect upon welfare of a marginal increase in the tax on good

k is

$$\frac{\partial W}{\partial t_k} = -\sum_{i=1}^{2} \beta^i x_k^i, \tag{15.30}$$

and the effect on revenue is

$$\frac{\partial R}{\partial t_k} = \sum_{h=1}^{2} \left[x_k^h + \sum_{i=1}^{2} t_k \frac{\partial x_i^h}{\partial q_k} \right] = X_k + \sum_{i=1}^{2} t_i \frac{\partial X_i}{\partial q_k}, \tag{15.31}$$

where X_i is the aggregate demand for good i. The marginal revenue benefit of taxation of good k is defined as the extra revenue generated relative to the welfare change of a marginal increase in a tax. This can be written as

$$MRB_k = -\frac{\frac{\partial R}{\partial t_k}}{\frac{\partial W}{\partial t_k}}. \tag{15.32}$$

At the optimum all goods should have the same marginal revenue benefit. If that was not the case, taxes could be raised on those with a high marginal revenue benefit and reduced for those with a low value. This is exactly the process we can use to deduce the direction of reform.

Looking at the marginal revenue benefit the economy of information can be clearly seen. All that is needed to evaluate it are the social marginal utilities, β^h, the individual commodity demands, x_k^h, and the aggregate derivatives of demand $\frac{\partial X_i}{\partial q_k}$ (or, equally, the aggregate demand elasticities). The demands and the elasticites are easily obtainable from data sets on consumer demands.

Table 15.2 displays the result of an application to Irish data for ten commodity categories in 1987. Two different values of ϵ are given, with $\epsilon = 5$ representing a greater concern for equity. The interpretation of these figures is that the tax leived on the goods towards the top of the table should be raised and the tax should be lowered on the goods at the bottom. Hence, services should be more highly tax and the tax on tobacco should be reduced. The rankings are fairly consistent for both values of ϵ, there is some movement but no good moves very far. Therefore, a reform based on this data would be fairly robust to changes in the concern for equity.

Good	$\epsilon = 2$	$\epsilon = 5$
Other goods	2.316	4.349
Services	2.258	5.064
Petrol	1.785	3.763
Food	1.633	3.291
Alcohol	1.566	3.153
Transport and equipment	1.509	3.291
Fuel and power	1.379	2.221
Clothing and footwear	1.341	2.837
Durables	1.234	2.514
Tobacco	0.420	0.683

Table 15.2
Source: Madden (1995)

15.7.2 Optimality

The most developed set of results derived in this way have been constructed using data from the Indian National Sample Survey. Defining θ to be the wage as a proportion of expenditure, a selection of these results are given in Table 15.2 for $\epsilon = 2$. The table shows that these tax rates achieve a degree of redistribution since cereals and milk products, both basic foodstuffs, are both subsidized. Such redistribution results from the concern for equity embodied in a value of ϵ of 2. Interesting as they are, these results are limited, as are other similar analyses, by the degree of commodity aggregation that leads to the excessively general other non-food category.

Item	$\theta = 0.05$	$\theta = 0.1$
Cereals	-0.015	-0.089
Milk and milk products	-0.042	-0.011
Edible oils	0.359	0.342
Meat, fish and eggs	0.071	0.083
Sugar and tea	0.013	0.003
Other food	0.226	0.231
Clothing	0.038	0.014
Fuel and light	0.038	0.014
Other non-food	0.083	0.126

Table 15.2: Optimal Tax Rates

This framework has also been used to analyze the redistributive impact of Indian commodity taxes. This can be done by calculating the total payment of commodity tax, T^h, by consumer h relative to the expenditure, μ^h, of that consumer. The net gain from the tax system for h is then be defined by

$$-\frac{T^h}{\mu^h}. \tag{15.33}$$

The consumer gains from the tax system if $-\frac{T^h}{\mu^h}$ is positive since this implies that a net subsidy is being received. Contrasting the gains of consumer h from the existing tax system with those of the optimal system then provides an indication of both the success of the existing system and the potential gains from the optimal system. The calculations for the existing Indian tax system give the gains shown in Table 15.3.

	Rrual	Urban
Expenditure level	$-\frac{T^h}{\mu^h}$	$-\frac{T^h}{\mu^h}$
Rs. 20	0.105	0.220
Rs. 50	0.004	0.037

Table 15.3: Redistribution of Indian commodity taxes

The expenditure levels of Rs. 20 and Rs. 50 place consumers with these incomes in the lower 30% of the income distribution. The table shows a net gain to consumers at both income levels from the tax system, with the lower expenditure consumer making a proportionately greater gain.

Using the same calculations, the redistributive impact of the optimal tax system for a consumer with expenditure level $\mu = 0.5\overline{\mu}$, where $\overline{\mu}$ is mean expenditure, is given in Table 15.4.

	$\nu = 0.1$	$\nu = 1.5$	$\nu = 5$
$-\frac{T}{\mu}$	0.07	0.343	0.447

Table 15.4: Optimal redistribution

For $\epsilon = 1$ or more, it can be seen that the potential gains from the tax system, relative to the outcome that would occur in the absence of taxation, are substantial. This shows that with sufficient weight given to equity considerations the optimal set of commodity taxes can effect significant redistribution and that the existing Indian tax system does not attain these gains.

This section has discussed a method for calculating the taxes implied by the optimal formula. The only difficulty in doing this is the specification of the social welfare weights. To determine these it is necessary to know both the private utility functions and the social welfare functions. In the absence of this information, a method for deriving the weights is employed that can embody equity criteria in a flexible way. Although these weights are easily calculated, they are not entirely consistent with the other components of the model. The numbers derived demonstrate clearly that when equity is embodied in the optimization, commodity taxes can secure a significant degree of redistribution. This is very much in contrast to what occurs with efficiency alone.

15.8 Efficient Taxation

The above tax rules have only considered the competitive case. When there is imperfect competition additional issues have to be taken into account. The basic fact is that imperfectly competitive firms produce less than the efficient output level. This gives a basic reason to subsidise their output relative to that of competitive firms. However, the details of the argument have to rely on the extent of taxshifting as identified in Chapter 11. The analysis will first focus on tax reform in a two-good and labor economy in order to highlight the importance of the tax incidence results. This will then be extended to a construction of optimal tax rules in the general equilibrium economy detailed at the start of this chapter.

The analysis of the taxation with imperfect competition is an interesting question because the equilibrium without intervention is not Pareto efficient. The commodity taxes can be used to offset this inefficiency and raise the level of welfare. To capture these observations, it is assumed that the commodity taxes raise no net revenue so that their effect is felt entirely through the changes they cause in relative prices.

The analysis of tax design can be understood by considering the following simple economy in which the tax analysis consists of characterizing the welfare-improving tax reform starting from an initial position with no commodity taxation. The economy has a single consumer and a zero revenue requirement so the taxes are used merely to correct for the distortion introduced by the imperfect competition. There are two consumption goods, each produced using labor alone. Good 1 is produced with constant returns to scale by a competitive industry with post-tax price $q_1 = p_1 + t_1$. It follows from these assumptions that $\frac{\partial q_1}{\partial t_1} = 1$.

It is assumed that there is a single household in the economy whose preferences can be represented by an indirect utility function

$$U = U\left(x_0\left(q_1, q_2\right), x_1\left(q_1, q_2\right), x_2\left(q_1, q_2\right)\right), \tag{15.34}$$

where w is the wage rate. Profits are assumed to be taxed at a rate of 100% and the revenue used to purchase labor. This assumption closes the model and avoids the need to worry about profit affecting the demand for consumption goods.

Now take from the tax incidence analysis of Chapter 11 the direct and induced effects of taxation. They are then denoted

$$\frac{\partial q_2}{\partial t_1} \equiv h_1, \tag{15.35}$$

and

$$\frac{\partial q_2}{\partial t_2} \equiv h_2. \tag{15.36}$$

The expression of these effects at a general level has the advantage that it is unnecessary to specify the particular model of imperfect competition in order to derive results. A specific formulation is only needed when the results require evaluation.

The tax reform problem now involves finding a pair of tax changes dt_1, dt_2 that raise welfare whilst collecting zero revenue. If the initial position is taken to be one where both commodity taxes are zero initially, so $t_1 = t_2 = 0$, the problem can be phrased succinctly as finding , from an initial position with such that $dU > 0$, $dR = 0$, where tax revenue, R, is defined by

$$R = t_1 x_1 + t_2 x_2. \tag{15.37}$$

This framework ensures that one of the taxes will be negative and the other positive. The aim is to provide a simple characterization of the determination of the relative rates. It should be noted that if both industries were competitive the initial equilibrium would be Pareto efficient and the solution to the tax problem would have $dt_1 = dt_2 = 0$. So non-zero tax rates will be a consequence of the distortion caused by the imperfect competition.

From differentiating the utility function and applying first-order condition for consumer choice, it follows that the effect of the tax change upon welfare is

$$dU = -\alpha x_1 \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial t_1} dt_1 - \alpha x_2 \frac{\partial q_2}{\partial t_1} dt_1 - \alpha x_2 \frac{\partial q_2}{\partial t_2} dt_2. \tag{15.38}$$

Using the definition of the tax incidence terms h_1 and h_2

$$dU = -\left[\alpha x_1 + \alpha x_2 h_1\right] dt_1 - \alpha x_2 h_2 dt_2 \qquad (15.39)$$

From the revenue constraint

$$dR = 0 = x_1 dt_1 + x_2 dt_2, \qquad (15.40)$$

where the fact that $t_1 = t_2 = 0$ initially has been used. Solving (15.40) for dt_1 gives

$$dt_1 = -\frac{x_2}{x_1} dt_2. \qquad (15.41)$$

Substituting (15.41) into the welfare expression determines the welfare change as dependent upon dt_2 alone

$$dU = \left[-\alpha x_2 h_2 + \alpha x_2 + \alpha \frac{x_2^2}{x_1} h_1\right] dt_2. \qquad (15.42)$$

It is condition (15.42) that provides the key to understanding the determination of the relative tax rates. Since we wish to choose the tax change dt_2 to ensure that $dU > 0$, it follows that the sign of the tax change must be the same as that of $\left[-\alpha x_2 h_2 + \alpha x_2 + \alpha \frac{x_2^2}{x_1} h_1\right]$. From this observation follows the conclusion that

$$\begin{aligned} x_1 \left[1 - h_2\right] + x_2 h_1 &> 0 \Rightarrow dt_2 > 0, & (15.43) \\ x_1 \left[1 - h_2\right] + x_2 h_1 &< 0 \Rightarrow dt_2 < 0. & (15.44) \end{aligned}$$

The discussion will focus on the second of these two conditions. From (15.44), the output of the imperfectly competitive industry should be subsidized and the competitive industry taxed when h_2 is large, so that overshifting is occurring, and h_1 is negative. These are, of course, sufficient conditions. In general, the greater the degree of tax shifting the more likely is subsidization. The explanation for this result is that if firms overshift taxes, they will also do the same for any subsidy. Hence a negative dt_2 will be reflected by an even greater reduction in price. If h_1 is also negative, the tax on the competitive industry secures a further reduction in the price of good 2.

The conclusion of this analysis is that the rate of tax shifting is important in the determination of relative rates of taxation. Although the economy is simplified by abstracting away from profit effects, it does demonstrate that with imperfect competition commodity taxation can be motivated on efficiency grounds alone.

15.9 Public Sector Pricing

The theory that has been developed in the previous sections also has a second application. This arises because there are close connections between the theory of commodity taxation and that of choosing optimal public sector prices. Firms operated by the public sector can be set the objective of choosing their pricing policy to maximize social welfare subject to some revenue target. If the firms have increasing returns to scale, which is often the reason they are operated by the public sector, then marginal cost pricing will lead to a deficit. The government will then want to find the optimal deviation from marginal cost pricing that ensures break-even.

For both commodity taxation and public sector pricing, the government is choosing the set of consumer prices that maximize welfare subject to a revenue constraint. Under the commodity taxation interpretation these prices are achieved by setting the level of tax to be included in each consumer price whereas with public sector pricing the prices are chosen directly. However the choice of tax rate is equivalent to the choice of consumer price.

In the context of public sector pricing, the optimal prices are generally known as Ramsey prices. The constraint on the optimization with commodity taxation requires the raising of a specified level of revenue. With public sector pricing this can be reinterpreted as the need to raise a given level of revenue in excess of marginal cost. The tax rates of the commodity taxation problem then translate into the mark-up over marginal cost in the public sector pricing interpretation. The rules for optimal taxation derived above then characterize the public sector prices.

15.10 Conclusions

This chapter has reviewed the determination of optimal commodity taxes. It has been shown how an efficient system places the burden of taxation primarily upon necessities. If implemented such a system would be very damaging to low income consumers. When equity is introduced this outcome is modified to reduce the extent to which goods consumed primarily by those with low income are affected by the tax system. These interpretations were borne out by the numerical calculations.

As well as providing these insights into the structure of taxes, it has also been shown that the optimal tax system should ensure production efficiency. The implication of this finding is that there should be no taxes upon intermediate goods. This is a very strong and clear prediction. It is also a property that actual tax systems adhere to.

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Chapter 16

Income Taxation

16.1 Introduction

As the discussion of Chapter 2 showed, the taxation of income is a major source of government revenue. This fact, coupled with the taxpayers' direct observation of income tax payments, make the structure of income tax the subject of much political discussion. The arguments that are aired in such debate reflect the two main perspectives upon income taxation. The first views the tax primarily as a disincentive to effort and enterprise. On these grounds, it follows that the rate of tax should be kept as low as possible in order to avoid such discouragement. This is essentially the expression of an efficiency argument. The competing perspective is that income taxation is well-suited for the task of redistributing income. Hence notions of equity require that high earners should pay proportionately more tax on their incomes than low earners. The determination of the optimal structure of income taxation involves the resolution of these contrasting views.

These arguments introduce the two major issues in the analysis of income taxation. The first is the effect of taxation upon the supply of labor. Taxation alters the choices that consumers make by affecting the trade-off between labor and leisure. In this respect, a particularly important question is whether an increase in the rate of tax necessarily reduces the supply of labor. If this is the case, support would be provided for the argument that taxes should be kept low to meet the needs of efficiency. Both theoretical and empirical results on this issue will be discussed. The second issue that has been studied is the determination of the optimal level of income taxation. For reasons which will become clear, this is a complex question since if involves constructing a model with a meaningful trade-off between efficiency and equity. Having said this, it has proved a fruitful avenue of investigation.

The essential idea in the chapter it is a capital mistake to analyze the equity of the tax structure without taking into account its impact on work efforts. To see why, consider the naive solution of setting the marginal tax rate at

100 percent for all incomes above some threshold z° and zero tax rate for all incomes below this threshold. We can expect such tax structure to maximize the redistribution from the rich (above the income threshold) to the poor (below the threshold). However, this conclusion is incorrect when taxpayers respond to the tax structure. The confiscatory tax at the top removes the incentive to earn more than the threshold z° and everyone above this level will choose to earn exactly that amount of income. This sets a vicious circle in motion. The government must lower the threshold, inducing everyone above the new level to lower again their incomes, and so forth until nobody chooses to work and income is zero. Therefore it stands to reason that we must analyze the equity of the tax structure in tandem with its effect on work incentives. The idea is to find the tax schedule that meets some social objective, as captured by the social welfare function (see Chapter 13), given the adjustment in work effort and participation by taxpayers. Such a tax scheme is said to be optimal conditional to a given objective. The results need to be interpreted with caution, however, since they are very sensitive to the distibution of abilities in the population and to the form of the utility function. More importantly, they depend on the form of the equity criterion itself.

In this chapter we will only consider welfaristic equity criterion (like the utilitarian and rawlsian social welfare functions). So inso far as the social objective is entirely based on individual welfare, we are not assessing the tax structure on the basis of its capacity of either redressing inequality, or eliminating poverty. We do not either consider egalitarian social objective like equal sacrifice or equality of opportunities. There is indeed a interesting literature on fair income tax examining the distribution of taxes that imposes the same loss of utility to everyone, either in absolute or relative terms. It is related to the ability to pay principle according to which $1 tax is less painful for a rich than for a poor (due to the decreasing marginal value of income). This equal sacrifice approach predicts that the resulting tax struture must be progressive (in the sense that everyone sacrifices equally if they pay increasing percent of their income in tax as their income rises).

The chapter begins by conducting an analysis of the interaction between income taxation and labor supply. A number of theoretical results are derived and these are related to the empirical evidence. This evidence makes clear how different are the responses of male and female labor supply to taxation. A model that permits the efficiency and equity aspects of taxation to be incorporated into the design of the optimal tax is then described. A series of results describing the optimal tax are then derived using this model and these are interpreted in terms of practical policy recommendations. The chapter is pursued by reviewing calculations of the optimal tax rates that emerge from the model. Finally, the chapter is completed by a discussion of the political economy aspects of income taxation.

16.2 Taxation and Labor Supply

The effect of income taxation upon labor supply can be investigated using the standard model of consumer choice. The analysis will begin with the general question of labor supply and then move on to a series of specific analyses concerning the effect of variations in the tax system. The major insight this gives will be to highlight the importance of competing income and substitution effects.

As is standard, it is assumed that the consumer has a given set of preferences over allocations of consumption and leisure. The consumer also has a fixed stock of time available which can be divided between labor supply and time spent as leisure. The utility function representing the preferences can then be defined by

$$U = U\left(x, T - \ell\right) = U\left(x, \ell\right), \tag{16.1}$$

where T is the stock of time, ℓ is labor supply and x is consumption. Consequently, leisure time is $T - \ell$. labor is assumed to be unpleasant for the worker so utility is reduced as more labor is supplied, implying that $\frac{\partial U}{\partial \ell} < 0$. Let each hour of labor supplied earn the wage rate w so that income, in the absence of taxation is $w\ell$. Letting the rate of tax be t, the budget constraint facing the consumer is $px = [1 - t]\, w\ell$, where p is the price of the consumption good.

This choice problem is shown in Figure 16.1a, which graphs consumption against leisure. The indifference curves and budget constraint are as standard for utility maximization. The optimal choice is at the tangency of the budget constraint and the highest attainable indifference curve. This results in consumption x^* and leisure $T - \ell^*$.

There is also an alternative way to represent the utility function. Let pre-tax income be denoted by z, so $z = w\ell$. Since $\ell = \frac{z}{w}$, utility can then be written in terms of pre-tax income as

$$U = U\left(x, \frac{z}{w}\right). \tag{16.2}$$

These preferences can be depicted on a graph of pre-tax income against consumption. The budget constraint then becomes $px = [1 - t]\, z$. This is shown in Figure 16.1b. The optimal choice is shown as the tangency at point between the highest attainable indifference curve and the budget constraint, with consumption x^* and pre-tax income $w\ell^*$. The feature of this representation is that the budget constraint is not affected as w changes, so it is the same whatever wage the consumer earns, but the indifference curves do change since it is $\frac{z}{w}$ that enters the utility function. How they change is described below.

This model can now be used to understand the effects of variations in the wage rate. Consider the effect of an increase in the wage rate which is shown in the Figure 16.2a by the move to the higher budget line and the new tangency at c. The move from a to c can be broken down into a substitution effect ($a \rightarrow b$) and an income effect ($b \rightarrow c$). The direction of the substitution effect can always be signed since it is given by a move around the indifference curve. In contrast, the income effect cannot be signed: it may be positive or negative. Consequently the net effect is ambiguous so an increase in the wage can raise or lower labor



Figure 16.1: Labour Supply Decision

supply. This is the basic ambiguity that runs throughout the analysis of labor supply.

The effect of a wage increase when preferences are written as $U\left(x, \frac{z}{w}\right)$ is shown in Figures 16.2b. An increase in the wage rate means that less additional labor is required to achieve any given increase in consumption. This change in the trade-off between labor and consumption causes the indifference curve through a point to pivot round and become flatter. This flattening of the indifference curves causes the optimal choice to move along the budget constraint. The level of pre-tax income will rise, but the effect on hours worked is ambiguous.

It is also helpful to consider more complex tax systems using this approach. A common feature of the income tax in many countries is that there is a threshold level of income below which income is untaxed. This is shown in Figures 16.3a and b. The threshold level of income is z^* so at wage rate w this arises at $\frac{z^*}{w}$ hours of labor supply. The economic importance of this threshold is that it puts a kink into the budget constraint. If a set of consumers with differing preferences are considered, some may locate at points such as a and pay no tax and some may locate at points like c. However, it can be expected that a number of consumers will cluster or "bunch" at the kink point b. The observation that consumers will bunch at a kink point is a common feature and reflects the fact that an extra unit of labor will receive net pay $[1 - t]\,w$ whereas the previous unit received w. It is therefore helpful to distinguish between interior solutions, such as a and c, and corner solutions such as b. The consumer at an interior solution will respond to changes in the tax rate in the manner illustrated in Figure 16.2. In contrast, a consumer at a corner solution may well be left unaffected by a tax change. Their choice will only be affected if the change is sufficient to



Figure 16.2: Effect of a Wage Increase

allow the attainment of a utility level higher than at the kink.

More generally, an income tax system may have a number of thresholds with the marginal tax rate rising at each. Such a tax system appears as in Figure 16.4. Again, with preferences varying across consumers the expectation is that there will tend to be collections of consumers at each kink point.

The final issue that is worth investigating in this framework is that of participation in the labor force. The basic assumption so far has been that the worker can continuously vary the number of working hours in order to arrive at the most preferred outcome. In practice it is often the case that hours are either fixed or else there is minimum that must be undertaken with the possibility of more. Either case leads to a discontinuity in the budget constraint at the point of minimum hours. The choice for the consumer is then between either undertaking no work or working at least the minimum. This is the participation decision: whether or not to join the workforce.

The participation decision and it relation to taxation is shown in Figure 16.5 where ℓ^m denotes the minimum working time. The effect of an increase in taxation is to lower the budget constraint. A consumer that was previously indifferent between working and not (both points being on the same indifference curve) now strictly prefers to not do so. At this margin there is no conflict between income and substitution effects. An increase in taxation strictly reduces participation in the labor force.

16.3 Empirical Evidence

The theoretical analysis of Section 16.2 has identified the three major issues in the study of labor supply. These are the potential conflict between income and



Figure 16.3: A Tax Threshold



Figure 16.4: Several Thresholds



Figure 16.5: Taxation and the Participation Decision

substitution effects which make it impossible to provide any clear cut results for those consumers at an interior solution, kinks in the budget constraint which make behavior insensitive to taxes, and the participation decision which can be very sensitive to taxation. How important each of these factors is in determining the actual level of labor supply can only be discovered by reference to the empirical evidence.

Empirical evidence on labor supply and the effect of income taxes can be found in both the results of surveys and in econometric estimates of labor supply functions. In considering what evidence is useful, it is best to recall that labor supply will be insensitive to taxation if working hours are determined by the firm or by union/firm agreement. When this is the case, only the participation decision is of real interest. The effect of taxation at interior solutions can only be judged when the evidence relates to workers who have the freedom to vary their hours of labor. This is most commonly the position for those in self-employment rather than employment. For those in employment, variations in hours can sometimes be achieved by undertaking overtime so this dimension of choice can be considered.

These comments also draw attention to the fact that the nature of labor supply may well be different between males and females, especially married females. It still remains a fact that males continue to remain the dominant income earner in most families. This leaves the married female as typically a secondary income earner and for them there is often no necessity to work. From this position, it is the participation decision that is paramount. In contrast, most males consider work to be a necessity so the participation decision is an irrelevance. It can therefore be expected that the labor supply of males and females will show different degrees of sensitivity to taxation.

Surveys on labor supply have normally arrived at the conclusion that changes in the tax rate have little effect on the labor supply decision. For instance, a survey of the disincentive effect of high tax rates upon solicitors and accountants in the UK, 63% of whom were subject to marginal tax rates above 50%, concluded that as many of the respondents were working harder because of the tax rates as were working less hard. A group such as this are ideal candidates for study for the reasons outlined above: they can be expected to have flexibility in the choice of working hours and should be well-informed about the tax system. A similar conclusion was also found in a survey of the effect of income taxation on the level of overtime worked by a sample of weekly paid workers: little net effect of taxation on working hours was found.

These results suggest the conclusion that labor supply does not vary significantly with the tax rate. If this were correct, the labor supply function would be approximately vertical. In terms of the theoretical analysis the survey results point to an income effect that almost entirely offsets the substitution effect. However, the discussion has already suggested that different groups in the population may have different reactions to changes in the tax system. This issue is now considered by considering the findings of some econometric analyses.

Tables 16.1a - c present some summary econometric estimates of labor supply elasticities. These are divided into those for married men, married women and unmarried women. Each gives the overall elasticity and its breakdown into substitution and income effects. Estimates for both the UK and the US are given.

	Married	Women	Married	Men	Lone	Mothers
	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK
Uncompensated Wage	0.45	0.43	0.03	-0.23	0.53	0.76
Compensated Wage	0.9	0.65	0.95	0.13	0.65	1.28
Income	-0.45	-0.22	-0.98	-0.36	-0.18	-0.52

Table 16.1: Labor supply elasticities

Since these results relate to the effect of a wage increase, theory would predict that the substitution effect should be positive. This is what is found in all cases. The income effect, which theoretically can be positive or negative, is found to be always negative. Consequently this offsets the substitution effect, sometimes more than completely. Whilst there are a range of estimates for each category, some general observations can be made. The estimated elasticity for married men is the lowest and is the only one that is ever estimated to be negative. This implies that the labor supply curve for married men is close to vertical and may even slopes backward. One explanation for these results could be that the working hours of this group are constrained by collective agreements which leave little flexibility for variation.

The labor supply of unmarried women is on average the largest of the three sets. These results are probably a consequence of the participation effect. For single women part-time work is an unattractive option since this usually implies the loss of state benefits. Consequently, labor supply becomes an all or nothing decision. Married women represent the intermediate case. For them part-time work is quite common and this often opens the way to some degree of flexibility in hours of work. As expected these factors lead to a labor supply elasticity greater than that of married men but lower than that of unmarried women.

Although the estimates vary widely within the groups, indicating some imprecision in the estimates, some general conclusions can still be drawn. Firstly, the elasticity of labor supply is not uniform across the population of workers. It clearly varies between the three groups identified in this discussion and probably varies within these groups. Despite this, it is still clearly apparent that the labor supply elasticity for married men is small with estimates grouped around zero. Such a finding has immediate implications for the efficiency consequences of a tax rate increase. In contrast, the elasticity of women is higher and reflects the participation effect and the greater flexibility they have in the choice of hours.

16.4 Modeling Income Taxation

The analysis of the chapter to this point has considered the positive question of how income taxation affects labor supply. Having completed this, it is now possible to turn to the normative question of how the income tax structure should be determined. This is by nature a complex issue. As has already been noted income tax systems in practice generally have a number of thresholds at which the marginal tax rate rises. An investigation of the optimal system must at least be flexible enough to consider such tax systems without limiting the number of thresholds or the rates of tax at each. In fact, it must do more much than this.

These comments imply that it is necessary to construct a model that has several important attributes. Firstly, there must be an unequal distribution of income in order for their to be equity motivations for taxation. Secondly, the income tax must affect the labor supply decisions of the consumers so that it has efficiency effects. Thirdly, in view of the comments above, the structure must also be sufficiently flexible that no prior restrictions are placed on the optimal tax functions that may arise.

The simplest model that is able to meet all these is now described. In this all the consumers have identical preferences but differ in their level of skill in employment. The hourly wage received by each consumer is determined by their level of skill. This combines with the labor supply decision to determine income. The economy is competitive so the wage rate is also equal to the marginal product of labor and firms price their output at marginal cost.

The interesting feature of the model is that the level of skill is private information and so cannot be observed by the government. As the discussion of Chapter 13 showed, this makes it impossible to tax directly. Since the government cannot observe a consumer's skill level (which is essentially the initial endowment of the consumer), it employs an income tax as a second-best policy. A tax levied on skill would be the first-best policy as it would be a lump-sum tax on the unalterable characteristic which differentiates different consumers.

But this first-best is not feasible.

The income tax function is chosen to maximize social welfare. This maximization is subject to two constraints. The first constraint is that the income tax must raise enough revenue to meets the government's requirements. The second constraint that must be satisfied is called the self-selection constraint. To understand this it is helpful to view the government as assigning to each household a pre-tax income-consumption pair. The self-selection constraint is then that each consumer must find it in their own interest to choose the pair that the government intends for them rather than a pair assigned to a different consumer. The self-selection constraint will be implicit in the utility maximization decision of each consumer in the diagrammatic analysis of this section, but will be made explicit in the calculations of Section 17.5.

It is assumed that there are two commodities: a consumption good and labor. A consumer's labor supply is denoted by ℓ and consumption by x. Each consumer is characterized by their skill level s The value of s measures the hourly output of the consumer and, since the economy is competitive, it also measures the wage rate. If a consumer of ability s supplies ℓ hours of labor, they earn income of $s\ell$ before tax. Denote the income of a consumer with skill s by $z(s) \equiv s\ell(s)$. For a consumer with income z, the income tax paid is given by $T(z)$. This termed the tax function and it is this function that the analysis aims to determine. Equivalently, denoting the consumption function by $c(z)$, a consumer who earns income $z(s)$ can consume

$$x(s) = c(z(s)) = z(s) - T(z(s)), \tag{16.3}$$

units of the consumption good.

The relationship between income, the tax function, and consumption is depicted in Figure 16.6. In the absence of taxation, income would be equal to consumption and this is depicted by the 45^o line. Where the consumption function lies above the 45^o line, the tax payment is negative. It is positive when the consumption function is below the line. The gradient of the consumption function is equal to 1 minus the marginal rate of tax, where the marginal rate of tax, T', is defined as $\frac{\partial T(z)}{\partial z}$. The fundamental aspect of the income tax problem is to determine what the shape of the tax function should be or, given the relation in (16.4), the optimal consumption function.

All households have the same utility function, an assumption that permits interpersonal comparability. This common utility function is denoted

$$U = U(x, \ell). \tag{16.4}$$

The indifference curves of the utility function are illustrated in Figure 16.7. As the consumer prefers more consumption and less labor, utility increases to the north west. Indifference curve I_2 represents a higher level of utility than I_1 and I_1 a higher level than I_0.

The depiction of the consumption function in Figure 16.6 is set in $z-x$ space, that of preferences in Figure 16.7 in $\ell - x$ space. To make them comparable and allow utility maximization to be shown in the diagram, it is necessary to set



Figure 16.6: Consumption Function and Taxation



Figure 16.7: Preferences



Figure 16.8: Translation of Indifference Curves

them in the same space. Since the consumption function is the object of primary interest, it is best to keep this in its natural form and to translate preferences into the new space. This can be done by taking the utility function and writing

$$U = U(x, \ell) = U\left(x, \frac{z}{s}\right) = u(x, z, s). \qquad (16.5)$$

The indifference curves of $u(x, z, s)$, drawn in $z - x$ space are dependent upon the ability level of the household since it takes a high-ability household less labor time to achieve any given level of income. In fact, the indifference curves are constructed from those in $\ell - x$ space by multiplying by the relevant value of s. This construction is shown in Figure 16.8 for the single indifference curve I_0 and consumers of three different ability levels.

Combining the preferences and consumption function it is now possible to display the utility maximization decision of a consumer. Each consumer makes the choice of income (which is equivalent to choosing labor supply) and consumption demand to maximize their utility subject to the satisfying the consumption function. Hence a consumer of ability s chooses x and z to

$$\max u(x, z, s) \text{ subject to } x = c(z) = z - T(z). \qquad (16.6)$$

This optimization is shown in Figure 16.9 in which the utility maximizing choice occurs on the highest indifference curve attainable given the consumption function. Except for the additional factor that skill level is also involved here, this is essentially the same diagram that was used in Section 16.2.

To derive results from the model requires that one further assumption be placed upon preferences. This involves relating the gradient of the indifference curves through a given consumption-income point for consumers of different abilities. The required assumption is termed agent monotonicity. This imposes the condition that at any point in $z-x$ space the indifference curve of a household



Figure 16.9: Utility Maximization

of ability s_1 passing through that point is steeper than the curve of a household of ability s_2 if $s_2 > s_1$. This is illustrated in Figure 16.10. The name for the condition follows from this monotonicity property that it imposes upon preferences.

As an example of a set of preferences that satisfy this condition, consider the utility function given by

$$U = \log x - \ell = \log x - \frac{z}{s}. \tag{16.7}$$

Taking the total differential of (16.7) gives

$$dU = \frac{1}{x}dx - \frac{1}{s}dz, \tag{16.8}$$

so that along an indifference curve where $dU = 0$

$$\frac{dx}{dz} = \frac{x}{s}. \tag{16.9}$$

It can be seen from this that for given x, the gradient falls as s increases.

The first consequence of agent monotonicity is that high ability consumers will never earn less income than low ability. Generally, they will earn more. This result is shown in Figure 16.11. It arises because at the point where the indifference curve of the low ability consumer is tangential to the consumption function, that of the high ability is flatter and so cannot be at a tangency. The solution for the high ability cannot be to the left of a since this would also be a better choice for the low ability.



Figure 16.10: Agent Monotonicity



Figure 16.11: Income and Ability



Figure 16.12: Upper Limit on Tax Rate

The second result relates to the maximum tax rate that will be charged. If the consumption function slopes downward, as shown in Figure 16.12, then the shape of the indifference curves ensures that no consumer will choose to locate on the downward sloping section. This part of the consumption function is therefore redundant and could be replaced by the flat dashed section without altering any of the consumers' choices. Economically, along the downward sloping section increased work effort is met with lower consumption. Hence there is no incentive to work harder and such points will not be chosen. Since $c(z) = z - T(z)$, it follows that $c'(z) = 1 - T'(z)$. The finding that $c'(z) \geq 0$ then implies $T'(z) \leq 1$, so the marginal tax rate is less than 100%.

It is also possible to put a lower limit on the marginal tax rate. If the gradient of the consumption function is greater than 1, *i.e.* $c'(z) > 1$, then $T'(z) < 0$. A negative tax rate like this represents a marginal subsidy to the tax payer from the tax system. That is, the after-tax wage for additional work will be greater than the pre-tax wage. Figure 16.13 illustrates the argument that a negative marginal rate can never be optimal. To see this, start with the tax function denoted $c^1(z)$ which has gradient greater than 1. Along this are located a high ability consumer at H^1 and a low ability consumer at L^1. Now consider the effect of moving to the new tax function $c^2(z)$ where the gradient is less than 1. Under this tax function the high ability consumer moves to H^2 and the low to L^2. The new tax function is chosen so the the extra pre-tax income earned by the high ability is exactly equal to the reduction in earning by the low. The consumption of the low ability rises but that of the high ability falls by the same amount. The net effect of these changes is to transfer consumption to the low ability and work effort to the high. This change must raise welfare because the marginal utility of consumption for the low ability is



Figure 16.13: Lower Limit on the Tax Rate

higher than that for the high and, because of their greater ability, the extra work is less arduous for the high ability consumer. The sum of these effects ensures that consumption function $c^2(z)$ leads to a higher welfare level than function $c^1(z)$. Consumption function $c^1(z)$ with a negative marginal rate of tax cannot therefore be optimal. From this it follows that the marginal tax rate must be non-negative so $T'(z) \geq 0$.

The next result relates to the tax rate faced by the high ability consumer. Let the consumption function ABC in Figure 16.14 be a candidate for optimality and I_0 be the indifference curve achieved by the highest ability consumer. It is now shown that ABC cannot be optimal unless its gradient is 1 (so the marginal rate of tax is 0) at point a. To prove this result, assume that the gradient is less than 1 (so the marginal tax rate is positive). A better consumption than ABC will now be constructed. To do this, define ABD by following the old consumption function up to point B and then let the new section BD have gradient of 1. The highest ability consumer will now relocate to point a on indifference curve I_1. Consequently, the highest ability consumer is better-off but their actual tax payment (the vertical distance from the consumption point to the 45^o line) is unchanged. So replacing ABC with ABD leaves aggregate tax revenue unchanged, makes one person better-off and makes no-one worse-off. This must be an improvement for society so no consumption function, like ABC, which has the highest ability person facing a positive marginal rate of tax can be optimal. In other words, the optimal tax function must have a zero marginal rate of tax for the highest ability person.

This result is important for assessing the optimality of actual tax schedules. Those observed in practice invariably have a marginal rate of tax that rises with



Figure 16.14: Zero Marginal Rate of Tax

income. This leaves the highest income consumers facing the greatest marginal tax rate rather than a zero rate. Accordingly, such tax systems cannot be optimal. The result also carries implications for debates about how progressive the income tax system should be. A tax system is progressive if the marginal rate of tax increases with income. Since it has been shown that the marginal rate should be zero at the top of the income distribution, the optimal tax system cannot be a progressive one.

There has been considerable debate about this result due partly to its contrast with what is observed. There are several points that can be made in this respect. The result is valid only for the highest ability consumer and it makes no prediction about the tax rate that will be faced by even the second-highest ability. Therefore it does not demonstrate that those close to the top of the ability range should face a tax rate of zero of even close to 0. For them the tax rate may have to be significantly different to 0. If this is the case, observed tax systems may only be “wrong” at the very top which will not result in too great a divergence from optimality. The result also relies on the fact that the highest ability person can be identified and the tax system adjusted around their needs. Putting this into practice is clearly an impossible tax. In summary, the result is important in that it questions preconceptions about the structure of taxes but it has limited immediate policy relevance.

The results described in this section capture the main general properties of an optimal income tax system that can be derived within this framework. They have shown that the marginal tax rate should be between 0 and 1 and that the highest ability consumer should face a 0 marginal rate. Moreover, they have established that the tax system should not be progressive. It is possible to derive further results only by adding further specification. The next section looks at the Rawlsian optimal tax which is one way of proceeding in this direction. However, even adopting this does not provide entirely transparent insights into the level of optimal tax rates. This can only be done through the use of numerical results and these are the subject matter of Section **??**.

16.5 Rawlsian Tax

In Chapter 13 we introduced the Rawlsian social objective function, where society is concerned about the welfare of the worst-off individuals. The worst-off persons are typically those at the bottom of the income distribution, and their welfare depends on the extent of redistribution. Assuming tax revenue are entirely redistributed in the form of lump sum grants; for a Rawlsian government, the optimal income tax is simply that which maximizes the lump-sum grant, that is, which maximizes the revenue that can be extracted from taxpayers.

Given a tax schedule $T(z)$, each consumer of skill level s makes the choice of income z (which is equivalent to choosing labor supply $l = z/s$) and consumption demand x to maximize their utility $u(x, z, s)$ subject to the satisfying the consumption function $x = z - T(z)$. Let $z(s)$ denote the optimal income choice of type s (conditional on tax scheme T). It has been seen that agent monotonicity implies that high ability consumers will never earn less income than low ability. So $z(s)$ is increasing and can be inverted to give the increasing inverse function $z^{-1}(s)$, that is, the skill s associated to any income choice z. Different tax shemes will induce different income distributions from the same underlying distribution of skills.

Consider skill levels are continuously distributed in the population according to a cumulative distribution function $F(s)$ (indicating the percentage of the population below any skill level s) with associated density function $f(s) > 0$ representing the probability associated with a small interval of the continuous skill. The tax scheme $T(z)$ induces the following income distribution $G(z) = F(z^{-1}(s))$ with density $g(z) = f(z^{-1}(s))$.

Now we are in a position to derive the optimal income tax associated to a Rawlsian social welfare function. Recall that the Rawlsian optimal tax is the revenue maximizing tax schedule. Revenue maximizing tax scheme is one such that there exists no alternative tax structure which can raise more revenue from the taxpayers given their optimal work response to that new tax structure. From the first order condition of the revenue maximization problem, small deviation from the optimal tax scheme must have no effect on total tax revenue (and larger deviations must lower tax revenue). It follows that small change of the tax rate at any given income level z does not change total revenue. Using htis simple argument we can derive the optimal tax structure. Take income level z, and consider a small increase in the marginal tax rate at that point by the amount $\Delta T'$. This change has two effects on tax revenue. First fixing labour supply, it will increase tax payment by the amount $z\Delta T'$ for all those taxpayers with an income above or equal to the level at which the higher marginal tax rate set in z. They represnet a proportion $1-G(z)$ of the population. Therefore the revenue gain from this marginal tax change is

$$[1-G(z)]\,z\Delta T'. \tag{16.10}$$

Obviously, labour supply is not fixed and it is expected to vary in respone to change in tax rates. Those facing higher marginal tax rate are expected to reduce their labour supply. Let ε_s denote the (uncompensated) elasticity of labour supply to the net price of labour (the percent work reduction in response to one percent reduction in the net price of labour). Under perfect competition on the labour market, the price of labour decreases by the amount of the tax rate (*i.e.*, there is no shifting of the tax burden to the employers in the form of higher gross wage). Now the marginal tax rate increase $\Delta T'$ at income level z induces a percentage reduction $\Delta T'/1-T'$ of the price of labour. Only those facing this marginal tax rate change will reduce their labour supply by $\varepsilon_s\Delta T'/1-T'$ percent inducing a reduction of their taxable income equal to $z\varepsilon_s\Delta T'/1-T'$. They represent a proportion $g(z)$ of the population (since those with an income level above the level at which higher marginal tax rate set in continue to face the same marginal tax rate). Therefore the revenue loss associated with the incentive effect of tax change is

$$[g(z)]\,T'z\varepsilon_s\frac{\Delta T'}{1-T'}. \tag{16.11}$$

The revenue maximizing tax scheme (Rawlsian tax) requires to equate the revenue loss with the revenue gain from marginal tax change for any income level. This yields

$$[1-G(z)]\,z\Delta T' = [g(z)]\,T'z\varepsilon_s\frac{\Delta T'}{1-T'}, \tag{16.12}$$

and the optimal Rawlsian tax is easily seen to be such that for all income level z

$$\frac{T'(z)}{1-T'(z)} = \frac{1-G(z)}{\varepsilon_s g(z)}. \tag{16.13}$$

This expression has the following interpretation. High marginal tax rates over some middle-income interval $[z; z+dz]$ mean that for these middle-income individuals but also for the upper-income individuals, the government is collecting more taxes. All together they represent a proportion $1-G(z)$ that is decreasing with z and converging to zero for the highest income level (hence, zero marginal tax rate at the top). The cost of the high marginal tax rates over this interval is greater distortions for those with income in the range $[z; z+dz]$. The total distortion (and revenue loss) will be low, however, if there are relatively few taxpayers in this interval (low $g(z)$), or if those in it have a relatively low labour supply elasticity (low ε_s). Interestingly enough, even though the redistribution motive is maximal under rawlsian criterion, the optimal tax struture does not require marginal progressivity. Indeed, since we do not really know how the labour supply elasticity changes with income, suppose that it is constant. Next, take the Pareto distribution of income which is supposed to be a good fit of the empirical distribution of income. For the pareto distribution, the *hazard* rate $g(z)/1-G(z)$ is increasing almost everywhere. Therefore, from the optimal tax structure given above, it follows that marginal tax rate must decrease everywhere as the labor supply elasticity increases and that marginal tax rates are decreasing when the hazard rate is decreasing. Maximal redistribution is better achieved when the tax schedule is regressive (concave) instead of progressive (convex). Such result is now extended to more general social welfare function through numerical analysis.

16.6 Numerical Results

The standard analysis of optimal income taxation has been introduced above and a number of results have been derived that provide some characterization of the shape of the tax schedule. It has been seen that the marginal rate is between 0 and 1 but as yet no idea has been developed, except for the endpoints, of how close it should be to either. Similarly, although equity considerations are expected to raise the marginal rate, this has not been demonstrated formally nor has consideration been given to how efficiency criteria, particularly the effect of taxation upon labor supply, affects the choice of tax schedule. Due to the analytical complexity of the model, these questions are best addressed via numerical analysis.

To generate numerical results, it is assumed that the social welfare function takes the form

$$W=\int_0^\infty \frac{1}{\epsilon}e^{-\epsilon U}\gamma\left(s\right)ds,\epsilon>0,=\int_0^\infty U\gamma\left(s\right)ds,\epsilon=0. \tag{16.14}$$

The form of this social welfare function permits variations in the degree of concern for equity by changes in ϵ. Higher values of ϵ represent greater concern for equity, with $\epsilon=0$ representing the utilitarian case. (This is an alternative specification to that of (14.24)). The individual utility function has the constant elasticity of substitution form

$$U=\left[\alpha\left[L-\ell\right]^{-\rho}+\left[1-\alpha\right]x^{-\rho}\right]^{-\frac{1}{\rho}}, \tag{16.15}$$

with elasticity of substitution ρ, $\rho=\frac{1}{\mu+1}$, equal to 1/2. The skill distribution is log-normal so

$$\gamma\left(s\right)=\frac{1}{s}\exp\left[-\frac{\log\left(s+1\right)^2}{2}\right]. \tag{16.16}$$

A selection of the numerical results obtained from this model are given in Tables 16.2 and 16.3. In Table 16.2 $\epsilon=0$ so this is the case of a utilitarian social welfare function. Table 16.3 introduces equity considerations by using $\epsilon=1$. In both cases government expenditure is set at 10% of national income. The parameter σ is the standard deviation of the skill distribution. The larger is σ the more dispersed are skills or. equivalently, the greater is inherent inequality. The value of $\sigma = 0.39$ corresponds approximately to the value found in a study of incomes. If the skill distribution matches the income distribution then this is a value of particular interest. $\Gamma(s)$ is the cumulative distribution of ability.

Income	Consumption	Average Tax (%)	Marginal Tax (%)
$z^G = 0.013$	$\nu = 0$		
0	0.03	-	23
0.055	0.07	-34	26
0.10	0.10	-5	24
0.20	0.18	9	21
0.30	0.26	13	19
0.40	0.34	14	18
0.50	0.43	15	16

Table 16.2: The Utilitarian Case

Income	Consumption	Average Tax (%)	Marginal Tax (%)
$z^G = 0.003$	$\nu = 1$		
0	0.05	-	30
0.05	0.08	-66	34
0.10	0.12	-34	32
0.20	0.19	7	28
0.30	0.26	13	25
0.40	0.34	16	22
0.50	0.41	17	20

Table 16.3: Some Equity Considerations

The first fact to be noticed from these results is that the average rate of tax for low ability consumers is negative. These consumers are receiving an income supplement from the government. This is in the nature of a negative income tax where income below a chosen cut-off are supplemented by the government through the tax system. The average rate of tax then increases with ability. For the value of $\sigma = 0.39$ the maximum average rate of tax is actually quite small. The value of 34% in Table 16.3 is not far out of line with the actual rate in many countries.

The behavior of the marginal rate of tax is rather different to that of the average rate. When $\sigma = 0.39$ it is greatest at low abilities and then falls. For the two other values of σ it first rises and then falls. In these cases the maximum rate is reached around the median of the skill distribution. Except at the extremes of the skill distribution, there is not actually much variation in the marginal tax rate. To a first approximation, the optimal tax systems reported in these figures have a basically constant marginal rate of tax so that the consumption function is close to being a straight line. This is one of the most surprising conclusions of the analysis of income taxation: the model allows non-constancy in the marginal rate but this does not feature to a great degree in the optimal solution. Finally, the zero tax for the highest ability consumer is reflected in the fall of the marginal rate at high abilities but this is not really significant until close to the top of the skill distribution.

Reading across the tables shows the effect of increasing the dispersion of skills. This raises the marginal tax rates but these remain fairly constant across the income range. This occurs despite the greater inequality of skills leads to a greater possible role for redistribution via the income tax. This increase in skill dispersion also has the effect of moving the maximum tax rate up the income range, so that the marginal tax rate is increasing over the majority of households.

These results provide an interesting picture of the optimal income tax function. They suggest that it should subsidize low skill households through a negative income tax but should still face them with a high marginal rate of tax. The maximum marginal rate of tax should not be at the top of the skill distribution but should occur much lower. Generally the marginal rate should be fairly constant. These are not results that would have been discovered without the use of this model.

16.7 Voting Over a Flat Tax

Having identified the optimal tax structure, we now need to look at how it is determined. To do this we consider a distribution of income and let people vote over tax schedules which have some degree of redistribution. Because it is difficult to model voting on non-linear tax schemes given the high dimensionality of the problem, we will restrict attention to a linear tax structure as originally proposed by Romer (1975). We specify the model further with quasi-linear preferences to avoid unnecessary complications and to simplify the analysis of the voting equilibrium.

Consider as before that individuals differ in only their level of skill. We assume that skills are distributed in the population according to a cumulative distribution function $F(s)$ that is known to everybody, with mean skill $\overline{s}$ and median s_m. Individuals work and consume. They also vote on a linear tax scheme that pays a lump sum benefit b to each individual, financed by a proportional income tax t. The individual utility function has the quasi-linear form

$$u(x,z,s) = x - \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{z}{s}\right)^2, \tag{16.17}$$

where x and z denote consumption and income respectively. As s is the skill level, z/s denotes effective labour supply. The individual budget constraint is

$$x = (1-t)z + b. \tag{16.18}$$

It is easy to verify that in this simple model the optimal income choice of type s individual is

$$z(s) = (1-t)s^2. \tag{16.19}$$

Quasi-linear preferences imply that there is no income effect on labour supply (*i.e.* $z(s)$ is independent of the lump-sum benefit b). This simplifies the effect of tax distortions and makes the analysis of the voting equilibrium easier. Less surprisingly, a higher tax rate induces taxpayers to work less and earn less income.

The lump-sum transfer b is constrained by the government budget balance condition,

$$b = tE(z(s)) = t(1-t)E(s^2), \tag{16.20}$$

where $E(.)$ is the mathematical expectation and we used the optimal income choice to derive the second equality. This constraint says that the lump-sum benefit paid to each individual must be equal to the expected tax payment $tE(z(s))$. This expression is termed the *Dupuit-Laffer curve* and describes tax revenue as a function of the tax rate. In this simple model, the Dupuit-Laffer curve is bell shaped with a peak at $t = 1/2$ and no tax collected at the ends $t = 0$ and $t = 1$. We can now derive individual preferences over tax schedules by means of indirect utility functions. Substituting (16.18) and (16.19) into (**??**) and rearranging, the indirect utility function becomes

$$V(t, b, s) = b + \frac{1}{2}(1-t)^2 s^2. \tag{16.21}$$

Taking the total differential of (16.21) gives

$$dV = db - (1-t)s^2 dt, \tag{16.22}$$

so that along an indifference curve where $dV = 0$

$$\frac{db}{dt} = (1-t)s^2. \tag{16.23}$$

It can be seen from this that for given t, the indifference curve becomes steeper in (t, b) space as s increases. The consequence of this monotonicity is the single-crossing property of the indifference curves. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the single crossing property is a sufficient condition for the median voter theorem to apply. It follows that there is only one tax policy that can result from a majority voting: it is the policy preferred by the median voter (half the voters are poorer than the median and prefer higher tax rates, and the other half is richer and prefers lower tax rates). Letting t_m be the tax rate preferred by the median voter, then t_m is implicitely defined by the solution to the first-order condition for maximizing the median voter's utility. We differentiate (16.21) with respect to t taking into account the goverment budget constraint (16.20) to obtain

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial t} = (1-2t)E(s^2) - (1-t)s^2. \tag{16.24}$$

Setting this expression equal to zero for the median skill level s_m yields the tax rate preferred by the median voter

$$t_m = \frac{E(s^2) - s_m^2}{2E(s^2) - s_m^2}, \tag{16.25}$$

or using the optimal income choice (16.19)

$$t_m = \frac{E(z) - z_m}{2E(z) - z_m}. \tag{16.26}$$

This simple model predicts that the political equilibrium tax rate is determined by the position of the median voter in the income distribution. The greater is income inequality as measured by the distance between median and mean income, the higher the tax rate. If the median voter is relatively worse off, with income well below the mean income, then equilibrium redistribution is large. In practice, the income distribution has a median income below the mean income, so that a majority of voters would favour redistribution through proportional income taxation. More general utility function would also predict that the extent of this redistribution decreases with the elasticity of labour supply.

16.8 Conclusions

This chapter introduced the issues surrounding the effects and design of the income tax structure. It was first shown how income and substitution effects left the theoretical impact of a tax increase upon labor supply indeterminate. If the income effect is sufficiently strong, it is possible for a tax increase to lead to more labor being supplied. The participation decision was also discussed and it was argued that taxation could be significant in affecting this choice.

This lack of theoretical predictions places great emphasis on empirical research for determining the actual effects of taxation. It was discussed how the labor supply responses of different groups in the population may be related to taxation. These observations were borne out by the empirical results which showed a very small or negative elasticity of supply for married men but a much large positive elasticity for unmarried women. The latter can be interpreted as a reflection of the participation decision.

A model that was able to incorporate the important issues of efficiency and equity in income taxation was then introduced. A number of results were derived capturing general features of the optimal tax system.. Most notably, the marginal rate of tax facing the highest ability person should be 0 and the optimal tax rate is bounded between 0 and 1. This model was then specialized to Rawlsian social welfare function and some further insights obtained. Numerical simulation results were given which showed that the marginal rate of tax should remain fairly constant whilst the average rate of tax should be negative for low-skill consumers. Finally the political economy of taxation was presented by means of a simple model of voting over linear income tax schedules.

Further reading

The economics of taxation and labor supply are surveyed in:

Blundell paper

Feldstein, M., (1995), The effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income: a panel study of the 1986 tax reform act, *Journal of Political Economy* 103, 551-72.

The initial analysis of the problem of nonlinear income taxation was given in:

Mirrlees, J.A. (1971) "An exploration in the theory of optimum income tax", *Review of Economic Studies*, **38**, 175 - 208.

Be warned, the analytical parts of this paper are exceptionally complex. Even so, the numerical simulation is easily understood.

Further numerical simulations are discussed in:

Kanbur, S.M.R. and M. Tuomala (1994) "Inherent inequality and the optimal graduation of marginal tax rates", *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, **96**, 275 - 282.

Tuomala, M. (1990) *Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

For a comprehensive survey of recent income tax policy in the US see

Pechman, J.E., (1987), *Federal State Policy*, 5th ed., Washington, D.C., The Brooking Institution.

The zero marginal tax rate at the top was first presented in

Seade, J.K., (1977), On the shape of optimal tax schedules, *Journal of Public Economics*, **7**, 203-35.

The properties of the quasi-linear model are explored in:

Weymark, J.A. (1986) "A reduced-form optimal income tax problem", *Journal of Public Economics*, **30**, 199 - 217.

An alternative form of quasi-linearity is used to discuss potential patterns of marginal tax rates in:

Diamond, P.A. (1998) "Optimal income taxation: an example with a U-shaped pattern of optimal marginal tax rates", *American Economic Review*, **88**, 83 – 95.

Another consideration of the pattern of marginal rates of tax is:

Myles, G.D. (2000) "On the optimal marginal rate of income tax", *Economics Letters*, **66**, 113 - 119.

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Marhuenda, F., and I. Ortuno-Ortin, (1995), Popular support for progressive taxation, *Economics Letters* **48**, 319-24.

Hindriks, J., (2001), Is there a demand for income tax progressivity?, *Economics Letters* **73**, 43-50.

A comprehensive and more advanced presentation of the optimal taxation theory is

Salanie, B., 2003, *Economics of Taxation*, Cambridge, MIT press

A bargaining approach to the income tax problem is in

Aumann, R.J., and M. Kurz, (1977), Power and taxes, *Econometrica* **45**, 1137-61.

For the relationship between existing income tax systems and the equal sarifice principle see:

Young, H.P., (1990), Progressive taxation and equal sacrifice, *American Economic Review* **80**, 253-66.

Chapter 17

The Limits to Redistribution

17.1 Introduction

In this chapter we step back from the specific models used in the previous two chapters in order to consider taxation from a broader perspective. We have already stressed that the role of taxation is to allow the government to achieve an allocation of resources that is preferred to that which would arise in the absence of intervention. The mixed economy approach we have adopted, by which is meant the combination of competitive trading alongside intervention by the government, is not the only means of organizing economic activity. Many alternatives exist, such as the command economy with direct government resource allocation or economies based on workers' cooperatives.

All forms of economy can be interpreted as *allocation mechanisms*: they provide a mechanism for allocating the economy's resources between competing uses. From this viewpoint, the mixed-economy model of taxation upon which we have focused represents just one form of allocation mechanism from among a very broad set of potential allocation mechanisms. This line of reasoning leads to some important questions. For instance, how effective is taxation in achieving the government's aims? Expressed differently, are there any allocation mechanisms that can achieve those aims better than the mixed economy with taxation? If there are, what is the nature of these alternatives? By considering the issue of the choice between allocation mechanisms, with the mixed economy as one option among many, this chapter will provide clear answers to these questions.

To provide the motivation for the approach we take, it is necessary to clarify some basic issues. As we have noted many times already, government policy aims to resolve the trade-off between efficiency and equity in order to maximize its objective function. Improving efficiency is uncontentious since it implies a Pareto improvement, and therefore will be unanimously supported. In contrast, attaining aims of equity implies redistribution, so there will be some consumers that lose from this (but others that gain). Those that stand to lose will have an incentive to take actions to reduce the loss. Such changes in action provide limits on the amount of redistribution that can be undertaken. Different allocation mechanisms will face different limits, so the effectiveness of taxation as an allocation mechanism can be measured against its success in achieving redistribution. More generally, it is possible to determine the limit to which redistribution can be undertaken and enquire to whether taxation can achieve this limit.

The prime obstacle to redistribution is its deleterious effect on the incentive to create wealth. Naturally, a greater incentive to create and accumulate wealth is linked with a greater inequality of income. The cause of inequality can take either of two forms. Firstly, inequality can follow simply from luck. Some people are born with higher innate talent than others - such talents can be assigned to the outcome of the "genetic lottery". In addition, among those who start equal, fortune favors the endeavors of some more than others. Many people may think it perfectly legitimate to tax away the economic benefits that arise from luck as a source of inequality. But the ability to do so depends on the possibility of the government observing the innate talents and inducing their owner to bring them to full fruition despite the knowledge that the resulting income will be taxed away. For example, even if born with the talent to become a concert pianist, a person will only choose to endure the hours of necessary practice if they can foresee future benefits from doing so. The second cause of inequality is the effort that is applied to gain wealth, given the level of ability. Some people choose to work harder than others, and allowing them to keep the fruits of their own effort seems legitimate. Put another way, there can be little justification for redistributing from those who incomes are high because of their efforts to those whose incomes are low solely because they choose to supply little effort.

If the government could determine what part of inequality was due to differences in effort and what part due to luck, these differences present no problems for redistribution. In such circumstances the tax system could be finely adjusted to elicit the correct effort level from all consumers by imposing a harsh punishment for realizing an income that is too low. In practice, effort is not observable and people can pretend to work when they do not. A high income may be the result of hard work or it may be due to chance (better natural talent), but without detailed information the government cannot infer which. Redressing inequality with respect to one dimension but not the other then becomes a difficult task. Higher innate talent must be judged, *faute de mieux*, indirectly by income which itself depends on effort. Taxing income is then a blunt tool for attacking the symptom, but not the cause. There is as a result a conflict between the redistributive and the incentive effects of the tax system that determines the scope for redistribution. These ideas were the basis of the analysis of optimal income taxation in Chapter 16 and the idea that a tax system had to be incentive compatible.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe how incentive compatibility, which is the requirement that the allocation mechanism must be consistent with the incentives for the truthful revelation of information, places limits upon the ability of the government to undertake redistribution. The fact that an optimal allocation mechanism will be consistent with truth-telling is called the *revelation principle.* We will also explain why taxation is typically the best mechanism, from among the set of incentive compatible mechanisms, for achieving redistribution. This conclusion is termed the *tax principle.* This result is interesting given that the notion of taxing income directly was for a long time rejected on the grounds that the collection of the necessary information would be costly and constitute a risk of invasion of privacy. The UK did not adopt a permanent income tax until the 1870s and the US Congress established the same form of taxation in the 1890s. Even today, the use of income taxation is not widespread and has a negligible role in many developing countries. While income tax is an important instrument of redistribution, there are additional instruments that can be used. Among them are commodity taxes tilted towards the poor. We shall then describe under what circumstances differential commodity taxation can usefully supplement the income tax and expand the possibilities for redistribution. This is the issue of the *tax mix.*

17.2 Revelation Principle

Any economic system is essentially a general *allocation mechanism* that determines the *economic allocation* for each possible economic environment. The *economic allocation* includes the bundle of commodities each consumer receives, the production activities that are undertaken in the economy and the public goods that are provided. The *economic environment* is a specification of each person's exogenous characteristics (*i.e.*, their endowments, needs, tastes, talents, *etc.*) as well as the production possibilities.

The competitive economy is one form of allocation mechanism. In Chapter 6 the competitive economy was described by the preferences and endowments of consumers and the firms' production technologies; this was the economic environment. Given this information, resources were allocated via the competitive trading mechanism: taking prices as given, each consumer chose demand to maximize utility and each firm chose output to maximize profit. Prices were adjusted until supply and demand were equal and then trading took place to allocate commodities. We have also discussed some alternative allocation mechanisms; two examples were the personalized pricing model in Chapter 10 and the Clarke-Groves mechanism in Chapter 8.

These allocation mechanisms have been judged by their success in allocating resources. The *First Theorem of Welfare Economics* says that the competitive economy is a successful allocation mechanism because it leads (under certain conditions) to a Pareto-efficient allocation. We have also seen the circumstances under which the competitive economy fails and government intervention can achieve a Pareto improvement. But this is not the end of the story, because an allocation can be efficient and at the same time extremely unfair. The competitive economy is indeed blind to injustice and the allocation achieved by the mechanism can involve extreme manifestations of inequity in the form of poverty and starvation.

In response to this problem, the *Second Theorem of Welfare Economics* says that (under certain conditions) any Pareto-efficient allocation can be reached through competitive trading by means of lump-sum redistribution. *Lump-sum* redistribution does not interfere with the working of the competitive market because it is based on the unalterable characteristics of the economic agents. The problem is that the personal characteristics relevant for redistribution need not be publicly observable (*i.e.*, tastes, talents, needs, abilities, *etc.*). Therefore, redistribution has to be based on information that people choose to reveal. These issues were introduced in Chapter 13.

The basis of a mechanism is that the agents in the economy make a report of information. This report could, for example, be a statement of their preferences (such as the valuation reported in the Clarke-Groves mechanism) or of their demands (as in the competitive economy). Alternatively, it could take the form of a direct statement of their characteristics. Given these announcements, the mechanism determines the economic allocation. For the Clarke-Groves mechanism, the allocation was a choice to provide the public good or not and set of side payments. In the competitive economy the allocation was determined by the market equilibrium given the announced demands.

A *desirable* economic allocation is defined as an achievable allocation that maximizes a social choice function. For example, a utilitarian social choice function will select the allocation that maximizes the sum of utilities. The *implementation problem* is to design the allocation mechanism so that it produces a desirable economic allocation, even when agents attempt to manipulate it to their advantage. Manipulation means reporting false characteristics in order to obtain an advantage - in Chapter 8 such manipulation arose in connection with the Lindahl equilibrium. The scope for manipulation arises because some (or all) of the characteristics that are relevant for the proper allocation of resources are not publicly observable.

To be more explicit, consider an economy populated by a set of agents $I = \{1, ..., i, ..., n\}$. Each agent, i, is described by θ_i which is a list of all the personal characteristics that can be economically relevant. Let Θ_i be the set of possible characteristics for agent i, so θ_i has to be drawn from the alternatives in Θ_i. The corresponding profile of characteristics for the set of agents in the economy is denoted $\theta = (\theta_1, ..., \theta_n)$. Finally, let X be the set of economic allocations that are technically possible using the economy's resources.

Given the characteristics for the agents the optimal allocation, that which is best according to the social choice function, is selected. Formally, the social choice function determines an allocation for every possible profile of the agents' characteristics. Specifically, if the profile of characteristics is $\theta = (\theta_1, ..., \theta_n)$, the social choice function selects the allocation $x = f(\theta)$. It must be the case that x is one of the allocations in X.

The central idea of *mechanism design* is the construction of an allocation mechanism that implements the social choice function. That is, if the social choice function selects the allocation $x = f(\theta)$, then given the characteristics



Figure 17.1: Mechanism Design

θ, the mechanism will result in the allocation x being achieved. It can be seen that this was exactly the process described in Chapter 7. The social welfare function selected the Pareto-efficient allocation that maximized welfare and then competitive activity was combined with lump-sum taxation to decentralize this allocation.

A *mechanism* is a strategy set for each agent and an outcome function that determines the allocation given a choice of strategies for each agent. The strategy set of i is denoted S_i and describes the choices that are open to agent i. The collection of strategy sets for the set of agents is $(S_1, ..., S_n)$. Letting the chosen strategy of agent i be s_i, the outcome function $g(\cdot)$ determines the allocation $x = g(s_1, ..., s_n)$. A mechanism, M, is described by the strategy sets and the outcome function so $M = (S_1, ..., S_n, g(.))$. Each agent makes their choice of strategy to maximize their payoff function. Often, there will be strategic interaction between the agents in the choice of strategies. The type of strategic action involved will determine the appropriate equilibrium concept.

The mechanism $M = (S_1, ..., S_n, g(.))$ is said to *implement* the social choice function $f(\cdot)$ if there is an equilibrium strategy profile $(s_1^*, ..., s_n^*)$ for the mechanism M such that $g(s_1^*, ..., s_n^*) = x = f(\theta_1, ..., \theta_n)$. The strategy profile is an equilibrium if s_i^* is optimal for agent i given the strategy choices of the other agents. This definition applies whether or not their is strategic interaction. These definitions are illustrated in Figure 17.1.

Among the very large set of possible mechanisms, there is a particularly interesting set of mechanisms, called *direct revelation mechanisms*, in which each agent is asked to reveal their characteristics directly (the characteristics can

$$\begin{tikzcd}
(\theta_1,...,\theta_n) \arrow[dd, "f(\theta_1,...,\theta_n)"'] \arrow[dr, "\mu_i = m(\theta_i)"] & \\
& (\mu_1,...,\mu_n) \arrow[dl, "\phi(\mu_1,...,\mu_n)"] \\
f(\theta_1,...,\theta_n) = x = \phi(m(\theta_1),...,m(\theta_n)) &
\end{tikzcd}$$

Figure 17.2: Direct and Indirect Mechanisms

also be called the agents *type*). Given the announcements of characteristics, the allocation is chosen according to the social choice function $f(\cdot)$. More precisely, a *direct revelation mechanism* is a mechanism in which the strategy set $S_i = \Theta_i$ for all i, so a strategy is an announcement of characteristics, and $g(\theta_1, ..., \theta_n) = x = f(\theta_1, ..., \theta_n)$ for all possible characteristics $(\theta_1, ..., \theta_n)$.

As an example of the distinction between direct and indirect mechanisms, consier the taxation of income. In the model of Chapter 16 agents were distinguished by their ability levels. A direct mechanism would involve each agent making an announcement of their ability. In contrast, income taxation is an indirect mechanism in which the announcement is an income level. Naturally, the income level is related to ability but is not directly ability.

The reason for the interest in direct mechanisms is that any indirect mechanism (where an announcement is made that need not be directly about characteristics) can always be replaced with a direct mechanism that achieves the same outcome. This can be easily demonstrated. Consider an indirect mechanism where the announcement of i is μ_i and the outcome $x = \phi(\mu_1, ..., \mu_n)$. Since μ_i is chosen as the announcement by i, there must be a relationship between their characteristics and the value chosen, we write this relationship as $\mu_i = m(\theta_i)$. But then the outcome of the indirect mechanism is $x = \phi(\mu_1, ..., \mu_n) = \phi(m(\theta_1), ..., m(\theta_n))$ which ultimately depends upon the characteristics. A direct mechanism with $f(\theta_1, ..., \theta_n)$ chosen to be identical to $\phi(m(\theta_1), ..., m(\theta_n))$ will then provide precisely the same outcome. This is illustrated in Figure 17.2. In brief, there is nothing an indirect mechanism can achieve that can't be achieved with a direct mechanism. Only direct mechanisms need therefore be studied.

The interesting issue here is whether mechanisms can be designed such that it is optimal for the agents to announce their true characteristics. In this respect, the social choice function $f(\cdot)$ is *truthfully implementable* in dominant strategies (or incentive compatible) if the direct revelation mechanism $M = (\Theta_1, ..., \Theta_n, f(\cdot))$ has a dominant strategy equilibrium $(s_1^*, ..., s_n^*)$ in which truthtelling is optimal so $s_i^* = \theta_i$ for any value of θ_i in the set Θ_i. By a dominant strategy equilibrium, it is meant that truthtelling is optimal for all agents regardless of what the other agents choose to do.

We are now almost in a position to state the fundamental result of this section but one final definition is necessary before this can be done. A *truly feasible* allocation is defined as one which is both technically feasible (given the endowments and endowments and technology of the economy) and which is informationally feasible given that the characteristics on which redistribution is based are not publicly observable. The following theorem is the Revelation Principle that is key to analyzing allocation mechanisms.

Theorem 11 ***Revelation Principle*** *(Dasgupta, Hammond, Maskin and Myerson) The set of allocations that are truly feasible when agents' characteristics are not observable is the set of allocations that are incentive compatible (or truthfully implementable in dominant strategies).*

There are two aspects to this theorem. Firstly, it tells us that there is nothing to be gained by constructing mechanisms in which agents are deliberately lead to reveal false information. Instead, we can confine attention to mechanisms in which the best strategy is to tell the truth. Secondly, it reveals that we need only study mechanisms where the equilibrium is found in dominant strategies. There have been several previous occasions in the text where we have analyzed the Nash equilibrium of games and it may seem that restricting attention to dominant strategies must reduce the set of allocations that can be achieved. This is not true for the following simple reason: the mechanism must be designed so that truth is the Nash equilibrium strategy for each agent whatever are the characteristics of the other agents. Now consider agent i. Since truth is his Nash equilibrium strategy for all possible characteristics of agents other than i, this implies that it must be chosen in response to any announcement by the others (whether these are truthful or not). Therefore, if it is always a Nash strategy, truth must be a dominant strategy.

17.3 Impossibility of Lump-Sum Taxes

Imagine that each individual in a society can be described by a list of personal attributes upon which the society wishes to condition taxes and transfers (*e.g.* tastes, needs, talents and endowments). Individuals are also identified by their names and possibly other publicly-observable attributes (such as eye color) which are not judged to be relevant attributes for taxation. The list of personal attributes associated to every agent is not publicly known but is the private information of each individual. This implies that the lump-sum taxes the government would like to implement must rely on information about personal attributes which individuals must either report or reveal indirectly through their actions.

Lump-sum taxes are incentive incompatible when at least one individual who understands how the information that is reported will be used, chooses to report falsely. We have already argued in Chapter 7 that there can be incentive problems in implementing optimal lump-sum taxes. What we now wish to demonstrate is that these problems are fundamental ones and will always afflict any attempt to implement optimal lump-sum taxes. The argument will show that optimal lump-sum taxes are not incentive compatible. This does not mean that lump-sum taxes cannot be used - for instance all individuals could be taxed the same amount - but only that the existence of private information places limits on the extent to which taxes can be differentiated before incentives for the false revelation of information come into play. These issues are first illustrated for a particular example and then a general result is provided.

A good illustration of the failure of incentive compatibility is provided in the following example due to Mirrlees. Assume individuals can have one of two levels of ability: either low or high. The low ability level is denoted by θ_ℓ and the high ability level by θ_h with $\theta_l < \theta_h$. For simplicity suppose the number with high ability is equal to the number with low. The two types have the same preferences over consumption, C, and labor, L as represented by the utility function $U(C, L) = u(C) - v(L)$. It is assumed that the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing in C and the marginal disutility of labor is increasing in L.

To determine the optimal lump-sum taxes, suppose that the government can observe the ability of each individual and impose taxes which are conditioned upon ability. Let the tax on an individual of ability level i be $T_i > 0$ (or a subsidy if $T_i < 0$). The budget constraint of a type i is

$$C_i = \theta_i L_i - T_i, \tag{17.1}$$

where earnings are $\theta_i L_i$. Given the lump-sum taxes, each type chooses labor supply to maximize utility subject to this budget constraint. The choice of labor supply equates the marginal utility of additional consumption to the disutility of labor

$$\theta_i \frac{\partial u}{\partial C_i} - \frac{\partial v}{\partial L_i} = 0. \tag{17.2}$$

This provides a labor-supply function $L_i = L_i(T_i)$.

Now suppose the government is utilitarian and chooses the lump-sum taxes to maximize the sum of utilities. Then the optimal lump-sum taxes solve

$$\sum_{\ell,h} u(\theta_i L_i(T_i) - T_i) - v(L_i(T_i)), \tag{17.3}$$

subject to government budget balance which, since there are equal numbers of the two types, requires

$$T_h + T_\ell = 0. \tag{17.4}$$

Now use this budget constraint to substitute for T_ℓ, in (17.3). Differentiating the resulting expression with respect to the tax T_h and using the first-order condition (17.2) for the choice of labor supply, the optimal lump-sum taxes are characterized by the condition

$$\frac{\partial u}{\partial C_h} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial C_\ell}. \tag{17.5}$$

Since the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing in C, the optimality condition (17.5) implies that there is equality of consumption for the two types; $C_h = C_\ell$. When this conclusion is combined with (17.2) and the fact $\theta_\ell < \theta_h$, it follows that

$$\frac{\partial v}{\partial L_\ell} = \theta_\ell \frac{\partial u}{\partial C_\ell} < \theta_h \frac{\partial u}{\partial C_h} = \frac{\partial v}{\partial L_h}. \tag{17.6}$$

Under the assumption of an increasing marginal disutility of labor, this inequality shows that the optimal lump-sum taxes should induce the outcome $L_h > L_\ell$, so the more able work harder than the less able. The motivation for this outcome is that working the high-ability type harder is the most efficient way to raise the level of total income for the society which can then be redistributed using the lump-sum taxes. Thus, the high-ability type works harder than the low-ability type but they only get to consume the same. Therefore, the high-ability type is left with a lower utility level than the low-ability type after redistribution.

Now suppose that the government can observe incomes but cannot observe the ability of each individual. Assume it still attempts to implement the optimal lump-sum taxes. The taxes are obviously not incentive compatible because, if the high-ability type understand the outcome, they can always choose to earn as little as the low-ability type. Doing so then qualifies the high-ability type for the redistribution aimed at the low-ability type. This will provide them with a higher utility level than if they did not act strategically. The optimal lump-sum taxes cannot then be implemented with private information.

Who would work hard if the government stood ready to tax away the resulting income? Optimal (utilitarian) lump-sum redistribution makes the more able individuals worse off because it requires them to work harder but does not reward them with additional consumption. In this context, it is profitable for the more able individuals to make themselves seem incapable. Many people believe there is something unfair about inequality that arises from the fact that some people are born with superior innate ability or similar advantage over others. But many people also think it morally right that one should be able to keep some of the fruits of one's own effort. This example may have been simple but its message is far-reaching. The Soviet Union and other communist economies have shown us that it is impossible to generate wealth without offering adequate material incentives. Incentive constraints inevitably limit the scope for redistribution.

The observations of the example are now shown to reflect a general principle concerning the incentive compatibility of optimal lump-sum taxes. We state the formal version of this result for a "large economy" which is one where every individual is insignificant and so powerless to affect the distribution of announcements. In other words, there is a continuum of different agents which is the idealization of a competitive economy with a very large number of small agents with no market power. The theorem shows that optimal lump-sum taxation is never incentive compatible.

Theorem 12 *(Hammond) In a large economy, redistribution through optimal lump-sum taxes is always incentive incompatible.*

The logic behind this theorem is surprisingly simple. A system of optimal lump-sum taxes is used to engineer a distribution of endowments that will decentralize the first-best allocation. The endowments after redistribution must be based on the agents' characteristics (recall that in the analysis of the Second Theorem the taxes were based on knowledge of endowments and preferences), so assume the endowment of an agent with characteristics θ_i is given by $e^i = e(\theta_i)$. For those characteristics which are not publicly observable, the government must rely on an announcement of the values by the agents. Assume for simplicity that none of the characteristics can be observed. Then the incentive exists for each agent to announce the set of characteristics that maximize the value of the endowment at the equilibrium prices p. This is illustrated in Figure 17.3 where θ_1 and θ_2 are two potential announcements, with related endowments $e(\theta_1)$ and $e(\theta_2)$, and θ^* is the announcement that maximizes $pe(\theta)$. The announcement of θ^* leads to the highest budget constraint from amongst the set of possible announcements and, by giving the agent maximum choice, allows the highest level of utility to be attained. Consequently, all agents will announce θ^* and the optimal lump-sum taxes are not incentive compatible.

In conclusion, lump-sum taxes can achieve the optimal allocation of resources provided all information is public. If some of the characteristics which are relevant for taxation are private information then the optimal lump-sum taxes are not incentive compatible. Information limitations therefore place a limit upon the extent to which redistribution can be undertaken using lump-sum taxation.

17.4 Tax Principle

If optimal lump-sum taxes could be employed, the first-best allocation would be achieved. There is no allocation mechanism that can achieve more than this. However, optimal lump-sum taxes are not incentive compatible so they do not function as an allocation mechanism. Other forms of taxation, such as income and commodity taxation, are incentive compatible but achieve only a second-best allocation. There is therefore a gap between what the economy could achieve at the first-best and what taxation achieves at the second-best. This observation raises the question which this section answers: can we improve upon the allocation achieved with taxation? In other words, is there any allocation mechanism that can locate the economy somewhere between the second-best achieved by taxation and the first-best?



Figure 17.3: Optimal Lump-Sum Taxes and Incentive Compatibility

The answer to this question is provided by the *Taxation Principle.* Loosely speaking, the Taxation Principle says that we cannot improve upon taxation in the sense that it is not possible to implement additional allocations by using a more complicated mechanism. Taxation allocates goods to individuals with different characteristics by designing the budget set to achieve the desired outcome. The appeal of taxation is that it requires the government to possess only limited information: the government only needs to know the aggregate distribution of characteristics in the population and not the characteristics of any individual. Every individual faces the same tax system and hence the same consumption opportunities, so that false revelation of characteristics does not change the budget set. Furthermore, the point in the budget set chosen by an individual is, by definition, the best that is available to them and there is no incentive to cheat.

The Taxation Principle determines what allocations can be reached under information and incentive constraints; namely all the allocations that can be implemented using a suitable tax system. Since this principle is the fundamental justification for employing taxation, it is important to state it precisely. To do this we need some preliminary definitions.

Following Hammond, an allocation mechanism is *admissible* whenever it is both individually and collectively physically feasible. It is *anonymous* if the allocation that results from the permutation of the characteristics of two individuals is just the permutation of the original allocation (*i.e.* the allocation mechanism does not depend on the name of the agent). An anonymous allocation mechanism makes each individual's allocation a function only of his own announcement and the announcements of all other players. A mechanism is *straightforward* whenever it implements a given allocation in dominant truthtelling strategies. A *dominant strategy* is a strategy that an individual, given his information, is willing to play regardless of what he believes others know and the way he believes others behave. The Tax Principle can now be stated.

Theorem 13 ***Tax Principle*** *(Guesnerie and Hammond) In a large economy, an allocation is implementable by an admissible tax mechanism if and only if it is implementable by an admissible straightforward allocation mechanism.*

The intuition behind this result is quite simple. The first step is to show that if an allocation is implementable by taxation it can be implemented by an admissible straightforward allocation mechanism. The justification for this result is that a tax system is an indirect mechanism which has a dominant strategy solution consisting of the announcements of each individual's trades. In fact, a tax schedule confronts each individual with the same budget set so that the bundle allocated to them depends only on their strategy. Thus, by appealing to the Revelation Principle, there exists a direct mechanism (in which individuals announce their characteristics) that is equivalent to the (indirect) tax mechanism.

The second step requires the demonstration that any allocation which is implementable by a straightforward allocation mechanism is implementable by taxation. Since the allocation must be incentive compatible, each individual must find the consumption bundle allocated to them at least as good as that allocated to any other individual (if they did not, they would make a false statement of characteristics in order to secure the alternative). A budget set can then be constructed which contains the consumption bundle allocated to each of the individuals but excludes any preferable bundles. This budget set implicitly defines a tax system. Faced with this budget set, the individuals will always choose the consumption bundle allocated by the mechanism. Taxation therefore achieves the same outcome as the alternative allocation mechanism. Therefore, tax systems yield in general the best allocations that can be achieved in a private information world! The only truly feasible allocations are those which can be decentralized by some non-linear income and commodity taxes (with everybody facing the same non-linear tax schedule).

We now illustrates this Taxation Principle in our economy composed of two ability types ($\theta_l < \theta_h$) and two goods (C and L). This example allows us to clarify the extent to which incentive considerations limit redistribution. We continue to assume, for simplicity, an equal number of individuals of both ability types. Assume the government observes only income $Y = \theta L$ and consumption C. From the preferences over consumption and labor can be derived different preferences over consumption and income given by

$$U(C, L) = U(C, \frac{Y}{\theta}).$$

(This construction was explored in detail in Chapter 16.) The indifference curves of both types are depicted in Figure 17.4 in income/consumption space. They



Figure 17.4: Allocation with no Redistribution

satisfy the single-crossing assumption in the sense that the high-ability individuals have a flatter indifference curve than the low-ability individuals through any point. This is because the high-ability type need undertake less work to earn any given income. Utility is increasing when moving in the north-west direction. With no redistribution, both types choose an income-consumption bundle on the 45° line tangent to their indifference curve; these are denoted $\{C_\ell^n, Y_\ell^n\}$ and $\{C_h^n, Y_h^n\}$. Each type strictly prefers their own bundle.

We now consider the scope for redistribution when only income and consumption are observable. The impossibility of observing ability opens up the possibility that the high-ability individuals will, if redistribution is pushed too far, choose the allocation intended for the low-ability individuals. To avoid this happening, the allocations are confined to be *incentive compatible.* In this case, incentive compatibility means allocations of income and consumption such that the high-ability individuals do not prefer the low-ability's bundle. This implies that the allocation for the low-ability type, $\{C_\ell, Y_\ell\}$, must lie on or below the indifference curve through the allocation $\{C_h, Y_h\}$ for the high-ability type. Expressed in terms of utility, the allocation must satisfy $U(C_h, \frac{Y_h}{\theta_h}) \geq U(C_l, \frac{Y_l}{\theta_h})$.

It can be seen immediately that this incentive constraint rules out full equalization of utilities. Since $\theta_h > \theta_\ell$ and the supply of labor causes disutility, it has to be the case that

$$U(C_h, \frac{Y_h}{\theta_h}) \geq U(C_\ell, \frac{Y_\ell}{\theta_h}) > U(C_\ell, \frac{Y_\ell}{\theta_\ell}). \qquad (17.7)$$

Therefore the allocation must give the high-ability type greater utility so the equality of welfare is not feasible when abilities are not observable. This conclusion confirms that the existence of private information places a limit upon potential redistribution.



Figure 17.5: Maximal Redistribution

But then what exactly will be the maximum redistribution and the form of the optimal redistribution scheme? To answer this we analyze the problem of choosing the allocations $\{C_\ell^*, Y_\ell^*\}$ for the low-ability type and $\{C_h^*, Y_h^*\}$ for the high-ability type that maximize the utility of the low-ability type subject to the constraints that the allocation is feasible (meaning total income is equal to total consumption) and that the high-ability will not choose to pretend to be low-ability. The solution is displayed in Figure 17.5.

The optimal allocation is characterized by the fact that the incentive constraint is binding: the high-ability individuals are just indifferent between their own bundle and the bundle of the low-ability. This means that the allocations $\{C_\ell^*, Y_\ell^*\}$ and $\{C_h^*, Y_h^*\}$ lie on the same indifference curve for the high-ability type. With an equal number of each type, feasibility requires that what the amount taken off each high-ability individual is equal to the amount given to each low-ability individual. In the figure, redistribution away from the high-ability means that the allocation must lie below the 45°, with the vertical distance from the allocation to the 45° line measuring the quantity of their output redistributed to the low-ability. Correspondingly, the allocation of the low-ability must be an equal distance above the 45° line. The amount taken from the high-ability type is maximized along a given indifference curve when the indifference curve is parallel to the 45° line. Thus, the allocation $\{C_h^*, Y_h^*\}$ in Figure 17.5 maximizes the amount of redistribution along indifference curve I_h^*. The allocation $\{C_\ell^*, Y_\ell^*\}$ is then determined by the point at which the distances a and b are equal.

Now according to the Tax Principle this optimal allocation is decentralizable by a non-linear income tax schedule. A non-linear tax function $T(Y)$ induces a non-linear consumption function relating consumption and income defined



Figure 17.6: Decentralization by Taxation

by $C(Y) = Y - T(Y)$. The consumption function that decentralizes the optimal allocation is depicted in Figure 17.6 by the dashed curve. This function must have the property that it passes through the two optimal allocations but must not cross above either indifference curve I_ℓ^* of the low-ability individual or indifference curve I_h^* of the high-ability. If the consumption function meets these conditions, it will ensure the optimal allocations are in the budget set but that preferred alternatives are excluded. Provided the consumption function is kinked at $\{C_\ell^*, Y_\ell^*\}$, this can be achieved. The non-linear tax function constructed in this way ensures the decentralization.

In the absence of taxation, income would be equal to consumption and this is depicted by the 45^o line. Where the consumption function lies above the 45^o line, the tax payment is negative. It is positive when the consumption function is below the line. It is clear from the Figure 17.6 that both ability types face the same tax function and will be induced to choose exactly the bundle designated for them. In addition, the construction ensures that the gradient of the indifference curve of the high-ability individual is equal to 1. Referring back to Chapter 16, this implies that high-ability individuals face a marginal income tax rate of 0% so that their income/consumption choice is not distorted at the margin. This was exactly the result we derived for incoem taxation using a different argument. However, because the bundle designated for the low-ability must lie on the indifference curve of the high-ability, the choice of the low-ability type has to be distorted in order to relax the incentive-compatibility constraint. This is easily seen from the fact that such distortion shifts the bundle of the low-ability further away from the bundle of the high-ability and thereby reduces the incentive of the high-ability to mimic the low-ability.

It has been shown how the allocation arising from any admissible straightforward allocation mechanism can be decentralized by means of a non-linear tax schedule. More importantly, a non-linear tax schedule can attain the maximum redistribution that is possible given limitations on information. There is no further redistributive instruments that can expand the possibilities of redistribution. Therefore, having analyed taxation in earlier chapters, we have exhausted the possibilities for achieving redistribution.

17.5 Quasi-Linearity

To provide insights additional to the general results derived above it is worth considering a specialization of the model. This specialization is noteworthy for the very clear view it gives into the models functioning. It is assumed that there are just two consumers and that utility is linear in labor supply. The latter is strictly necessary for the analysis, the former is not. These assumptions permit an explicit solution to be derived to the optimal tax problem.

With only two consumers the problem of choosing the optimal tax (or consumption) function can be given the following formulation. Whatever consumption function is chosen, the fact that there are only two consumers ensures that at most two locations on it will ever be selected. Having observed this, it is apparent that instead of choosing the consumption function itself it is possible to restrict attention to choosing only these two locations. The rest of the consumption function can then be chosen to ensure that it is no better for the consumers than the two chosen locations. Essentially the consumption function just needs to link the two points, whilst elsewhere remaining below the indifference curves through the points. This procedure reduces the choice of tax function to a simple maximization problem involving the two locations.

The quasi-linear utility function has the form

$$U(C, Y, \theta) = u(C) - \frac{Y}{\theta}, \tag{17.8}$$

so that the marginal disutility of labor $L = Y/\theta$ is constant and $u(C)$ is increasing and concave. The marginal rate of substitution between consumption and income can be calculated to be $MRS = 1/\theta u'(C)$, so that it is consistent with the requirements of agent monotonicity. As discussed previously, the incentive compatibility constraint requires that each consumer should prefer their own location to that of the other. Denoting the location intended for low ability consumer by $\{C_l, Y_l\}$ and that for high-ability by $\{C_h, Y_h\}$, self-selection implies that

$$u(C_l) - \frac{Y_l}{\theta_l} \geq u(C_h) - \frac{Y_h}{\theta_l}, \tag{17.9}$$

and

$$u(C_h) - \frac{Y_h}{\theta_h} \geq u(C_l) - \frac{Y_l}{\theta_h}, \tag{17.10}$$

where θ_i is the ability level of consumer $i = l, h$. It is assumed that $\theta_l < \theta_h < 3\theta_l$ (the reason for this is apparent later).

Equation (17.9) is the requirement that the consumer l prefers their location to that of consumer h. The converse requirement is given in (**??**). Putting these together, the full optimization facing the *utilitarian* government is

$$\max_{\{C_l,C_h,Y_l,Y_h\}} u(C_l) - \frac{Y_l}{\theta_l} + u(C_h) - \frac{Y_h}{\theta_h}, \tag{17.11}$$

subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (17.9) and (**??**) and the production constraint

$$C_l + C_h = Y_l + Y_h. \tag{17.12}$$

The production constraint makes the simplifying assumption that zero revenue is to be raised. What is now shown is that this maximization problem can be considerably simplified. The simplification then permits a simple and explicit solution to be given.

The first step is to consider which of the incentive compatibility constraints will hold at the optimum. They cannot both be equalities. If they were, the difference in the slopes of the indifference curves resulting from agent monotonicity implies that both consumers must have the same income and consumption levels. This cannot be optimal since consumer h earns income with less effort. A reallocation that made consumer h work harder and consumer l less hard would then raise welfare. Now assume that both are strict inequalities. Consider holding incomes levels constant and transferring consumption from consumer h to consumer l. There will always be a transfer $\Delta > 0$ that satisfies

$$u(C_h - \Delta) - \frac{Y_h}{\theta_h} = u(C_l + \Delta) - \frac{Y_l}{\theta_h}, \tag{17.13}$$

that is, it makes consumer h indifferent between $\{C_h - \Delta, Y_h\}$ and $\{C_l + \Delta, Y_l\}$. The change must also raise welfare since it transfers consumption to consumer l who has a lower consumption level and hence higher marginal utility. The initial position could not therefore be optimal. Consequently, the only remaining possibility is that at any optimum, (17.10) must be an equality so that consumer h is indifferent between the two locations and (17.9) an inequality.

Given that (17.10) is an equality, it can be solved to write

$$Y_h = \theta_h [u(C_h) - u(C_l)] + Y_l. \tag{17.14}$$

Using the revenue constraint and eliminating Y_h by using (17.14)

$$Y_l = \frac{1}{2}[C_l + C_h - \theta_h [u(C_h) - u(C_l)]]. \tag{17.15}$$

This can now be used with the revenue constraint to give

$$Y_h = \frac{1}{2}[C_l + C_h + \theta_h [u(C_h) - u(C_l)]]. \tag{17.16}$$

These solution for the pre-tax income levels can be then be substituted into the objective function (17.11). Doing this shows that the original constrained optimization is equivalent to

$$\max_{\{C_l,C_h\}} \beta_l u(C_l) + \beta_h u(C_h) - \left[\frac{\theta_l+\theta_h}{2\theta_l\theta_h}\right][C_l + C_h], \tag{17.17}$$

where $\beta_l = \frac{3\theta_l-\theta_h}{2\theta_l}$ and $\beta_h = \frac{\theta_l+\theta_h}{2\theta_l}$.

Comparing (17.11) and (17.17) allows a new interpretation of the optimal tax problem. The construction undertaken has turned the maximization of the utilitarian social welfare function subject to constraint into the maximization of a weighted welfare function without constraints. The constraints have become equivalent to placing a greater weight on the welfare of the high ability consumer (since $\beta_h > \beta_l$) which, in turn, ensures that their consumption level must be greater at the optimum. From (17.15) and (17.16), this feeds back into a higher level of pre-tax income for consumer h. It can also be seen that as the ability difference between the two consumers increases, so does the relative weight given to consumer h.

Carrying out the optimization in (17.17), the consumption levels of consumer $i = h, l$ satisfy the first-order conditions

$$\beta_i u'(C_i) - \frac{\theta_l+\theta_h}{2\theta_l\theta_h} = 0 \tag{17.18}$$

which shows how the consumption levels are proportional to the welfare weights. For consumer h, substituting in the value of β_h gives

$$u'(C_h) = \frac{1}{\theta_h}. \tag{17.19}$$

Consequently the marginal utility of consumer h is inversely proportional to their ability level. With $u'' < 0$ (decreasing marginal utility) this implies that consumption is proportional to ability. Using this result it follows that $MRS_h = 1$ at the optimum. The fact that the marginal rate of substitution is 1 shows that consumer h is facing a zero marginal tax rate. This is the no-distortion-at-the-top result already derived in Chapter 16. For consumer l

$$u'(C_l) = \frac{\theta_l+\theta_h}{\theta_h[3\theta_l-\theta_h]}, \tag{17.20}$$

and $MRS_l = \frac{\theta_h[3\theta_l-\theta_h]}{\theta_l[\theta_l+\theta_h]} < 1$. These show that consumer l faces a positive marginal rate of tax.

The use of quasi-linear utility allows the construction of an explicit solution which shows how the general findings of the previous section translate into this special case. It is interesting to note the simple dependence of consumption levels upon the relative abilities and the manner in which the constraints become translated into a higher effective welfare weight for the high ability consumer. This is showing that this consumer needs to be encouraged to supply more labor through the reward of additional consumption.

17.6 Tax Mix: Separation Principle

Tax systems must be based on observable variables. In practice governments use income and consumption as the basis of taxation, even if they are imperfect measures of individual earning ability. From a lifetime perspective, savings are future consumption and thus, as consumption must equal income, a tax on the value of consumption is equivalent to a tax on income. From this perspective, it does not matter whether taxes are levied on income or on the value of consumption.

In the simple models we have used so far in this chapter, we have assumed that there is a single consumption good When there are two or more consumption goods, the commodity taxes levied upon then need not be uniform. As we showed in Chapter 15, when there is no income tax the Ramsey rule says that the tax on each commodity should be inversely related to the elasticity of demand. We now consider how this conclusion can be modified when income and commodity taxes can be simultaneously employed.

The central question is whether there should be differential commodity taxation when combined with a nonlinear income tax. There is a sense in which commodity taxation can usefully supplement income taxation by reducing the distortion in the labor/consumption choice induced by income tax. If we tax commodities that are substitutes for work and subsidize those that are complements we can encourage people to work more and thus reduce the work discouraging effect of income tax. The optimal differentiation depends on how the preferences for some goods vary with labor supply. Turning this argument around, if the preference between commodities does not vary with labor supply, then there seems to be no argument for differential commodity taxes.

Preferences over commodities are independent of labor supply if the utility function is *separable*. What separable means is that utility can be written as $U = U\left(u(C), L\right)$, so that the marginal rate of substitution between any pair of goods depends only on $u(C)$ and is independent of labor supply. We now demonstrate this if labor and goods are separable in utility then there is no need to supplement an optimal nonlinear income tax with differential commodity taxation.

The result that commodity taxation is not needed with separability between labor and goods is easily demonstrated in the two-ability model we have been using in this chapter. We now interpret C_i as a vector describing the consumption levels of n goods, $C_i = \left(C_1^i, ..., C_n^i\right)$. We already know that the optimal allocation $\{C_i^*, Y_i^*\}$ is constrained by the incentive of high-ability individuals to "disguise" themselves as low-ability. That is, the downward incentive constraint, $U\left(u(C_h^*), Y_h^*/\theta_h\right) \geq U\left(u(C_\ell^*), Y_\ell^*/\theta_h\right)$, is binding at the optimum because it requires less work for a high-ability individual to earn the income Y_ℓ^* of a low-ability individual, $L_h = Y_\ell^*/\theta_h < L_\ell = Y_\ell^*/\theta_\ell$. The only difference between then two types at any given level of income arises from the difference in the amount of work. This feeds into a utility difference, $U\left(u(C_\ell^*), L_\ell\right) \neq U\left(u(C_\ell^*), L_h\right)$, when the high-ability mimic the low-ability. With separable preferences, such a difference does not affect the indifference curves between commodities (since



Figure 17.7: Differential Taxation and Non-Separability

$u(C_\ell^*)$ is the same for both types), so that we cannot use differential taxation to separate the types (*i.e.* to make the consumption bundle of the low-ability individual less attractive to high-ability individual). The fact that differential taxes do not help in relaxing the incentive constraint renders their use unnecessary.

With a non-separable utility function, $U(C, L)$, the indifference curves between commodities differ and we can tax more heavily the good that the high-ability person values more in the low-ability consumption bundle. This reduces the incentive for the high-ability to mimic the low-ability. Figure 17.7 illustrates how differential commodity taxation (changing prices from p to p') can be used to make the consumption bundle of the low-ability type less attractive for the high-ability type. The change in prices from the budget constraint labelled p to the budget constraint labelled p' does not affect the utility of the low-ability (the budget constraint pivots around their indifference curve I_ℓ) but it causes a reduction in utility of the high-ability (shown by the new budget constraint changing the location of the choice from initial indifference curve I_h^1 to the lower indifference curve I_h^2). This reduction in utility for the high-ability type relaxes the incentive constraint.

17.7 Non-tax redistribution

The principal implication of the previous analysis, as reflected in the tax principle, is that society cannot improve redistribution possibilities by using non-fiscal instruments. The question is then why non-fiscal forms of redistribution are so widely used. Governments frequently provide for goods such as education or health services at less than their costs, which may be viewed as redistributional policies. One may expect that a cash transfer of the same value would have more redistributional power than such in-kind transfer programmes. This is mistaken. There are three reasons why such transfers in kind may be superior to cash transfers as achieved through standard tax-transfer programmes.

One reason is *political.* Rather than voting for a tax-transfer scheme which benefits the poor, i might impose my own preferences and vote for providing certain services such as education, even though the recipient would have preferred another use. Voters may support redistributional policies if in kind but not if in cash with use at the discretion of the recipient. Such preference for redistribution in kind. Political considerations dictate that many government provision programmes like education, pension and basic health insurance, be universal. Without such feature the programmes would not have the political support required to be adopted or continued. For instance, public pensions and health care would be far more vulnerable politically if they were targeted to the poor and not available to others. It should be noted that it is not because some government programmes are universal that there is no redistribution. First if the programme is financed by proportional inome taxation, the rich contribute more than the poor. Second, even if everyone contributes the same to the programme, it is possible that the rich will not use the publicly provided good. To take an example, consider public provision of basic health care which is available to everyone for free. The programme is financed by a uniform tax on all households. There exists a private health care alternative with higher quality but at some cost. Since the rich can afford a better quality, they will use the private health even though free public health care is available. These rich households still pay their contribution to the public programme and thus the poor households derive a net benefit from this cross subsidization.

Another reason is *self-selection.* What ultimately sets the limit to redistribution is when its becomes advantageous for higher ability persons to earn lower income by expending less effort and thereby paying taxes (or receiving transfers) intended for the lower ability groups. The limits to redistribution is reached when persons a person of a given ability would be just as well off earning the income of other with lesser ability. The self-selection argument is that anything which makes it less attractive for persons to mimic those with lesser ability could extend the limits to redistribution. As seen in the previous section, if the government could supplement non-linear income tax with differential commodity taxes, it will do so in certain cases (namely, if the shares of income devoted to the consumption of each good depend are not independent of the amount of leisure). For our discussion of non-fiscal redistibutive instruments, the use of in-kind transfers to supplement standard taxation can be optimal. This is an efficiency based argument. Basically, a given degree of redistribution can be more efficiently achieved by using in-kind transfers as supplement ot income taxes. The argument, unlike the separability argument just used for differential commodity taxes, relies on differences in preferences among different income groups. Consider two individuals who differ not only in their ability but also in their health status. Suppose that lesser ability means also poorer health so that the less able also spend more on health. Then both income and health expenditures act as a signal of ability. It follows that the limits to redistribution can be relaxed if transfers are made partly in the form of provision of health care (or equivalently with full subsidization of health expenditures). The reason is simply that the more able individual (with less tendency to become ill) is less likely to claim in-kind benefits in the form of health care provision, than he would be to claim cash benefits. To take another example, suppose the government is considering redistribution either in cash or in the form of low-income housing. All households, needy or not would like the cash transfer. However few non-needy households may want living in low-income housing. They can afford better housing. Thus self-selection arises by which the non-needy drop out of the housing programme and only the needy take up. In short, transfers in kind invite people to self-select in a way which reveals their neediness. When need is correlated to income-earning ability, then in-kind transfers can relax incentive and selection constraints, thereby improving the government ability to redistribute income. Interestingly universal government provision provision

A third reason is *time consistency.* Here the argument for in-kind transfers relies on the inability of government to commit to its future actions. Unlike Strotz (1956) earliest argument on government time inconsistency, it does not arise from a change in government objective over time ((e.g. because of election) nor from the fact that the government is not welfaristic or rational. The time consistency problem arises from a perfectly rational government who does fully respect individual preferences, but who does not have the power to commit its policy on the long run. The time-consistency problem is obvious with pensions. To the extent that households expect governments to provide some basic pensions to those with too little savings, their incentive to save for retirement consumption and provide for themselves is reduced. Anticipating that, the government may prefer to provide public pensions itself. A related time consistency problem can explain why transfer programmes, such as social security, education and job training are in kind. If a welfaristic government cannot commit not to come to the rescue of those in need in the future, potential recipients will have little reason to invest in their education or to undertake job training, because the government will help them out anyway. Again, the government can improve both economic efficiency and redistribution by making education and job training available at less than their cost, rather than making cash transfers of equivalent value.

17.8 Conclusions

We addressed the important question of what limits the extent of redistribution in a society. We began the chapter with the very general concept of selecting the allocation mechanism that achieved the best possible outcome given the constraint that some relevant individual characteristics are private information. This information restriction requires that the characteristics must be reported, either directly or indirectly, as part of the mechanism. The competitive economy with taxation is just one example of a mechanism. What we wished to discover is whether there were any better mechanisms.

When there are no informational problems, lump-sum transfers combined with competitive economic activity can take the economy to the first-best outcome. No mechanism can perform better than this. When there is private information the situation is considerably changed: optimal lump-sum taxes are not incentive compatible. All other forms of taxation (such as income taxes or commodity taxes) are distortionary, so will only ever allow attain allocations strictly worse than the first-best. These observations raise the possibility that there may be allocation mechanisms that can achieve outcomes which are strictly better than those arising from distortionary taxation. Perhaps surprisingly, the Tax Principle shows this is not the case. The taxation of observable variables is as good as any other allocation mechanism.

These are very general and very powerful results. What they do is emphasize from a fresh perspective just how successful is the competitive economy as an allocation mechanism. When combined with intervention via taxation, there is no other allocation mechanism that can better it. But it should always be recalled that the intervention has to be well-intended and that politics can also shape the outcome and constraint further the possibilities of redistribution. For example with political determination of redistribution, increasing the number of the rich can actually leave the poor worse off: as the rich becomes politically more influencial, the extent of redistribution from each rich person may fall by so much as to more than offset the increase in the relative number of rich redistributing to the poor.

The arguments developed in the chapter are also based on welfaristic objectives (i.e. social objectives only but fully respect individual preferences). Recently there has been growing emphasis on non-welfaristic objectives that include equality of chance and capability, fairness, poverty alleviation, inequality. This poses a real challenge not just in the value judgments associated with the different objectives themselves, but also because welfaristic and non-welfaristic objectives are typically in conflict as the social choice theory has convincingly shown. Resolving the conflict itself involves a value judgment that ultimately is left to the political process.

Further reading

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Chapter 18

Tax Evasion

18.1 Introduction

It is not unusual to offered a discount for payment in cash. This is almost routine in the employment of the services of builders, plumbers and decorators. It is less frequent, but still occurs, when major purchases are made in shops. While the expense of banking checks and the commissions charged by credit card companies may explain some of these discounts, the usual explanation is that payment in cash makes concealment of the transaction much easier. Income that can be concealed need not be declared to the tax authorities.

The same motivation can be provided for exaggeration in claims for expenses. By converting income into expenses that are either exempt from tax or deductible from tax, the total tax bill can be reduced. Second jobs are also a lucrative source of income that can be concealed from taxation. A declaration that reports no income, or at least a very low level, is likely to attract more attention to one which declares earnings from primary employment but fails to mention income from secondary employment.

In contrast to these observations on tax evasion, the analysis of taxation in the previous chapters assumed that firms and consumers honestly reported their taxable activities. Although acceptable for providing simplified insights into the underlying issues, this assumption is patently unacceptable when confronted with reality. The purpose of this chapter can therefore be seen as the introduction of practical constraints upon the free choice of tax policy. Tax evasion, the intentional failure to declare taxable economic activity, is pervasive in many economies as the evidence given in the following section makes clear and is therefore a subject of practical as well as theoretical interest.

The chapter begins by considering how tax evasion can be measured. Evidence on the extent of tax evasion in a range of countries is then reviewed. The chapter then proceeds to try to understand the factors involved in the decision to evade tax. Initially, this decision is represented as a choice under uncertainty. The analysis predicts the relationship between the level of evasion, tax rates and punishments. Within this framework, the optimal degree of auditing and of punishment is considered. Evidence that can be used to assess the models predictions is then reviewed. In light of this, some extensions of the basic model are then considered. Then a game-theoretic approach of tax compliance is presented where taxpayers and governments interact strategically. The last section is about the importance of social interaction on compliance decisions.

18.2 The Extent of Evasion

Tax evasion is illegal, so those engaging in it have every reason to seek to conceal what they are doing. This introduces a fundamental difficulty into the measurement of tax evasion. Even so, the fact that the estimates that are available show evasion to constitute a significant part of total economic activity underline the importance of measurement. They also emphasize the value of developing a theory of evasion which can be used to design a tax structure that minimizes evasion and ensures that the policy is optimal given that evasion occurs.

Before proceeding, it is worth making some distinctions. Firstly, *tax evasion* is the failure to declare taxable activity. Tax evasion should be distinguished from *tax avoidance*, which is the reorganization of economic activity, possibly at some cost, to lower tax payment. Tax avoidance is legal, tax evasion is not. In practice, the distinction is not this clear cut since tax avoidance schemes frequently need to be tested in court to clarify their legality. Secondly, the terms *black*, *shadow* or *hidden economy* refer to all economic activities for which payment is made but are not officially declared. Under these headings would be included illegal activities, such as the drug trade, and unmeasured activity such as agricultural output by smallholders. They would also incorporate the legal, but undeclared, income which constitutes tax evasion. Finally, the *unmeasured* economy would be the shadow economy plus activities such as do-it-yourself which are economically valuable but do not involve any transaction.

This discussion reveals that there are several issues concerning how economic activity should be divided between the regular economy and the shadow economy. For instance, most systems of national accounts do not include criminal activity (although Italy, for example, does make some adjustment for smuggling). In principle, the UN System of National Accounts includes both legal and illegal activities and it has been suggested that criminal activity should be made explicit when the system is revised. Although this chapter is primarily about tax evasion, when an attempt is made at the measurement of tax evasion the figures obtained may also include some or all of the components of the shadow economy.

The simplest measure of tax evasion is to use the difference between the income and expenditure measures of national income. The standard analysis of the circular flow of income suggests that these two should be equal: what is spent must be earned. However, the existence of tax evasion can destroy this identity. Income that is undeclared will not figure in the measure of national income but will appear on the expenditure side. This suggests that an expenditure figure in excess of an income figure is an indication of the degree of tax evasion. This method is a useful first step but suffers from the problem that both incomes and expenditures may be undeclared, so it can only place a lower limit on the extent of evasion.

The essential problem involved in the measurement of tax evasion is that the illegality provides an incentive for individuals to keep the activity hidden. Furthermore, by its very nature, tax evasion does not appear in any official statistics. This implies that the extent of tax evasion cannot be measured directly but must be inferred from economic variables that can be observed.

A first method for measuring tax evasion is to use survey evidence. This can be employed either directly or indirectly as an input into an estimation procedure. The obvious difficulty with this is that respondents who are active in the hidden economy have every incentive to conceal the truth. There are two ways in which this issue can be circumvented. Firstly, information collected for other purposes can be employed. One example of this is the use of data from the Family Expenditure Survey in the UK. This survey involves consumers recording their incomes and expenditures in a diary. Participants in this have no reason to falsely recorded information. The relation between income and expenditure can be derived from the respondents whose entire income is obtained in employment which cannot escape tax. This can then be used to infer, from the expenditure recorded, the income of those who do have an opportunity to evade. Although they are not surveys in the normal sense, studies of taxpayer compliance conducted by revenue collection agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service, can be treated as survey evidence and have some claim to accuracy.

The second general method is to infer the extent of tax evasion, or the hidden economy generally, from the observation of another economic variable. This is done by determining total economic activity then subtracting measured activity to gives the hidden economy. The *direct input* approach observes the use of an input to production and from this predicts what output must be. An input which is often used for this purpose is electricity since this universally employed and accurate statistics are kept on energy consumption. The *monetary* approach employs the demand for cash to infer the size of the hidden economy on the basis that transactions in the hidden economy are financed by cash rather than cheques or credit. Given a relationship between the quantity of cash and the level of economic activity. This allows estimation of the hidden economy.

What distinguishes alternative studies that fall under the heading of monetary approaches is the method used to derive the total level of economic activity from the observed use of cash. One way to do this is to assume that there was a base year in which the hidden economy did not exist. The ratio of cash to total activity is then fixed by that year. This ratio allows observed cash use in other years to be compounded up into total activity. An alternative has been to look at the actual use of bank notes. The issuing authorities know the expected lifespan of a note (that is, how many transactions it can finance). Multiplying the number of notes used by the number of transactions gives the total value of activity financed.

Table 18.1 presents a number of estimates of the size of the hidden economy on a range of countries. These figures are based on a combination of the direct input (actually use of electricity as a proxy for output) and money demand approaches. Further details can be found in the reference. The table clearly indicates that the hidden economy is a significant issue, especially in the developing and transition economies. Even for Japan and Austria, which have the smallest estimated size of hidden economy, the percentage figure is still very significant.

Developing	*Transition*	*OECD*
Egypt 68-76%	Georgia 28-43%	Italy 24-30%
Thailand 70%	Ukraine 28-43%	Spain 24-30%
Mexico 40-60%	Hungary 20-28%	Denmark 13-23%
Malaysia 38-50%	Russia 20-27%	France 13-23%
Tunisia 39-45%	Latvia 20-27%	Japan 8-10%
Singapore 13%	Slovakia 9-16%	Austria 8-10%

Table 18.1: Hidden Economy as % of GDP, Average Over 1990-93
Source: Schneider and Enste (2000)

As already noted, all of these estimates are clearly subject to error and must be treated with a degree of caution. Having said this, there is a degree of consistency running through them. Since they indicate that a value for the hidden economy of at least 10% would not be an unreasonable approximation, they show that undeclared economic activity is substantial relative to total economic activity. Tax evasion is an important phenomenon and merits extensive investigation.

18.3 The Evasion Decision

The estimates of the hidden economy have revealed that this is a significant part of overall economic activity. We now turn to modeling the decision to evade in order to understand how the decision is made and the factors that can affect that decision.

The simplest model of the evasion decision considers it to be just a gamble. If a taxpayer declares less then their true income (or overstates deductions) there is a chance that they may do so without being detected. This leads to a clear benefit over making an honest declaration. However there is a chance that they may be caught. When they are, a punishment is inflicted (usually a fine, but sometimes imprisonment) and they are worse-off than if they had been honest. In deciding how much to evade the taxpayer has to weigh-up these gains and losses, taking account of the chance of being caught and the level of the punishment.

A simple formal statement of this decision problem can be given as follows. Let the taxpayer have an income level Y which they know but which is not known to the tax collector. The income declared by the taxpayer, X, is taxed at a constant rate t. The amount of unreported income is $Y - X \geq 0$ and the unpaid tax is $t[Y - X]$. If the taxpayer evades without being caught, their income is given by $Y^{nc} = Y - tX$. When the taxpayer is caught evading, all income is taxed and a fine at rate F is levied on the tax that has been evaded. This gives an income level $Y^{c} = [1 - t] Y - Ft [Y - X]$. If income is understated, the probability of being caught is p.

Assume that the taxpayer derives utility $U(Y)$ from an income Y. After making declaration X, the income level Y^{c} occurs with probability p and the income level Y^{nc} with probability $1 - p$. In the face of such uncertainty, the taxpayer should choose the income declaration to maximize expected utility. Combining these facts, the declaration X solves

$$\max_{\{X\}} E[U(X)] = [1 - p] U(Y^{nc}) + pU(Y^{c}). \tag{18.1}$$

The solution to this choice problem can be derived graphically. To do this, observe that there are two states of the world. In one state of the world, the taxpayer is not caught evading and has income Y^{nc}. In the other state of the world, they are caught and have income Y^{c}. The expected utility function describes preferences over income levels in these two states. The choice of a declaration X determines an income level in each state, and by varying X the taxpayer can trade-off income between the two states. A high value of X provides relatively more income in the state in which the taxpayer is caught evading and a low value of X relatively more when they are not caught.

The details of this trade-off can be identified by considering two extreme values of X. When the maximum declaration is made, so $X = Y$, the taxpayer's income will be $[1 - t] Y$ in both states of the world. Alternatively, when the minimum declaration of $X = 0$ is made, income will be $[1 - t(1 + F)] Y$ if caught and Y if not. These two points are illustrated in Figure **??** income when not caught against income when caught. The other options available to the consumer lie on the line joining $X = 0$ and $X = Y$; this is the opportunity set showing the achievable allocations of income between the two states. From the utility function can be derived a set of indifference curves - the points on an indifference curve being income levels in the two states which give the same level of utility. Adding the indifference curves of the utility function completes the diagram and allows the taxpayer's choice to be depicted. The taxpayer whose preferences are shown in Figure **??** chooses to locate at the point with declarationX^{*}. This is an interior point with $0 < X < Y$ - some tax is evaded but some income is declared.

As well as the interior location of Figure 18.1 it is also possible for corner solutions to arise. The consumer whose preferences are shown in Figure 18.2a chooses to declare their entire income so $X = Y$. In contrast the consumer in Figure 18.2b declares no income, so $X = 0$.

The interesting question is what condition guarantees that evasion will occur rather than the no-evasion corner solution with $X = Y$. Comparing the figures it can be seen that evasion will occur if the indifference curve is steeper than the budget constraint where it crosses the dashed 45^{o} line. The condition that



Figure 18.1: Interior Choice: $0 < X^* < Y$



a : $X^* = Y$

b : $X^* = 0$

Figure 18.2: Corner Solutions

ensures this occurs is easily derived. Totally differentiating the expected utility function (18.1) at a constant level of utility gives the slope of the indifference curve as

$$\frac{dY^c}{dY^{nc}} = -\frac{[1-p]\, U^{'}\left(Y^{nc}\right)}{pU'\left(Y^c\right)}. \tag{18.2}$$

where $U^{'}\left(Y\right)$ is the marginal utility of income level Y. On the 45^o line $Y^{nc} = Y^c$ so the marginal utility of income is the same whether caught or not. This implies

$$\text{slope of indifference curve} = -\frac{1-p}{p}. \tag{18.3}$$

What this expression implies is that all the indifference curves have the same slope, $-\frac{[1-p]}{p}$, where they cross the 45^o line. The slope of the budget constraint is seen in Figure 18.1 to be given by the ratio of the penalty $Ft\left[Y-X\right]$ to the unpaid tax $t\left[Y-X\right]$. Thus

$$\text{slope of budget constraint} = -F \tag{18.4}$$

Using these conditions, the indifference curve is steeper than the budget constraint on the 45° line if

$$\frac{1-p}{p} > F, \tag{18.5}$$

or

$$p < \frac{1}{1+F}. \tag{18.6}$$

This result shows that evasion will arise if the probability of detection is too small relative to the fine rate.

Several points can be made about this condition for evasion. First, this is a trigger condition that determines whether or not evasion will arise; but it does not say anything about the extent of evasion. Second, the condition is dependent only on the fine rate and the probability of detection so it applies for all taxpayers regardless of their utility-of-income function $U\left(Y\right)$. Consequently it follows that if one taxpayer chooses to evade, they should all evade.

Third, this condition can be given some practical evaluation. Typical punishments inflicted for tax evasion suggest that an acceptable magnitude for F is between 0.5 and 1. In the UK, the Taxes Management Act specifies the maximum fine as 100 percent of the tax lost, which implies the maximum value of $F = 1$. This makes the ratio $1/1+F$ greater or equal to $1/2$. Information on p is hard to obtain but a figure of between 1 in a 100 or 1 in a 1000 evaders being caught is probably a fair estimate. Therefore $p < 1/2 < \frac{1}{1+F}$ and the conclusion is reached that the model predicts all taxpayers should be evading. In the US, taxpayers who understate their tax liabilities may be subjected to penalties at a rate between 20-75 percent of the under-reported taxes depending on the gravity of the offence. The proportion of all individual tax returns that are audited was 1.7 percent in 1997. This is clearly not big enough to deter



Figure 18.3: Increase in Detection Probability

cheating and everyone should be under-reporting taxes. In fact the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program reveals that 40 percent of US taxpayers underpaid their taxes. This is a sizeable minority, but not as widespread evasion as the theoretical model would predict. So taxpayers appears to be more honest than might be expected.

The next step is to determine the amount of tax evasion and how it is affected by changes in the model's variables. There are four such variables that are of interest: the income level Y, the tax rate t, the probability of detection p and the fine rate F. These effects can be explored by using the figure depicting the choice of evasion level.

Take the probability of detection first. The probability of detection does not affect the opportunity set but does affect preferences. The effect of an increase in p is to make the indifference curves flatter where they cross the 45^o line. As shown in Figure 18.3, this moves the optimal choice closer to the point $X = Y$ of honest declaration. The amount of income declared rises, so an increase in the probability of detection reduces the level of evasion. This is a clearly expected result since an increase in the likelihood of detection lowers the payoff from evading and makes evasion a less attractive proposition.

A change in the fine rate only affects income when the taxpayer is caught evading. The consequence of an increase in F is that the budget constraint pivots round the honest report point and becomes steeper. Since the indifference curve is unaffected by the penalty change, the optimal choice must again move closer to the honest declaration point. This is shown in Figure 18.4 by the move from the initial choice of X^{old} when the fine rate if F to the choice X^{new} when the fine rate increases to $\widehat{F}$. An increase in the fine rate therefore leads to a reduction in the level of tax evasion. This, and the previous result, shows that



Figure 18.4: Increase in the Fine Rate

the effects of the detection and punishment variables upon the level of evasion are unambiguous.

Now consider the effect of an increase in income. This causes the budget constraint to move outward. As already noted the slope of the budget constraint is equal to $-F$ which does not change with income, so the shift is a parallel one. The optimal choice then moves from X^{old} to X^{new} in Figure 18.5. How the evasion decision is affected depends upon the degree of absolute risk aversion, $R_A(Y) = -\frac{U''(Y)}{U'(Y)}$, of the utility function. What absolute risk aversion measures is the willingness to engage in small bets of fixed size. If $R_A(Y)$ is constant as Y changes, the optimal choices will be on a locus parallel to the 45^o line. There is evidence, though, that in practice $R_A(Y)$ decreases as income increases, so wealthier individuals are more prone to engage in small bets, in the sense that the odds demanded to participate diminish. This causes the locus of choices to bend away from the 45^o line, so that the amount of undeclared income rises as actual income increases. This is the outcome shown in Figure 18.5. Hence with increasing absolute risk aversion an increase in income increases tax evasion.

The final variable to consider is the tax rate. An increase in t moves the budget constraint inwards. As can be seen in Figure 18.6 the outcome is not clear-cut. However, when absolute risk aversion is decreasing the effect of the tax increase is to reduce tax evasion.

This final result has received much discussion since it is counter to what seems reasonable. A high tax rate is normally seen as providing a motive for tax evasion whereas the model predicts precisely the converse. Why the result emerges is because the fine paid by the consumer is determined by t times F.



Figure 18.5: Income Increase



Figure 18.6: Tax Rate Increase

An increase in the tax rate thus has the effect of raising the penalty. This takes income away from the taxpayer when they are caught - the state in which they have least income. It is through this mechanism that a higher tax rate can reduce evasion.

This completes the analysis of the basic model of tax evasion. It has been shown how the level of evasion is determined and how this is affected by the parameters of the model. The next section turn to the issue of determining the optimal levels of auditing and punishment when the behavior of taxpayers corresponds to the predictions of this model. Some empirical and experimental evidence is then considered and the model is assessed in the light of this.

18.4 Auditing and Punishment

The analysis of the tax evasion decision assumed that the probability of detection and the rate of the fine levied when caught evading were fixed. This is a satisfactory assumption from the perspective of the individual taxpayer. From the government's perspective, though, these are variables that can be chosen. The probability of detection can be raised by the employment of additional taxpayers and the fine can be legislated or set by the courts. The purpose of this section is to analyze the issues involved in the government's decision.

It has already been shown that an increase in either p or F will reduce the amount of undeclared income. The next step is consider how they affect the level of revenue raised by the government. Revenue in this context is defined as taxes paid plus the money received from fines. From a taxpayer with income Y the expected value (it is expected since there is only a probability the taxpayer will be fined) of the revenue collected is

$$R = tX + p(1+F)t\left[Y - X\right]. \tag{18.7}$$

Differentiating with respect to p shows that the effect upon revenue of an increase in the probability of detection is

$$\frac{\partial R}{\partial p} = (1+F)t\left[Y - X\right] + t\left[1 - p - pF\right]\frac{\partial X}{\partial p} > 0, \tag{18.8}$$

whenever $pF < 1 - p$. Recalling (18.6), if $pF \geq 1 - p$ there is no evasion and so p has no effect on revenue. Carrying out the differentiation for the fine rate shows that if $pF < 1 - p$

$$\frac{\partial R}{\partial F} = pt\left[Y - X\right] + t\left[1 - p - pF\right]\frac{\partial X}{\partial F} > 0. \tag{18.9}$$

Again, the fine has no effect if $pF \geq 1 - p$. These expressions show that if evasion is taking place, an increase in either the probability of detection or of the fine will increase the revenue the government receives.

The choice problem of the government can now be addressed. It has already been noted that an increase in the probability of detection can be achieved by the employment of additional tax inspectors. Tax inspectors require payment so, as a consequence, an increase in p is costly to achieve. In contrast, there is no cost involved in raising or lowering the fine. Effectively, increases in F are costless to produce. From these observations, the optimal policy can be determined.

Since p is costly and F is free, the interests of the government are best served by reducing p close to zero whilst raising F towards infinity. This has been termed the policy of "*hanging taxpayers with probability zero*". Expressed in words, the government should put virtually no effort into attempting to catch tax evaders but should severely punish those it apprehends. This is an extreme form of policy and nothing like it is observed in practice. Surprising as it is, it does follow from the logical application of the model.

Numerous comments can be made in respect of this result. The first begins with the objective of the government. In previous chapters it has been assumed that the government is guided in its policy choice by a social welfare function. There will be clear differences between a policy designed to maximize revenue and one that maximizes welfare. For instance, inflicting an infinite fine upon a taxpayer caught evading will have a significantly detrimental effect on welfare. Even if the government does not pursue welfare maximization, it may be constrained by political factors such as the need to ensure re-election. A policy of severely punishing tax evaders may be politically damaging especially if tax evasion is a widely-established phenomenon.

One could think that such argument is not relevant because if the punishment is large enough to deter cheating, it should not matter how dire it is. The fear keeps everyone from cheating, hence the punishment never actually occurs and its costs is irrelevant. The problem with this argument is that it ignores the risk of mistakes. The detection process may go wrong or the taxpayer can mistakenly understate taxable income. If punishment are as large as possible, even for small tax underpayments, then mistakes will be very costly. To reduce the cost of mistakes, the punishment should be of the smallest size required to deter cheating. Minimal deterrence accomplishes this purpose.

A further observation, and one whose consequences will be investigated in detail, concerns the policy instruments under the government's control. The view of the government so far is that it a single entity that chooses the level of all its policy instruments simultaneously. In practice, the government consists of many different departments and agencies. When it comes to taxation and tax policy, a reasonable breakdown would be to view the tax rate as set by central government as part of a general economic policy. The probability of detection is controlled by a revenue service whose objective is the maximization of revenue. Finally, the punishment for tax evasion is set by the judiciary.

This breakdown shows why the choice of probability and fine may not be chosen in a cohesive manner by a single authority. What it does not do is provide any argument for why the fine should not be set infinitely high to deter evasion. An explanation for this can be found by applying reasoning from the economics of crime. This would view tax evasion as just another crime, and the punishment for it should fit with the scheme of punishments for other crimes. The construction of these punishments relies on the argument that they should provide incentives that lessen the overall level of crime. To see what this means, imagine that crimes can be ranked from least harmful to most harmful. Naturally, if someone is going to commit a crime, the authorities wish that they commit a less harmful one rather than a more harmful one. If more harmful ones are also more rewarding (think of robbing a bank whilst armed compared to merely attempting to snatch cash), then a scheme of equal punishments will not provide any incentive for committing the less harmful crime. What will provide the right incentive is for the more harmful crime to also have a heavier punishment. So the extent of punishment should be related to the harmfulness of the crime. Punishment should fit the crime.

This framework has two implications. First of all, the punishment for tax evasion will not be varied freely in order to maximized revenue. Instead it will be set as part of a general crime policy. The second implication is that the punishment will also be quite modest since tax evasion is not an especially harmful crime. Arguments such as these are reflected in the fact that the fine rate on evasion is quite low - a figure in the order of 1.5 to 2 would not be unrealistic. As already noted, the maximum fine in the UK is 100% of the unpaid tax, but the Inland Revenue may accept a lesser fine depending on the "size and gravity" of the offence.

Putting all of these arguments together suggests adopting a different perspective on choosing the optimal probability of detection. With the tax rate set as a tool of economic policy and the fine set by the judiciary, the only instrument under the control of the revenue service is the probability of detection. As already seen, an increase in this raises revenue but only does so at a cost. The optimal probability is found when the marginal gain in revenue just equals the marginal cost - and this could occur at a very low value of p.

18.5 Evidence on Evasion

The model of tax evasion has predicted the effect that changes in various parameters will have upon the level of tax evasion. In some cases, such as the effect of the probability of detection and the fine, these are unambiguous. In others, particularly the effect of changes in the tax rate, the effects depend upon the precise specification of the tax system and upon assumptions concerning attitudes towards risk. These uncertainties make it valuable to investigate further evidence to see how the ambiguities are resolved in practice. The analysis of evidence also allows the investigation of the relevance of other parameters, such as the source of income, and other hypotheses on tax evasion, for example the importance of social norms.

There have been two approaches taken in studying tax evasion. The first has been to collect survey or interview data and use econometric analysis to provide a quantitative determination of the relationships. The second has been to use experiments to provide an opportunity of designing the environment to permit the investigation of particular hypotheses.

The results that have been found can be summarized as follows. When income levels ascertained from interviews has been contrasted to that given on the tax returns of the same individuals, a steady decline of declared income as a proportion of reported income occurs as income rises. This finding is in agreement with the comparative statics analysis. Table 18.2 provides a sample of data to illustrate this. Interviewees were placed in income intervals according to their responses to interview questions. The information on their tax declaration was then used to determine assessed income. The percentage is then found by dividing the assessed income by the midpoint of the income interval.

Income Interval	17-20	20-25	25-30	30-35	35-40
Midpoint	18.5	22.5	27.5	32.5	37.5
Assessed Income	17.5	20.6	24.2	28.7	31.7
Percentage	94.6	91.5	88.0	88.3	84.5

Table 18.2: Declaration and Income
Source: Mork (1975)

Econometrics and survey methods have been used to investigate the importance of attitudes and social norms in the evasion decision. The study reported in Table 18.3 shows that the propensity to evade taxation is reduced by an increased probability of detection and an increase in age. An increase in income reduces the propensity to evade. With respect to the attitude and social variables, both an increase in the perceived inequity of taxation and of the number of other tax evaders known to the individual make evasion more likely. The extent of tax evasion is also increased by the attitude and social variables but was also increased by the experience of the tax payer with previous tax audits. The social variables are clearly important in the decision to evade tax.

	Propensity to Evade	Extent of Evasion
Inequity	0.34	0.24
No. of Evaders Known	0.16	0.18
Probability of Detection	-0.17	
Age	-0.29	
Experience of Audits	0.22	0.29
Income Level	-0.27	
Income from Wages and Salaries	0.20	

Table 18.3: Explanatory Factors
Source: Spicer and Lundstedt (1976)

As far as the effect of the tax rate is concerned, data from the Internal Revenue Services Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program survey of 1969 shows that tax evasion increases as the marginal tax rates increases but is decreased when wages where a significant proportion of income. This result is supported by employing the difference between income and expenditure figures in National Accounts as a measure of evasion. In contrast a study, of Belgian data found precisely the converse conclusion with tax increases leading to lower evasion. Therefore these studies do not resolve the ambiguity about the relation between marginal tax rates and tax evasion.

Turning now to *experimental* studies, tax evasion games have shown that evasion increases with the tax rate and that evasion falls as the fine is increased and the detection probability reduced. Further results have shown that women evade more often than men but evade lower amounts and that purchasers of lottery tickets, presumed to be less risk averse, were no more likely to evade than non-purchasers but evaded greater amounts when they did evade. Finally, the very nature of the tax evasion decision has been tested by running two sets of experiments. One was framed as a tax evasion decision and the other as a simple gamble with the same payoffs. For the tax evasion experiment some taxpayers chose not to evade even when they would under the same conditions with the gambling experiment.

There are two important lessons to be drawn from this brief review of the empirical and experimental results. Firstly, the theoretical predictions are generally supported except for the effect of the tax rate. The latter remains uncertain with conflicting conclusions from the evidence. Secondly it appears that tax evasion is more than the simple gamble portrayed in the basic model. In addition to the basic element of risk, there are attitudinal and social aspects to the evasion decision.

18.6 Effect of Honesty

The evidence discussed in the previous section has turned up a number of factors that are not explained by the basic model of tax evasion. Foremost amongst these are that some taxpayers choose not to evade even when they would accept an identical gamble and that there are social aspects of the evasion decision. The purpose of this section is to show how simple modifications to the model can incorporate these factors and can change the conclusions concerning the effect of the tax rate.

The feature that distinguishes tax evasion from a simple gamble is that taxpayers submitting incorrect returns feel varying degrees of anxiety and regret. To some, being caught would represent a traumatic experience which would do immense damage to their self-image. To others, it would be only a slight inconvenience. The innate belief in honesty of some taxpayers is not captured by representing tax evasion as just a gamble nor are the non-monetary costs of detection and punishment captured by preferences defined on income alone. The first intention of this section is to incorporate these features into the analysis and to study their consequences.

A preference for honesty can be introduced into the utility function by writing utility as

$$U = U(Y) - \chi E,$$

where χ is the measure of the taxpayers honesty and, with $E = Y - X$ the extent of evasion, χE is the utility cost of deviating from complete honesty. To see the consequence of this assumption, assume that taxpayers differ in their value of χ

but are identical in all other respects. Those with higher values of χ will suffer from a greater utility reduction for any given level of evasion. In order for them to evade, the utility gain from evasion must exceed this utility reduction. The population is therefore separated into two parts with some taxpayers choosing not to evade (those with high values of χ) while others will evade (those with low χ). It is tempting to label those who do not evade as honest, but this is not really appropriate since they will evade if the benefit is sufficiently great.

Let the value of χ that separates the evaders from the non-evaders be denoted $\widehat{\chi}$. A change in one of the parameters of the model (p, F and t) now has two effects. Firstly, it changes the benefit from evasion so alters the value of $\widehat{\chi}$. For instance, an increase in the rate of tax raises the benefit of evasion so increases $\widehat{\chi}$ with the consequence that more taxpayers evade. Secondly, the change in the parameter affects the evasion decision of all existing tax evaders. Putting together these effects together, it becomes possible for an increase in the tax rate to lead to more evasion in aggregate. This is in contrast to the basic model where it would reduce evasion.

The discussion of the empirical evidence has drawn attention to the positive connection between the number of tax evaders known to a taxpayer and the level of that taxpayer's own evasion. This observation suggests that the evasion decision is not made in isolation by each taxpayer but is made with reference to the norms and behavior of the general society of the taxpayer. Given the empirical significance of such norms, the second part of this section focuses on their implications.

Social norms have been incorporated into the evasion decision in two distinct ways. It can be introduced as an additional element of the utility cost to evasion. The additional utility cost is assumed to be an increasing function of the proportion of taxpayers who do not evade. This formulation is intended to capture the fact that more utility will be lost, in terms of reputation, the more out of step the taxpayer is with the remainder of society. The consequence of this modification is to reinforce the separation of the population into evaders and non-evaders.

An alternative approach is to explicitly impose a social norm upon behavior. One such social norm can be based on the concept of Kantian morality and, effectively, has each individual assessing their fair contribution in tax payments towards the provision of public goods. This calculation then provides an upper bound on the extent of tax evasion. To calculate the actual degree of tax evasion each taxpayer then performs the expected utility maximization calculation, as in (18.1), and evades whichever is the smaller out of this quantity and the previously determined upper bound. This formulation is also able to provide a positive relation between the tax rate and evaded tax for some range of taxes and to divide the population into those who evade tax and those who do not.

The introduction of psychic costs and of social norms is capable of explaining some of the empirically observed features of tax evasion which are not explained by the standard expected utility maximization hypothesis. It does this modifying the form of preferences but the basic nature of the approach is unchanged. The obvious difficulty with these changes is that there is little to suggest precisely how social norms and utility costs of dishonesty should be formalized.

18.7 Tax Compliance Game

An initial analysis of the choice of audit probability was undertaken in Section 18.4. It was argued there that the practical situation involves a revenue service that chooses the probability to maximize total revenue taking as given the tax rate and the punishment. The choice of probability in this setting requires an analysis of the interaction between the revenue service and the taxpayers. The revenue service reacts to the declarations of taxpayers, and taxpayers make declarations on the basis of the detection probability.

Such interaction is best analyzed by formalizing the structure of the game that is being played between the revenue service and the taxpayers. The choice of a strategy for the revenue service is the probability with which it chooses to audit any given value of declaration. This probability need not be constant for declarations of different values and is based on its perception of the behaviour of taxpayers. For the taxpayers, a strategy is a choice of declaration given the audit strategy of the revenue service. At a Nash equilibrium of the game, the strategy choices must be mutually optimal: the audit strategy must maximise the revenue collected, net of the costs of auditing, given the declarations and the declaration must maximize utility given the audit strategy.

Even without specifying details of the game, it is possible to make a general observation: predictability in auditing cannot be an equilibrium strategy. This can be seen in several stages. First, no auditing at all cannot be a optimal because it would mean maximal tax evasion. Secondly, auditing of all declarations cannot be a solution either because no revenue service would incur the cost of auditing knowing that full enforcement induces everyone to comply. Finally, prespecified limits on the range of delarations that will be audited are also flawed. Taxpayers who are considering under-reporting income will make sure that they stay just outside the audit limit, and those who cannot avoid being audited will choose to report truthfully. Exactly the wrong set of taxpayers will be audited. This establishes that the equilibrium strategy must be unpredictable.

To be unpredictable, the audit strategy must be random. But how should the probability of audit depend on the information available on the tax return? Since the incentive of a taxpayer is to understate income to reduce their tax liabilities, it seems to require that the probability of an audit should be higher for low income reports. More precisely, the probability of an audit should be high for an income report that is low compared to what one would expect from someone in that taxpayer's occupation or given the information on previous tax returns for that taxpayer. This is what theory predicts and what is done in practice.

A simple version of the strategic interaction between the revenue service and a taxpayer is depicted in Figure **??**. The taxpayer with true income Y can either evade (reporting zero income) or not (truthful income report) By reporting truthfully the taxpayer pays tax T to the revenue service (with $T < Y$). The

Revenue Service

		Audit	No Audit
Taxpayer	Evasion	$Y-T-F,\ T+F-C$	$Y,\ 0$
	No Evasion	$Y-T,\ T-C$	$Y-T,\ T$

Figure 18.7: The Audit Game

revenue service can either audit the income report or not audit. An audit costs C for the government to conduct but provides irrefutable evidence on whether the taxpayer has misreported income. If the taxpayer is caught evading, he pays the tax due, T, plus a fine F (where the fine includes the cost of auditing and tax surcharge so that $F > C$). If the taxpayer is not caught evading then he pays no tax at all. The two players choose their strategies simultaneously which reflects the fact that the revenue service does not know whether the taxpayer has chosen to evade when it decides whether to audit. To make the problem interesting we assume that $C < T$, the cost of auditing is less than the tax due.

There is no pure strategy equilibrium in this tax compliance game. If the revenue servicet does not audit, the agent strictly prefers evading, and therefore the revenue is better off auditing as $T+F > C$. On the other hand, if the revenue service audits with certainty, the taxpayer prefers not to evade as $T + F > T$, which implies that the revenue service is better off not auditing. Therefore the revenue must play a mixed strategy in equilibrium, with the audit strategy being random. Similarly, for the taxpayer, the evasion strategy must also be random.

Let e be the probability that the taxpayer evades, and p the probability of audit. To obtain the equilibrium probabilities, we solve the conditions that the players must be indifferent between their two pure strategies. For the government to be indifferent between auditing and not auditing, it must be the case that the cost from auditing, C equals the expected gain in tax and fine revenue, $e[T + F]$. For the taxpayer to be indifferent between evading and not evading, the expected gain from evading, $(1-p)T$ equals the expected penalty pF. Hence in equilibrium the probability of evasion is

$$e^* = \frac{C}{T+F}, \tag{18.10}$$

and the probability of audit is

$$p^* = \frac{T}{T+F}, \tag{18.11}$$

where both e^* and p^* belong to the interval $(0, 1)$ so that both evasion and audit strategies are random.

The equilibrium probabilities are determined by the strategic interaction between the taxpayer and the revenue service. For instance, the audit probability declines with the fine, though a higher fine may be expected to make auditing more profitable. The reason is that a higher fine discourages evasion, thus making auditing less useful. Similarly, evasion is less likely with high tax because the higher tax induces the government to audit more. Note that these results are obtained without specifying the details of the fine function which could be either a lump sum amount or something proportional to evaded tax. Evasion is also more likely the more costly is auditing, since the revenue service is willing to audit at a higher cost only if the taxpayer is more likely to have evaded tax. The equilibrium payoffs are

$$u^* = Y - T + e^*[T - p^*[T + F]], \tag{18.12}$$

for the taxpayer and

$$v^* = (1 - e^*)T + p^*[e^*[T + F] - C], \tag{18.13}$$

for the revenue service. Substituting into these payoffs the equilibrium probabilities of evasion and audit gives

$$u^* = Y - T, \tag{18.14}$$

$$v^* = T - \frac{C}{T + F}T. \tag{18.15}$$

Because the taxpayer is indifferent between evading or not evading, his equilibrium payoff is equal to his truthful payoff $Y - T$. This means that the unpaid taxes and the fine cancel out in expected terms. Increasing the fine does not affect the taxpayer. However a higher fine increases the payoff of the revenue service since it reduces the amount of evasion. Hence increasing the penalty is Pareto improving in this model. The equilibrium payoffs also reflect the cost from evasion. Indeed for any tax T paid by the taxpayer, the revenue service effectively receives $T - \Delta$ where $\Delta = \frac{C}{T+F}T$ is the deadweight loss from evasion. Thus evasion involves a deadweight loss that is increasing with the tax rate.

18.8 Compliance and Social Interaction

It has been assumed so far that the decision by any taxpayer to comply with the tax law is independent of what the other taxpayers are doing. This decision is based entirely on the enforcement policy (penalty and auditing) and the economic opportunity (tax rates and income). In practice, however, we may expect that someone is more likely to break the law when non-compliance is already widespread than when it is confined to a small segment of the population. This observation is supported by the evidence in Table 18.3 which shows that tax compliance is susceptible to social interaction.

The reasoning behind this social interaction can be motivated along the following lines. The amount of stigma or guilt I feel if I do not comply may depend on what others do and think. Whether they also underpay taxes may determine how I feel if I do not comply. As we now show, this simple interdependence between taxpayers can trigger a dynamic process that moves the economy toward either full compliance or no compliance at all.

To see this, consider a set of taxpayers. Each taxpayer has to decide whether to evade taxes or not. Fixing the enforcement parameters, the payoff from evading taxes depends on the number of non-compliers. In particular, the payoff from non-compliance is increasing with the number of non-compliers because then the chances of getting away with the act of evasion increase. On the other hand, the payoff from compliance decreases with the number of non-compliers. The reason can be that you suffer some resentment cost from abiding with the law when so many are breaking the law. Therefore individuals care about the overall compliance in the group when choosing to comply themselves.

It follows from this that the choice of tax evasion becomes more attractive when more taxpayers make the same choice of breaking the law. Because of the way interactions work, the aggregate compliance tendency is toward one of the extremes: only the worst outcome of nobody complying or the best outcome of full compliance are possible. This is illustrated in the Figure 18.8 depicting the payoff from compliance and non-compliance (vertical axis) against the non-compliance rate in the group (horizontal axis). At the intersection of the two payoff functions taxpayers are indifferent between compliance or non-compliance. Starting from this point, a small reduction in non-compliance would break the indifference in favour of compliance and trigger a chain reaction toward increasing compliance. Alternatively a small increase in non-compliance triggers a chain reaction in the opposite direction making non-compliance progressively more and more attractive.

In this situation, how do we get to encourage taxpayers to abide by the law when the dynamic is pushing in the opposite direction? The solution is to get a critical mass of individuals complying to reverse the dynamic. This requires a short but intense audit policy backed by a harsh punishment in order to change the decisions of enough taxpayers that the dynamics switch toward full compliance. When at this new full compliance equilibrium, it is then possible to cut down on audit costs because compliance is self-sustained by the large numbers of taxpayers who comply. It follows from this simple argument that moderate enforcement policy with few audits and light penalties over a long period is ineffective. Another interesting implication of this model is that two countries with similar enforcement policies can end up with very different compliance rates. Social interaction can be a crucial explanation for the astoundingly high variance of compliance rates across locations and over time: much higher than what can be predicted by differences in local enforcement policies.



Figure 18.8: Compliance Rate

18.9 Conclusions

Tax evasion is an important and significant phenomenon that affects both developed and developing economies. Although there is residual uncertainty surrounding the accuracy of measurements, even the most conservative estimates suggest the hidden economy in the UK and US to be at least ten per cent of the measured economy. There are many countries where it si very much higher. The substantial size of the hidden economy, and the tax evasion that accompanies it, requires understanding so that the effects of policies that interact with it can be correctly forecast.

The predictions of the standard representation of tax evasion as a choice with risk were derived and contrasted with empirical and experimental evidence. This showed that although it is valuable as a starting point for a theory of evasion, the model did not incorporate some key aspects of the evasion decision, most notably the effects of a basic wish to avoid dishonesty and the the social interaction between taxpayers. The analysis was then extended to incoporporate both of these issues.

Further reading

One of the earliest model of tax compliance:

Allingham M. and A. Sandmo, 1972, Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis, *Journal of Public Economic*s, **1**, 323-38.

Becker, G., 1968, Crime and punishment: an economic approach, *Journal of Political Economy*, **76**, 169-217.

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For a comprehensive survey of the extent of tax evasion in wide range of countries:

Schneider F., and Enste D.H., 2000, "Shadow economies: Size, causes, and consequences", *Journal of Economic Literature*, **38**, 77-114.

Empirical and experimental evidence is found in

Baldry, J.C., 1986, “Tax evasion is not a gamble“, *Economics Letters*, **22**, 333 - 335.

Mork, K.A., 1975, “Income tax evasion: some empirical evidence“, *Public Finance*, **30**, 70-76.

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On the effect of social interaction on law compliance

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Game theoretic model of the strategic interaction between taxpayer and enforcement agency, including honest taxpayers:

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Part VII

Multiple Jurisdictions

Chapter 19

Fiscal Federalism

19.1 Introduction

Fiscal federalism is the division of revenue collection and expenditure responsibilities between different levels of government. Most countries have a central (or federal) government, state or county governments, town councils and, at the lowest level, parish councils. Each level has restrictions on the tax instruments it can employ and the expenditures that it can make. Together they constitute the multi-levelled and overlapping administration that governs a typical developed country.

The central government can usually choose whatever tax instruments it pleases and, although it has freedom in its expenditure, it usually focuses upon national defence, the provision of law and order, infrastructure and transfer payments. The taxation powers of state governments are more restricted. In the UK they can levy only property taxes; in the US both commodity and local income taxes are allowed. Their responsibilities include education, local infrastructure and the provision of health care. Local governments provide services such as rubbish collection and parks. The responsibility for the police and fire service can be at either the state or local level. These levels of government are connected by overlapping responsibilities and transfers payments between levels.

The issue of fiscal federalism is not restricted to the design of government within countries. Indeed, the recent impetus for the advancement of this theory has been issues involving the design of institutional structures for the European Union. The progress made towards economic and monetary integration has begun to raise questions about subsidiarity, which is the degree of independence that individual countries will maintain in the setting of taxes. Such arguments just involve the application of fiscal federalism, albeit at a larger scale.

These observations lead to a number of interesting economic questions. Firstly, why should there be more than one level of government? Using the logic of economic reasoning, multi-level government can only be justified if it can achieve something that a single-level cannot. Explanations of what this can be must revolve around access to information and how this can be best utilized. If this argument is accepted, and it is explored in detail below, then a second question arises. How are the functions of government allocated between the levels? A brief sketch of how this works in practice has already been given; is this outcome efficient or does it reflect some other factors?

The next section of the chapter will consider the rationale for multi-level government, focussing upon the availability of information. Section 2 provides an overview of arguments in favour of multi-level government. A more detailed analysis of some of the key issues is given in Section 3 and the concept of an optimal structure is investigated. The issue of accountability and decentralization is analyzed in Section 4. The essential elements of inter-regional risk sharing are presented in Section 5 and the distinction between insurance and redistribution is discussed. Section 6 provides empirical evidence on the extent of decentralization by countries and functions, and the main determinants of the observed decentralization. Concluding comments are in Section 7.

19.2 Arguments for Multi-Level Government

The economic arguments for having government are founded on the two principles outlined in Chapter 6. If there is market failure, the government can intervene in the economy to increase efficiency. It can also intervene to improve equity, regardless of whether the economy is efficient or not. These arguments justify intervention; to justify multi-level government the case must be made objectives of efficiency and equity are better-served by a combination of local and central government.

If the correct decisions are made about the level of public good provision and about taxes, then it does not matter at which level of government they are taken. Provided that there are no resources wasted in overlapping responsibilities, the number of levels of government is a matter of indifference. A case for multi-level government must therefore be sought in differences in information and political process that allow some structures to achieve better outcomes than others.

Decisions should be taken at a national level if they involve public goods which serve the entire economy. The obvious example here would be defence, the benefits of which cannot be assigned to any particular community within the economy. It is common to argue that all citizens should have the same access to the law, have the same rights under the law and be subject to the same restrictions. An application of this equity argument supports a legal system that is organized and administered from the centre. Given the central provision of these services, it is natural to support them through centrally-organized taxes.

Other public goods, namely the local public goods of Chapter 16, benefit only those resident within a defined geographic area. The level of supply of these goods could be determined and financed at the national level but there are three arguments to suggest a lower-level decision is preferable.

Firstly, determination at the local level can take account of more precise information available on local preferences. In this context, local ballots and knowledge of local circumstances may help in reaching a more efficient decision. Secondly, if a decision were to be made at the national level political pressures may prevent there from being any differentiation of provision between communities, whereas it might be efficient to have different levels of local public good provision in different areas. Finally, the Tiebout hypothesis investigated in Chapter 16 argued that if consumers have heterogenous preferences then efficiency requires numerous communities to form and offer different levels of public good provision. This will not be possible if decisions are taken at a national level.

If these arguments for determining and providing public goods at a local level are accepted, then it follows almost inevitably that financing should be determined at the same level. To do otherwise, and to set a tax policy that was uniform across the economy, would result in transfers between regions. Those regions choosing levels of public good provision that were high relative to their tax base would not generate sufficient tax revenue to finance their provision whilst those with relatively low levels would raise excessive revenue. These deficits and surpluses result in implicit transfers between regions. Such transfers may not be efficient, equitable or politically acceptable.

Similar arguments can be repeated for the other roles of government such as the control of externalities and some aspects of the reallocation of income. The provision of services, even if they have the nature of private goods (such as garbage disposal), can be subject to the same reasoning. This suggests that different levels of government should be constructed to ensure that decisions are made at the most appropriate level. This process has a limit, though, in that duplication of effort and wasted resources should be avoided. The precise design of the structure of government then emerges from the trade-off between increasing the number of levels to ensure decisions are made at the correct point and the resource benefits of having fewer levels.

The general observations made above can now be refined into more detailed arguments. We first explore the costs of imposing uniformity and then consider positive arguments for decentralization.

19.2.1 The Costs of Uniformity

Uniform provision of public goods and services by all jurisdictions will only ever exactly meet the needs of the entire population when preferences are homogeneous. When they are not, any form of uniform provision must be a compromise between competing levels of demand. As such, it must involve some loss in welfare relative to differentiated provision.

This argument can be illustrated by considering an economy in which there are two groups of consumers who have different tastes for the economy's single public good. Assume that the public good is financed by the use of an income tax. Denoting the two groups by A and B, the utility of a typical consumer of



Figure 19.1: The Costs of Uniformity

group i with income y_i is given by

$$u_i([1-t]\,y_i, G),\ i = A, B, \tag{19.1}$$

where t is the tax rate and G the level of public good provision. Denoting the number of consumers in the two groups by n_A and n_B, G and t are related by

$$G = n_A t y_A + n_B t y_B. \tag{19.2}$$

The level of utility can then be written in terms of the public good as

$$u_i\,(G) \equiv u_i\left(\left[1 - \frac{G}{n_A y_A + n_B y_B}\right] y_i, G\right). \tag{19.3}$$

Now assume that group B have a relatively stronger preference for the public good than group A, taking into account the higher tax rate that this brings. The utility levels of the two groups can then be graphed against the quantity of public good provision as in Figure 19.1. The preferred choices of public good provision are denoted as G_A and G_B (with $G_A < G_B$). Now consider the choice of a uniform level of provision and let this level be G_0. Assume that this lies between G_A and G_B (the argument easily extends to cases where it lies outside these limits). The loss of welfare to society is then given by $L = n_A[u_A(G_A) - u_A(G_0)] + n_B[u_B(G_B) - u_B(G_0)]$ compared to what would be achieved if each group could be supplied with its preferred quantity.

The value of the loss can be minimized by setting the location of G_0 so that the marginal benefit for group B of having more public good, $n_B u_B^{'}(G_0) > 0$, just offsets the marginal loss of group A, $n_A u_A^{'}(G_0) < 0$; but the essential point is that the loss remains positive. Furthermore, the loss increases the more widely dispersed are preferences and the more members there are of each group.

This analysis shows how uniformity can be costly in terms of foregone welfare. A policy of uniformity can then only be supported if the costs of differentiation exceed the benefit. Such costs could arise in the collection of information to determine the differentiation and in the administration costs of a differentiated system. These arguments will be explored further below. The next section though considers the limit of the benefits that can arise from differentiation.

19.2.2 The Tiebout Hypothesis

Although the costs of uniformity as illustrated above are indisputable, it is another step to show that decentralization is justified. The route to doing this is to exploit the Tiebout hypothesis that was analyzed in Section 16.5 in connection with the theory of local public goods. The exact same arguments are applicable here. Each community can be treated as an independent provider of local public goods. If the consumers in the economy have heterogeneous tastes, then there will be clear advantages to jurisdictions having different levels of provision. Each can design what it offers (its tax rates, level of provision and type of provision) to appeal to particular groups within society. By choosing the jurisdiction in which to live (*i.e.*, by voting with their feet) the consumers reveal their tastes for public goods. In the absence of transactions costs, or other impediments to freedom of movement, an efficient equilibrium must ensue.

The limits to this argument explored in the context of local public goods are also applicable here. Transactions costs are relevant in practice, and the problem of optimally dividing a finite population into a limited number of jurisdictions will arise. The fact that the first-best allocation will not be achieved does not necessarily undermine the argument for decentralization. There are clearly still benefits to decentralization even when this cannot be taken to the level required by the Tiebout hypothesis. Starting from a uniform level of services that is too little for some consumers, and too much for others, then a move away from this uniform level by some jurisdictions must benefit some of the consumers. In this way, even restricted decentralization can be efficiency-increasing. This argument can be easily understood from Figure 19.1.

The Tiebout hypothesis shows the benefits achievable by decentralization. Although these will not be fully realizable, a limited version of the same argument suggests that even restricted decentralization will improve upon uniform provision.

19.2.3 Distributive Arguments

The regions that constitute any economy are endowed with different stocks of resources. Some may be rich in natural resources, such as oil and coal, others may have a well-educated workforce with high levels of human capital. Such differences in endowments will be reflected in disparities in living standards between regions.

The ability to differentiate public good provision between the regions then allows more accurate targeting of resources to where they are required. This is an equity argument for not having uniform provision. Decentralized decision making allows each region to communicate its needs to the centre and permits the centre to make differential allocations to the regions.

This process will be designed to offset the differences in living standards caused by endowments. Typically there will be no compensation for differences in preference for public good provision such as giving more to a region wishing to spend more on public goods. This form of redistribution between regions is called an *equalization* formula and will be explored in Chapter 20 when discussing inter-governmental grants.

19.3 Optimal Structure: Efficiency versus Stability

The previous arguments have explored a number of advantages of fiscal decentralization. These have involved both efficiency and equity aspects. The issue that remains is what is the optimal structure or the correct number of levels of administration.

The difficulty that arises here is that the optimal division may be different between public goods. The examples in the introduction have discussed how fire services are organized at a very local level, education at a higher level and defence at an even higher one. There are many other public goods provided by the federal government. If each were to be allocated at the correct level of decentralization, this would imply an equally large number of levels of government.

To understand whether this will be done, it is now necessary to consider an important aspect of decentralization that has not yet been introduced. So far only the advantages have been considered, now it is time to introduce the costs. Each level of government brings with it additional costs. These involve all the factors that are necessary to provide administration. Buildings, staff and equipment will all be required, as will elections to choose politicians. The politicians will also require compensation for the time devoted to political activity. These costs are replicated each time an additional level of government is introduced.

Consequently, introducing further levels of government is not costless. The choice of the optimal degree of decentralization must take these costs into account and balance them against the benefits. From such a process will emerge the optimal structure. This will depend on the relative sizes of costs and benefits but is most likely to result in a level of decentralization such that some decisions are taken at a higher level than would be best if decentralization were costless.

This argument is now illustrated in a simple location model that trades off



Figure 19.2: Centralization and Decentralization

scale economies against diversity of preference. The point of departure is that centralized decision making produces a “one size fits all” outcome that does not reflect the heterogeneity of tastes. The uniform provision follows from political economy considerations preventing centralized majority voting from allocating different levels of public goods to different districts. It is only by decentralizing the majority voting at the district level that it is possible to differentiate public good provision but at some cost of duplication.

Suppose there is one public good that can be provided either at the federal level or at the regional level. We model the federation as the line segment $[0, 1]$, with points on the line representing different geographical locations. The public good can be located anywhere along the line and each individuals is characterized by their ideal location for the public good. With the central provision the public good is located at $1/2$, the midpoint of the line segment. The further away from this point individuals are located, the less they like the public good provided at the federal level. This is shown in Figure 19.2.

Alternatively provision can be decentralized. Each region is then represented by an interval on the line segment. Region L is the left-interval $[0, 1/2]$ and region R the right-interval $[1/2, 1]$. Individuals are assumed to be uniformly distributed so that both regions are of equal size. Decentralized provision of public good is located at the midpoint of each interval, that is $1/4$ in the left-region and $3/4$ in the right-region. There is a fixed cost C (per capita) of providing the public good at the central level and, due to duplication, the cost is $2C$ with decentralized provision (*i.e.*, the number of individuals across whom the cost of public good provision is spread is reduced by one half).

The utility function of each individual i is under centralization

$$u_i^c = \left(1 - \alpha \left|\frac{1}{2} - i\right|\right) - C, \tag{19.4}$$

and under decentralization

$$\begin{aligned} u_i^d &= \left(1-\alpha\left|\frac{1}{4}-i\right|\right)-2C \quad \text{for } i\in[0,1/2] \\ &= \left(1-\alpha\left|\frac{3}{4}-i\right|\right)-2C \quad \text{for } i\in[1/2,1], \end{aligned} \tag{19.5}$$

where $\left|\frac{1}{2}-i\right|$ and $\left|\frac{1}{4}-i\right|$ denote the distance between the actual public good location and the ideal location of individual i, respectively under centralization and decentralization for an individual i is located in the left-region ($\left|\frac{3}{4}-i\right|$ for one located in the right-region). The rate at which utility decreases with the distance is given by the parameter α.

Now we can define when decentralization is socially optimal as the result of a trade-off between duplicating the cost of public good provision against bringing provision closer to individual preferences. The socially optimal solution maximizes the sum of all individual utilities. Since individual utilities differ only in the distance to the public good location (because of the equal cost sharing) the sum of utilities will depend on the average distance. Under centralized provision, the average distance from $1/2$ is, due to the uniform distribution, just equal to $1/4$. Note that this distance is actually minimized by locating the public good at the midpoint $1/2$. Decentralization brings the average distance in either region down to $1/8$. This positive effect of decentralization has to be balanced against the extra cost C of providing two different public goods. Therefore decentralization is the optimal solution if and only if the extra cost C is less than the advantage of reducing the average distance by $1/4-1/8$ evaluated at the rate α at which utility falls with distance; that is $C\le\alpha\,(1/4-1/8)=\alpha/8$. The observations are summarized in the following proposition.

Proposition 2 *Decentralization is optimal if and only if* $C\le\alpha/8$.

These arguments show that the optimal amount of decentralization will be achieved when the benefits from further decentralization, in terms of matching the diversity of tastes, outweigh the cost of differentiating public good provision. Using this basic model we can now illustrate the tendency for majority voting to lead to excessive decentralization.

In order to look at the incentive for decentralization under majority voting, we assume that decentralized provision prevails when a majority of voters are favorable in at least one region. This assumption is innocuous given the symmetry between regions: if there is a majority in favor of decentralization in one region there must also be an equivalent majority in the other region. We concentrate on the incentive of the left region for decentralization.

The majority in the left region is formed by those who are either to the left or to the right of the individual at the regional midpoint $1/4$. It is easily seen that if this central individual prefers decentralization, then all those to his left also have the same preferences because they are located further away from the centralized provision but share the cost equally. Therefore there will be a majority in favour of decentralization in the left-region if the decisive individual $i = 1/4$ prefers decentralization, that is if

$$u_i^c = (1 - \alpha \left| \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{4} \right|) - C \ \leq u_i^d = (1 - \alpha \left| \frac{1}{4} - \frac{1}{4} \right|) - 2C. \tag{19.6}$$

From this follows the next proposition.

Proposition 3 *Decentralization is a majority voting equilibrium if and only if* $C \leq \alpha/4$.

This result suggests excessive decentralization under majority voting because the critical cost level under majority voting is higher than the critical cost level for optimality. In particular for any cost $C \in (\alpha/8, \alpha/4)$, majority voting leads to decentralization ($C < \alpha/4$) although it is not socially optimal ($C > \alpha/8$). Therefore under majority voting there is *too much decentralization*: voters who are located at the extreme have an incentive to support decentralized provision to get a public good closer to what they want, but the democratic process does not internalize the negative externalities imposed on voters located in the center.

19.4 Accountability

Politicians may pursue a range of different objectives. At times, they may be public-spirited and dedicate themselves fully to furthering public interest. But they may also pursue their own ideas, even if these differ from those of their constituents. Some may want to derive private gains while in office or actively seek perks of office. Some may extend clientilistic favors to their families and friends. But the most important way in which they can act against the best interests of their constituents is by choosing policies that advance their own interests or those of special groups to which they are beholden.

A government is "accountable" if voters can discern whether it is acting in their interest and sanction them appropriately if they are not, so that incumbents anticipate that they will have to render accounts for their past actions. The problem is then to confront politicians with a trade-off between diverting rents and losing office or doing what voters want and getting re-elected. In this view, elections can be seen as an accountability mechanism for controlling and sorting good from bad incumbents. By "good incumbent", we mean someone who is honest, competent and not easily bought-off by special interests.

The standard view of how electoral accountability works is that voters set some standard of performance to evaluate governments and they vote out the incumbent unless these criteria are fulfilled. However elections do not work well in controlling and sorting politicians. There are severe problems in monitoring and evaluating the incumbent's behavior in order to make informed decisions about whether to re-elect or not. Voters face a formidable agency problem because they are inevitably poorly informed about politicians' behavior and type. Moreover, the electoral sanction (pass or fail) is such a crude instrument that it can hardly induce the politicians to do what the public wants.



	State a	State b
Policy A	0, 3	r, 0
Policy B	r, 1	0, 1

Figure 19.3: Political Accountability and Voter Welfare

In this perspective, it might be reasonable to try to organize competition among politicians in order to control them. In this respect, the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) view is that decentralization is an effective mechanism to control governments' expansive tendencies. The basic argument is that *competition among different decentralized governments can exercise a disciplinary force* and break the monopoly power of a large central government. Comparing performance in office among different incumbents helps in sorting good types from bad types as well as controlling the quality of their decisions. Hence one votes against an incumbent if his performance is bad relative to others, in order to induce each incumbent to behave in the public interest.

To see the logic of the argument, consider a simple example. Suppose that the circumstances under which politicians make decisions can be good (state a) or bad (state b). Governments decide to adopt policy A, which is better for their constituents in the good state a, or policy B, which is better in the bad state b. Governments need not pursue the public interest and can rather advance their own interests by choosing policy A in state b and policy B in state a to get some private gains (say a rent $r > 0$). Suppose that politicians value being re-elected and that such value is $V > r$. The payoff matrix is shown in Figure 19.3: the first number in each cell is the government payoff and the second number is voters welfare. If the government is re-elected it gets the extra value V. The government knows the prevailing conditions (*i.e.*, whether a or b has occurred) but all that citizens observe is their current welfare.

To induce politicians to act as well as they can under this information structure, voters must set their re-election rule. If voters set the standard the incumbent must meet in order to be re-elected too high (such as committing to vote for the incumbent if the welfare level is at least 3), then the incumbent cannot be re-elected whatever he does if conditions turn out to be bad (state b). Consequently, the incumbent has the incentive to obtain the rent r and leave office. Alternatively, if the voters set the standard for re-election lower, say at 1, the incumbent will be able to divert rent when conditions happen to be good (state a) and be re-elected by giving voters less than what they could obtain. Then voters are in a quandary because whatever they decide to do, the politicians will sometimes escape from their control and divert rent.

Suppose now that the electorate can compare the outcome of its incumbent with other incumbents (in different constituencies) facing exactly the same circumstances. Then from the observation of outcomes elsewhere, voters can potentially infer whether the prevailing conditions are good or bad and thereby get the most they can under either conditions. The information will be revealed if there is at least one government that chooses a different policy from that of the others. When conditions are good, vote for the incumbent if the outcome is at least 3. When conditions are bad, vote for the incumbent if the outcome is at least 1. Otherwise vote the incumbent out. Hence, a government facing good conditions a knows that by choosing the appropriate policy A, it will be re-elected for sure and get V which is more than the rent r he can get by choosing B and being voted out. In turn a government facing bad conditions b knows that by choosing B it will be re-elected and get V which is better than what it would get by adopting the wrong policy A to get the rent r but no chance of being re-elected. Therefore, comparing the performance of their incumbent with other incumbents facing similar circumstances, voters can gain increased control over their politicians and deduce what is attributable to circumstances as opposed to government actions.

Another argument for why decentralization should lead to greater efficiency and accountability is that a central decision maker does not need to please all jurisdictions to get re-elected but simply a majority of them. However this argument is usually balanced against the fact that the value of holding office is larger in a centralized arrangement and thus politicians are more eager to win election, which in a conventional political agency model may increase accountability and efficiency.

19.5 Risk sharing

Inter-regional insurance is fundamentally about sharing risk among a group of regions so that no region bears an undue amount of risk. Because of this, insurance can arise even when all parties are risk averse. What is necessary for this to happen is that the risks the parties bear are, to some degree, independent of each other. That is, when one region suffers a loss, there are other regions (or group of regions) that do not suffer a loss. While such independence is usually true of almost all individual risks for which standard forms of insurance exist (fires, car accidents, sicknesses ...) it is less obvious at the regional level.

There are some fundamental principles in mutual insurance. First, risk-sharing is more effective the broader the basis on which risks are pooled. This is a consequence of Borch's theorem on mutual insurance. Second, it is more advantageous for any region to engage in mutual insurance with other regions when risks are negatively correlated across regions. Third, there must be min-



	State *a*	State *b*
Region *a*	$y_a + \Delta$	y_a
Region *b*	y_b	$y_b + \Delta$

Figure 19.4: Regional Distribution of Income

imal symmetry across regions. The reason is that with asymmetric regional distribution of risks, some regions will systematically and persistently subsidize others. The distributional considerations will then dominate insurance aspects. Fourth, risk-sharing arrangements require reciprocal behavior: a region with favorable shock accepts to help out other regions if it can reasonably expect that those regions will in turn help it out in bad circumstances. With voluntary insurance, participants are free to opt out at any time and so we must also consider the possibility of risk sharing agreement without commitment.

19.5.1 Voluntary risk sharing

A model of voluntary insurance between two regions when aggregate income is constant is as follows: In each period, two regions, indexed $i = \{a, b\}$, receive an income y_i and one of them is randomly selected to receive a monetary gain $\Delta > 0$. Each has the same probability $1/2$ of receiving this gain and the total income is fixed at $Y = y_a + y_b + \Delta$. The regional income distribution is given in Figure 19.4.

With constant aggregate income, risk aversion requires the smoothing of regional income across states of nature. Optimal risk-sharing arrangements imply full insurance which requires that the region receiving the gain Δ transfer one half of this gain to the other region. Denoting such a transfer by t^*, then $t^* = \Delta/2$. Therefore the gain is equally shared among regions and regional income is constant.

Let $U_i(x)$ denotes the utility of region i from disposal income x. Then it is readily seen that both regions are better off with such optimal risk sharing arrangement since

$$u_a(y_a + \frac{\Delta}{2}) \geq \frac{1}{2}u_a(y_a + \Delta) + \frac{1}{2}u_a(y_a), \tag{19.7}$$

$$u_b(y_b + \frac{\Delta}{2}) \geq \frac{1}{2}u_b(y_b + \Delta) + \frac{1}{2}u_b(y_b). \tag{19.8}$$

Without commitment, complete risk sharing is not guaranteed. We must take into account the possibility that the region receiving the gain may refuse to transfer some of the gain to the other region. Risk-sharing agreement without commitment must be "self-enforcing" in the sense that no region has incentive to defect unilaterally from the agreement. To be self-enforcing, the risk-sharing arrangement must be such that the expected net benefits from participating is at any time larger than the one time gain from defection (by not making transfer when call upon). If full insurance is not possible, it is still possible to design partial insurance by limiting transfers when the participation constraint is binding. Let t_i be the transfer made by region i to the other region when region i receives the gain Δ. Upon receiving the gain Δ, region i can trade off the immediate gain of defecting by refusing to make the transfer t_i, against the cost of being excluded from any future insurance arrangement and to bear regional income variation alone. Taking region a, the gain from defection when receiving Δ is

$$u_a(y_a + \Delta) - u_a(y_a + \Delta - t_a). \tag{19.9}$$

The cost of losing insurance in the next period (discounted at rate $\delta < 1$) is

$$\left[\frac{1}{2}u_a(y_a + \Delta - t_a) + \frac{1}{2}u_a(y_a + t_b)\right] - \left[\frac{1}{2}u_a(y_a + \Delta) + \frac{1}{2}u_a(y_a)\right]. \tag{19.10}$$

The participation constraint holds if the cost of defecting exceeds the gain from future insurance (discounted at rate $\delta < 1$) . Comparing the two values and rearranging we find that region a has no incentive to defect if

$$(1 - \frac{\delta}{2})u_a(y_a + \Delta - t_a) + \frac{\delta}{2}u_a(y_a + t_b) \geq (1 - \frac{\delta}{2})u_a(y_a + \Delta) + \frac{\delta}{2}u_a(y_a), \tag{19.11}$$

and similarly region b has no incentive to defect if

$$(1 - \frac{\delta}{2})u_b(y_b + \Delta - t_b) + \frac{\delta}{2}u_b(y_b + t_a) \geq (1 - \frac{\delta}{2})u_b(y_b + \Delta) + \frac{\delta}{2}u_b(y_b). \tag{19.12}$$

We can draw several implications from this simple model of risk-sharing without commitment. First, the time horizon will influence the amount of mutual insurance that is sustainable. Indeed the value attached to continued insurance depends on the discount rate (reflecting the time horizon). At one extreme when $\delta \longrightarrow 0$ (extremely short horizon) the value of future insurance is zero and regions always defect. No insurance is possible. At the other extreme when $\delta \longrightarrow 1$ (very long horizon) the value of future insurance is sufficiently high that full insurance is possible ($t_i = \Delta/2$). And by a continuity argument, for intermediate discounting values $\delta \in (\underline{\delta}, \overline{\delta})$, with $0 < \underline{\delta} < \overline{\delta} < 1$, only limited insurance is possible ($t_i < \Delta/2$). Therefore the expected time horizon limits the amount of risk sharing. For values $\delta \geq \overline{\delta}$ complete risk sharing can be achieved. For intermediate values $\underline{\delta} < \delta < \overline{\delta}$ there is partial risk sharing. And for values $\delta < \underline{\delta}$ no risk sharing is possible.

The second implication is that the level of risk sharing that regions can achieve increases with risk aversion. The reason is that regions put more weight on the gain from long-term insurance against the short-term gain from defecting. This is immediately seen from the participation constraints. Indeed the income distribution on the left-hand side is less uncertain than the income distribution on the right-hand side which makes the participation constraints more likely to be satisfied under increased risk aversion.

A third implication is about the effect of income inequality. Intuition would suggest that mutual insurance is more likely if regions are *ex-ante* identical and that regional inequality limits the scope for insurance. But this is not true. The reason is that risk-sharing redistributes *ex-post* from the region with positive shock to the other region, but it does not redistribute *ex-ante* from the rich to the poor regions. More surprisingly, it is even possible that increased inequality, while maintaining constant the aggregate income and the variance of income, would improve insurance. To see this, start from income equality $y_a = y_b$. Using the participation constraint it is possible to calculate the level of risk sharing that is possible. Then, increase y_a and reduce y_b by the same amount. Supposing the same positive shock Δ, aggregate income and the intra-regional variance of income are unchanged. However the participation constraints are affected because income levels influence the demand for insurance. It is then possible to show that for some standard utility functions, the likelihood of complete insurance and the amount of risk sharing under constrained insurance have increased with inequality.

19.5.2 Insurance versus Redistribution

In practice inter-regional insurance is organized in a federation through federal taxes and transfers. The effect of such a federal tax system is to redistribute income from high- to low-income regions. By pooling income risk across the regions, the federal tax system provide insurance against region-specific shocks. However to the extent that there is *ex-ante* income inequality between regions, federal taxes also provide *ex-ante* regional redistribution. We ignore the stabilizing effect of federal taxation which refers to the possibility of smoothing shocks over time (between bad years and good years). The insurance motive for the federal tax system is explicitly recognized in many countries. For instance in the UK part of the tax system is actually called “National Insurance”. To appreciate the amount of insurance federal taxes can provide it is necessary to disentangle redistribution from insurance components. Redistribution acts on the initial income distribution, while insurance responds to income shocks (either permanent or temporary).

Assume region i's income at time t is subject to permanent shock ψ_i^t and temporary shock η_i^t. Both shocks are assumed to be mean zero. Thus regional income at time t can be written

$$y_i^t = y_i^0 + \sum_{s=1}^{t} \psi_i^s + \eta_i^t. \tag{19.13}$$

Suppose the federal tax system taxes all regions' incomes at the same rate τ and redistributes total tax revenue as a uniform transfer to all regions. It follows that region i at time t pays taxes τy_i^t and receives transfers from the federation based on the average tax payment

$$\tau E_i \left[y_i^0 + \sum_{s=1}^{t} \psi_i^s + \eta_i^t \right] = \tau E_i \left[y_i^0 \right] = \tau \overline{y}^0. \tag{19.14}$$

The after tax and transfer regional income is

$$x_i^t = y_i^0 + \tau(\overline{y}^0 - y_i^0) + (1-\tau) \left[\Sigma \psi_i^s + \eta_i^t \right]. \tag{19.15}$$

The income change can be decomposed into an insurance part and a redistribution part as follows

$$x_i^t - y_i^t = \underbrace{\tau(\overline{y}^0 - y_i^0)}_{redistribution} + \underbrace{\tau \left[\Sigma \psi_i^s + \eta_i^t \right]}_{insurance}. \tag{19.16}$$

Using this decomposition, it is interesting to measure the extent of insurance provided by federal taxation in practice. Empirical studies for the US federal tax system clearly suggest the presence of intranational insurance. Though there is disagreement about the exact magnitude of the insurance, all studies find that the redistribution effect largely dominates the insurance effect. They also find that insurance is rather modest in the sense that it cannot smooth more than 10 cents on a dollar change in state income caused by asymmetric shocks.

19.6 Evidence on decentralization

19.6.1 Decentralization around the World

The degree of decentralization of government activity can be measured in several different ways. Oates (1972) distinguishes three measures of fiscal decentralization: (i) share of total public revenue collected by the central government; (ii) share of the central government in all public expenditures (including income redistribution payments); (iii) share of the central government in current government consumption expenditures.

The first measure based on revenue collection raises the problem that the center may collect revenue for regions. It underestimates the degree of decentralization to the extent that regions get back substantial portions of revenue collected at the central level. The second measure, including income redistribution payments, also underestimates the degree of decentralization because the redistribution of income is mostly the role of central governments regardless of how decentralized a country is. The same argument applies for excluding defense spending which is the other public good that is uniformly provided by central governments. So the more appropriate measure is the concentration of total government current consumption. Such information is readily available in the rich dataset at Brown University, in which total government expenditures are the consolidated sum of all expenditures at different government levels. Consolidation matters to prevent double counting of inter-governmental grants and transfers.

Table 19.1 shows the patterns of decentralization around the world and suggests some clear trends. First developed countries are generally more decentralized. Latin America countries decentralized mostly during the period 1980 to 1995. However, government consumption in Latin America remains substantially more centralized, with spending at the central level close to 70 percent against central spending less than 50 percent in developed countries. African countries are the most centralized and display little decrease in centralization (with almost all government spending occurring at the central level). Among all regions, developed countries exhibit the most substantial decreases in centralization. Looking at the world level average (involving up to 48 countries) also reveals a general trend toward greater decentralization, with central spending share declining from 75 percent in 1975 to 64 percent in 1995.

Countries	1975	1985	1995
Developed	0.57	0.49	0.46
Russia	n.a.	0.61	0.63
Latin America	0.76	0.71	0.70
Asia	0.79	0.74	0.72
Africa	0.88	0.86	0.82
World	0.76	0.68	0.64

Table 19.1: Share of Central Government Expenditure in Total Expenditures
Source: Vernon Henderson's dataset, 1975-1995, Brown University

19.6.2 Decentralization by Functions

It has been seen that the degree of decentralization differs quite substantially between countries. It is also instructive to measure decentralization of public expenditures by function to see whether this is consistent with normative advice. From a normative point of view decentralization is desirable when the need to tailor spending to local preferences dominates the possible economies of scale and cross-regional spillovers.

The Government Finance Statistics of the IMF contain the data for breaking down government activities by functions and levels. All local expenditures refer to expenditures of the state, regional and provincial governments. Table

19.2 indicates the functional decentralization of government activity country-by-country. Housing and Community Amenities are the most decentralized, with an average of 71 percent, followed closely by Education and Health with an average of 64 percent each. The least decentralized are the expenditures for Social Security and Welfare with an average of 18 percent. This is consistent with the normative view that income redistribution is better achieved at the central level.

Country	Education	Health	Social Welfare	Housing	Transport	Total
Australia	72	48	10	77	85	50
Canada	94	96	31	74	90	60
Denmark	45	95	55	29	51	56
France	37	2	9	82	42	19
Germany	96	28	21	93	57	38
Ireland	22	48	6	70	43	25
Netherlands	33	5	14	79	35	26
Norway	63	78	19	87	31	38
Russia	83	90	10	96	68	39
Spain	71	63	6	93	62	36
U.K.	68	0	20	40	61	26
U.S.	95	43	31	32	75	49
Average	64	64	18	71	56	38

Table 19.2: Local Expenditures as a % of Total Government Expenditure by Function (1995-1999)
Source: IMF *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook*, 2001

19.6.3 Determinants of Decentralization

Decentralization is a complex process and we have provided a snapshot of the enormous normative literature on how best to allocate different responsibilities between central and local governments and the possible efficiency gains of decentralization. However the positive issue of why and when decentralization occurs deserves also some attention.

The positive literature on decentralization suggests certain empirical regularities concerning the forces that promote decentralization. Oates (1972) finds in a cross-sectional analysis that both country size and income per capita play a crucial role in explaining decentralization. The empirical evidence suggests that for different measures of decentralization, larger and richer countries are more decentralized. To better control for inter-regional geographic and cultural differences, Oates and Wallis (1988) use a panel analysis of 48 US states. They find that diversity as measured by urbanization increases decentralization.

In a very interesting study, Panizza (1999) estimates a theoretical model of decentralization allowing to test for the preference sorting effects. He uses a linear country model like the one presented previously in the optimal structure section. The level of public good provision is determined at the central level by majority voting (*i.e.* by the median voter's preference). The central government provides a uniform public good level whose value decreases with the spatial distance between the citizens and the central government. Local government provision is closer to the preferences of citizens and so more valuable. Since voters benefit more from local provision, increasing central provision reduces overall demand for the public good. Central government decides its share in provision of the public good anticipating how that share influences overall demand for the public good. Using cross-sectional analysis and standard measures of decentralization, Panizza finds that decentralization increases with country size, income per capita, the level of democracy and ethno-linguistic fractionalization.

A important limit of the existing empirical testing of decentralization is that it ignores a central force in the process of decentralization, namely the threat of separation. The possibility of secession has been a powerful force to limit the ability of the central government to exploit peripheral minorities of voters for the sake of the majority of the population. The idea is that unitary government is more willing to devolve more power and responsibility when the threat of secession is more credible. It has been a recurrent feature in Europe that the decision to decentralize is not necessarily guided by efficiency considerations, but is also driven by distributional and political forces. When rich regions, which today transfer large amount of income to poorer regions, demand more decentralization it is to limit their net contributions. They often do that because they do not believe anymore in the mutual insurance effect that such transfers might change directions in a near future. Also the size of the regional redistribution has become so visible that it creates an insurmountable political problem. The perception is that rich regions would become better off by seceding and, to prevent such countries from breaking apart, concessions in the form of larger devolution of responsibilities and resources to regions have been taking place. Italy and Belgium are two good illustrations of the sort of decentralization forced by the pressing demand of the rich regions Lombardy and Flanders, respectively. It is clear that in those cases, the efficiency argument that decentralization allows policy choices that better reflect local preference was not the key force. Richer regions demand more autonomy because the regional income inequality is such that mutual insurance becomes pure redistribution. Moreover, the demand for more autonomy is exacerbated, rightly or wrongly, by the perceptions in the rich regions that the regional transfers are very much influenced by opportunistic behavior of the receiving regions (*i.e.* some form of moral hazard problem at the regional level).

19.7 Conclusions

There is a considerable controversy as to what public activities should be decentralized or centralized. There is also empirical evidence of increasing decentralization around the world. In this chapter we have seen the costs and benefits of decentralization. One important advantage of a decentralized system is the tailoring of the provision of public goods and services to local preferences. The idea is that local government is closer to the people and so more responsive to their preferences than central governments. Another advantage of decentralization is to foster intergovernmental competition making government more efficient and more accountable to their electorate.

There are also disadvantages of decentralized system. Some of them, like fiscal competition, will be covered in the next chapter. The main disadvantage of decentralization is probably its failure to exploit all the economies of scale in the provision of public goods. Another disadvantage is to limit the scope for interregional risk sharing through the federal fiscal system.

Optimal federalism results from the trade off between these various costs and benefits from decentralization. It provides normative conclusions about the allocation of responsibilities between central and local levels. However from a more positive perspective, political and distributional considerations can lead to different conclusions. The best illustration is that too much decentralization will result from a democratic choice.

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Chapter 20

Fiscal Competition

20.1 Introduction

What is the role of competition between governments? If competition is the fundamental force of efficient economic performance in the private sector, why should it be different for the public sector? Why cannot the same disciplining effect of competition be applied to the public sector as well? In the private sector competition will promote efficiency because firms which best satisfy consumers' preferences will survive and prosper, while others will lose customers and fail. Extending this argument to the public sector, competition among governments and jurisdictions should induce them to best serve the will of their residents. If they fail to do so, residents will vote with their feet and leave for other jurisdictions which offer a better deal.

The purpose of this chapter is to show that if the private competition analogy has some merit, it also needs to be seriously qualified. The chapter is organized as follows. First the efficiency aspects of fiscal competition are presented. Second, the distributional aspects of residential mobility are evaluated. The key issue is how mobility limits the possibility of redistributing income. Third, the role of inter-governmental transfers is discussed both in terms of efficiency and redistribution. Fourth, some evidence on fiscal competition and inter-governmental interactions is given. Lastly, the main results from the fiscal competition theory are summarized and evaluated in the concluding section.

20.2 Tax Competition

Tax competition refers to the interaction between governments due to interjurisdictional mobility of the tax base. It does not include fiscal interaction between governments resulting from public good spillovers, where residents of one jurisdiction consume the public goods provided by neighboring jurisdictions. Tax competition arises because jurisdictions finance provision of a public good with a tax on locally employed capital. Capital moves across jurisdictions in response to tax differentials, while residents are typically immobile (or at least less mobile).

In the competitive version of tax competition, jurisdictions are "too small" (relative to the economy) to affect the net return to capital that is determined worldwide. As a result, each jurisdiction sets its tax on locally employed capital taking as given the net-of-tax price of capital. Tax rates in other jurisdictions do not matter and there is no strategic interaction among jurisdictions when setting their taxes. We say that jurisdictions behave competitively. When jurisdictions are "large" relative to the economy, each jurisdiction can affect the net return to capital by varying its own tax rate. In this case, the tax rate chosen in one jurisdiction varies with the taxes in other jurisdictions. Jurisdictions behave strategically: they set their tax in response to the tax rates in other jurisdictions.

Both the competitive and strategic version of the tax competition model produce the same important conclusion, namely, that public goods are underprovided relative to the efficient Samuelson rule level. The reason is that each jurisdiction perceives the mobility of capital and keeps its tax low to preserve its tax base. To understand the inefficiency from inter-governmental competition, it is useful to consider a simple model in which we assume in turn that jurisdictions behave competitively and then strategically.

20.2.1 Competitive Behavior

The assumption of perfect competition means that the mobile factor of production is available to the "small" jurisdiction at a fixed price. Suppose capital is the mobile factor of production and that the jurisdiction seeks to impose a tax on capital and to use the revenue to provide public goods and services to its residents, or to directly transfer cash to them. If capital were perfectly immobile, a local source-based tax on capital would reduce the net rate of return to capital by the exact amount of the tax. This capital tax would make the residents better off at the expense of capital owners (who are not necessarily residents).

In contrast, when capital is costlessly mobile, local capital taxation cannot affect the net return to capital. The reason is that the imposition of the local tax drives capital out of the jurisdiction until the increase in before-tax rate of return is sufficient to compensate capital owners for local taxes. However the outflow of capital from the jurisdiction reduces the remuneration of labor. The resulting loss of income to the residents will exceed the value of the tax revenue collected from capital taxation. Except if public expenditures have greater value to local residents than the tax revenue used to finance them, the net effect of capital taxation is to harm immobile residents. Therefore with perfect competition and costless mobility, the taxation of capital is impossible whereas it may be desirable without mobility. Capital taxes that help immobile residents when capital is immobile harm them when this factor is perfectly mobile.

Assume that the local production process uses mobile capital k, and immobile labor. Let $f(k)$ denote the production function in the jurisdiction, where $f(k)$ is strictly increasing $f'(k) > 0$ and concave $f^{"}(k) < 0$. The concavity of the production function reflects diminishing returns to capital as it is combined with the immobile stock of labor. Let ρ denote the net return to capital outside the jurisdiction, and let t denote the per-unit tax on the capital employed in the jurisdiction. With costless mobility of capital, the local supply of capital equates its net return in the jurisdiction with its net return elsewhere

$$f'(k) - t = \rho. \tag{20.1}$$

With exogenously fixed ρ, the fact that $f'(k)$ is decreasing in k implies that a higher tax drives capital away so $\Delta k/\Delta t < 0$. Assuming that the net revenue collected from local capital taxation accrues to workers in the form of cash transfers or public goods of the same value, the net income of workers will be

$$\begin{aligned} y &= f(k) - f'(k)k + tk \\ &= f(k) - \rho k, \end{aligned} \tag{20.2}$$

where the second equality follows from the arbitrage condition $f'(k) = \rho + t$. Because taxation reduces the amount of capital in the jurisdiction, it is then easily seen that the welfare of the workers, as measured by their net income x, is maximized by setting $t = 0$.

20.2.2 Strategic Behavior

It is now assumed that jurisdictions behave strategically. The strategic interaction makes the equilibrium analysis more delicate and it is useful to describe the equilibrium outcome rigorously. Consequently this section will use more calculus than usual and can be skipped with little loss of continuity by those who wish to.

Consider two countries ($i = 1, 2$) that levy a tax upon the return to capital. Capital is mobile and is used together with some fixed amount of labor to produce output. The production function is $F(K_i, L)$, where K_i is the aggregate capital and L_i is aggregate labor employed in country i. The quantity of labor available and the production technology are the same for the two countries, and each worker is endowed with one unit of labor. Under constant returns to scale, $F(K_i, L_i) = L_i F(\frac{K_i}{L_i}, 1) = L_i f(k_i)$ where k_i is the capital-labor ratio. The production function $f(k_i)$ gives the per capital output, which is increasing and concave ($f^{"}(k_i) < 0 < f'(k_i)$). There is a fixed stock of capital $\overline{k}$ which allocates itself between the two countries, so $k_1 + k_2 = \overline{k}$. Each country levies a per-unit tax t_i on the capital that is employed within its boundaries. The revenue raised is used to supply a level of public services of $G_i = t_i k_i$. Due to capital mobility, the tax choice of one jurisdiction affects the size of the tax base available to the other country.

Given the pair of tax rates, costless mobility implies the equality of after-tax return to capital across countries

$$\begin{aligned} f'(k_1) - t_1 &= f'(k_2) - t_2 \\ &= f'(\overline{k} - k_1) - t_2. \end{aligned} \tag{20.3}$$

This arbitrage condition produces an allocation of capital across countries depending on tax rates, as illustrated in Figure 20.1.



Figure 20.1: Allocation of Capital

The partition of the capital stock between the two countries is represented on the horizontal axis with the capital levels measured from the two corners (from left to right for country 1). The corresponding marginal product of capital in each country is measured on the vertical axis (the left axis for country 1). Note that if the tax rates do differ (say, $t_1 > t_2$) then capital is inefficiently allocated because the marginal product of capital differs across countries ($f'(k_1) > f'(k_2)$). It can also be seen that an increase in the tax rate in country 1 reduces the net return to capital in that country and causes some capital to move away to country 2. The converse holds when the tax in country 2 is increased.

These observations can be demonstrated formally by taking the total differential of the arbitrage condition (20.3) with respect to $t_1$and k_1 to give

$$f''(k_1)dk_1 - dt_1 = -f''(\overline{k} - k_1)dk_1. \tag{20.4}$$

Then the variation in $k_1$in response to the tax change dt_1 is

$$\frac{dk_1}{dt_1} = \frac{1}{f''(k_1) + f''(k_2)} < 0, \tag{20.5}$$

The sign of this expression follows from the assumption of a decreasing marginal product of capital, $f'' < 0$. Note that this assumption implies some regulating forces in the allocation of capital because: when capital moves from 1 to 2, its marginal product decreases in country 2 at rate $f''(k_2)$ and raises in country 1 at rate $f''(k_1)$. When setting its tax rate country 1 will take into account how capital responds. That is, it will incorporate the movement of capital described by above into its decision problem.

Assuming that the net revenue collected from local capital taxation accrues to workers in the form of cash transfers or public goods of the same value, the net income of workers (or residents) in country 1 will be

$$y_1 = f(k_1) - f'(k_1)k_1 + t_1k_1. \tag{20.6}$$

Each country maximizes the net income of its residents taking into account capital flows resulting from tax changes. Because the amount of capital employed in each country also depends on the other country's tax rate, there is strategic fiscal interaction among countries: neither can set its own tax rate without taking into account what the other is doing.

The optimal choice of each country is found by applying the usual Nash assumption: each takes the tax rate of the other as given when maximizing. Applying this reasoning, the best response of country 1 to the other country's tax t_2 is described by the following first-order condition

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{dy_1(t_1,t_2)}{dt_1} &= -k_1f_1''\frac{dk_1}{dt_1} + k_1 + t_1\frac{dk_1}{dt_1} \\ &= \left[k_1f_2'' + t_1\right]\frac{dk_1}{dt_1} = 0, \end{aligned} \tag{20.7}$$

where the second equality is obtained by using (20.5) to substitute for $k_1 = k_1\left[f_1'' + f_2''\right]\frac{dk_1}{dt_1}$. Therefore the best response function for country 1 can be written as

$$t_1 = -k_1f_2'' = r_1(t_2), \tag{20.8}$$

and similarly for country 2

$$t_2 = -k_2f_1'' = r_2(t_1). \tag{20.9}$$

A Nash equilibrium is a pair (t_1^*, t_2^*) such that the tax choice of each country is a best response to the other country's tax choice, $t_1^* = r_1(t_2^*)$ and $t_2^* = r_2(t_1^*)$. The symmetry of the model implies that both countries choose the same taxes in equilibrium, so $t_1^* = t_2^*$, and that consequently the capital is evenly distributed between jurisdictions with $k_1 = k_2 = \overline{k}/2$. The Nash equilibrium in taxes is thus

$$t_1^* = t_2^* = -\frac{\overline{k}}{2}f''\left(\frac{\overline{k}}{2}\right). \tag{20.10}$$

We can also find the slope of the best response function $r_1(t_2)$ to evaluate the nature of strategic interdependency between the two countries. The first-order condition $\psi_1(t_1, t_2) = k_1f_2'' + t_1 = 0$ implicitly defines t_1 as a function of t_2, and we need to know how the optimum choice of t_1 will respond to changes in t_2. Differentiating the first-order condition totally, we have

$$\frac{\partial\psi_1}{\partial t_1}dt_1 - \frac{\partial\psi_1}{\partial t_2}dt_2 = 0. \tag{20.11}$$



Figure 20.2: Symmetric Nash Equilibrium

This gives the slope of the best-response as

$$\frac{dr_1}{dt_2} = \frac{\left(f_2'' - k_1 f_2'''\right) dk_1/dt_1}{1 + \left(f_2'' - k_1 f_2'''\right) dk_1/dt_1}, \tag{20.12}$$

where $dk_1/dt_1 < 0$ and $f'' < 0$. It follows that for $f''' \geq 0$ the slope of the best response function satisfies $0 < \frac{dr_1}{dt_2} < 1$. Tax rates are strategic complements: a lower tax in country 2 attracts capital away from country 1 which in response cuts its own tax rate.

It is now easily seen that such a Nash equilibrium $t_1^* = t_2^* = t^*$ involves inefficiently low taxes and that jointly increasing taxes to $t > t^*$ is beneficial to both countries. First, observe that from the perspective of the two countries together, the stock of capital is fixed at $\overline{k}$. Hence it is simply a fixed factor. Provided both countries levy the same tax rate $t = t_1 = t_2$, half of the capital, $\overline{k}/2$, will be located in each country regardless of the level of the taxes. The welfare of the workers in each country, as measured by their net income $y = f(k) - f'(k)k + tk$, is then improved since $t\overline{k}/2 > t^*\overline{k}/2$. In fact, with the cooperative tax setting, the countries can maximize the net income of their residents by fully taxing the mobile factor, whereas the non-cooperative equilibrium leads to a lower rate on capital. Welfare is higher with cooperation. This loss in potential welfare is the efficiency cost of fiscal competition.

Although the model just considered leads to the extreme conclusion that the tax is pushed to its maximum with cooperation, this was not the major point of the analysis. What the model does illustrate are the forces that are at work when an attempt is made to tax a mobile factor of production. The movement of the factor generates an externality between countries which is not internalized when they conduct individual optimization of taxes. This externality is due to the fact that a higher tax in one country pushes some of the factor to the other country. This has the beneficial effect of increasing the other country's tax base and consequently its tax revenue at any given tax rate. Cooperation between countries in the choice of taxes internalizes this externality and allows them to choose a mutually preferable set of tax rates.

Consequently, competition for mobile factors of production results in tax rates which are lower than is optimal for the countries involved. Implicitly, each country can be understood to be trying to undercut the others to attract the mobile factor of production. This undercutting puts downward pressure on tax rates to the detriment of all countries. The policy principle that emerges from this is that international cooperation on the setting of tax rates is beneficial.

As already noted, although the argument has been phrased in terms of countries, the same results would apply within a federal structure in which the separate jurisdictions at any level set their own rates. It is possibly even more relevant in such a context because the factors of production may be even more mobile than they are between countries. Furthermore, the tax base need not be a factor of production but simply needs to be mobile between jurisdictions. For example, the argument applies equally well to the taxation of commodities provided purchases can be made mobile through cross-border shopping.

As such, the tax competition argument provides some important reasons for being cautious about the benefits of fiscal federalism that were described in the previous chapter. Giving jurisdictions too much freedom in tax setting may lead to mutually damaging reductions in taxes - the so-called "race to the bottom".

20.2.3 Size Matters

Difference in country size, production technologies, factor endowments or residents' preferences can be expected to cause the countries to choose different tax rates. An interesting aspect of the ensuing asymmetric tax competition is the so-called *benefit of smallness*. The idea is that although fiscal competition is inefficient, it can actually benefit small countries. Of course such gain comes at the expense of larger countries.

This can be seen in our simple two country model by assuming they differ in their number of residents only. Suppose country 1 is "large" with a share $s > 1/2$ of the total population and country 2 is "small" with population share $1 - s < 1/2$. The capital market clearing condition is then

$$sk_1(t_1, t_2) + (1 - s)k_2(t_1, t_2) = \overline{k}, \tag{20.13}$$

where $\overline{k}$ is the (worldwide) average capital/labor ratio. The arbitrage condition implies equality of the after tax return on capital across countries

$$\begin{aligned} f'(k_1) - t_1 &= f'(k_2) - t_2 \\ &= f'\left(\frac{\overline{k}}{1-s} - \frac{sk_1}{1-s}\right) - t_2. \end{aligned} \tag{20.14}$$

Differentiating the arbitrage condition gives the capital outflow in response to a domestic tax increase

$$\frac{dk_1}{dt_1} = \frac{1-s}{(1-s)f''(k_1) + sf''(k_2)} < 0, \tag{20.15}$$

and by analogy for the small country

$$\frac{dk_2}{dt_2} = \frac{s}{(1-s)f''(k_1) + sf''(k_2)} < 0. \tag{20.16}$$

From (20.15) and (20.16), it follows that both countries face a capital outflow after an increase in their own tax rate, but this outflow is less severe in the large country. Indeed when $t_1 = t_2$, we have $k_1 = k_2$, $f''(k_1) = f''(k_2)$ and thus $\frac{dk_2}{dt_2} < \frac{dk_1}{dt_1} < 0$ for $s > 1-s$. The larger country faces a less elastic tax base and thereby chooses a higher tax rate than the smaller country, so in equilibrium $t_1 > t_2$. Because the small country charges a lower tax on capital, it will employ more capital per unit of labor, ($k_2 > k_1$) increasing per capita income and making its residents better off than the residents of the large country. It is even possible that for a sufficiently large difference in size, the small country will be better off than it would be without tax competition.

This benefit of smallness is illustrated in Figure 20.3, where for country $i = 1, 2$ per capita income is denoted $c_i = f(k_i) - f'(k_i)k_i$ and tax revenue is denoted $g_i = t_ik_i$. The net-return to capital, denoted by R, is the same for both countries by arbitrage and is adjusted to tax choices in order to clear the market. It is then readily seen that the residents of the small country are better-off taxing less since $c_2 + g_2 > c_1 + G_1$.

We can obviously extend this reasoning to show that if the number of countries competing for capital increases, each country having a lower population share will perceive a greater elasticity of its tax base and choose lower taxes: the larger the number of countries, the more intense the competition and the lower the equilibrium taxes.

20.2.4 Tax Overlap

A common feature of fiscal federalism is that higher- and lower-levels of government share the same tax base. This tax base overlap gives rise to vertical fiscal externalities. With tax competition between jurisdictions, the horizontal fiscal externality upon other regions is positive - an increase in tax rate by one region raises the tax base of others. In contrast, if different levels of government share the same tax base, then the tax levied by one government will reduce the tax base available to other levels of governments. This introduces a negative vertical externality. Not surprisingly such vertical externalities lead to over-taxation in equilibrium because each level of government neglects the negative effect of its taxation on the other levels of government.

The joint taxation of cigarettes by Canadian federal and provincial governments is a good example. Figure 20.4 illustrates this tax overlap problem. The



Figure 20.3: The Advantage of Smallness

supply curve, S, is assumed to be perfectly elastic and the demand curve, D, is downward sloping. Suppose the initial federal excise tax rate is T_0 and the provincial tax rate is t_0. The corresponding price is p_0 and the quantity of cigarettes consumed is q_0. Tax revenue is $T_0 q_0$ for the federal government, and $t_0 q_0$ for the provincial government. If the provincial government raises its tax rate to $t_1 = t_0 + \Delta$, the consumer price increases by the amount of the tax increase $p_1 = p_0 + \Delta$ and the quantity consumed decreases to q_1. The tax revenue of the provincial government increases by $[t_1 - t_0] q_1 - t_0 [q_0 - q_1]$ but due to the reduction in the consumption of cigarettes, revenue for the federal government decreases by $T_0 [q_0 - q_1]$, as represented by the shaded area in Figure 19.5. A similar vertical externality (but in the opposite direction) would arise if the federal government were to raise its tax rate. If both levels of government neglect the revenue losses incurred by the other government when making their tax choices, then both governments are underestimating the cost of raising tax revenue from the common tax base and would tend to choose tax rates that are inefficiently high.

When vertical and horizontal externalities are combined, then the noncooperative equilibrium outcome is ambiguous: it would involve excessively low taxes if the horizontal externalities dominate the vertical externalities. Canada again provides an important example since most provincial governments levy their personal income tax as a fraction of the federal income tax. On top of this each province levies a surtax on high-income residents. The bias in the perceived marginal cost of taxation caused by tax base overlap may explain why Canadian provinces have introduced high-income surtaxes when tax competition for mobile high-income taxpayers would predict the reverse.



Figure 20.4: Tax Overlap

20.2.5 Tax Exporting

In any country, some commodities that are sold within its borders will be purchased by non-residents. This will be particularly true if the country is especially important in the context of international tourism. It will also be encouraged under fiscal federalism with a single market covering all jurisdictions. Similarly, some of the productive activity carried out in a country will be undertaken by firms that repatriate their profits to another country. Whenever there is such economic activity by non-residents, the possibility for tax exporting arises.

Tax exporting is the levying of taxes that discriminate against non-residents. A simple example would be the imposition of a higher level of VAT upon restaurants located in centers of tourism. The motive for such tax exporting is to shift some of the burden of revenue collection onto non-residents and lower it on residents. All else held constant, this is clearly of benefit to residents. However, all else is not constant in practice and the same argument will apply to all countries. As for tax overlap, tax exporting provides an argument for why tax rates may be set too high when countries compete.

Another form of tax exporting is the taxation of capital employed in the country but owned by non-residents. The simplest version of this form of tax exporting can be described with the previous model of tax competition by assuming that country 1's residents have a capital endowment $\overline{k}_1 > 0$ that differs from that of country 2, $\overline{k}_1 \neq \overline{k}_2$. Capital owners in each country are free to invest their capital in their home country or abroad. The level of social welfare in country 1, is measured by the net income of its workers $y_1 = f(k_1) - f'(k_1)k_1 + t_1 k_1$ plus the net income of its capital owners $\rho\overline{k}_1$; where k_1 is the amount of capital employed in country 1. The capital market clearing condition requires

$$\overline{k}_1 - k_1 = -\left(\overline{k}_2 - k_2\right). \tag{20.17}$$

That is, when $k_1 < \overline{k}_1$ country 1 is employing less capital than its endowment, its net export of capital has to be equal to the net import of capital from country 2. For country 1 the problem is to set its tax t_1 on capital given the tax of country 2 so as to maximize

$$f(k_1) - f'(k_1)k_1 + t_1k_1 + \rho\overline{k}_1, \tag{20.18}$$

where $k_1 = k_1(t_1, t_2)$ is the amount of capital employed in country 1 given tax rates t_1, t_2 and $\rho = \rho(t_1, t_2)$ is the net return to capital. Using $\rho = f'(k_1) - t_1$, the objective function can be written as follows

$$W_1 = f(k_1) + \rho(\overline{k}_1 - k_1),$$

that is, country welfare is the total production $f(k_1)$ plus the net return to capital export $(\overline{k}_1 - k_1)$. When deriving the first-order condition, we must differentiate W_1 with respect to t_1 taking into account the change in capital supply $\frac{dk_1}{dt_1}$ and the change in the net return to capital $\frac{d\rho}{dt_1}$. This gives

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dW}{dt_1} &= (f'(k_1) - \rho)\frac{dk_1}{dt_1} + (\overline{k}_1 - k_1)\frac{d\rho}{dt_1} \\ &= t_1\frac{dk_1}{dt_1} + (\overline{k}_1 - k_1)(f_1''\frac{dk_1}{dt_1} - 1) = 0. \end{aligned} \tag{20.19}$$

To solve this first-order condition, we can use (20.5) to get $f_1''\frac{dk_1}{dt_1} - 1 = -f_2''\frac{dk_1}{dt_1}$, this gives

$$t_1 = f_2''(\overline{k}_1 - k_1), \tag{20.20}$$

and by analogy for country 2, using (20.17)

$$t_2 = -f_1''(\overline{k}_1 - k_1), \tag{20.21}$$

with $f'' < 0$. Therefore in any equilibrium, if country 1 has the larger endowment of capital, $\overline{k}_1 > \overline{k}_2$, it will export capital $\overline{k}_1 > k_1$ and so it will prefer to subsidize capital $t_1 < 0$. The reason is the term of trade effect. By subsidizing capital, the country with large endowment of capital can raise the net-return to capital. Because the other country will import capital from country 1, it will tax capital $t_2 > 0$ as a means to tax non-residents. This is the tax exporting effect. Next, note that the initial asymmetry in capital endowments leads countries to set different tax rates. This non-uniform tax equilibrium has important implications in terms of productive efficiency. Indeed efficient allocation of capital requires its marginal product to be equalized across countries. But because country 1 subsidizes capital and country 2 taxes it, it follows that the marginal product of capital is higher in country 2 than in country 1, $f_2' > f_1'$. Therefore, in equilibrium, country 1 attracts too much capital and country 2 too little, relative to what efficiency recommends.

20.2.6 Efficient Tax Competition

Tax competition has been seen as producing wasteful competition. There are circumstances however where tax competition may be welfare enhancing. We consider two examples.

The first example is the case where countries seek to give a competitive advantage to their own firms by offering *wasteful subsidies.* In equilibrium all countries will do this, so each country's subsidy cancels out with of others. Since they cancel, none gains any advantage and all countries would be better off giving no subsidy. This is the Prisoners' Dilemma once again. Tax competition may help solve this inefficient outcome by allowing firms to locate wherever they choose and preventing governments from discriminating between domestic and foreign firms operating within a country. The mobility of the firms will force governments to recognize that their subsidy will not only give a competitive advantage to their domestic firms but that it will also attract firms from other countries. Because the government cannot discriminate between all firms operating within its borders, it will have to pay the subsidy to both the domestic and foreign firms, thereby eliminating the competitive advantage. Therefore mobility eliminates the potential gains from the subsidy and raises its cost by extending its payment to foreign firms.

Tax competition can therefore improve welfare by reducing the incentive for countries to resort to wasteful subsidies to protect their own industries. Notice that the non-discrimination requirement plays a crucial role in making tax competition welfare improving. If discrimination were possible, then governments could continue to give wasteful subsidies to their domestic firms.

The second example is the use of tax competition as a *commitment device.* In the tax competition model, governments independently announce tax rates and then the owners of capital choose where to invest. A commitment problem arises here because the governments are able to revise their tax rates after investment decisions are made. If there were a single government and investment decision were irreversible, then this government would have an incentive to tax away all profits. The capital owner would anticipate this incentive when making its initial investment decision and choose not to invest capital in such a country.

Tax competition may help to solve this commitment problem. The reason is that inter-governmental competition for capital would deter each government from taxing away profits within its borders because it would induce reallocation of capital between countries in response to difference in tax rates. Tax competition is a useful commitment device as it induces governments to forego their incentive to tax investment in an effort to attract further investment or to maintain the existing investment level.

The original insight that tax competition leads to inefficiently low taxes and public good provision was obtained in models with benevolent decision makers. An alternative approach is to consider public officials that seek in their decision making to maximize their own welfare and not necessarily that of their constituencies. From this perspective, tax competition may help discipline *non-benevolent* governments. For instance if we view governments as "leviathan" mainly concerned with maximizing the size of the public sector, then tax competition may improve welfare by limiting taxation possibilities and thereby cutting down the size of government that would be otherwise excessive. This argument suggests that the public sector should be smaller, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized. The evidence on this is, however, mixed. In fact there is not much evidence on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the overall size of the public sector.

An analogous argument applies to governments with some degree of benevolence, possibly due to electoral concerns. When political agency problems are introduced, this inefficiency of competition among governments is no longer so clear. Inter-governmental competition makes the costs of public programs more visible, as well as their benefits in ways that make public officials accountable for their decisions. Stated briefly, competition may induce government officials to reduce waste and thus reduce the effective price of public goods.

20.3 Income Distribution

When the powers for tax setting are devolved to individual jurisdictions, the Tiebout hypothesis asserts that the outcome will be efficient. The basis for this argument is that there are enough jurisdictions for individuals to sort themselves into optimal locations. For practical purposes it is not possible to appeal to this large-numbers assumption and questions need to be asked about the outcome that will emerge when only a small, and predetermined, number of jurisdictions exist. The Tiebout hypothesis is also silent about how the policy of a jurisdiction emerges. It is possible that equilibrium results in all the residents of any jurisdiction being identical, so that there is no need to resolve different points of view. More generally, though, it is necessary to explore the consequences of political-decision making, expressed through elections, on the choice of policy.

An important set of issues revolve around income distribution and the role that this has in determining the composition of the population in jurisdictions. For instance, will it always be the case that the rich wish to detach themselves from the poor so that they can avoid being subject to redistributive taxation? And, if they have the option, would the poor wish to live with the rich? These questions are now explored under perfect and imperfect mobility.

20.3.1 Perfect Mobility

The difficulty that mobility poses for redistribution is seen most strongly in the following example. Consider individuals who differ only in income level y and who can choose to reside in one of the two available jurisdictions. The jurisdictions independently set a constant tax rate $t \in [0,1]$ and pay a lump sum transfer g subject to a budget balance constraint. Individuals care only about their income after taxes and transfers, so their preferences are given by

$$v(t,g;y) = g + [1-t]\,y. \tag{20.22}$$

The tax-transfer pair (t, g) in each jurisdiction is chosen by some unspecified collective decision rule (*e.g.* majority voting). We are looking for an equilibrium in which the two jurisdictions differ and offer different tax and transfer schemes, thereby inducing the sorting of types across jurisdictions (as the Tiebout hypothesis would predict).

With no loss of generality, suppose it is jurisdiction 1 that sets the higher tax rate. Then to attract any individuals, it must also provide a higher level of transfer, that is $(t_1, g_1) > (t_2, g_2)$. Individuals with different income levels differ in their preferences for redistribution. From (20.22), if a type y prefers the high tax jurisdiction 1, then all those with lower income levels will also prefer this jurisdiction. And if a type y prefers the low tax jurisdiction 2, then all those with higher income levels will also prefer this jurisdiction. Therefore if both jurisdictions are occupied in equilibrium, there must exist a separating type y^* who is just indifferent between the two tax schemes and all those who are poorer, with $y \leq y^*$, join jurisdiction 1 and all those who are richer, with $y > y^*$, join jurisdiction 2. That is the jurisdiction undertaking more redistribution attracts the poorest individuals.

However this cannot be an equilibrium, because the richest individual in the poor jurisdiction loses out from intra-jurisdictional redistribution and will prefer to move to the rich jurisdiction and become a net beneficiary of redistribution as its poorest resident. Therefore there cannot be an equilibrium with different tax-transfer schemes.

There remains the possibility of a symmetric equilibrium with individuals evenly divided between the two jurisdictions. In other words, perfect mobility leads to harmonization of tax-transfer schemes, even though agents differ in their preferences. The mobility does not lead to the sorting of types across jurisdictions as Tiebout predicts. The possibility for the rich to detach themselves from the poor to escape redistributive taxation induces jurisdictions either to abandon any taxation or to choose the same tax rate.

20.3.2 Imperfect Mobility

Suppose now that consumers have one of two income levels. Those with the higher income level are termed the "rich" and those with the lower income are the "poor". The two groups are imperfectly mobile but to different degrees. The rich (group 1) have income 1 and poor (group 0) have income 0. For simplicity, there is an equal number of poor and rich in the total population. The focus is placed on one of the jurisdictions (say region 1) and the proportions from each group residing there are denoted x_1 and x_0 , where the index denotes income group. The remainder $(1 - x_1)$ and $(1 - x_0)$ are located in the other jurisdiction. Redistribution implies that the rich are subject to taxation and the poor recipients of transfer. Accordingly, each jurisdiction levies a head tax t on its rich residents to pay a transfer b to each of its poor residents. The feasible choices are restricted by the budget constraint $tx_1 = bx_0$.

In addition to income differences, each individual is characterized by a preference for location $x \in [0, 1]$ where a low x implies preference for region 1 and a high x implies preference for region 2. Individuals care only about their net income and their location. Given the pair of transfers (b, b^*) in the two regions, the payoff of a poor individual with preference $x \in [0,1]$ is

$$\begin{array}{ll} b - d_0 x & \text{in region 1,} \\ b^* - d_0(1-x) & \text{in region 2,} \end{array} \tag{20.23}$$

where $d_0 > 0$ measures the degree of attachment to location of the poor with higher attachment equivalent to lower mobility.

Given the tax pair (t, t^*) the payoff of a rich individual with preference $x \in [0,1]$ is

$$\begin{array}{ll} (1-t) - d_1 x & \text{in region 1,} \\ (1-t^*) - d_1(1-x) & \text{in region 2.} \end{array} \tag{20.24}$$

It is assumed that x is uniformly distributed within income groups.

Given the tax policies, the population is divided between the two regions. The proportion of poor joining region 1, $x = x_0$, is defined by the type that is indifferent between the two regions so

$$b - d_0 x_0 = b^* - d_0(1 - x_0), \tag{20.25}$$

and thus

$$x_0 = \frac{1}{2} + \mu_0 \left[\frac{b - b^*}{2}\right], \tag{20.26}$$

with $\mu_0 = 1/d_0$ denoting the mobility of the poor. Higher mobility of the poor increases their migration in response to transfer differential. The poor are evenly distributed across regions with uniform transfers $b = b^*$.

Similarly, the proportion of rich, $x = x_1$ joining region 1 is given by the indifference condition

$$(1-t) - d_1 x_1 = (1-t^*) - d_1(1-x_1). \tag{20.27}$$

Defining the mobility of the rich by $\mu_1 = 1/d_1$, this yields

$$x_1 = \frac{1}{2} + \mu_1 \left[\frac{t^* - t}{2}\right].$$

with equal taxes inducing equal division of the rich between the two regions, $x_1 = 1/2$. Taxing more drives out some of the rich (*i.e.*, x_1 decreases with t).

Budget balance implies that the transfer you can afford to pay depends on who you attract. The transfer paid to each poor resident is

$$b = \frac{t x_1}{x_0} \quad \text{in region 1,} \tag{20.28}$$

$$b^* = \frac{t^*(1 - x_1)}{1 - x_0} \quad \text{in region 2.} \tag{20.29}$$

Assume that both governments follow a policy of maximal redistribution. Then region 1 sets its tax rate t taking as given the tax rate of the other, t^*, so as to maximize the transfer given to its poor residents, b, correctly anticipating the induced migration. The migration response of the rich to a small tax change is proportional to their mobility

$$\frac{dx_1}{dt} = -\frac{\mu_1}{2} < 0. \tag{20.30}$$

How the poor respond to a small tax change depends on the migration response of the rich and is given by total differentiation

$$dx_0 = \frac{\mu_0}{2}\left(\frac{d(b-b^*)}{dt}dt + \frac{d(b-b^*)}{dx_0}dx_0\right). \tag{20.31}$$

Evaluating this expression around $t = t^*$ (*i.e.*, with $x_i = 1/2$) for separate changes in t and x_0 gives

$$\frac{d(b-b^*)}{dt} = \frac{x_1 + t\frac{dx_1}{dt}}{x_0} - \frac{t^*\frac{d(1-x_1)}{dt}}{1-x_0} = 1 - 2t\mu_1, \tag{20.32}$$

$$\frac{d(b-b^*)}{dx_0} = \frac{-tx_1}{(x_0)^2} - \frac{t^*(1-x_1)}{(1-x_0)^2} = -4t. \tag{20.33}$$

Therefore the migration response of the poor to a domestic tax change is

$$\frac{dx_0}{dt} = \frac{\frac{1}{2} - t\mu_1}{\frac{1}{\mu_0} + 2t} \gtrless 0. \tag{20.34}$$

It is worth noting that the migration response of the poor to tax change can go either way. In particular higher tax can drive out the poor: $dx_0/dt < 0$ for $t > \frac{1}{2\mu_1}$. The reason is that if the rich are sufficiently mobile (high μ_1), a tax increase induces so many rich to leave that the poor would find it better to follow them. In such circumstances, the poor will chase the rich.

Putting these points together the (symmetric) equilibrium tax choice can be determined. Region 1 chooses its tax rate t so as to maximize the transfer to its poor residents b taking as given the tax choice of the other region and correctly anticipating the migration responses of the rich and the poor. The necessary first-order condition is

$$\frac{db}{dt} = \frac{x_1}{x_0} + \left(\frac{t}{x_0}\right)\frac{dx_1}{dt} + \frac{db}{dx_0}\left(\frac{dx_0}{dt}\right) = 0 \tag{20.35}$$

Using the migration changes as given by (20.30) and (20.34) and evaluating the condition at the symmetric outcome in which both regions pick the same tax-transfer scheme and each group divides evenly between the two regions, the first-order condition becomes

$$\frac{db}{dt} = 1 - t\mu_1 - 2t\left(\frac{\frac{1}{2} - t\mu_1}{\frac{1}{\mu_0} + 2t}\right) = 0. \tag{20.36}$$

This gives the following symmetric equilibrium

$$t = t^* = \frac{1}{\mu_1 - \mu_0}. \tag{20.37}$$

Consequently, the equilibrium level of redistributive taxation is inversely proportional to the difference in the mobility of the rich and the poor. Higher mobility of the rich reduces taxation but this is partially offset by the mobility of the poor. The reasoning behind this is that in equilibrium the poor chase the rich and so it is not possible for the rich to detach themselves from the poor.

The logic of the conclusion also applies in a model with capital and labor mobility. With this extension, it implies that the possibility to tax capital increases with the mobility of labor. So the problem of tax competition is not only the excessive mobility of capital but also the lack of mobility of labor.

20.3.3 The Race to the Bottom

In a context where there are no legal barriers to migration, so that the forces of fiscal competition are at work, any attempt at redistribution or the provision of social insurance in a country would be impossible because it would induce emigration of those who were supposed to give (the rich) and immigration of those who were supposed to receive (the poor). The most extreme predictions of this form imply a "race to the bottom" but receive little theoretical or empirical support. This is probably due to the presence of significant costs and barriers to migration.

For example, welfare shopping has been discouraged in Europe by limiting portability between member states and requiring, for eligibility, previous employment in the country. However we believe that under-provision of social insurance in an integrated market is an issue that cannot be ignored in the EU. Even if it has not been a pressing issue to date, fiscal competition for capital and labor factors has already arrived. The Irish experience of the success of reduced corporation taxes is evidence of this. And with the prospect of enlargement, this issue will become even more pressing.

20.4 Inter-Governmental Transfers

The reasons for organizing inter-governmental transfers are twofold: efficiency and redistribution. We consider the two in turn.

20.4.1 Efficiency

A critical insight from the analysis of tax competition is that increasing the tax rate in one region benefits other regions by increasing their tax bases. If we take the tax base to be the capital stock and the aggregate supply of capital to be fixed, then the tax-induced outflow of capital from the region taxing more represents an inflow of capital to the other regions.

In particular, another region j benefits from increased revenue by the amount $t_j \Delta k_j$, where t_j is its tax rate and Δk_j the fiscally-induced capital inflow. The problem facing each region is to choose the tax rate on capital to finance the public good level that maximizes the welfare of its residents subject to the budget constraint $G = tk(t)$. The optimal regional level of public good is given by the fact that the marginal benefit of public good MB must be high enough to not only cover its marginal cost, MC, but also to offset the negative impact of capital outflow on tax revenue, denoted by $t\Delta k < 0$. Then we obtain the following modified Samuelson rule

$$MB = MC - t\Delta k. \tag{20.38}$$

The context of identical regions provides a useful reference for isolating the fiscal-externality inefficiency from other equity and efficiency aspects that would arise when regions differ and choose different tax rates and public good levels. With identical tax rates, t, the cost of a capital outflow from one region is exactly offset by the benefits from the resulting capital inflows to other regions. It follows that if regions were to take into account such external benefits they would no longer perceive capital outflows as a cost and the efficient provision of public good (as given by the usual Samuelson rule) would obtain with

$$MB = MC. \tag{20.39}$$

The central authority can achieve this efficient outcome by means of *revenue matching grants*. The idea is to correct the externality by providing a subsidy to the revenue raised by each region. The matching rate to a region is the additional revenue that accrues to other regions when this region raises its tax rate. Then regions are correctly compensated for the positive externalities of raising their taxes.

Differences among regions bring about a second inefficiency from tax competition, namely that different tax rates induce a misallocation of capital across regions, such that the marginal product of capital is relatively high in high-tax regions (see Figure 20.3). It follows that matching rates should be differentiated to induce all regions to choose the same tax rate and at the same time to internalize the fiscal externality. Tax harmonization requires the payment of a higher subsidy to regions with a low preference for taxation and public goods. In practice, however, the central government may not have the political authority or the information required to impose differentiated matching grants. The information problem is rather severe because all regions can claim to be of the low-tax type in order to obtain a higher subsidy. With tax overlap, the matching rate will be negative to represent the reduction in tax revenues for other levels of government when the region raises additional revenue from the common tax base (see Figure 20.4).

Expenditure externalities can also be corrected with *expenditure matching grants*. For example, spending by a local government on education or public infrastructure improves the potential earnings of its residents by making them more productive and this will increase the federal government's revenue from income, payroll and sales taxes. To induce the local government to internalize this vertical expenditure externality, the federal authority can use expenditure matching grants. Matching grant programs specify that the federal government matches on a dollar-for-dollar basis local expenditure up to some maximum. The effect is to lower the price of local public goods and thereby offset the tendency for local governments to under-provide public expenditures generating positive externalities.

An important example of vertical expenditure externalities in Canada is the substitutability between expenditures on unemployment benefits at the federal level and welfare benefits at the provincial levels. If the federal government reduces unemployment benefits or their duration, more people will apply for welfare benefits, increasing spending at the provincial level. Conversely, employment programs by provincial government which allow welfare recipients to regain eligibility to unemployment benefits will lead to higher spending at the federal level.

In the US, until 1996, the federal government could bear 50-80 percent of the cost of some welfare expenditures undertaken by states (like the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Food stamp and Medicaid programs). In 1996 the AFDC matching system was replaced by a lump-sum grant (*i.e.*, the TANF programme). This is intriguing because as illustrated in Figure 20.5, the matching system is more effective in stimulating local public expenditures than a lump-sum subsidy of the same amount. The reason is simply that the lump-sum grant can be used in any way the recipient wishes, in contrast to the matching grant that is increasing with the amount of public spending. In that perspective matching grants are also called ”conditional” grants because they place some restrictions on their use by the recipient, and the lump-sum grants are called ”unconditional” grants. Figure 20.5 also indicates the distortionary effect of matching grants: higher welfare could be attained at the same cost with lump-sum grants. This is the advantage of the freedom of choice that ”unconditional” grants provide.

The attraction of matching grants is to internalize expenditure externalities. However lump-sum grants also have their own attraction which is to maintain fiscal discipline (at the heart of the EMU). The idea here is that by creating a hard budget constraint, they impose a very useful discipline on decentralized expenditure decisions. More generally, a *hard budget* constraint implies that decentralized governments must place a basic reliance on their own sources of revenue and must not be overly dependent on transfers from the federal government. Self-financing is a powerful incentive device and it is essential that local governments do not turn to the federal authority to bail them out of fiscal difficulties by resorting to expansible matching grants.

20.4.2 Redistribution

Inter-governmental grants are also used to channel resources from wealthy jurisdictions to poorer ones. Such transfers are based on equalization formula that measure the fiscal need and fiscal capacity of each jurisdiction, locality or



Figure 20.5: Matching Versus Lump-Sum Grant

province. *Fiscal equalization* then involves higher grants to those jurisdictions with the greatest fiscal need and the least fiscal capacity. If the objective is to equalize taxable capacity, the central government can supplement the revenue base of poorer jurisdictions by matching any revenues they collect by the addition of a further percentage. This form of equalization is sometimes called "power equalization".

In practice equalization grants play a major role in countries like Australia, Denmark, Canada, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland and involve substantial transfers from wealthy to poor jurisdictions. In the United States, such equalizing grants have never played an important role in allowing poorer states to compete effectively with fiscally stronger ones, but the equalization formula has been the basis of local school district finance in many states.

Typically, an equalization system sets the transfer to each region equal to the difference between its observed tax base and the average tax base of all regions, multiplied by some standard tax rate, usually equal to the average tax among all the regions. Accordingly, if b_i is the tax base of region i with $\overline{b}$ the average tax base among regions and $\overline{t}$ the average tax rate, then the equalization transfer to region i is given by

$$T_i = \overline{t}[\overline{b} - b_i] \gtrless 0 \quad \text{for } b_i \lessgtr \overline{b}. \tag{20.40}$$

The use of the average tax rate as the standard tax rate is to accommodate a diversity of regional spending behavior. The intention is that equalization compensates for difference in fiscal capacities but not for difference in preferences for public spending. Indeed, when all regions choose the same tax rate, the formula guarantees equal revenues. The equalization formula can also correct for fiscal externalities. A tax cut by one region increases not only its tax base at the expense of other regions, but also relative to the average tax base, thereby reducing the entitlement of this region to equalization grants.

Fiscal equalization is a contentious issue. In some cases, as in Canada, it may provide the cement that holds the bricks of the federation together. In other cases, like Italy or Belgium, it may become the source of division, where rich regions weary of large and durable transfers to poor regions, actually seek the break up of the federation.

20.4.3 Flypaper Effect

When considering the budgetary decisions of the recipients of inter-governmental grants, models of rational choice suggest that the response to a lump-sum grant should be roughly the same as the response to an equal increase in income resulting from a federal tax cut. But empirical studies of the response to grants have rejected this equivalence. There are indeed strong evidence that local government spending is more sensitive to grants than it is to increasing income through tax cut. Among the best estimates of this in the US: the marginal propensity for state local governments to spend out of personal income in the state is about 10 percent. But the marginal propensity for state local governments to spend out of grants from the federal level is around 80-90 percent. This has been known as the "flypaper effect" to say that money sticks where it hits. This is intriguing because it suggests that the same budget could give rise to different choices depending on what form the increment to the budget takes. It has been suggested that this may reflect the behavioral regularity that money on hand (from grants) has different effect on spending than where the money must be raised (by taxation). This is can be understood with the following thought experiment. Consider you have lost your ticket for the cinema and you must decide whether to buy a new one. Now suppose instead that you lose the same amount of money, would you be as willing to buy the ticket in the first place. Although in both cases you face exactly the same budget constraint, it is less likely that you will buy the new ticket after losing the original one than if you were losing the equivalent amount of money. The fly paper effect also casts serious doubt on the idea that local governments are more responsive to local demand. Indeed taking the estimates above, one might think that if the local government were strictly responding to local demand, \$100 per capita of federal grants would lead to about \$90 per capita tax reduction and \$10 additional spending, but it is entirely the other way around with about \$90 additional spending and \$10 of reduced local taxes.

20.5 Evidence

Race to the bottom: The central result of the tax competition model is that increasing mobility of capital will drive down the equilibrium tax on capital.

This canonical model is at the heart of concerns about capital tax competition within the EU. In response to this growing concern, the OECD published a report (OECD, 1998) comprising about 20 recommendations to counter what was perceived as "harmful" tax competition of capital income. This issue was also taken seriously by the EU in December 1997. The EU commission agreed with a "Code of Conduct" in business taxation, as part of a "package to tackle harmful tax competition". The Code is aimed at identifying tax measures that reduce the level of tax paid below the "usual" level. In particular, a measure is considered as "harmful" if the tax advantage is restricted only to non-residents, or if it is "ring-fenced" from the domestic market, or if the tax break is granted without any real economic activity taking place. The central motivation for these reforms is the race to the bottom in capital taxation. To appreciate the relevance of this we must evaluate the existence and magnitude of this race to the bottom. The following table shows the statutory corporate income tax rates between 1982 and 2001 for a group of countries in the EU and G7. The statutory tax rate includes local tax rates and any supplementary charges made. Except for Italy and Ireland, all countries have significantly reduced their statutory tax rate. In 1982 Ireland had the lowest rate at 10 percent and Germany the highest rate at 64 percent, while both the US and the UK had a rate around 50 percent. In 2001, Ireland had still the lowest rate at 10 percent but both Germany and the US had reduced their rate just below 40 percent, and the rate in the UK was down to 30 percent. Over this period Austria, Finland and Sweden have cut their statutory rate by more than one half.

	1982	2001
Austria	61	34
Belgium	45	40
Canada	45	35
Finland	60	28
France	50	35
UK	53	30
Germany	62	38
Greece	42	38
Ireland	10	10
Italy	38	40
Japan	52	41
Netherlands	48	35
Portugal	55	36
Sweden	61	28
USA	50	49

Table 20.1: Statutory Corporate Income Tax
Source: Devereux *et al.* (2002)

Table 20.2 shows the fall in the *median* statutory corporate income tax rates over the last two decades for the same group of countries. Between 1982 and 2001, the median statutory tax rate for this group fell from 50 percent to about

35 percent. The statutory tax rate is likely to be important in determining the incentive for firms to shift investment between countries. However the tax base is also likely to be relevant. A higher tax rate does not necessarily imply higher tax payment, since effective tax payments also depend on the definition of the tax base. Governments with different tax rates can also adjust their rates of depreciation allowances for capital expenditure. The rate allowed for firms to spread the cost of capital against tax varies considerably across countries. Adjusting the statutory tax rate to take account of this effect and other difference in tax base, we obtain the "effective" average tax rate. It measures the proportion of total profit taken in tax. The evolution of the "effective" rate does not replicate the statutory rate. There is a decline from 43 percent in 1982 to 32 percent in 2001, but the fall is less pronounced as for statutory rate. The lower fall in the effective rates indicates that the reduction in the statutory rates has been partially offset by less generous allowances for capital expenditures (broader tax base).

	82	84	86	88	90	92	94	96	98	01
Median Statutory	50	48	46	43	39	38	37	36	37	35
Average Effective	43	42	41	38	36	37	36	36	34	32

Table 20.2: Statutory and Effective Corporate Income Tax Rates
Source: Devereux *et al.* (2002)

Race to the top: It is natural for economists to think that competition among jurisdictions should stimulate public decision makers to act more efficiently and limit their discretion to pursue objectives that are not congruent with the interest of their constituency. Test of this hypothesis led to substantial empirical research investigating whether inter-governmental competition through fiscal decentralization affects public expenditures. The evidence as reviewed in Oates (1999), supports strongly the conclusion that increased competition tends to restrict government spending. But the fact that spending falls with more competition does not mean that resources are more efficiently allocated as competition increases. The problem is that it is hard to come up with measures of the quality of locally provided public services. However, there is one notable exception which is education where standardized test scores and post-graduating earnings provide performance measures that are easily comparable across districts. Following this strategy, Hoxby (2000) finds that greater competition among school districts has a significant effect both in improving educational performances and reducing expenditures per student. Besley and Case (1995) develop and test a political model of yardstick competition in which voters are poorly informed about the true cost of public good provision. They use data on state taxes and gubernatorial election outcomes in the US. The theoretical idea is that to see how much of a tax increase is due to the economic environment or to the quality of their local government, voters can use the performance in others jurisdictions as a "yardstick" to obtain an assessment of the relative performance of their own government. The empirical evidence supports the prediction that yardstick competition does indeed influence local tax setting. From that perspective intergovernmental competition is good to discipline politicians and limit wasteful public spending.

Tax mimicking: A substantial body of empirical studies has emerged testing for interdependence among jurisdictions in tax and expenditure choices. One of the first and very influential work is by Case *et al.* (1993) who test a model in which state's expenditure may generate spillovers to nearby states. The great novelty of this work is to allow for spatially correlated shocks as well as spillovers. Using data from a group of states, strong evidence of fiscal interdependence emerges and the effects arising from interdependence are large. A dollar increase in spending in one state induces neighboring states to increase their own spending by seventy cents. Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) test for the presence of strategic competition among local governments using data of 70 cities in the Boston metropolitan area. Taking capital as the mobile factor and population as fixed, local jurisdictions choose property tax rates taking into account the mobility of capital in response to tax differentials. Property taxes are the only important local revenue. The authors use spatial econometric methods to relate the property tax rate in one community to its own characteristics and to the tax rates in competing communities. They find that tax rate in one locality is positively and significantly related to tax rates in contiguous localities. This means that the tax interdependence generates upward sloping reaction functions. Same conclusion has been obtained with similar methodology by Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) in their study of property-tax mimicking among Belgian municipalities. Turning to welfare migration, Saavedra (1998) uses spatial econometric estimates of cross sections welfare benefits (AFDC) for the year 1985, 1990 and 1995 of all states in the continental US. She find strong evidence that a given state's welfare benefit choice is affected by benefit levels in nearby states for each year. Moreover the findings show significant and positive spatial interdependence, suggesting that a given state would increase its benefit level as nearby-state benefits rise.

20.6 Conclusions

The role of competition may be thought as a device to secure better fiscal performance, or at least to detect fiscal inefficiency. If market competition by private firms provides households with what they want at least cost, why intergovernmental competition cannot lead to better governmental activities? Poorly performing governments will lose out and better performing ones will be rewarded. Though appealing, the analogy can be misleading and the competitive model is not directly transferable to fiscal competition among governments. Once there is more than one jurisdiction, the possibility is opened for a range of fiscal externalities to emerge. Such externalities can be positive, as with tax competition, and lead to tax rates that are too low. Competition among governments to render high quality services may give way to competition for under cutting tax rates to attract mobile factors always from neighboring jurisdictions. Given capital mobility, any attempt by local government to impose a net tax on capital will drive out capital until its net return is raised to that available elsewhere. The revenue gain from higher tax rate would be more than offset by an income loss to workers due to the reduction in the locally employed capital stock. Fiscal harmonization across jurisdiction would be unanimously preferred. Alternatively, the externalities can be negative, as with tax overlapping, and put upward pressure on tax rates. This is the common pool problem leading to overspending and overtaxation. Interestingly when there is no clear division of power, there is competition between central and local governments not only for the same tax base but also for the same local voter base. The federal government is competing with the local government for the provision of what might otherwise be local government services (child care, education, police ...). The implication of that is the overexpansion of public spending. To make things worse, tax bases as well as consumers of public services are mobile and need not move together. Instead of voting with their feet to sanction inefficient government, consumers of public services can move to escape fiscal obligations rather than to obtain efficient public services. At the extreme, given household mobility, public services may used and benefits may be received in one region, while income is derived and taxes are paid in another. Such externalities can be corrected, and inter-governmental transfers are one means of doing so. Grants may be either conditional (matching grants and categorical grants) or unconditional (lump sum block grants). Each type of grants involves different incentives and induces different behaviors for local governments. The final mix of increased expenditure versus lower local taxes depends on the preferences guiding local choices. Empirical studies are essential to compare the costs and benefits of intergovermental competition. Evidence of the presence of fiscal interaction between jurisdictions is not compelling evidence of harmful tax competition. Tax interaction can also be due to political effect where the electoral concern induces local governments to mimic tax setting in neighboring jurisdictions. In such case competition can be an effective instrument to discipline and control officials.

We can conclude with the question raised at the beginning of this chapter on the analogy between market competition and government competition. The main lesson from the fiscal competition theory is that intergovernmental competition limits the set of actions and policies available to each government. There is no doubt that such constraints that are imposed on the authority of governments do, indeed, constraint or limit actions, and, in so doing, both "good" and "bad" actions may be forestalled. So, whether we view such competition as harmful or not reflects our perception of the quality of governments. Unconstrained actions of a benevolent governments is good, but it can be very costly when governments can abuse power.

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Part VIII

Issues of Time

Chapter 21

Intertemporal Efficiency

21.1 Introduction

Time is an essential component of economic activity. The passage of time sees the birth and death of consumers and the purchase, depreciation and eventual obsolescence of capital. It sees new products and production processes introduced, and provides a motive for borrowing and saving. Time also brings with it new and important issues in public economics such as the benefits from the provision of social security (pensions) and the effect of government policy upon economic growth. The remaining chapters of the book are devoted to exploring these issues.

The competitive economy described in Chapter 6 provided a firm foundation for the discussion of economic efficiency and equity in a static setting. This economy also underpinned the analysis of efficiency failures and the policy responses to them. It also taught a number of important lessons about economic modelling. For all these reasons, it has been one of the most influential and durable models in economics. Despite this, the model has shortcomings when it is applied to economic issues involving time. We presented the competitive economy as being *atemporal* - having an absence of any time structure. A temporal structure can be added by interpreting commodities as being available at different times, so that the commodity "bread for delivery today" is a distinct commodity from "bread available tomorrow". The list of commodities traded is then extended to include all commodities at all points in time. Since only the labelling of commodities has changed, all the results derived for the economy - the efficiency theorems in particular - remain valid.

Although analyzing time in this way has the benefit of simplicity it also has one major shortcoming. This shortcoming is best understood by considering the implications of the equilibrium concept we applied to the model. Equilibrium was found by selecting a set of prices that equate supply and demand on all markets. Moreover, it was assumed that no trade took place until these equilibrium prices were announced. The implication of this structure is that all agreements to trade present commodities, and commodities to be consumed in the future, have to be made at the start of the economy. That is, contracts have to be negotiated and agreed, and equilibrium prices determined, before production and consumption can take place. This produces a poor representation of an intertemporal economy that misses the gradual unfolding of trade which is the very essence of time. It is also an untenable one: the need to make trades now for all commodities into the future requires all consumers and firms to be present at the start of the economy and to know what all future products will be. Consequently, if issues of time are to be properly addressed, a better model is needed. We consider two alternative models of time: the overlapping generations economy, whose focus is upon population structure, in this chapter and an alternative set of models, focusing on growth through capital accumulation and technological innovation, in Chapter 23.

The *overlapping generation economy* is one alternative to the competitive economy that introduces time in a more convincing manner. This model has the basic feature that the economy evolves over time with new consumers being born at the start of each period and old ones dying. At any point in time the population consists of a mix of old and young consumers. The lifespans of these generations of young and old overlap, which gives the model its name, and provides a motive for trade between generations at different points in their life-cycle. This evolution of the population allows the overlapping generations economy to address many issues of interest in public economics.

Overlapping generations economies are important not only because they gives a simple yet realistic model of the lifecycle, but also because of their many surprising properties. Foremost amongst these, and the one that is focus of this chapter, is that the competitive equilibrium can fail to be Pareto efficient despite the absence of any of the sources of market failure identified in Part IV. The potential failure of Pareto efficiency provides an efficiency-based justification for assessing the benefits of government intervention. Among such interventions, the one with the most important policy implications is social security (or pensions). Social security can transfer wealth across points in the lifecycle and between the generations. Given the impending "pensions crises" that are slowly developing in many advanced economies as the elderly population increases relative to the number of workers, social security is an issue of major policy concern.

This chapter sets out the structure of a basic overlapping generations economy with production. It presents the decision problems facing the consumers and the producers in the economy. The solutions to these problems are then used to characterize the equilibrium of the economy and to determine the steady-state equilibrium in which consumption and output per capita are constant. Both Pareto-efficient steady states and the optimal Golden Rule steady state are characterized. It is then shown that the economy can settle into an inefficient steady state which is the important result from a policy perspective. The nature of the inefficiency and the reason why it arises are discussed.



Figure 21.1: Generational Structure

21.2 Overlapping Generations

21.2.1 Time and Generations

The two features of economic activity connected with the passage of time that we wish to capture are the accumulation of capital and the fact that the lifespan of each individual is short relative to the lifespan of the economy. The model we now develop incorporates the first aspect by allowing capital to be transferable across time periods and to depreciate steadily over time. The second aspect is introduced by letting each consumer have a finite life set within the infinite life of the economy.

In the overlapping generations economy, time is divided into discrete periods with the length of the unit time interval being equal to the time between the birth of one generation and the birth of the next. There is no end period for the economy, instead economic activity is expected to continue indefinitely. At the beginning of each period a new generation of young consumers is born. Each consumer lives for two periods of time. The population grows at a constant rate so, if the rate of population growth is positive, each generation is larger than the previous one. Generation t is defined as the set of consumers who are born at the start of period t. Denoting the population growth rate by n, if generation t is of size H_t then the size of generation $t+1$, H_{t+1}, is given by $H_{t+1} = [1+n] H_t$.

The population at any point in time is made up of young and old consumers; it is this overlapping of two consecutive generations that gives the model its name. This generational structure is shown in Figure 21.1 where the solid lines represent the lifespan of a generation. It is the differing motives for trade for the old and the young, due to their different lifecycle positions, that give economic content to the model.

At each point in time, the economy has a single good which is produced using capital and labor. This good can either be consumed or saved to be used as the capital input in the next period. (Thinking of potatoes may be helpful.

When harvested they can either be eaten or put aside to be used for planting in the next year.) The existence of capital as a store of value allows consumers to carry purchasing power from one period to the next. To simplify, we assume that capital does not depreciate during the production process. Consumers plan their consumption to maximize lifetime utility and the level of production is chosen so as to maximize profits. All markets are competitive. An allocation of production is feasible for the economy if consumption plus saving by the two generations alive at each point in time is no greater than total output.

21.2.2 Consumers

The modelling of consumers is designed to capture a very simple form of lifecycle behavior. Each consumer works only during the first period of their life and inelastically supplies one unit of labor. This unit of labor is their entire endowment. Hence the total quantity of labor in the economy is equal to the number of young consumers. In their second period of life each consumer is retired and supplies no labor. Retired from work, old consumers live off the savings they accumulated when working. They are fully aware of their own mortality and plan their consumption profile accordingly. The income earned by a consumer during the first period of their life is divided between consumption and savings. Second period consumption is equal to savings plus interest. With the exception of their date of birth, consumers are otherwise identical.

All consumers have identical preferences over consumption in the two periods of life. For a consumer born in period t, these preferences are represented by the utility function

$$U = U\left(x_t^t, x_t^{t+1}\right), \tag{21.1}$$

where x_t^t is consumption when young and x_t^{t+1} consumption when old. There is no explicit disutility from the supply of the single unit of labor in the first period of life.

The budget constraint of a typical consumer can be constructed by noting that labor income is equal to the sum of consumption and saving. In the first period of life, consumption, x_t^t, and saving, s_t, must satisfy the budget constraint

$$w_t = x_t^t + s_t, \tag{21.2}$$

where w_t is the wage received for the single unit of labor. Savings accrue interest at rate r_{t+1}(with interest paid in period $t+1$), so the value of second-period consumption x_t^{t+1} is given by

$$x_t^{t+1} = [1 + r_{t+1}]\, s_t. \tag{21.3}$$

Combining (21.2) and (21.3), the life-cycle budget constraint is

$$w_t = x_t^t + \frac{x_t^{t+1}}{[1 + r_{t+1}]}. \tag{21.4}$$

Before proceeding to further analysis of consumer choice, it is worth emphasizing an important point: there are no financial assets in this economy. Instead,



Figure 21.2: Consumer Choice

saving takes the form of investment in real capital. The interest rate is therefore equal to the return on capital, and the same interest rate guides the investment in capital by firms.

From (21.1) and (21.4) the utility-maximizing consumption plan satisfies the first-order condition '

$$\frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_t^t}}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_t^{t+1}}} = [1 + r_{t+1}] \,. \tag{21.5}$$

In (21.5) the left-hand side is the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between consumption in the two periods of life. The right-hand side is the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation. The solution to this choice problem is illustrated in Figure 21.2.

21.2.3 Production

The productive sector of the economy is assumed to consist of many competitive firms all producing with the same constant-returns-to-scale production technology. These assumptions allow the firms to be aggregated into one single representative firm modelled by an aggregate production function. Using a representative firm greatly simplifies the presentation.

It has been assumed that the capital used in production does not depreciate (this simplifies matters, but has no significant economic consequences). At the end of the production process in each period, the firm has: (a) the (undepreciated) capital used in production and (b) new output. The sum of these is the total output of the economy which is divided between saving (to be re-invested as capital) and consumption. To be consistent, the aggregate production function is defined to measure the *gross* output of the firm which is the sum of new output plus the undepreciated capital. Denote this production function by $F(K_t, L_t)$, where K_t is the capital stock in period t and L_t is aggregate labor supply. An allocation is feasible if gross output is equal to the sum of consumption for the two generations alive at time t plus savings

$$F(K_t, L_t) = H_t x_t^t + H_{t-1} x_{t-1}^t + H_t s_t. \tag{21.6}$$

The representative firm chooses its use of capital and labor to maximize profits, π_t, where

$$\pi_t = F(K_t, L_t) - w_t L_t - r_t K_t. \tag{21.7}$$

Note that this expression for profit values net output and the undepreciated capital equally and assigns a rental rate of r_t for the use of capital. The necessary condition for choice of the level of capital is

$$F_K = r_t. \tag{21.8}$$

This is just the usual statement that capital should be employed up to the point at which its marginal product, F_K, is equal to its cost, r_t. The first-order condition for the quantity of labor input is

$$F_L = w_t, \tag{21.9}$$

so labor is employed up to the point at which its marginal product, F_L, is equal to the wage, w_t.

This development of the firm's decision problem allows the results to be related to standard results from microeconomics. However an alternative presentation is more helpful in the context of an overlapping generations economy with a possibly variable population. In this case what matters for economic welfare is not just how much is produced but, instead, how much is produced per unit of labor. An increase in production per unit of labor (with labor equal to the number of young consumers) can allow an unambiguous increase in welfare, provided it is correctly distributed, but an increase in production, without reference to the size of population, can not. To capture these observations, it is preferable to re-phrase the formulation of the production function.

It is now assumed that the production function satisfies constant returns to scale. This assumption makes it possible to write

$$Y_t = L_t F\left(\frac{K_t}{L_t}, 1\right) = L_t f\left(\frac{K_t}{L_t}\right), \tag{21.10}$$

where $\frac{K_t}{L_t}$ is the capital/labour ratio. Defining $y_t = \frac{Y_t}{L_t}$ and $k_t = \frac{K_t}{L_t}$, net output per unit of labor is determined by a function that has the capital/labor ratio as its sole argument

$$y_t = f(k_t). \tag{21.11}$$

It is assumed that this function satisfies $f(0) = 0$, $f' > 0$ and $f'' < 0$ so that no output can be produced without capital and the marginal product is positive but decreasing. Using (21.10) it follows that the marginal product of capital is

$$\frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial K_t} \equiv F_K = f', \tag{21.12}$$

and the marginal product of labor

$$\frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial L_t} \equiv F_L = f - \frac{K_t}{L_t} f' = f - k_t f'. \tag{21.13}$$

These derivatives can be used to re-write (21.8) and (21.9) as

$$f'(k_t) = r_t, \tag{21.14}$$

and

$$f(k_t) - k_t f'(k_t) = w_t. \tag{21.15}$$

Conditions (21.14) and (21.15) represent the optimal choice of capital and labor for the firm when the production function is expressed in terms of the capital/labor ratio. This pair of conditions characterize the choices arising from profit maximization by the firm.

21.3 Equilibrium

At an equilibrium for the overlapping generations economy it is necessary that consumers maximize utility, that the representative firm maximizes profit, and that all markets clear. Since there is a single good which can be used as capital or consumed, market clearing can be captured by the equality of demand and supply on the capital market.

Granted this fact, there are two ways in which equilibrium can be viewed. The first is to consider the *intertemporal equilibrium* of the economy. By this is meant a sequence of values for the economic variables that ensure markets are in equilibrium in every time period. This intertemporal equilibrium determines the full time-path for the endogenous variables (x_t^t, x_t^{t+1}, k_t, w_t and r_t) and hence their changes from one period to the next. The alternative form of equilibrium is to consider the steady-state of the economy. The *steady state* is the situation in which the endogenous variables remain constant over time. Such an equilibrium can be thought of as a long-run position for the economy. By definition, once the economy reaches a steady-state it never leaves it.

To describe either of the forms of equilibrium, it is first necessary to characterize equilibrium on the capital market. Equilibrium is achieved when the quantity of capital used in production is equal to the level of savings, since capital is the only store of value for saving. By definition, saving is labor income less consumption so $s_t = w_t - x_t^t$. Hence, as there are H_t young consumers in period t, the equality of total savings in period t with capital used in period $t+1$ requires that

$$H_t \left[w_t - x_t^t\right] = K_{t+1}. \tag{21.16}$$

Dividing through by H_t, recalling that $H_{t+1} = [1+n]\, H_t$ and $H_t = L_t$, expresses this in terms of the capital/labor ratio as

$$w_t - x_t^t = k_{t+1}\,[1+n]\,. \tag{21.17}$$

When (21.17) is satisfied, there is equilibrium in the capital market.

21.3.1 Intertemporal Equilibrium

An intertemporal equilibrium is a sequence $\left\{x_t^t, x_t^{t+1}, k_t, w_t, r_t\right\}$ of the endogenous variables that attain equilibrium in every time period t. In each time period, all consumers must maximize utility, the representative firm must maximize profit and the capital market must be in equilibrium. Putting these together, the set of conditions that must be simultaneously satisfied for the economy to be in equilibrium are:

- Utility maximization: (21.5), (21.4);
- Profit maximization: (21.14), (21.15);
- Market clearing: (21.17).

The equilibrium determined by these conditions should be seen as one in which the economy develops over time. The way that this works can be understood by following the economy from its very beginning. Let the economy have an initial capital stock, k_1, in period 1. This capital stock is endowed by nature and belongs to consumers who are already in the second period of life at the start of economic activity. The level of capital and the initial labor force determine the interest rate, r_1, and wage rate, w_1, from (21.14) and (21.15). Using these, (21.5), (21.4) and (21.17) simultaneously determine x_1^1, x_1^2 and k_2. Starting with k_2, the process can be repeated for the next time period. Continuing forward in this way, generates the entire equilibrium path of the economy.

Although the intertemporal behavior of the overlapping generations economy is of great analytical interest, it will not be pursued in detail here. Instead, our focus will be upon steady state from this point onwards.

21.3.2 Steady State

In the steady state, all variables are constant. Consequently consumers in all generations must have the same lifetime consumption plan. The quantity of capital per worker must also remain constant. These observations suggest an interpretation of the steady state as the long-run equilibrium in which the economy has reached the limit of its development (but note that this interpretation is only strictly true if the economy converges to the steady state).

Since all variables are constant in the steady state, the notation can be simplified by dropping the subscripts referring to time. The steady-state equations determining the wage and the interest rate are $w = f(k) - kf'(k)$ and $r = f'(k)$, where k, w and r are the (constant) capital/labor ratio, wage rate and interest rate. Each consumer's budget constraint can then be written as

$$x^1 + \frac{x^2}{1 + f'(k)} = f(k) - kf'(k), \tag{21.18}$$

where x^1 and x^2 are the steady-state consumption levels in the first-period and second-period of the consumer's life. The steady-state capital market equilibrium condition becomes

$$f(k) - kf'(k) - x^1 = [1 + n] k. \tag{21.19}$$

These equations can be used to provide a helpful means of displaying the steady state equilibrium. Solving (21.18) and (21.19) for the consumption levels x^1 and x^2 gives

$$x^1 = f(k) - kf'(k) - [1 + n] k, \tag{21.20}$$

and

$$x^2 = [1 + n] k [1 + f'(k)]. \tag{21.21}$$

The interpretation of (21.20) and (21.21) is that each value of the steady-state capital/labor ratio k implies a steady-state level of first-period consumption from (21.20) and of second-period consumption from (21.21). As k is varied, this pair of equations generates a locus of $\{x^1, x^2\}$ pairs. This is termed the *consumption possibility frontier*. It shows the steady-state consumption plans that are possible for alternative capital/labor ratios.

There are basic economic reasons for expecting the consumption possibility frontier to describe a non-monotonic relationship between x^1 and x^2 as illustrated in Figure 21.3. When $k = 0$ it can be seen immediately that x^1 and x^2 are both zero - no output can be produced without capital. This is illustrated by the frontier beginning at the origin in the figure. When k becomes positive, x^1 and x^2 also become positive. As k is increased, we move further around the frontier with both x^1 and x^2 increasing. For large values of k, x^1 may begin to fall and can even become zero since $f(k)$ increases at an ever slower rate while $[1 + n] k$ increases at a constant rate. The actual shape of the frontier depends on how quickly the returns to capital decrease as the capital input is increased whilst holding labor input constant. What is underlying this is that low values of k do not allow much to be produced so consumption must be low. As k increases, more consumption becomes possible. However, at high values of k decreasing returns to capital become important and consumption must be decreased in order to support the reproduction of a very high capital stock.

The importance of this construction is the following interpretation. All points on the frontier are potentially steady-state equilibria. Each point determines a pair $\{x^1, x^2\}$ and an implied value of the capital/labor ratio, k. The



Figure 21.3: Consumption Possibilities

steady-state that will actually arise as the competitive equilibrium of the economy is determined by the interaction of consumer preferences and the consumption possibility frontier. The question then arises as to the efficiency properties of the consumption pair $\left\{x^1, x^2\right\}$ or equivalently of the value of k. That is, are all values of k equally good or are some preferable to others? If some are preferable, will the competitive economic activity result in an optimal value of k in equilibrium? The answers to these questions are given in the following sections. Before proceeding to these, we first look at how the competitive equilibrium is determined.

The optimal choice of the consumer is a point where the indifference curve is tangential to the budget constraint. The budget constraint has gradient $-[1+r]$. In a steady-state equilibrium the consumption plan $\left\{x^1, x^2\right\}$ must also be on the consumption possibility frontier and tangential to the budget constraint. The equilibrium is found by moving around the frontier until a value of k is reached at which the indifference curve is tangent to the budget constraint defined by the rate of interest, $r = f'(k)$, at that level of capital. A steady-state equilibrium satisfying this condition and two non-equilibrium allocations, at a and b, are shown in Figure 21.4.



Figure 21.4: Steady-State Equilibrium

21.4 Optimality and Efficiency

21.4.1 The Golden Rule

The central message of the previous section was that the competitive equilibrium would occur at some point on the consumption possibility frontier. The consumer's preferences, in conjunction with the production function, will determine precisely which point this is. Having reached this conclusion, it is now possible to determine whether any of the points on the frontier are preferable to others.

To do this it is first necessary to clarify in what sense one point can be preferable to another. In a steady state, every consumer in every generation has an identical lifetime consumption plan. Consequently, there are no equity issues involved so "preferable" will have to be stronger than just raising welfare through redistribution. If one point is to be preferred to another, it must in the sense of a Pareto improvement. But if a Pareto-preferred allocation can be found, it implies that the competitive equilibrium is not efficient - a finding that would show the First Theorem of Welfare Economics does not apply to the overlapping generations economy.

The analytical strategy that we employ is to show that there is an optimal value of the capital/labor ratio. This is the content of this section. The next step is to show that there are other values which are Pareto inferior to the optimal value. This is undertaken in the next section.

In the construction of the consumption possibility frontier it was noted that each consumption allocation was related to a unique value of the capital/labor ratio. This observation allows the study of the efficiency of alternative consumption allocations to be reinterpreted as the study of alternative capital/labor ratios. Doing this, the optimum level of the capital/labor ratio can be taken as that which maximizes total consumption in each period. The relation that this level of capital satisfies is termed the *Golden Rule* and the resulting capital/labor ratio is the Golden Rule level. Rules such as this are important throughout the theory of economic growth.

The total level of consumption in period t is the sum of consumption by the young and by the old. This is given by $x_t^t H_t + x_{t-1}^t H_{t-1}$. Since $H_{t-1} = \frac{H_t}{[1+n]}$, this can written alternatively in terms of consumption per capita as $x_t^t + \frac{x_{t-1}^t}{1+n}$. Moving to the steady-state, the optimal capital stock which maximizes consumption per capita must solve

$$\max_{\{k\}} x^1 + \frac{x^2}{1+n}. \tag{21.22}$$

This can be expressed in a more convenient way by noting that consumption in any period must be equal to total output less additions to the capital stock, or

$$x_t^t H_t + x_{t-1}^t H_{t-1} = H_t f\left(k_t\right) - H_t\left[k_{t+1}\left[1+n\right] - k_t\right]. \tag{21.23}$$

At a steady-state equilibrium (21.23) reduces to

$$x_1 + \frac{x_2}{[1+n]} = f\left(k\right) - nk, \tag{21.24}$$

so that the maximization in (21.22) is equivalent to

$$\max_{\{k\}} f\left(k\right) - nk. \tag{21.25}$$

Hence the optimal capital/labor ratio, denoted k^*, satisfies the first-order condition for this optimization

$$f'\left(k^*\right) = n. \tag{21.26}$$

The condition in (21.26) is called the Golden Rule and the capital/labor ratio k^* is termed the Golden rule capital/labor ratio. It is the optimal capital/labor ratio in the sense that it maximizes consumption per head. Its relation to Pareto efficiency is addressed in the next section.

Returning to the competitive economy a simple rule exists for determining whether its equilibrium achieves the Golden Rule. The choice of capital by the firm ensures that $f' = r$. Combining this with the Golden Rule shows that if the competitive economy reaches a steady-state equilibrium with $r = n$, this equilibrium will satisfy the Golden Rule. Since no other equilibrium will, this identifies $r = n$ as the Golden Rule rate of interest. Hence the competitive economy achieves the Golden Rule when its interest rate is equal to the rate of population growth. If this occurs, it will have a capital/labor ratio $k = k^*$.

Some further analysis provides more insight into the structure of the Golden Rule equilibrium. Using (21.20) and (21.21), total differentiation shows that $dx^1 = -\left[1 + n + kf''\right] dk$ and $dx^2 = \left[1 + n\right]\left[1 + f' + kf''\right] dk$. From these

$$\frac{dx^2}{dx^1} = -\frac{\left[1 + n\right]\left[1 + f' + kf''\right]}{\left[1 + n + kf''\right]}. \tag{21.27}$$

This expression is the gradient of the consumption possibility frontier at a point corresponding to a given value of k. At the Golden Rule capital/labor ratio k^*, with $f' = n$, (21.27) reduces to

$$\frac{dx^2}{dx^1} = -\left[1 + n\right]. \tag{21.28}$$

To understand what this implies, recall that the gradient of the consumer's budget constraint is $-\left[1 + n\right]$. The maximal budget constraint with this gradient will thus be tangential to the consumption possibility frontier at the point corresponding to the Golden Rule capital/labor ratio. Denote the implied consumption levels at this point by x^{1*}, x^{2*} - see Figure 21.5. Therefore, for the competitive equilibrium to achieve the Golden Rule, when offered this budget constraint the consumer must want to choose the quantities x^{1*}, x^{2*}. The solid indifference curve in Figure 21.5 illustrates such an outcome. The coincidence of the Golden Rule allocation and the consumer's choice can only happen with an unlikely combination of preferences and technology. In fact, the optimal choice for the consumer with this budget constraint will almost always be somewhere other than at the Golden Rule. With the dashed indifference curve in Figure 21.5 the Golden Rule will not be a competitive equilibrium.

21.4.2 Pareto Efficiency

Having now characterized the Golden Rule capital/labor ratio and its corresponding rate of interest, it is possible to address the question of Pareto efficiency. To do this, first note that if $k > k^*$, so the equilibrium capital stock exceeds the Golden Rule level, then $r < n$ and the rate of interest is less than the rate of population growth. The converse is true if $k < k^*$. These relations are a simple consequence of the decision process of the firm and the concavity of the production function. In treating Pareto efficiency the cases of $k > k^*$ and $k \leq k^*$ need to be taken separately. We shall begin with $k > k^*$.

It the capital/labor ratio is above k^* the economy has over-accumulated along its growth path. Consequently, it is in a steady state with an excessive capital/labor ratio. The analysis of the Golden Rule has shown that such a steady state fails to maximize consumption per head. We now show that it is also not Pareto efficient. This is achieved by describing a Pareto-improving reallocation for the economy.

The first point to note is that there is a single good available in the economy so that capital simply represents units of the good withheld from consumption. It is therefore feasible at any point in time to reduce the capital stock and to



Figure 21.5: Golden Rule and Competitive Equilibrium

raise consumption simply by consuming some of the capital stock (*i.e.* eating the potatoes put aside for planting.) So, in an economy that has over-accumulated, the consumers alive in any period with an excessive capital stock ($k > k^*$) can consume some of the existing capital stock so as to reduce the stock to the level k^*. Undertaking this consumption has two consequences:

(i) It raises the welfare of the existing generations because it increases their present consumption at no cost;

(ii) It raises the welfare of all following generations because it places the economy on the Golden Rule path and so maximizes their consumption.

Thus, consumption of the excess of the capital stock above the Golden Rule level raises the consumption of those currently alive and of all those who follow. This is clearly a Pareto improvement. Therefore, any steady state with $k > k^*$ and $r < n$ is not Pareto efficient.

When $k \leq k^*$ no such Pareto improvements can be found. In this case the economy has accumulated insufficient capital over the growth path. To move to the Golden Rule it must accumulate additional capital. This can only be achieved if one (or more) of the generations is willing to forego consumption. This has two effects:

(i) It reduces the welfare of the generations who give up consumption to increase the capital stock;

(ii) It raises the welfare of all following generations because it moves the economy closer (or on to) the Golden Rule.

Consequently, since at least one generation must reduce their consumption in the transition to a Golden rule steady-state, no Pareto improvement can be made from the initial position. Therefore all states with $k \leq k^*$ are Pareto efficient.

In summary, any steady state with $k > k^*$ and $r < n$ is not Pareto efficient. Such states are called *dynamically inefficient.* Those with $k \leq k^*$ are Pareto efficient and are termed *dynamically efficient.* The fact that steady-states which are not Pareto efficient can exist despite the model satisfying all the standard behavioral and informational assumptions that describe a competitive economy shows that the First Theorem of Welfare Economics cannot be extended to include overlapping generations economies. Therefore, these economies demonstrate the competition need not always lead to efficiency even when none of the standard causes of inefficiency (such as monopoly) are present. This observation is one of the most fundamental to emerge out of the analysis of overlapping generations economies. As we will see, it provides the motive for studying numerous forms of policy intervention.

The discussion has concluded that a steady-state equilibrium with $r < n$ is not Pareto efficient despite the economy satisfying all the standard competitive assumptions. However, it might still be suspected that to arrive at a steady-state with $r < n$ requires some unusual structure to be placed on the economy. To show that this is not so, consider the following example. The utility function of the single consumer in each generation is given by

$$U\left(x^1, x^2\right) = \beta \log x^1 + [1-\beta] \log x^2, \tag{21.29}$$

and the production function is $y = Ak^\alpha$. Using the five equations describing a steady-state, the interest rate can be calculated to be (the derivation of this result is undertaken in Exercise 21.14)

$$r = \frac{\alpha [1+n]}{[1-\beta][1-\alpha]}. \tag{21.30}$$

This will only be equal to the Golden Rule rate when

$$n = \frac{\alpha}{[1-\beta][1-\alpha] - \alpha}. \tag{21.31}$$

If preferences and production do not satisfy this condition, and there is no reason why they should, the economy will not grow on the Golden Rule growth path. This example illustrates that a Golden Rule economy will be the exception rather than the norm. A dynamically inefficient steady-state occurs when $r < n$. Using the solution for r in (21.30), this inequality can be written as

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} < \frac{n}{1+n}[1-\beta]. \tag{21.32}$$

From (21.32) it can been seen that this is most likely to arise when:

(i) The increase in output following a marginal increase in the capital/labor ratio is small (α low);

(ii) The rate of population growth is high (n large);

(iii) The consumer places a high weight on second-period consumption ($1-\beta$ large).

In conclusion, the efficiency of the steady-state equilibrium is dependent upon the relation of the capital stock to the Golden Rule level. The economy may reach an equilibrium at a dynamically inefficient steady-state which is not Pareto efficient. In such a case, a Pareto improvement can be achieved by consuming some of the capital stock. A Cobb-Douglas example illustrates the factors that may lead to dynamic inefficiency.

Now that it has been demonstrated that the competitive equilibrium of the overlapping generations economy need not be Pareto efficient, it remains to explain why. There is a significant difficulty in doing this: there is no agreed explanation for the inefficiency. To explore this further, consider a very simple variant of the economy. In this variant there is no production, and hence no capital. Instead each young consumer is endowed with one unit of a consumption good while old consumers are endowed with nothing. Clearly, each consumer would like to even out consumption over the lifespan and so would trade some consumption when young for consumption when old. But such a trade is not possible. The young could give the old some consumption but the old have nothing to trade in exchange. Therefore, the only equilibrium is that no trade takes place (a position called *autarky*) whereas a Pareto efficient allocation would have consumption in both periods of life.

It was in this setting that the inefficiency result was initially discovered. At first sight it might seem that it is just the structure of the economy - in particular, the lack of any way of transferring purchasing power across periods - that prevents the attainment of Pareto efficiency. There are two responses to this. First, in the standard competitive economy the efficiency result holds independent of any particular details of the economy. Second, the analysis of this chapter has already shown that inefficiency can hold even if consumers are able to hold savings which transfer purchasing power across periods. Inefficiency usually arises when the market provides the wrong price signals. This is the case, for example, with monopoly and externalities. This might lead one to suspect that the inefficiency can be explained because the interest rate provides the wrong signal for investment. But this cannot be the explanation since in the model without production there is no interest rate.

There is one point that is agreed upon. As the overlapping generations economy has no end, over its lifespan it has an infinite number of consumers and, counting the good in each period as a different good, an infinite number of goods. The inefficiency can only arise if there is this double infinity of consumers and goods. We have already seen that the competitive economy with a finite number of goods and consumers is Pareto efficient. If the number of consumers is infinite, but the number of goods finite, we have the idealized competitive model with each consumer being insignificant relative to the market and efficiency again holds. Finally, with a finite number of consumers but an infinite number of goods, the economy is again efficient.

21.5 Testing Efficiency

The Golden Rule, and the characterization of dynamic efficiency, provide conditions which are very simple to evaluate. Before this can be done credibly, there is an important issue concerning the assumptions describing the economy that need to be addressed. The most significant assumption was that of a constant growth rate in the population. The importance of this emerges in the fact that the Golden Rule is determined by the equality of the interest rate to the growth rate of population. If the growth rate is not constant, then this simple condition cannot be used. To provide a general means of testing efficiency, an extension must be made to the analysis.

A more general condition can be motivated as follows. In the economy we have described, the growth rate of capital is equal to the growth rate of population in the steady state. Observing this, new investment in each period is given by nK. The total payments to the owners of capital are rK. The difference between these, $rK - nK$ measures the total flows out of the firm - which we can call dividend payments. The economy is dynamically efficient if $r \geq n$, which implies that dividend payments are positive so that funds are flowing out of the firm to the consumption sector. Conversely, the economy is dynamically inefficient if $r < n$ so funds are flowing to the firm. The logic of looking at the flows in or out of firms provides a more general method of testing efficiency than comparing the interest rate to the population growth rate since it holds under much less restrictive assumptions.

The general version of the test is to look at the difference between gross profit (the generalization of rK) and investment (the generalization of nK). The value of this difference, as a proportion of GDP, for a selection of countries is presented in Table 21.1. All of the values in the table are positive which shows clear evidence that the countries are dynamically efficient. However, given the high values reported in the table, these countries remain some distance from achieving the Golden Rule.

Year	England	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	US
1965	9.4	13.6	8.5	22.9	15.2	6.9
1970	7.5	11.8	7.8	18.9	11.6	5.6
1975	6.0	10.9	12.4	16.6	6.8	14.4
1980	10.1	8.3	8.4	12.9	7.5	10.2
1984	13.9	12.9	13.8	17.3	9.4	6.7

Table 21.1: Gross Profit minus Investment as a Proportion of GDP
Source: Abel, Mankiw, Summers and Zeckhauser (1989)

21.6 Conclusions

The overlapping generations economy provides a very flexible representation of how an economy evolves through time. It captures the natural features that consumers' lives are short relative to the lifespan of the economy and that consumers allocate consumption in a rational way over their lifecycle. Using the concept of the steady state also gives a description of equilibrium that is simple to apply.

The most interesting feature of the economy is that its lack of an ending means that there is a double infinity of goods and consumers. This is responsible for creating a potential inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium. This is a result in complete contrast to the static model. The chapter has characterized both efficient and optimal steady state equilibria. These produce a simple test of dynamic efficiency which the evidence suggests is met by a range of economies.

Further reading

The classic paper which introduced the overlapping generations economy is

Samuelson, P.A. (1958) “An exact consumption-loan model of interest with or without the social contrivance of money“, *Journal of Political Economy*, **66**, 467 - 482.

It must be noted that the focus of this paper is on providing an intertemporal model that determines the interest rate endogenously. The inefficiency result, which has generated an immense literature since, falls out as an almost unintentional by-product of this.

The model used here was introduced in:

Diamond, P.A. (1965) “National debt in a neo-classical growth model“, *Journal of Political Economy*, **55**, 1126 - 1150.

Two interesting discussions (but note the first is very technical) of the inefficiency result are:

Geanakoplos, J. (1987) ”Overlapping generations model of general equilibrium” in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds.) *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics* (London: Macmillan).

Shell, K. (1971) “Notes on the economics of infinity“, *Journal of Political Economy*, **79**, 1002 - 1011.

For a study of the role of money in overlapping generations, see:

Hahn, F.H. (1982) Money and inflation, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

The empirical analysis of efficiency is taken from:

Abel, A.B., N.G. Mankiw, L.H. Summers and R.J. Zeckhauser (1989) ”Assessing dynamic efficiency”, *Review of Economic Studies*, **56**, 1 - 19.

Chapter 22

Social Security and Debt

22.1 Introduction

A typical social security system provides income during periods of unemployment, ill-health or disability and financial support, in the form of pensions, to the retired. Although the generosity of systems varies between countries, these elements are present in all developed economies. The focus of this chapter is the economic implications of financial assistance to the retired. The overlapping generations economy proves to be ideal for this purpose.

In economic terms, the analysis of that part of the social security system which provide assistance during unemployment or ill-health is concerned with issues of uncertainty and insurance. Specifically, unemployment and ill-health can be viewed as events which are fundamentally uncertain and the provision of social security is insurance cover against bad outcomes. In contrast retirement is an inevitable outcome, or at least an option, once the retirement age has been reached. Insurance is therefore not the main issue (except for the problem of living for longer than accumulated wealth can finance). Instead, the issues that are raised with pensions are the potential transfers of resources between generations and the effect upon savings behavior in the economy. Both of these issues require a treatment that is set within an explicitly intertemporal framework.

The pensions systems in many developed economies are coming under pressure in a process that has become known as the "pensions crisis". The roots of this crisis can be found in the design of the systems and the process of change in population structure. The potential extent of this crisis provides strong grounds for holding the view that reform of the pension system is currently one of the most pressing economic policy challenges.

After describing alternative forms of pension systems, the nature of the pensions crisis is described. This introduces the concept of the dependency ratio and the how this ratio links pensions and pension contributions. The economic analysis of social security begins with a study of their effect upon the equilibrium of the economy. Chapter 21 introduced the overlapping generations economy and showed how its competitive equilibrium may be inefficient. The potential for inefficiency opens up the possibility of efficiency-enhancing policy interventions. From this perspective, we consider whether social security can enhance efficiency. The fact that it may can be understood from the effect of social security upon the level of the capital stock. If a social security program has the form of forced saving, so that consumers are provided with greater second-period income than they would naturally choose, then the program may raise the capital stock through the increased savings it generates. This will be beneficial in an undercapitalized economy. Conversely, if the program simply transfers earnings from those who are working to those who are retired, savings and hence the level of capital will fall. These observations motivate the search for a social security program that can guide the economy to the Golden Rule.

The fall in the birth rate is one of the causes of the pensions crisis. It is an interesting question to consider how a change in the birth rate affects the level of welfare at the steady-state of an overlapping generations economy. We pursue this issue by considering how the birth rate affects the structure of the consumption possibility frontier, both in the absence and in the presence of a social security program. Social security may be beneficial for the economy, but there are issues of political economy connected with the continuation of a program. The introduction of a program with the structure observed in practice results in a transfer of resources towards the first generation of retired (they receive but do not contribute) and away from some of the generations that follow. This raises question of how such a program is ever sustained since each generation has incentive to receive but not to contribute. The final analytical issue is to review the concept of Ricardian equivalence and its implications for social security. Ricardian equivalence is the observation that by changing their behavior consumers are able to offset the actions of the government. We show the consequences this can have for social security and address the limitations of the argument. Finally, after having completed the analytical material, we return to address some of the proposals that have been made for the reform of social security programs.

22.2 Types of System

One defining characteristic of a social security system is whether pensions are paid from an accumulated fund or from current tax contributions. This feature forms the distinction between fully-funded and pay-as-you-go social security systems. The economic effects, both in terms of efficiency and distribution, between these two polar forms of system are markedly different.

In a *pay-as-you-go* social security program the current contributions through taxation of those in employment provide the pensions of those who are retired. At any point in time, the contributions to the system must match the pension payments made by the system. The social security systems presently in operation in the US, the UK, and numerous other countries are broadly of this form. The qualifier "broadly" is used because, for example, though the US system owns some assets and could afford a short-term deficit, the assets would fund only a very short period of payments. At each point in time, a pay-as-you-go system satisfies the equality

$$\text{benefits received by retired} = \text{contributions of workers} \tag{22.1}$$

This equality can be expressed in terms of the number of workers and pensioners by

$$\beta R = \tau E, \tag{22.2}$$

where τ is the average social security contribution of each worker, β is the average pension received, E the number of workers in employment and R the number of retired. If there is a constant rate of growth of population, so the workforce is a constant multiple of retired population, then $E = [1 + n] R$. Using this in (22.2), $\beta R = \tau [1 + n] R$ or

$$\beta = [1 + n] \tau. \tag{22.3}$$

This relationship implies that the tax paid when young earns interest at rate n before being returned as a pension when old. Hence in a pay-as-you-go pension system the return on contributions is determined by the growth rate of population.

In a *fully-funded system* each worker makes a contributions toward social security via the social security tax and the contributions are invested by the social security program. The program therefore builds up a pension fund for each worker. The total pension benefits received by the worker when retired are then equal to their contribution to the program plus the return received on the investment. Such a program satisfies the equalities

$$\text{pensions} = \text{social security tax plus interest} = \text{investment plus return}. \tag{22.4}$$

The implication of this constraint is that the fund earns interest at rate r, so the pension and the tax are related by

$$\beta = [1 + r] \tau. \tag{22.5}$$

A fully-funded social security system forces each worker to save an amount at least equal to the tax they pay. It remains possible for workers to save more if they choose to do so. If, in the absence of social security, all workers chose to save an amount in excess of the taxed levied by the program then, holding all else constant, a fully-funded system will simply replace some of the private saving by an equivalent amount of public saving. In this case, a fully-funded system will have no effect upon the equilibrium outcome. We explore this observation further when we discuss Ricardian Equivalence in Section 22.8. In more general settings with a variety of investment opportunities, the possibility must be considered that the rate of return on private savings may differ from that on public savings. When it does, a fully-funded system may affect the equilibrium. This point arises again in the analysis of pension reform.

Contrasting these two forms of system, it can be observed that a pay-as-you-go system leads to an intergenerational transfer of resources, from current workers to current retired, whereas a fully-funded system can at most cause an intertemporal reallocation for each generation. This observation suggests that the two systems will have rather different welfare implications; these will be investigated in the following sections. In addition, the pay-as-you-go system has a return of n on contributions and the fully-funded system has a return of r. These returns will differ unless the economy is at the Golden Rule allocation.

Systems that fall between these two extremes will be termed *non-fully-funded*. Such systems make some investments but the payments made in any given period may be greater than or less than the revenue, composed of tax payments plus return on investment, received in that period. The difference between payments and revenue will comprise investment, or disinvestment, in the pension fund.

22.3 The Pensions Crisis

Many countries face a pensions crisis which will require that their pensions systems are significantly reformed. This section identifies the nature and consequences of this crisis. Once the analysis of social security is completed, we return in Section 22.9 to review a range of proposals for reform of the system in the light of this crisis.

The basis of the pensions crisis is three-fold. Firstly, most developed economies have witnessed a reduction in their birth rates. Although immigration has partially offset the effect of this in some countries, there has still been a net effect of a steady reduction in the addition of new workers. The second effect is that longevity is increasing so that people are on average living longer. For any given retirement age, this is increasing the number of retired. Thirdly, there is also a tendency for the retirement age to fall.

The net effect of these three is that the proportion of retired in the population is growing and it is this that is problematic. In general terms, as the proportion of the population that is retired increases, the output of each worker must support an ever larger number of people. Output per capita must increase just to keep consumption per capita constant. If output does not rise quickly enough, then productivity gains will be diluted and output per capita will fall. Furthermore, supporting the retired at a given standard of living will impose an increasing burden upon the economy.

The size of this effect can be seen by looking at forecasts for the *dependency ratio*. The dependency ratio measures the relative size of the retired population and is defined as the size of the retired population relative to the size of the working population. Table 22.1 reports the dependency ratio for a range of countries over the recent past and forecasts for its development into the future. The countries in the table are typical with the dependency ratio forecast to increase substantially - in all cases the ratio more than doubles from 1980 to 2040. This means that those working have to support an increasing proportion of retired. In some cases, for instance Japan, the forecast increase in the dependency ratio is dramatic.

	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030	2040
Australia	14.7	16.7	18.2	19.9	25.9	32.3	36.1
France	21.9	21.3	24.5	25.4	32.7	39.8	45.4
Japan	13.4	17.2	25.2	34.8	46.9	51.7	63.6
UK	23.5	24.1	24.1	25.3	31.1	40.4	47.2
US	16.9	18.9	18.6	19.0	25.0	32.9	34.6

Table 22.1: Dependency Ratio (Population over 65 as a proportion of population 15 - 64)
Source: OECD (www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/27/2492139.xls)

The consequence of the increase in the dependency ratio can be expressed in more precise terms by looking at the relationship between the contributions to pay for social security and the resulting level of social security. Using the identity (22.2) for a pay-as-you-go system and dividing through by W, the relationship between social security tax, pension and dependency ratio is given by

$$\tau = \beta D, \tag{22.6}$$

where D is the dependency ratio, $\frac{R}{W}$. Hence as D rises, τ must increase if the level of the pension β is to be maintained. Alternatively, the pension decreases as D increases if the tax rate is held constant. If some combination of such changes is not made, then the social security system will go into deficit if the dependency ratio increases. Neither a deficit, a falling pension or an increasing tax are attractive options for governments to present to their electors.

These factors can be seen at work in forecasts for the future path of the US social security program as predicted by the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (OASDI). Figure 22.1 shows the forecast deficit for the US Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Fund (but does not include the Disability Insurance Fund). The income rate is defined as the ratio of income from payroll tax contributions to the OASDI taxable payroll (effectively the average tax rate for social security contributions) and the cost rate is the ratio of the cost of the program to the taxable payroll. The projections are based on the structure of the social security program remaining much as it is today (in terms of the rate of tax and the value of benefits). As the figure shows, the fund is forecast to go into deficit in 2018 and remain in deficit unless some significant reform is undertaken.

To avoid such deficits, what these facts imply is that governments face a choice between maintaining the value of pension payments but with an ever increasing tax rate, or they must allow the value of pensions to erode so as to keep the tax rate broadly constant. As an example, the UK government has reacted to this situation by allowing the real value of the state pension to steadily erode. As shown in Table 22.2 the value of the pension has fallen from almost 40% of average earnings in 1975 to 26% in 2000 and it is expected to continue to fall, especially since the pension is now indexed to prices rather



Figure 22.1: Annual Income and Cost Forecast for OASI (Source: www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR04)

than earnings. These reductions have taken the value of the pension well below the subsistence level of income. Consequently, pensioners with no other source of income receive supplementary state benefits to take them to the subsistence level. This reduction in the state pension has been accompanied by government encouragement of the use of private pensions. We return to this in the discussion of reforms in Section 22.9.

Date	Rate as a % of Average Earnings
1975	39.3
1980	39.4
1985	35.8
1990	29.1
1995	28.3
2000	25.7

Table 22.2: Forecasts for UK Basic State Pension
Source: UK Department of Work and Pensions
(www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/abstract/Abstrat2003.pdf)

In conclusion, the basis of the pensions crisis has been identified and it has been shown how this can impact upon the state pensions that will be paid in the future. The depth of this crisis shows why social security reform is such an important policy issue. The chapter now proceeds to look at the economic effects of social security as a basis for understanding more about the arguments behind the alternative reforms that have been proposed.

22.4 The Simplest Program

Having set out the issues connected with social security programs, the focus is now placed upon their economic effects. The fundamental insight into the effect of social security upon the economy can be obtained using the simple model of Section 21.4.2. In this economy there is no production but only the exchange of endowments. Although simple, this economy is still capable of supporting a role for social security.

In the economy under analysis, each consumer receives an endowment of one unit of the single consumption good in the first period of their life but receives no endowment in the second period. To simplify, the population is assumed to be constant. As already noted in Chapter 21, the equilibrium of this economy without any government intervention has the endowment entirely consumed when young so that there is no consumption when old. This has to be the equilibrium since the old have nothing to offer the young in trade. This autarkic equilibrium is not Pareto efficient since all consumers would prefer a more even distribution of consumption over the two periods of life.

How can a social security program improve upon the autarkic equilibrium? Consider a pay-as-you-go program that taxes each young consumer half a unit of consumption and transfers this to an old consumer. The lifetime consumption plan for every consumer then changes from the autarkic equilibrium consumption plan of $\{1, 0\}$ to the new consumption plan of $\left\{\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right\}$. Provided that the preferences of the consumers are convex, the new allocation is preferred to the original allocation. Since this applies to all generations, the social security system has achieved a Pareto improvement. This argument is illustrated in Figure 22.2. The Pareto improvement from the social security system is represented by the move from the lowest indifference curve to the central indifference curve.

In fact, a far stronger conclusion can be obtained than just the ability of social security to achieve a Pareto improvement. To see this, note that the assumption of a constant population means that the per-capita consumption possibilities for the economy lie on the line joining $\{1, 0\}$ to $\{0, 1\}$. In the same way that the Golden Rule was defined for the economy with production, the Golden Rule allocation can be defined for this economy as that which maximizes utility subject to the first- and second-period consumption levels summing to 1. Denote this allocation by $\left\{x^{1*}, x^{2*}\right\}$. The Golden Rule allocation can then be achieved by a pay-as-you-go social security programme that transfers x^{2*} units of the consumption good from the young consumer to the old consumer.

These arguments show how social security can achieve a Pareto improvement and, for the simple exchange economy described, even achieve the Golden Rule allocation. The social security program is effective because of the intergenerational transfer that it engineers and the consequent revision in the consumption plans. The optimality result was built upon the use of a pay-as-you-go program. In contrast, a fully-funded program cannot be employed since there is no commodity that can be used as an investment vehicle. The form in which these conclusions extend to the more general overlapping generations economy with production is now discussed.



Figure 22.2: Pareto-Improvement and Social Security

22.5 Social Security and Production

It has already been shown how social security can obtain a Pareto improvement in an overlapping generations economy with no production. When there is production, a wider range of effects can arise since social security affects the level of savings and hence capital accumulation. These additional features have to be accounted for in the analysis of social security.

The concept of the Golden Rule and its associated capital/labor ratio was introduced in Chapter 21. This showed that the optimal capital stock is the level which equates the rate of interest to the rate of population growth. If the capital stock is larger than this, the economy is dynamically inefficient and a Pareto improvement can be made by reducing it. When it is smaller, the economy is dynamically efficient, so no Pareto improvement can be made, but the economy is not in an optimal position. These observations then raise the questions: How does social security affect capital accumulation? Can it be used to move a non-optimal economy closer to the Golden Rule?

To answer these questions, consider a social security program that taxes each worker an amount τ and pays each retired person a pension β. The program also owns a quantity K_t^s of capital at time t. Equivalently, it can be said to own k_t^s, $k_t^s = \frac{K_t^s}{L_t}$, of capital per unit of labor. A social security program will be optimal if the combination of τ, β and k_t^s is feasible for the program and ensures the economy achieves the Golden Rule.

A feasible social security program must satisfy the budget identity

$$\beta L_{t-1} = \tau L_t + r_t k_t^s L_t - \left[k_{t+1}^s L_{t+1} - k_t^s L_t \right], \tag{22.7}$$

which states that pension payments must be equal to tax revenue plus the return on capital holdings less investment in new capital. Since the population grows at rate n, in a steady state the identities $L_{t-1} = \frac{L_t}{1+n}$, $L_{t+1} = [1+n] L_t$ and $k_{t+1}^s = k_t^s \equiv k^s$ can be used in (22.7) to generate the steady state budget identity

$$\frac{\beta}{1+n} = \tau + [r - n] k^s. \tag{22.8}$$

Noting that the pension, β, which is received in the second period of life, is discounted in a consumer's budget constraint (since $x^1 + s = w - \tau$ and $[1+r] s + \beta = x^2$, it follows that $s = \frac{x^2 - \beta}{1+r}$), the budget constraint under the program can be written

$$x^1 + \frac{x^2}{1+r} = w - \tau + \frac{\beta}{1+r}. \tag{22.9}$$

The condition describing consumer choice remains

$$\frac{U_1\left(x^1, x^2\right)}{U_2\left(x^1, x^2\right)} = 1 + r. \tag{22.10}$$

Equilibrium on the capital market requires that private savings are equal to total capital less the capital owned by the social security program. This condition can be expressed as

$$w - x^1 - \tau = [1+n][k - k^s]. \tag{22.11}$$

The choices of the representative firm do not change, so the conditions relating factor prices to capital still apply with

$$f'(k) = r, \tag{22.12}$$

$$f(k) - kf'(k) = w. \tag{22.13}$$

The steady-state equilibrium with the pension program is the solution to equations (22.8) to (22.13).

The aim now is to investigate the effect that the social security policy can have upon the equilibrium. To see why it may be possible to design a program that can achieve the Golden Rule, it should be noted that the failure of the competitive equilibrium without intervention to achieve efficiency results from the savings behavior of individuals leading to over- or under-accumulation of capital. With the correct choice of social security program the government can effectively force-save for individuals. This alters the steady state level of the capital stock and hence the growth path of output.

In equations (22.8) to (22.13) there are five private-sector choice variables (k,x^1, x^2, w and r) which are treated as endogenous, plus the three variables (β, τ and k^s) that describe the social security program. Given that there are six equilibrium conditions, the pension system can choose any two of the variables describing the program with the third determined alongside the endogenous variables. To analyze the system, it is simplest to treat β as endogenous and τ and k^s as exogenous.

The method of analysis is to assume that the Golden Rule is achieved and then to work back to the implications of this assumption. Consequently, let $r = n$. From the firm's choice of capital, the Golden Rule is consistent with a capital stock that solves $f'(k^*) = n$ and hence a wage rate that satisfies $w = f(k^*) - k^* f'(k^*)$. The important observation is that with $r = n$, the budget constraint for the social security program collapses to

$$\frac{\beta}{1+n} = \tau + [r - n] k^s = \tau, \tag{22.14}$$

so a program attaining the Golden Rule must have the form of a pay-as-you-go system with $\beta = [1+n]\tau$. It is important to observe that any value of k^s is consistent with (22.14) when $r = n$, including positive values. This observation seems to conflict with the definition of a pay-as-you-go program. These comments are rationalized by the fact that we are working with the steady state of the economy. The social security program may own a stock of capital, $k^s > 0$, but operating the pay-as-you-go-system it does not add to or subtract from this level of capital. Instead, the return on the capital it owns is just sufficient to maintain it at a constant level. It remains true that along any growth path, including the steady state, a pay-as-you-go system cannot increase its capital holdings.

The values of the tax and capital stock of the program required to support the Golden Rule can now be found by using the fact that the program is pay-as-you-go to reduce the consumer's budget constraint to

$$x^1 + \frac{x^2}{1+r} = w. \tag{22.15}$$

Combining this constraint with the condition describing consumer choice, the demand for first-period consumption must depend only on the wage rate and the interest rate, so $x^1 = x^1(w, r)$. Using the conditions for the choice of the firm, the wage rate and interest rate depend on the level of capital, so demand for first-period consumption can be written as

$$x^1 = x^1(w, r) = x^1(f(k) - kf'(k), f'(k)) = x^1(k). \tag{22.16}$$

The capital market clearing condition can then be written as

$$w - x^1(k) - \tau = [1+n][k - k^s]. \tag{22.17}$$

Using the conditions for the choice of the firm and evaluating at the Golden Rule level,

$$\tau = \left[f(k^*) - k^* f'(k^*) - x^1(k^*) - [1+n] k^*\right] + [1+n] k^s. \tag{22.18}$$

The condition determines pairs of values $\{\tau, k^s\}$ that will achieve the Golden Rule.

Any pair $\{\tau, k^s\}$ that satisfies (22.18) will generate the Golden Rule, provided that the capital stock held by the program is not negative. For instance, if the program holds no capital, so $k^s = 0$, then the value of the social security tax will be

$$\tau = f(k^*) - k^* f'(k^*) - x^1(k^*) - [1+n]k^*. \qquad (22.19)$$

Although the discussion to this point has implicitly been based on the tax, τ, being positive, it is possible that the optimal program may require it to be negative. If it is negative, the social security program will generate a transfer from the old to the young.

As an example, if $x^1(w,r) = \frac{w}{2}$ and $f(k) = k^\alpha$, then $k^* = \left(\frac{\alpha}{n}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$ (see Exercise 22.8 for the details of this derivation). Substituting into these values into (22.19)

$$\tau = \left(\frac{\alpha}{n}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left[\frac{[1-\alpha]n}{2\alpha} - [1+n]\right]. \qquad (22.20)$$

If the rate of population growth is 5%, then the tax will be negative whenever

$$\frac{1}{43} < \alpha. \qquad (22.21)$$

For this example, the tax rate is positive only for very small values of α.

The results have shown that attainment of the Golden Rule requires a pay-as-you-go social security system. By implication, a fully-funded program will fail to attain the Golden Rule. In fact, an even stronger result can be shown: a fully-funded program will have no effect upon the equilibrium. To demonstrate this result, observe that a fully-funded program must satisfy the identity that the value of pension paid must equal the value of tax contributions plus interest, or

$$\beta L_{t-1} = \tau L_{t-1}[1+r_t] = k^s L_t [1+r_t]. \qquad (22.22)$$

Evaluated at a steady state

$$\beta = \tau[1+r] = k^s [1+n][1+r]. \qquad (22.23)$$

The substitution of (22.23) into the equilibrium conditions (22.8) to (22.13) shows that they reduce to the original market equilibrium conditions described in (21.18) to (21.21). The fully-funded system therefore replaces private saving by public saving and does not affect the consumption choices of individual consumers. It therefore has no real effect upon the equilibrium and, if the initial steady state were not at the Golden Rule, the fully-funded social security program will not restore efficiency. This observation is discussed further in Section 22.8.

This analysis has demonstrated how a correctly designed social security program can generate the Golden Rule equilibrium, provided that it is not of the fully-funded kind. A fully-funded system does not affect the growth path. In contrast, a pay-as-you-go system can affect the aggregate levels of savings and hence the steady state capital/labor ratio. This allows it to achieve the Golden Rule.

22.6 Population Growth

The fall in the rate of population growth is an important factor in the pensions crisis. While operating a simple pay-as-you-go program this makes it harder to sustain any given level of pension. This raises the general question of how the level of welfare is related to the rate of population growth. This section addresses this issue both with and without a social security program.

Assume first that there is no social security program in operation. Recall that the consumption possibility frontier is defined by a pair of consumption levels x^1 and x^2 that satisfy the conditions

$$x^1 = f\left(k\right) - kf'\left(k\right) - \left[1+n\right]k, \tag{22.24}$$

and

$$x^2 = \left[1+n\right]k\left[1+f'\left(k\right)\right]. \tag{22.25}$$

The effect of a change in the population growth rate can be determined by calculating how it modifies this consumption possibility frontier. For a given value of k, it follows that $\frac{\partial x^1}{\partial n} = -k$ and $\frac{\partial x^2}{\partial n} = k\left[1+f'\left(k\right)\right].$ Consequently, holding k fixed, an increase in the growth rate of population reduces the level of first-period consumption but raises the second-period level. This moves each point on the consumption possibility frontier inwards and upwards. Furthermore, when evaluated at the Golden Rule capital/labor ratio, these changes in the consumption levels satisfy

$$\frac{\frac{\partial x^2}{\partial n}}{\frac{\partial x^1}{\partial n}} = -\left[1+f'\left(k^*\right)\right] = -\left[1+n\right]. \tag{22.26}$$

Hence, for a small increase in n, the point on the frontier corresponding to the Golden Rule equilibrium must shift upwards along a line with gradient $-\left[1+n\right].$ The consequence of these calculations is that the shift of the consumption possibility must be as illustrated in Figure 22.3.

How the level of welfare generated by the economy is affected by an increase in n then depends upon whether the initial equilibrium level of capital is above or below the Golden Rule level. If it is below, then welfare is reduced by an increase in the population growth rate - the capital stock moves further from the Golden Rule level. The converse occurs if the initial equilibrium is above the Golden Rule. This is illustrated in Figure 22.4 where the initial equilibrium is at e^0 with a capital/labor ratio below the Golden Rule. The equilibrium moves to e^1 following an increase in n. It can also be seen in the figure that if the initial equilibrium had been at a point on the frontier above the Golden Rule, then the upward shift in the frontier would imply that the new equilibrium moves onto a higher indifference curve.



Figure 22.3: Population Growth and Consumption Possibilities



Figure 22.4: Equilibrium and Population Growth Rate



Figure 22.5: Population Growth and Social Security

Now introduce a social security system and assume that this is adjusted as population growth changes to ensure that the Golden Rule is satisfied for all values of n. For a small change in n, the Golden Rule allocation moves along the line with gradient $-[1+n]$, as noted above. However, for large increases in n, the gradient of this line becomes steeper. This moves the Golden Rule equilibrium as shown in Figure 22.5 to a point below the original tangent line. As a consequence, the increase in population growth must reduce the per-capita level of consumption $x^1 + \frac{x^2}{1+n}$. Therefore, even with an optimal social security scheme in operation, an increase in population growth will reduce per-capita consumption.

The effect of changes in the rate of population growth are not as clear as the simple equilibrium identity for a pay-as-you-go program suggests. As well as the simple mechanics of the dependency ratio, a change in population growth also affects the shape of the consumption possibility frontier. How welfare changes depends upon whether a social security program is in operation and upon the location of the initial equilibrium relative to the Golden Rule. If an optimal program is in operation, then an increase in population growth must necessarily reduce the level of per-capita consumption.

22.7 Sustaining a Program

In the simple economy without production, a social security program involving the transfer of resources between generations achieves a Pareto improvement.

This raises the obvious question of why such a program will not always be introduced.

The basic nature of the pay-as-you go pension program described above is that the young make a transfer to the old without receiving anything directly from those old in return. Instead, they must wait until their own old age before receiving the compensating payment. Although these transfers do give rise to a Pareto improvement, it can be argued not to be in the young consumer's private interest to make the transfer provided they expect to receive a transfer. If they do not give their transfer, but still expect to receive, then their consumption level will be increased. Clearly, this makes them better off and so they will not wish to make the transfer. Since the social security system is not individually-rational, how can the young be persuaded to consent to the imposition of the social security program?

Two different answers to this question will be considered. The first answer is based upon altruism on the part of the young - they are willing to provide the transfer because they care about the old. This rationalizes the existence of a social security program but only by making an assumption that move outside the standard economic framework of individual self-interest. The second answer works with the standard neoclassical model of self-interest but shows how the program can be sustained by the use of "punishment strategies" in an intertemporal game. It should be stressed that the fact that participation in a social security program is mandatory is not by itself a valid explanation of the existence of the program. Any program has to have willing participants to initiate them (so that they must be individually-rational at their introduction) and need continuing support to sustain them.

Altruism refers to feelings of concern for others beside oneself. It is natural to think that altruism applies to close family members but it may also apply to concern for people generally. Feelings of altruism can also be held with respect to animals, plants and even non-sentient objects.

Although the existence of altruism takes us outside the standard perspective of behavior driven by narrow self-interest, it need not affect the tools we employ to analyze behavior. What is meant by this is that altruism alters the nature of preferences but does not affect the fact that a consumer will want to achieve the highest level of preference possible. Consequently, given a set of altruistic preferences the consumer will still choose the action that best satisfies those preferences subject to the constraint placed upon their choices. The standard tools remain valid but operate on different preferences.

There are numerous ways to represent altruism but one of the simplest is to view it as consumption externality. Writing the utility of a consumer in generation t in the form

$$U_t = U\left(x_t^t, x_t^{t+1}, x_{t-1}^t\right), \tag{22.27}$$

gives an interpretation of altruism as concern for the consumption level, x_{t-1}^t, achieved by a member of the earlier generation (which is usually interpreted as the parent of the consumer). A very similar alternative would be to assume that

$$U_t = U\left(x_t^t, x_t^{t+1}, U_{t-1}\right), \tag{22.28}$$

so that altruism is reflected in a concern for the utility of the member of the earlier generation.

Both of these forms of altruism can be seen to provide a motive for a social security program that transfers resources from the young to the old. Consider (22.27). A consumer with this utility function can be thought of as choosing their personal consumption levels x_t^t, x_t^{t+1} and a transfer, τ, to the old consumer. The effect of the transfer is to raise the consumption level x_{t-1}^t since the budget constraint of the old consumer is

$$x_{t-1}^t = [1 + r_t]\, s_t + \tau. \tag{22.29}$$

Provided the marginal utility generated by an increase in x_{t-1}^t is sufficiently high, the consumer will willingly choose to make a positive transfer. In this sense, the provision of social security has become individually rational.

The rationality for participating in a social security program can be found in the fact that each young person expects a similar transfer when they are old. They can then be threatened with having this removed if they do not themselves act in the appropriate manner. This punishment can sometimes (but not always) be sufficient to ensure that compliance with the social security program is maintained.

To give substance to these observations, it is best to express the argument using the language of game theory. The analysis so far has shown that the strategy to provide a transfer is not a Nash equilibrium. Recall that in the determination of a Nash equilibrium each individual holds the strategies of all others constant as they consider their own choice. So, if all others are providing transfers, it will be a better strategy not to do so but to still receive. If others are not transferring, then it is also best not to do so. Therefore not providing a transfer is a dominant strategy and the individually-rational Nash equilibrium must be for no transfers to take place.

These simple Nash strategies are not the only ones that can be played. To motivate what else can be done, it is best to think about repeated games and the more sophisticated strategies that can be played in them. A repeated game is one where the same "stage" game is played once each period for an endless number of periods by the same players. The prisoner's dilemma given in the matrix in Figure **??** has the general features of the social security model. Although it is not exactly the same since the social security model has many generations of consumers, not just the two given in the game.

If both players contribute to social security, then a payoff of 5 is attained. If neither contributes, the payoff is only 2. This reflects the fact that the social security equilibrium is Pareto preferred to the equilibrium without. However, the highest payoff is obtained if a player chooses not to contribute but the other does. When played a single time, the unique Nash equilibrium is for both players to choose Don't Contribute - if the other contributes, then it pays not to. This

		Player 1	
		Contribute	Don't contribute
Player 2	Contribute	5, 5	0, 10
	Don't contribute	10, 0	2, 2

Figure 22.6: Social Security Game

reasoning applies to both players and hence the equilibrium. This equilibrium is inefficient and is Pareto dominated by {Contribute, Contribute}.

The situation is completely changed if the game is repeated indefinitely and the efficient equilibrium {Contribute, Contribute} can be sustained. The strategy that supports this is for each player to choose Contribute until their opponent chooses Don't Contribute. Once this has happened, they should continue to play Don't Contribute from that point onwards.

To evaluate the payoffs from this strategy, assume that the discount rate between periods is δ. The payoff from always playing Contribute is then

$$5 + 5\delta + 5\delta^2 + 5\delta^3 + \ldots = 5\left[\frac{1}{1-\delta}\right]. \tag{22.30}$$

Alternatively, if Don't Contribute is played a temporary gain will be obtained but the payoff will then fall back to that at the Nash equilibrium of the single-period game once the other player switches to Don't Contribute. This gives the payoff

$$10 + 2\delta + 2\delta^2 + 2\delta^3 + \ldots = 10 + 2\left[\frac{\delta}{1-\delta}\right]. \tag{22.31}$$

Contrasting these, playing Contribute in every period will give a higher payoff if

$$5\left[\frac{1}{1-\delta}\right] > 10 + 2\left[\frac{\delta}{1-\delta}\right], \tag{22.32}$$

or

$$\delta > \frac{5}{8}. \tag{22.33}$$

That is, {Contribute, Contribute} will be an equilibrium if the players are sufficiently patient. The reason behind this is that a patient player will put a high value on payoffs well into the future. Therefore the reduction to a payoff of 2 after the first period will be very painful. For a very impatient player, only the payoff of 10 will really matter and they are driven to Don't Contribute.

The strategy just described is known as a "punishment strategy": the deviation from Don't Contribute is punished by reversion to the inefficient Nash equilibrium. Although the punishment will hurt both the players, the point is that will not happen in equilibrium since the optimal play with these strategies is always to play Contribute. In summary, in an infinitely repeated game, punishment strategies can be used to support efficient equilibria.

The same line of reasoning can be applied to the analysis of social security. What is different in this context is that the same players do not interact every period. Instead, it is a different pair of old and young consumers that meet in each period. However, the punishment strategy can still be employed in the following way: each consumer when young will provide a transfer of size x to the old consumer that overlaps with them provided the old person they coexist with provided a transfer in the previous period; otherwise no transfer is provided. If all generations of consumers play according to this strategy then the transfers can be made self-supporting.

There remains one important limitation to this use of punishment strategies in the social security environment. In order to implement the strategy, each young consumer must know whether the transfer was made in the period before they were alive. This issue does not arise in the standard application of punishment strategies since the players are alive in all periods – they need only remember what happened in the previous period. Consequently, some form of verification device is necessary to support the punishment strategy. Without the verification, the only equilibrium is for there to be no transfers which is a Pareto inferior outcome.

This discussion of pay-as-you-go social security has shown how such a system can be sustained even when there is a short-run incentive for consumers not to make the required transfers. The basis for this claim is that social security in an overlapping generations economy has the nature of a repeated game so that]strategies which punish the failure to provide a transfer can be employed. What this analysis shows is that an apparent act of generosity – the gift of a transfer to the older generation – can be made to be rational for each individual. So the provision of social security may occur not through altruism but through rationality.

22.8 Ricardian Equivalence

Ricardian Equivalence refers to the proposition that the government can alter an economic policy and yet the equilibrium of the economy can remain unchanged. This occurs if consumers can respond to the policy by making off-setting changes in their behavior which neutralize the effect of the policy change. In terms of the present chapter, Ricardian equivalence holds when the government introduces, or changes, a social security system and yet the changes in individual behavior render the policy change ineffectual.

Such equivalence results have already featured twice in the text. On the first occasion, in the analysis of the private purchase of public goods, it was shown that, by changing their purchases, the individuals could offset the effect of income redistribution. Furthermore, it was also rational for the individuals to make the off-setting changes. The second case of equivalence arose in the derivation of the optimal social security program where it was noted that a fully-funded system would not affect the capital/labor ratio. The explanation for this equivalence was that consumers react to a fully-funded social security program by making a reduction in their private saving which ensures total saving is unchanged.

The common feature of these examples is that the effect of the policy change and the off-setting reaction involve the same individuals. It is this that provides them with a direct incentive to modify their behavior. Clearly, this is true only of a social security system that is fully-funded with a return equal to that on private savings. If social security is anything but fully-funded, a change in the system will affect a number of generations since the system must be redistributive over time. In the case of pay-as-you-go, social security is purely redistributive over time. A change in a program can therefore affect consumers in different generations who need not be alive at the time the program is changed nor even be alive at the same time. At first sight, this would seem to mean that it cannot be possible for equivalence to hold. This argument is in fact correct given the assumptions made so far.

To give a basis for eliminating the effect of policy it is necessary to link the generations across time so that something that affects one generation directly somehow affects all generations indirectly. The way that this can be done is to return to the idea of altruism and intergenerational concern. Intuitively we can think of each consumer as having familial forebears and descendents (or parents and children in simple language). This time we assume that each parent is concerned with the welfare of their children, and that their children are concerned with the welfare of the grandchildren. Indirectly, although they are not alive at the same time in the model, this makes the parents concerned about the grandchildren. What effect does this have? It makes each family act as if it was a dynasty stretching through time, and its decisions at any one moment take into account all later consequences. A change in a social security program then causes a reaction right through the decision process of the dynasty.

To provide some details, let the utility of the generation born at time t be

$$U_t = U\left(x_t^t, x_t^{t+1}, \widetilde{U}_{t+1}\right). \tag{22.34}$$

It is the term $\widetilde{U}_{t+1}$ that represents the concern for the next generation. Here $\widetilde{U}_{t+1}$ is defined as the maximum utility that will be obtained by the children, who are born at $t+1$, of the parent born in t. The fact that the family will act as a dynasty can the be seen by substituting for $\widetilde{U}_{t+1}$ to give

$$U_t = U\left(x_t^t, x_t^{t+1}, U\left(x_{t+1}^{t+1}, x_{t+1}^{t+2}, \widetilde{U}_{t+2}\right)\right). \tag{22.35}$$

If this substitution is continually repeated then the single parent born at t ultimately cares about consumption levels in all future time periods.

Using this fact, it is now possible to demonstrate that Ricardian Equivalence applies to social security in these circumstances. Consider an initial position with no social security program. The consumer at t reflects their concern for the descendent by making a bequest of value b^t. Hence the consumption level in the second period of life is

$$x_t^{t+1} = s_t \left[1 + r_{t+1}\right] - b_t, \tag{22.36}$$

and that of their descendent is

$$x_{t+1}^{t+1} = w_{t+1} + b_t - s_{t+1}. \tag{22.37}$$

Now assume that each consumer has one descendent and that the young consumers are taxed and amount τ to pay a pension of equal value to old consumers Then the consumption level of each parent satisfies

$$x_t^{t+1} = s_t \left[1 + r_{t+1}\right] + \tau - \widehat{b}_t, \tag{22.38}$$

and that of their descendent

$$x_{t+1}^{t+1} = w_{t+1} + \widehat{b}_t - \tau - s_{t+1}. \tag{22.39}$$

But now note that if the bequest is changed so that $\widehat{b}_t = b_t + \tau$, the same consumption levels can be achieved for both the parent and the child as for the case with no pension. Furthermore, since these consumptions levels were the optimal choice initially, they will still be the optimal choice. So the old consumer will make this change to their bequest and the social security scheme will have no effect.

The conclusion of this analysis is that the change in the bequest can offset the intertemporal transfer caused by a social security system. Although this was only a two period system, it can easily be seen that the same logic can be applied to any series of transfers. All that the dynasty has to do is adjust each bequest to offset the effect of the social security system between any two generations. The outcome is that the policy has no effect. This is the basic point of Ricardian Equivalence.

It must be noted that there are limitations to this argument. Firstly, it is necessary that there be active intergenerational altruism. Without this there is no dynastic structure and the offsetting changes in bequests will not occur. In addition, the argument only works if the initial bequest is sufficiently large that it can be changed to offset the policy without becoming negative. Does it apply in practice? We clearly observe bequests but many of these may be unintentional and occur due to premature death.

The concept of Ricardian Equivalence can be extended into other areas of policy. Closely related to social security is the issue of government debt, which is also an intergenerational transfer (but from children to parents), and its effects upon the economy. This was the initial area of application for Ricardian Equivalence, with changes in bequests offsetting changes in government debt policy. Furthermore, if links are made across households it becomes possible for changes in household choices to offset a policy that causes transfers between households. This has lead to the question of whether "everything is neutral?". The answer depends upon the extent of the links.

22.9 Social Security Reform

The basic nature of the pensions crisis facing a range of economies was identified in Section 22.3: increasing longevity and the decline in the birth rate are combining to increase the dependency ratio. Without major reform or an unacceptably high increase in tax rates, the pension programs will either go into deficit or pay a much reduced pension. A variety of reforms have been proposed in response to this crisis. Some of these are now briefly reviewed.

Underlying the crisis is the fact that the pension systems are essentially of the pay-as-you-go form. With such a structure an increase in the dependency ratio will always put pressure upon the pension system. The reform most often discussed in the US is for the social security system to move towards a fully-funded structure. Once the system reaches the point of being fully-funded, pensions are paid from the pension fund accumulated by each worker. This breaks the identity relating pensions to the dependency ratio. A fully-funded system can operate either as a government-run scheme of on the basis of private pensions. We comment on this choice below. For now, we note that as well as reducing the real value of the pension, the UK government has moved in the direction of a fully-funded program by encouraging the use of private pensions. The difficulty with this approach is that it relies on workers making adequate provision for their retirement - and there is much evidence that this is not the case.

If an economy were to reform its pension system, it would take some time to transit from the pay-as-you-go system to the fully-funded system. The reform requires that a capital fund is established which takes a period of investment. Furthermore, the pay-as-you-go system cannot be terminated abruptly. Those already retired will still require to provide their pensions and those close to retirement will have too little time to invest in a pension fund and so will require the continuation of the pay-as-you-go element. These facts imply that those who are in work during the transition process will be required to both pay the pensions of the retired and pay to finance their own pension fund. In simple terms, they are paying for two sets of pensions and fare badly during the reform process. At the very least, this suggests that there could be significant political pressure against the proposed reform.

The distributional effects of a reform from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully-funded system are illustrated by the simulation reported in Table 22.3. This simulation determines the growth path of the economic model for a reference case in which the state pension is held constant. Applied to the UK, the model assumes that the value of the pension is 20% of average earnings. For the application to Europe, the value is taken to be 40%. A reform is then considered where an announcement is made in 1997 (the year the research was conducted) that the state pension will be steadily reduced from the year 2020 until being phased out in 2040. The aim of the long period between announcement and reduction is to allow for adjustment in private behavior. The removal of the state pension implies that private savings will have to increase to compensate.

The negative ages in the first column of Table 22.3 refer to consumers who had not yet been born in 1997, so a consumer with age - 10 in 1997 will be born in 2007. The numbers in the second and third columns shows the percentage by which the lifetime wage of that age group would need to be changed in the reference case to give the same level of welfare as in the reform case. Hence the value of -1.1 for the age group 40-50 in the UK shows that they are worse off with the reform - a reduction of 1.1% of their wage in the base case would give then the same welfare level as in the reform case.

Age in 1997	UK	Europe
> 57	0	0
50 - 57	- 0.09	- 0.6
40 - 50	- 1.1	- 2.3
30 - 40	- 3.0	- 5.7
20 - 30	- 3.8	- 7.2
10 - 20	- 2.3	- 4.2
0 - 10	0.7	1.7
-10 - 0	3.95	9.2
-20 - -10	6.5	15.7
-40 - -30	7.4	18.7
< -40	7.2	18.9

Table 22.3: Gains and Losses in transition
Source: Miles (1998)

The values in Table 22.3 show that the pension reform hurts those early in life who must pay the pensions of the retired and pay into their own retirement fund. Ultimately, the reform benefits consumers in the long run. The long-run gain comes from the fact that the reduction in the pension leads to an increase in private saving. Private saving has to be invested, so there is also an increase in the capital stock. The consequence of this capital stock increase depends on the initial level of capital compared to the Golden Rule level. In the simulations, capital is initially below the Golden Rule level and remains so throughout the transition. But since this is moving the economy closer to the Golden Rule, there is ultimately a gain in welfare for later generations. The structure of the gains and losses also illustrates the political problem involved in implementing the reform: those who must vote in favor of its implementation are those who lose the most. This political problem will be exacerbated by the aging of the electorate that is expected over the next 50 years. Estimates of the age of the median voter are given in Table 22.4. These reveal that the age of the median voter is likely to rise from the mid-40s to the mid-50s, so the electorate will become dominated by the age group that will lose most if the pension system reform were undertaken.

Country	Year	Age of Median Voter
France	2000	43
	2050	53
Germany	2000	46
	2050	55
Italy	1992	44
	2050	57
Spain	2000	44
	2050	57
UK	2000	45
	2050	53
US	2000	47
	2050	53

Table 22.4: Age of the Median Voter
Source: Galasso and Profeta (2004)

It has already been noted that a fully-funded scheme run by the government is equivalent to a system of private pension provision. This is only strictly true in an economy, like the overlapping generations model we have studied, that has a single capital good. In a more practical setting with a range of investment assets, the equivalence will only hold if the same portfolio choices are made. Moving from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully-funded system run by the government raises the issue of the portfolio of investments made by the pension fund. In the US, the assets of the fund are invested entirely in long-term Treasury Debt. Such debt is very low risk but as a consequence it also has a low return. This is not a portfolio that any private sector institution would choose, except one that is especially risk-averse. Nor is it one that many private investors would choose. Permitting the social security fund to invest in a wider portfolio opens the possibility for a higher return to be obtained but introduces questions about the degree of investment risk that the pension fund could accept. In addition, changing the portfolio structure of the social security fund could have significant macroeconomic consequences because of its potential size.

A further issue in the design of a pensions system is the choice between a *defined contributions* system and a *defined benefits* system. In a defined contribution scheme, social security contributions are paid into an investment fund and, at the time of retirement, the accumulated fund is annuitized. What annuitized means is that the fund purchases an annuity which is a financial instrument that pays a constant income to the purchaser until their date of death. In a defined benefits scheme, contributions are made at a constant proportion of income whereas the benefit is a known fraction of income at retirement (or some average over income levels in years close to retirement).

The consequences of these differences are most apparent in the apportionment of risk under the two types of system. With a defined contributions system, the level of payment into the pension fund is certain for the worker. What is not certain is the maturity value of the pension fund, since this depends on the return earned on the fund, or the pension that will be received, since this depends on the rate offered on annuities at retirement. All risk therefore falls upon the worker. With a defined benefits system, the risk is placed entirely upon the pension fund since it must meet the promises that have been made. The pension fund receives contributions which it can invest but it runs the risk that the returns on these may not meet pension commitments. This is currently the situation of the US fund where the forecast deficit is a consequence of the defined benefits it has promised.

Assuming that a defined contributions scheme is chosen, there is a further reform that can be made. In the discussion of the simulation it was noted that the reform involved a move from a state pension scheme to private pension schemes. In a defined contribution system there is no real distinction between state and private schemes in principal. When put into practice, distinctions will arise in the choice of investment portfolio, the returns earned on the portfolio and the transactions costs incurred in running the scheme. If moving to a fully-funded system pensions, the choice between state and private become a real issue. One option is to use a public fund, either directly administered or run privately after a competitive tendering process. Alternatively, a limited range of approved private funds could be made available. Both choices would lead to a problem of monitoring the performance of the schemes given the fundamentally uncertain nature of financial markets. In addition, seeking low transactions costs could prove detrimental to other areas of performance. A final option is to make use of an open selection of private investment funds. Doing so relies upon investors making informed choices between the providers and between the funds on offer to ensure the risk characteristics of the fund match their preferences. Such a scheme will not work with poorly informed investors and may run foul of high transactions costs. Both of these have been significant problems in the UK where "mis-selling" - the selling of inappropriate pensions plans - and high costs have accompanied the move toward the private financing of pensions.

The reform of pensions systems is an issue with much current policy relevance. A range of reforms have been suggested to cope with the forecast change in the dependency ratio. Some of these represent adjustments to the structure of pension schemes whereas others envisage a major reorganization of pension provision. The UK is probably further down the path of reform than most countries, but its increasing reliance on private rather than state pension schemes is a model that other countries should judge carefully before electing to follow.

22.10 Conclusions

Social security in the form of pensions is important both in policy and for its effect upon the economy. The generosity of a pension scheme has implications for individual saving behavior and, in the aggregate, for capital accumulation. Since an economy may reach an inefficient steady state, the design of pension scheme can impact upon economic efficiency.

Demographic changes and changes in employment behavior are currently putting existing state pension schemes under pressure because of their fundamentally pay-as-you-go nature. Reform proposals have focused upon a move to a fully-funded system, but such a reform can have a detrimental impact upon the welfare level of consumers living during the transition period.

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Chapter 23

Economic Growth

23.1 Introduction

Economic growth is the basis of increased prosperity. Growth comes from the accumulation of capital (both human and physical) and from innovation which leads to technical progress. These advances raise the productivity of labor and increase the potential for consumption. The rate of growth can be affected by policy through the effect that taxation has upon on the return to investments. Taxation can also finance public expenditures that enhance productivity. In most developed countries the level of taxes has risen steadily over the course of the last century: an increase from about 5%-10% of GDP at the turn of the century to 20% - 30% at present is typical. Such significant increases raise serious questions about the effect taxation has upon economic growth.

Until recently, economic models that could offer convincing insights into this question were lacking. Much of the growth literature focused on the long-run equilibrium where output per head was constant or modelled growth through exogenous technical progress. By definition, when technical progress is exogenous it cannot be affected by policy. The development of endogenous growth theory has overcome these limitations by explicitly modelling the process through which growth is generated. This allows the effects of taxation to be traced through the economy and predictions made about its effects on growth.

The chapter begins with a review of exogenous growth models. The concept of the steady state is introduced and it is shown why growth is limited unless there is some external process of technical progress. The exogenous growth model is employed to prove the important result that the optimal long-run tax rate on capital income should be zero. Actual tax systems are some way from this ideal position, so the welfare cost of the non-optimality is also addressed.

Endogenous growth models are then considered. A brief survey is given of the various ways in which endogenous growth has been modelled. The focus is then placed upon endogenous growth arising from the provision of a public input for private firms. It is shown that there is an optimal level of public expenditure which maximizes the growth rate of consumption. This model provides a positive role for government in the growth process. The optimality of a zero tax on capital extends to endogenous growth models with human capital as an input. With this result in mind, a range of simulation experiments have assessed the effect on the growth rate of changes in the tax structure in this setting. The differences in structure and parameter values between the experiments provides for some divergent conclusions.

The analytical results and the simulations reveal that economic theory provides no definitive prediction about how taxation affects economic growth. The limitations of the theory places an increased reliance upon empirical evidence to provide clarification. We look at a range of studies that have estimated the effect of taxation upon economic growth. Some of these studies find a significant effect, others do not. We discuss the many issues involved in interpreting these results.

23.2 Exogenous Growth

The exogenous growth theory that developed in the 1950s and 1960s viewed growth as being achieved by the accumulation of capital and increases in productivity via technical progress. The theory generally placed its emphasis upon capital accumulation, so the source of the technical progress was not investigated by the theory. It was assumed instead to arise from some outside or exogenous factors.

The standard form of these growth models was based upon a production function that had capital and labor (with labor measured in man-hours) as the inputs into production. Constant returns to scale were assumed, as was diminishing marginal productivity of both inputs. Given that the emphasis was upon the level and growth of economic variables, rather than their distribution, the consumption side was modelled by either a representative consumer or a steadily growing population of identical consumers.

Our analysis begins with the simplest of these growth models which assumes that both the rate of saving and the supply of labor are constant. Although this eliminates issues of consumer choice, the model is still able to teach important lessons about the limits to growth and the potential for efficiency of the long-run equilibrium. The key finding is that if growth occurs only through the accumulation of capital, there has to be a limit to the growth process if there is no technical progress.

23.2.1 Constant Saving Rate

The fact that there are limits to growth in an economy when there is no technical progress can be most easily demonstrated in a setting in which consumer optimization plays no role. Instead, it is assumed that a constant fraction of output is invested in new capital goods. This assumption may seem restrictive but it allows a precise derivation of the growth path of the economy. In addition the main conclusions relating to limits on growth are little modified even when an optimizing consumer is introduced.

Consider an economy with a population that is growing at a constant rate. Each person works a fixed number of hours and capital depreciates partially when used. There is a single good in the economy which can be consumed or saved. The only source of saving is investment in capital. Under these assumptions, the output that is produced at time t, Y_t, must be divided between consumption, C_t, and investment, I_t. In equilibrium, the level of investment must be equal to the level of saving.

With inputs of capital K_t and labor L_t employed in production, the level of output is

$$Y_t = F\left(K_t, L_t\right). \tag{23.1}$$

This output can be either consumed or saved. The fundamental assumption of the model is that the level of saving is a fixed proportion s, $0 < s < 1$, of output. As saving must equal investment in equilibrium, at time t investment in new capital is given by

$$I_t = sF\left(K_t, L_t\right). \tag{23.2}$$

The use of capital in production results in its partial depreciation. We assume that this depreciation is a constant fraction δ, so the capital available in period $t+1$ is given by new investment plus the undepreciated capital, or

$$\begin{aligned} K_{t+1} &= I_t + (1-\delta) K_t \\ &= sF\left(K_t, L_t\right) + (1-\delta) K_t. \end{aligned} \tag{23.3}$$

This equation is the basic capital accumulation relationship that determines how the capital stock evolves through time.

The fact that the population is growing makes it preferable to express variables in per capita terms. This can be done by exploiting the assumption of constant returns to scale in the production function to write $Y_t = L_t F\left(\frac{K_t}{L_t}, 1\right) = L_t f\left(k_t\right)$ where $k_t = \frac{K_t}{L_t}$. Dividing (23.3) through by L_t, the capital accumulation relation becomes

$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{L_t} = sf\left(k_t\right) + \frac{(1-\delta)K_t}{L_t}. \tag{23.4}$$

Denoting the constant population growth rate by n, labor supply grows according to $L_{t+1} = (1+n)L_t$. Using this growth relationship, the capital accumulation relation shows that the dynamics of the capital/labor ratio are governed by

$$(1+n)k_{t+1} = sf\left(k_t\right) + (1-\delta) k_t. \tag{23.5}$$

The relation in (23.5) will trace the development of the capital stock over time from an initial stock $k_0 = \frac{K_0}{L_o}$. To see what this implies, consider an example where the production function has the form $f\left(k_t\right) = k_t^\alpha$. The capital/labor ratio must then satisfy

$$k_{t+1} = \frac{sk_t^\alpha + (1-\delta) k_t}{1+n}. \tag{23.6}$$



Figure 23.1: Dynamics of the Capital Stock

For $k_0 = 1, n = 0.05$, $\delta = 0.05, s = 0.2$ and $\alpha = 0.5$, Figure 23.1 plots the first 50 values of the capital stock. It can be seen that starting from the initial value of $k_0 = 1$ the capital stock doubles in 13 years. After this the rate of growth slows noticeably and even after by the 50^{th} year it has not yet doubled again. The figure also shows that the capital stock is tending to a long-run equilibrium level which is called the *steady state*. For the parameters chosen, the steady state level is $k = 4$ which is achieved at $t = 328$, though the economy does reach a capital stock of 3.9 at $t = 77$. It is the final part of the adjustment that takes a long time.

The steady state is achieved when the capital stock is constant with $k_{t+1} = k_t$. Denoting the steady state value of the capital/labor ratio by k, the capital accumulation condition shows that k must satisfy

$$(1+n)k = sf(k) + (1-\delta)k, \tag{23.7}$$

or

$$sf(k) - (n+\delta)k = 0. \tag{23.8}$$

The solution to this equation is called the steady state capital/labor ratio and can be interpreted as the economy's long-run equilibrium value of k.

The solution of this equation is illustrated in Figure 23.2. The steady state occurs where the curves $sf(k)$ and $(n+\delta)k$ intersect. If this point is achieved by the economy, the capital/labor ratio will remain constant. Since k is constant, it follows from the production function that $\frac{Y_t}{L_t}$ will remain constant as will $\frac{C_t}{L_t}$. (However, it should be noted that as L is growing at rate n, then Y, K and C will also grow at rate n in the steady state.) It is the constancy of these variables that shows there is a limit to the growth achievable by this economy. Once $\frac{C_t}{L_t}$ is constant, the level of consumption per capita will remain constant over time. In this sense, a limit is placed upon the growth in living standards that can be



Figure 23.2: The Steady State

achieved. The explanation for this limit is that capital suffers from decreasing returns when added to the exogenous supply of labor. Eventually, the return will fall so low that the capital stock is unable to reproduce itself.

Although we have not yet included any policy variables, this analysis of the steady state can be used to reflect on the potential for economic policy to affect the equilibrium. Studying Figure 23.2 reveals that the equilibrium level of k can be raised by any policy that engineers an increase in the saving rate, s, or an upward shift in the production function, $f(k)$. However, any policy that leads only to a one-off change in s or $f(k)$ cannot affect the long-run growth rate of consumption or output. By definition, once the new steady state is achieved after the policy change, the per capita growth rates of the variables will return to zero. Furthermore, any policy that only increases s cannot sustain growth since s has an upper limit of 1 which must eventually be reached. If policy intervention is to result in sustained growth it has to produce a continuous upward movement in the production function. A mechanism through which policy can achieve this is studied in Section 23.3.2.

A means for growth to be sustained without policy intervention is to assume that output increases over time for any given levels of the inputs. This can be achieved through labor or capital (or both) becoming more productive over time for exogenous reasons summarized as "technical progress". A way to incorporate this in the model is to write the production function as $f(k,t)$, where the dependence upon t captures the technical progress which allows increased output. Technical progress results in the curve $f(k,t)$ in Figure 23.2 continuously shifting upwards over time, thus raising the steady state levels of capital and output. The drawback of this approach is that the mechanism for growth, the "growth engine", is exogenous so preventing the models from explaining the most fundamental factor of what determines the rate of growth. This deficiency is addressed by the endogenous growth models of the next section which explore the mechanisms that can drive technical progress.

Returning to the basic model without technical progress, condition (23.8) shows the steady state capital/labor ratio is dependent upon the saving rate s. This raises the question as to whether some saving rates are better than others. To address this question, it is noted first that for each value of s there is a corresponding steady-state capital/labor ratio at the intersection of $sf(k)$ and $(n+\delta)\,k$. It is clear from Figure 23.2 that for low values of s, the curve $sf(k)$ will intersect the curve $(n+\delta)\,k$ at low values of k. As s is increased, $sf(k)$ shifts upwards and the steady state level of k will rise. The relationship between the capital/labor ratio and the saving rate implied by this construction is denoted by $k = k\,(s)$. We have observed that $k\,(s)$ is an increasing function of s up until the maximum value of $s = 1$.

Taking account of the link between s and k, the level of consumption per capita can be written

$$c\,(s) = (1-s)\,f\,(k\,(s)) = f\,(k\,(s)) - (n+\delta)\,k(s), \tag{23.9}$$

where the second equality follows from definition (23.8) of a steady state. What is of interest are the properties of the saving rate that maximizes consumption. The first-order condition for defining this saving rate can be found by differentiating $c(s)$ with respect to s. Doing so gives

$$\frac{dc\,(s)}{ds} = \left[f'\,(k\,(s)) - (n+\delta)\right]k'\,(s) = 0. \tag{23.10}$$

Since $k'(s)$ is positive, the saving rate, s^*, that maximizes consumption is defined by

$$f'\,(k(s^*)) = n+\delta. \tag{23.11}$$

The saving rate s^* determines a level of capital $k^* = k(s^*)$ which is called the *Golden Rule* capital/labor ratio. If the economy achieves this capital/labor ratio at its steady state it is maximizing consumption per capita. The same logic applies here as it did in the derivation of the steady state in Chapter 21 (though δ was assumed to be zero in the overlapping generations economy).

The nature of the Golden Rule is illustrated in Figure 23.3. For any level of the capital/labor ratio, the steady state level of consumption per capita is given by the vertical distance between the curve $(n+\delta)k$ and the curve $f(k)$. This distance is maximized when the gradient of the production function is equal to $(n+\delta)$ which gives the Golden Rule condition. The figure also shows that consumption will fall if the capital/labor ratio is either raised or lowered from the Golden Rule level. In line with the definitions of Chapter 21, an economy with a steady-state capital stock below the Golden Rule level, k^*, is dynamically efficient - it requires a sacrifice of consumption now in order to raise k so a Pareto improvement cannot be found. An economy with a capital stock in excess of k^* is dynamically inefficient since immediate consumption of the excess would raise current welfare and place the economy on a path with higher consumption.



Figure 23.3: The Golden Rule

As an example of these calculations, let the production function be given by $y = k^{\alpha}$, with $\alpha < 1$. For a given saving rate s the steady state is defined by the solution to

$$sk^{\alpha} = (n + \delta)\, k. \tag{23.12}$$

Solving this equation determines the steady state capital/labor ratio as $k = \left(\frac{s}{n+\delta}\right)^{1/(1-\alpha)}$. Using this solution, the per capita level of consumption follows as

$$c(s) = k^{\alpha} - (n + \delta)\, k = \left(\frac{s}{n+\delta}\right)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} - (n + \delta)\left(\frac{s}{n+\delta}\right)^{1/(1-\alpha)}. \tag{23.13}$$

Adopting the parameter values $n = 0.025, \delta = 0.025$ and $\alpha = 0.75$, the level of consumption is plotted in Figure 23.4 as a function of s. The figure shows that consumption rises with s until the saving rate is reached at which the equilibrium capital stock is equal to the Golden Rule level and then falls again for higher values.

Formally, the fact that the saving rate is fixed leaves little scope for policy analysis. However, studying the effect of changes in the saving rate reveals the factors that would be at work in a more general model in which the level of saving is a choice variable that can be affected by policy variables. By definition, the per capita level of the variables are constant once the steady state has been achieved. The living standards in the economy reach a limit and then cannot grow any further unless the production function is continually raised. Changes in the saving rate affect the level of consumption but not its growth rate.



Figure 23.4: Consumption and the Saving Rate

23.2.2 Optimal Taxation

The analysis of the fixed saving model has touched upon some of the potential consequences of policy intervention. As a tool for policy analysis, the model is very limited given the lack of choice variables that can be affected by policy. This shortcoming is now overcome by studying a variant of the *Ramsey growth model* in which a representative consumer chooses an intertemporal consumption plan to maximize lifetime utility. Using this model, we analyze the optimal taxes upon labor and capital income.

The Ramsey model has a single representative consumer who chooses the paths of consumption, labor and capital over time. The single consumer assumption is adopted to eliminate issues concerning distribution between consumers of differing abilities and tastes and to place the focus entirely upon efficiency. For simplicity, it is also assumed that the growth rate of labor, n, is zero. There is a representative firm that chooses its use of capital and labor to maximize profits. Given that the market must be in equilibrium, the choices of the consumer drive the rest of the economy through the level of saving, and hence capital, that they imply. The supply of labor and capital from the consumer combine with the factor demands of the firm to determine the equilibrium factor rewards.

The aim is to characterize the optimal tax structure in this economy. We assume there is a government that requires revenue of amount g_t at time t. It raises this revenue through taxes on capital and labor, which are denoted by τ_t^K and τ_t^L respectively. The government chooses these tax rates in the most efficient manner.

The choices of the consumer are made to maximize the discounted sum of the flow of utility. Letting $0 < \beta < 1$ be the discount factor on future utility, the consumer's preferences are described by

$$U = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U\left(C_t, L_t\right). \tag{23.14}$$

The specification of the utility function implies that the consumer has an infinite life. This can be justified by treating the consumer as a dynasty with concern for descendents. Further discussion of this assumption can be found in Section 22.8.

As there is a single consumer, the capital stock is equal to the saving of this consumer. This observation allows the budget constraint for the consumer to be written as

$$C_t + K_{t+1} = (1 - \tau_t^L) w_t L_t + (1 - \delta + (1 - \tau_t^K) r_t) K_t. \tag{23.15}$$

The utility maximization decision for the consumer involves choosing the time paths of consumption, labor supply and capital for the entire lifespan of the economy. The formal decision problem is

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{C_t, L_t, K_t\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} [\beta^t U\left(C_t, L_t\right) + \beta^t \lambda_t ((1 - \tau_t^L) w_t L_t + \\ (1 - \delta + (1 - \tau_t^K) r_t) K_t - C_t - K_{t+1})], \end{aligned} \tag{23.16}$$

where λ_t is the multiplier on the budget constraint at time t.

In solving this optimization, it is assumed that the representative consumer takes the factor rewards w_t and r_t as given. This captures the representative consumer as a competitive price-taker. (It is helpful to note that when we consider the government optimization below, the dependence of the factor rewards on the choice of capital and labor is taken into account by the government. This is what distinguishes the consumer who *reacts* to the factor rewards, and the government which *manipulates* the factor rewards.) With fixed factor rewards, the necessary conditions for the choice of C_t, L_t and K_{t+1} are

$$U_{C_t} - \lambda_t = 0, \tag{23.17}$$

$$U_{L_t} + \lambda_t (1 - \tau_t^L) w_t = 0, \tag{23.18}$$

and

$$\beta \lambda_{t+1} \left(1 - \delta + (1 - \tau_{t+1}^K) r_{t+1}\right) - \lambda_t = 0. \tag{23.19}$$

Using the first condition to substitute for λ_t in the second condition gives

$$U_{L_t} + U_{C_t} (1 - \tau_t^L) w_t = 0. \tag{23.20}$$

Stepping the first condition one period ahead and then substituting for λ_{t+1} in the third gives

$$\beta U_{C_{t+1}} \left(1 - \delta + (1 - \tau_{t+1}^K) r_{t+1}\right) - U_{C_t} = 0. \tag{23.21}$$

Conditions (23.20) and (23.21) describe utility maximization by the consumer. To interpret these it should be observed that there are two aspects to the consumer's decision. Firstly, within each period the consumer needs to optimize over the levels of consumption and labor supply. The efficient solution to this within-period decision is described by (23.20) which ensures that the marginal utilities are proportional to the relative prices. Secondly, the consumer has to allocate their resources efficiently across time. Condition (23.21) describes efficiency in this process by linking the marginal utility of consumption in two adjacent periods to the rate at which consumption can be transferred through time via investments in capital. Taken together for every time period t, these necessary conditions describe the optimal paths of consumption, labor supply and capital investment for the consumer.

The representative firm is assumed to maximize profit by choosing its use of capital and labor. Since the firm rents capital from the consumer, it makes no irreversible decisions so it need do no more than maximize profit in each period. The standard efficiency conditions for factor use then apply which equate marginal products to factor rewards. Hence the interest rate and the wage rate satisfy

$$F_{K_t} = r_t, \tag{23.22}$$

and

$$F_{L_t} = w_t. \tag{23.23}$$

Following these preliminaries, it is possible to state the government optimization problem. The sequence of government expenditures $\{g_t\}$ is taken as given. It is assumed that these expenditures are used for a purpose which does not directly affect utility. Formally, the government chooses the tax rates and the levels of consumption, labor supply and capital to maximize the level of utility. The values of these variables must be chosen for each point in time, so the government decision is a sequence $\left\{\tau_t^K, \tau_t^L, C_t, L_t, K_t\right\}$. The choices of C_t, L_t and K_t must be identical to what would be chosen by the consumer given the tax rates τ_t^K and τ_t^L. This can be achieved by imposing conditions (23.20) and (23.21) as constraints upon the optimization. When these constraints are satisfied it is as if the consumer were making the choice. As already noted, the government explicitly takes into account the endogenous determination of the factor rewards.

The optimization also has to be constrained by the budget constraints of the consumer and government, and by aggregate production feasibility. However, if any two of these constraints hold the third must also hold. Therefore one of them need not be included as a separate constraint for the optimization. In this case it is the consumer's budget constraint which is dropped. The government budget constraint that taxes must equal expenditure is given by

$$\tau_t^K r_t K_t + \tau_t^L w_t L_t = g_t. \tag{23.24}$$

In addition, the aggregate production condition for the economy is that

$$C_t + g_t + I_t = F\left(K_t, L_t\right). \tag{23.25}$$

Using the definition of investment this becomes

$$C_t + g_t + K_{t+1} = F\left(K_t, L_t\right) + \left(1 - \delta\right) K_t. \tag{23.26}$$

Employing the determination of the factor prices (23.22) and (23.23), the government optimization problem that determines the efficient taxes is

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\left\{\tau_t^K, \tau_t^L, C_t, L_t, K_t\right\}} & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [U + \psi_t \left(\tau_t^K F_{K_t} K_t + \tau_t^L F_{L_t} L_t - g_t\right) \\ & + \theta_t \left(F + \left(1 - \delta\right) K_t - C_t - g_t - K_{t+1}\right) + \mu_{1t}\left(U_{L_t} + U_{C_t}(1 - \tau_t^L) F_{L_t}\right) \\ & + \mu_{2t}\left(\beta U_{C_{t+1}}\left(1 - \delta + (1 - \tau_{t+1}^K) F_{K_{t+1}}\right) - U_{C_t}\right)]. \end{aligned} \tag{23.27}$$

The complete set of first-order necessary conditions for this optimization involve the derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to all of the choice variables at every point in time plus the derivatives with respect to the multipliers at every point in time. However, to demonstrate the key result concerning the value of the optimal capital tax only the necessary conditions for the tax rates and for capital are required. The other first-order conditions will add further information on the solution but do not bear on the determination of the capital tax.

The necessary condition for the choice of τ_t^K is

$$\psi_t F_{K_t} K_t - \mu_{2t-1} U_{C_t} F_{K_t} = 0, \tag{23.28}$$

for τ_t^L the necessary condition is

$$\psi_t F_{L_t} L_t - \mu_{1t} U_{C_t} F_{L_t} = 0, \tag{23.29}$$

and for K_t it is

$$\begin{aligned} & \psi_t \left(\tau_t^K \left(F_{K_t} + K_t F_{K_t K_t}\right) + \tau_t^L F_{L_t K_t} L_t\right) + \theta_t \left(F_{K_t} + 1 - \delta\right) - \frac{1}{\beta} \theta_{t-1} \\ & + \mu_{1t} U_{C_t} (1 - \tau_t^L) F_{L_t K_t} + \mu_{2t-1} U_{C_t} (1 - \tau_t^K) F_{K_t K_t} = 0. \end{aligned} \tag{23.30}$$

The two conditions for τ_t^K and τ_t^L can be used to substitute for μ_{1t} and μ_{2t-1} in the condition for K_t. Cancelling terms and using the fact that constant returns to scale implies $K_t F_{K_t K_t} + L_t F_{L_t K_t} = 0$, condition (23.30) reduces to

$$\psi_t \tau_t^K F_{K_t} + \theta_t \left(F_{K_t} + 1 - \delta\right) - \frac{1}{\beta} \theta_{t-1} = 0. \tag{23.31}$$

Along the growth path of the economy this equation is only one part of the complete description of the outcome induced by the optimal policy. However, by focussing on the steady state in which all the variables are constant it becomes possible to use the information contained in this condition to determine the optimal tax on capital.

Consequently, the analysis now moves to consider the steady state that is reached under the optimal policy. In order to be in a steady state it must be the case that the tax rates and the level of government expenditure remain constant over time. In addition, the levels of capital, consumption and labor supply will be constant. Moreover, being in a steady state also implies that $\theta_t = \theta_{t-1}$. Using these facts, in the steady state the necessary condition for the choice of the capital stock becomes

$$\psi\tau^K F_K + \theta\left(F_K + 1 - \delta\right) - \frac{1}{\beta}\theta = 0. \qquad (23.32)$$

This can be simplified further by observing that in the steady state the choice condition for the consumer (23.21) reduces to

$$\beta\left(1 - \delta + (1 - \tau^K)F_K\right) - 1 = 0. \qquad (23.33)$$

Using (23.33) to substitute for β, the final condition for the choice of the capital stock is

$$\left(\psi + \theta\right)\tau^K F_K = 0. \qquad (23.34)$$

Given that the resource constraints are binding, implying ψ and θ are positive, and that the marginal product of capital, F_K, is positive, the solution to (23.34) has to be $\tau^K = 0$. This is the well-known result (due originally to Chamley and Judd) that the long-run value of the optimal capital tax has to be zero.

The analysis has concluded that in the steady state, which we can interpret as the long-run equilibrium, income from interest on capital should not be taxed. This result is easily interpreted. Firstly, note that the result does not say that the tax should be zero when we are on the growth path to the steady state - it was derived for the steady state so applies only to that situation. This does not prevent the tax being positive (or negative) along the growth path. Secondly, the zero tax on capital income implies that all taxation must fall upon labor income. If labor were a fixed factor this conclusion would not be a surprise, but here labor is a variable factor. Finally, the reason for avoiding the taxation of capital is that the return on capital is fundamental to the intertemporal allocation of resources by the consumer. The result shows that it is optimal to leave this allocation undistorted to focus distortions upon the choice between consumption and labor within periods.

Since the optimal tax rate is zero, any other value of the tax rate must lead to a reduction in welfare compared to what is achievable. An insight into the extent of the welfare cost of deviating from the optimal solution is given in Table 23.1. These results are derived from a model with a Cobb-Douglas production function and a utility function with a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution (see (23.45) below). The policy experiment calculates what would happen if a tax on capital was replaced by a lump-sum tax. The increase in consumption and the welfare cost are measured by comparing the steady state with the tax to the steady state without. When a tax rate of 30% on capital income is replaced by a lump-sum tax, consumption increases by 3.3% and the welfare cost of the distortionary tax is measured at 11% of tax revenue. The increase in consumption and the welfare cost are both higher for an initial 50% tax rate.

Initial Tax Rate (%)	*Increase in Consumption* (%)	*Welfare Cost* (% *of Tax Revenue*)
30	3.30	11
50	8.38	26

Table 23.1: Welfare Cost of Taxation
Source: Chamley (1981)

In summary, the optimal tax policy is to set the long-run tax on capital to zero. This outcome is explained by the wish to avoid intertemporal distortions. As a consequence, all revenue must be raised by taxation of labor income. This will cause a distortion of choice within periods but does not affect the intertemporal allocation. The conclusion is very general and does not depend upon any restrictive assumptions. Simulations of the welfare cost of non-optimal policies show that these can be a significant percentage of the revenue raised.

23.3 Endogenous Growth

Decreasing returns to capital have already been identified as the source of the limit upon growth in the exogenous growth model. The removal of this limit requires the decreasing marginal product of capital to be circumvented in a way that is, ideally, determined by choices made by the agents in the economy. Models that allow both sustained growth and explain its source are said to generate "endogenous growth". There have emerged in the literature four basic methods through which endogenous growth can be achieved. All of these approaches achieve the same end – that of sustained growth – but by different routes. We briefly review these four approaches and then focus attention on government expenditure as the source of endogenous growth.

23.3.1 Models of Endogenous Growth

The first, and simplest, approach to modelling endogenous growth, the *AK model*, assumes that capital is the only input into production and that there are constant returns to scale. This may seem at first sight to simply remove the problem of decreasing returns by assumption, but we will later show that the AK model can be given a broader interpretation. Under these assumptions the production function is given by $Y_t = AK_t$, hence the model's name. Constant returns to scale ensures that output grows at the same rate as the capital stock.

To show that this model can generate continuous growth, it is simplest to return to the assumption of a constant saving rate. With a saving rate s the level of investment in time period t is $I_t = sAK_t$. Since there is no labor, the capital accumulation condition is just

$$K_{t+1} = sAK_t + (1-\delta)K_t = (1 + sA - \delta)K_t. \tag{23.35}$$

Provided that $sA > \delta$, the level of capital will grow linearly over time at rate $sA - \delta$. Output will grow at the same rate, as will consumption. The model is therefore able to generate continuous growth.

The second approach is to match increases in capital with equal growth in other inputs. One way to do this is to consider *human capital* as an input rather than just raw labor time. The level of the human capital input is then the product of the quality of labor and labor time. Doing so allows labor time to be made more productive by investment in education and training which raise human capital. Technical progress is then embodied in the quality of labor. The model requires two investment processes: one for investment in physical capital and another for investment in human capital. There can either be one sector, with human capital produced by the same technology as physical capital, or two sectors with a separate production process for human capital. The standard form of production function for such a model would be

$$Y_t = F\left(K_t, H_t\right), \tag{23.36}$$

where H_t is the level of human capital. If the production function has constant returns to scale in human capital and physical capital jointly, then investment in both can raise output without limit even if the quantity of labor time is fixed.

The one-sector model with human capital actually reduces to the AK model - this is the broader interpretation of the AK model referred to above. To see this, note that the one-sector assumption means that output can be used for consumption or invested in physical capital or invested in human capital. This means that the two capital goods are perfect substitutes for the consumer in the sense that a unit of output can become one unit of either. The perfect substitutability implies that in equilibrium the two factors must have the same rate of return. Combining this with the constant returns to scale in the production function results in the two factors always being employed in the same proportions. Therefore the ratio $\frac{H_t}{K_t}$ is constant for all t. Denoting this constant value by $\frac{H}{K}$, the production function becomes

$$Y_t = K_t f\left(\frac{H}{K}\right) = AK_t, \tag{23.37}$$

where $A \equiv f\left(\frac{H}{K}\right)$. This returns us to the AK form.

A two-sector model can have different production functions for the creation of the two types of capital good. This eliminates the restriction that they are perfect substitutes and moves away from the AK setting. In a two-sector model different human and physical capital intensities can be incorporated in the production of the two types of capital. This can make it consistent with the observation that human capital production tends to be more intensive in human capital - through the requirement for skilled teaching staff *etc.*

The next two approaches focus on inputs other than labor. If output depends upon labor use and a range of other inputs, technological progress can take the form of the introduction of *new inputs* into the production function without any of the old inputs being dropped. This allows production to increase since the expansion of the input range prevents the level of use of any one of the inputs becoming too large relative to the labor input. An alternative view of technological progress is that it takes the form of an increase in the *quality of inputs.* Expenditure on research and development results in better quality inputs which are more productive. Over time, old inputs are replaced by new inputs and total productivity increases. Firms are driven to innovate in order to exploit the position of monopoly that goes with ownership of the latest innovation. This is the process of "creative destruction" which was seen by Schumpeter as a fundamental component of technological progress.

A special case of this approach, and the one upon which we will focus, is to use a *public good* as the additional input in the production function. This can allow for constant returns in the private inputs to production, but also constant returns to private capital provided the level of the public good is raised to match. The analytical details of this model are described below because it is a useful vehicle for thinking about the channels through which public expenditure can impact upon growth.

A final approach to endogenous growth is to assume that there are *externalities* between firms which operate through learning-by-doing. Investment by a firm leads to parallel improvements in the productivity of labor as new knowledge and techniques are acquired. Moreover, this increased knowledge is a public good so the learning spills over into other firms. This makes the level of knowledge, and hence labor productivity, dependent upon the aggregate capital stock of the economy. Decreasing returns to capital for a single firm (for a given use of labor) then translate into constant returns for the economy.

The common property of these models of endogenous growth is that there are growth-related choices which can be influenced by policy. The government can encourage (or discourage) investment in human capital through subsidies to training or the tax treatment of the returns. Subsidies to research and development can encourage innovation, as can the details of patent law. From amongst these many possibilities, the remainder of the chapter chooses to focus upon the interaction of taxation and economic growth.

23.3.2 Government Expenditure

Endogenous growth can arise when capital and labor are augmented by additional inputs in the production function. One case of particular interest for understanding the link between government policy and growth is when the additional input is a public good financed by taxation. The existence of a public input provides a positive role for public expenditure and a direct mechanism through which policy can affect growth. This opens a path to an analysis of whether there is a sense in which an optimal level of public expenditure can be derived in a growth model.

A public input can be introduced by assuming that the production function for the representative firm at time t takes the form

$$Y_t = AL_t^{1-\alpha}K_t^{\alpha}G_t^{1-\alpha}, \tag{23.38}$$

where A is a positive constant and G_t is the quantity of the public input. The structure of this production function ensures that there are constant returns to scale in L_t and K_t for the firm given a fixed level of the public input. Although returns are decreasing to private capital as the level of capital is increased for fixed levels of labor and public input, there are constant returns to scale in public input and private capital together. For a fixed level of L_t, this property of constant returns to scale in the other two inputs permits endogenous growth to occur.

It is assumed that the public input is financed by a tax upon output. Assuming that capital does not depreciate in order to simplify the derivation, the profit level of the firm is

$$\pi_t = (1-\tau)\, AL_t^{1-\alpha} K_t^{\alpha} G_t^{1-\alpha} - r_t K_t - w_t L_t, \tag{23.39}$$

where r_t is the interest rate, w_t the wage rate and τ the tax rate. From this specification of profit, the choice of capital and labor by the firm satisfy

$$(1-\tau)\, \alpha A L_t^{1-\alpha} K_t^{\alpha-1} G_t^{1-\alpha} = r_t, \tag{23.40}$$

and

$$(1-\tau)(1-\alpha)\, A L_t^{-\alpha} K_t^{\alpha} G_t^{1-\alpha} = w_t. \tag{23.41}$$

The government budget constraint requires that tax revenue equals the cost of the public good provided, so

$$G_t = \tau Y_t. \tag{23.42}$$

Now assume that labor supply is constant at $L_t = L$ for all t. Without the public input, it would not be possible given this assumption to sustain growth because the marginal product of capital would decrease as the capital stock increased. With the public input, growth can now be driven by a joint increase in private and public capital even though labor supply is fixed. Using (23.38) and (23.42), the level of public input can be written as

$$G_t = (\tau A)^{1/\alpha} L^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha} K_t. \tag{23.43}$$

This result can be substituted into (23.40) to obtain an expression for the interest rate as a function of the tax rate

$$r_t = (1-\tau)\, \alpha A^{1/\alpha} (L\tau)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha}. \tag{23.44}$$

The economy's representative consumer is assumed to have preferences described by the utility function

$$U = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{C_t^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma}. \tag{23.45}$$

This specific form of utility is adopted to permit an explicit solution for the steady state. The consumer chooses the path $\{C_t\}$ over time to maximize utility. The standard condition for intertemporal choice must hold for the optimization, so the ratio of the marginal utilities of consuming at t and at $t+1$ must equal the gross interest rate. Hence

$$\frac{\partial U/\partial C_t}{\partial U/\partial C_{t+1}} \equiv \frac{C_t^{-\sigma}}{\beta C_{t+1}^{-\sigma}} = (1 + r_{t+1}). \tag{23.46}$$

By solving for $\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t}$ and then subtracting $\frac{C_t}{C_t}$ from both sides of the resulting equation, this optimality condition can be written in terms of the growth rate of consumption

$$\frac{C_{t+1} - C_t}{C_t} = (\beta (1 + r_{t+1}))^{1/\sigma} - 1. \tag{23.47}$$

Finally, using the solution (23.44) to substitute for the interest rate, the growth rate of consumption is related to the tax rate by

$$\frac{C_{t+1} - C_t}{C_t} = \beta^{1/\sigma} \left(1 + (1 - \tau) \alpha A^{1/\alpha} (L\tau)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha}\right)^{1/\sigma} - 1. \tag{23.48}$$

The result in (23.48) demonstrates the two channels through which the tax rate affects consumption growth. Firstly, taxation reduces the growth rate of consumption through the term $(1 - \tau)$ which represents the effect on the marginal return of capital reducing the amount of capital used. Secondly, the tax rate increases growth through the term $\tau^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha}$ which represents the gains through the provision of the public input.

Further insight into these effects can be obtained by plotting the relationship between the tax rate and consumption growth. This is shown in Figure 23.5 under the assumption that $A = 1$, $L = 1$, $\alpha = 0.5, \beta = 0.95$ and $\sigma = 0.5$. The figure displays several notable features. First, for low levels of the public input growth is negative, so a positive tax rate is required for there to be consumption growth. Secondly, the relationship between growth and the tax rate is non-monotonic: growth initially increases with the tax rate, reaches a maximum, and then decreases. Finally, there is a tax rate which maximizes the growth rate of consumption. Differentiating (23.48) with respect to τ, the tax rate that maximizes consumption growth is

$$\tau = 1 - \alpha. \tag{23.49}$$

For the values in the figure, this optimal tax rate is $\tau = 0.5$. To see what this tax rate implies, observe that

$$\frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial G_t} = (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y_t}{G_t} = 1, \tag{23.50}$$

using $G_t = \tau Y_t$ and $\tau = 1 - \alpha$. Hence the tax rate that maximizes consumption growth ensures that the marginal product of the public input is equal to 1 which is also its marginal cost.

This model reveals a positive role for government in enhancing growth through the provision of a public input. It illustrates a sense in which there can be an



Figure 23.5: Tax Rate and Consumption Growth

optimal level of government. Also, if the size of government becomes excessive it reduces the rate of growth because of the distortions imposed by the tax used to finance expenditure. Although simple, this model does make it a legitimate question to consider what the effect of increased government spending may be on economic growth.

23.4 Policy Reform

The analysis of Section 23.2.2 has demonstrated the surprising and strong result that the long-run tax rate on capital should be zero. Although the derivation was undertaken for an exogenous growth model, the result also applies when growth is endogenous. The basic intuition that the intertemporal allocation should not be distorted applies equally in both cases. This is an important conclusion since it contrasts markedly with observed tax structures. For example, in 2002 the top corporate tax rate was 40% in the US, 30% in the UK and 38.4% in Germany. Although Ireland was much lower at 16%, the OECD average was 31.4%.

This divergence of the observed tax rates from the theoretically optimal rate raises the possibility that a reform of the actual systems can raise the rate of economic growth and the level of welfare. This question has been tested by simulating the response of model economies to policy reforms involving changes in the tax rates upon capital and labor. Such studies have provided an interesting range of conclusions that are worth close scrutiny.

Before discussing these results, it is helpful to clarify the distinction between



Figure 23.6: Level and Growth Effects

the effect of a change in taxation on the *level* of output and its effect on the rate of *growth* of output. This distinction is illustrated in Figure 23.6 which shows three different growth paths for the economy. Paths 1 and 2 have the same rate of growth - the rate of growth is equal to the gradient of the growth path. Path 3, whose path has a steeper gradient, displays a faster rate of growth.

Assume that at time t_0 the economy is located at point a and, in the absence of any policy change, will grow along path 1. Following this path it will arrive at point b at time t_1. The distinction between level and growth effects can now be described. Consider a policy change at time t_0 that moves the economy to point c with consequent growth along path 2 up to point d at time t_1. This policy has a *level effect*: it changes the level of output but not its rate of growth. Alternatively, consider a different policy that causes the economy to switch from path 1 to path 3 at t_0, so at time t_1 it arrives at point e. This change in policy has affected the rate of growth but not (at least initially) its level. Of course, output eventually achieves a higher level because of the higher growth rate. This second policy has a *growth effect* but no level effect. Most policy changes will have some combination of level and growth effects.

The basic setting for the simulation analysis is an endogenous growth model with both physical and human capital entering the production function. The consumption side is modelled by a single, infinitely lived representative consumer who has preferences represented by the utility function

$$U = \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[C_t L_t^{\alpha} \right]^{1-\sigma}, \tag{23.51}$$

where C_t is consumption and L_t is leisure. Alternative studies adopt different values for the parameters α and σ. The second area of differentiation between studies is the range of inputs into the production process for human capital, in particular whether it requires only human capital and time or whether it also needs physical capital. The analytical process is to specify the initial tax rates, which usually take values close to the actual position in the US, then calculate the initial growth path. The tax rates are then changed and the new steady state growth path calculated. The two steady states are then contrasted with a focus placed upon the change in growth rate and in levels of the variables.

Figure 23.7 summarizes some of the policy experiments and their consequences. The experiment of Lucas involves elimination of the capital tax with an increase in the labor tax to balance the government budget. This policy change has virtually no growth effect (it is negative but very small) but a significant level effect. In contrast, King and Rebelo and Jones *et al.* find very strong growth and level effects. King and Rebelo consider the effect of an increase in the capital tax by 10% whereas Jones *et al.* mirror Lucas by eliminating the capital tax. What distinguishes the King and Rebelo analysis is that they have physical capital entering into the production of human capital. Jones *et al.* employ a higher value for the elasticity of labor supply than other studies. The model of Pecorino has the feature that capital is a separate commodity to the consumption good. This permits different factor intensities in the production of human capital, physical capital and the consumption good. Complete elimination of the capital tax raises the growth rate, in contrast to the finding of Lucas.

The importance of each of the elements in explaining the divergence between the results is studied in Stokey and Rebelo (1995). Using a model that encompasses the previous three, they show that the elasticity of substitution in production matters little for the growth effect but does have implications for the level effect - with a high elasticity of substitution, a tax system that treats inputs asymmetrically will be more distortionary. The elimination of the distortion then leads to a significant welfare increase. What are important are the factor shares in production of human capital and physical capital, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in utility and the elasticity of labor supply. Stokey and Rebelo conclude that the empirical evidence provides support for values of these parameters which justify Lucas' claim that the growth effect is small.

A range of estimates have been given for the effects of taxation upon growth involving several different policy experiments. Some of the models predict that the growth effect is insignificant, others predict it could be very significant. What distinguishes the models are a number of key parameters, particularly the share of physical capital in human capital production, the elasticities in the utility function and the depreciation rates. In principal, these could be isolated empirically and a firm statement of the size of the growth effect given. To do so and thus claim an "answer" would be to overlook several important issues about the restrictiveness of the model. Moreover, it would not be justifiable to



Author	Features	Utility Parameters	Initial Tax Rates and Growth Rate	Final Position	Additional Observations
Lucas (1990)	Production of human capital did not require physical capital	σ = 2 α = 0.5	Capital 36% Labor 40% Growth 1.50%	Capital 0% Labor 46% Growth 1.47%	33% increase in capital stock 6% increase in consumption
King and Rebelo (1990)	Production of human capital requires physical capital (proportion = 1/3)	σ = 2 α = 0	Capital 20% Labor 20% Growth 1.02%	Capital 30% Labor 20% Growth 0.50%	Labor supply is inelastic
Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993)	Time and physical capital produce human capital	σ = 2 α= 4.99 α calibrated given σ	Capital 21% Labor 31% Growth 2.00%	Capital 0% Labor 0% Growth 4.00%	10% increase in capital stock 29% increase in consumption
Pecorino (1993)	Production of human capital requires physical capital	σ = 2 α = 0.5	Capital 42% Labor 20% Growth 1.51%	Capital 0% Labor 0% Growth 2.74%	Capital and consumption different goods, consumption tax replaces income taxes

Figure 23.7: Growth Effects of Tax Reform

provide an answer without consulting the empirical evidence. Tax rates have grown steadily over the last century in most countries and so there should be ample evidence for determining the actual effect. Consequently, the next section considers empirical evidence on the effect of taxation.

23.5 Empirical Evidence

We have presented two theoretical perspectives upon the link between taxation and growth. The endogenous growth model with a public good as an input provided a positive channel through which taxation could raise growth. The relationship was not monotonic because increases in the tax rate above the optimum would reduce the growth rate. In practice, economies could be located on either side of the optimum. Similarly, the evidence from the simulations provides a wide range of estimates for the effect of taxation upon economic growth from negligible to significant. Since the theory is so inconclusive, it is natural to turn to the empirical evidence.

At first glance, a very clear picture emerges from this: tax revenue as a proportion of GDP has risen significantly in all developed countries over the course of the last century, but the level of growth has remained relatively stable. This suggests the immediate conclusion that, in practice, taxation does not affect



Figure 23.8: US Tax and Growth Rates Source: US Department of Commerce: www.bea.doc.gov/

the rate of growth. Data to support this claim is displayed in Figures 23.8 and 23.9. Figure 23.8 plots the growth rate of US GDP and federal government tax revenue as a percentage of GDP since 1930. Trend lines have been fitted to the data series using ordinary least squares regression to show the trend over time. The two trend lines show as steady rise in taxation (the upper line) and a very slight decline in the growth rate (the lower line). Although the variance of the growth process reduces after 1940, statistical tests on US data have found no statistical difference between the average rate of growth prior to 1942 and after 1942. The data for the UK in Figure 23.9 tell a very similar story. The trend lines show an increase in taxation but, in contrast to the US, an increase in the rate of growth.

The message from these figures appears compelling but must be considered carefully. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, a contrast between tax rates and growth across time cannot answer the counter-factual question “if taxes had been lower, would growth have been higher?” To do so requires a study involving countries with different regimes. Secondly, there are substantive issues that have to be resolved about the definition of the tax rate that should be used in any such comparison.

To understand the problem of definition, consider Figure 23.10 which illustrates a typical progressive income tax. There is an initial tax exemption up to income level Y_1, then a band at tax rate t_1 and a final band at rate t_2, $t_2 > t_1$. What is important about the figure is that it shows how the marginal rate of tax



Figure 23.9: UK Tax and Growth Rates Source: Feinstein (1972), UK Revenue Statistics, Economic Trends

differs from the average rate of tax. For instance at income $\hat{Y}$, the marginal rate is one minus the gradient of the graph whilst the average rate is one minus the gradient of the ray to the graph (shown by the dashed line). With a progressive tax system, the marginal rate is always greater than the average rate.

The data displayed in Figures 23.8 and 23.9 uses tax revenue as a fraction of GDP to measure the tax rate. This measure captures the average rate of tax. However, what matters for economic behavior is the marginal tax rate - the decision on whether or not to earn additional income depends on how much of that income can be retained. This suggests that the link between growth and taxation should focus more on how the marginal rate of tax affects growth.

The difficulty with undertaking the analysis comes in determining what the marginal rate actually is. Figure 23.10 illustrates this problem: the marginal rate is either 0, t^1 or t^2 depending upon the income level of the consumer. In practice, income tax systems typically have several different levels of exemption (*e.g.* married and single persons allowances), several marginal rates and interact with social security taxes and with the benefit system. All of this makes it difficult to assign any unique value to the marginal rate of tax. The same comments apply equally to corporation tax, which has exemptions, credits and depreciation allowances, and Value Added Taxation which has exemptions, zero rated goods and lower rated goods. In brief, the rate of growth should be related to the marginal rate of tax but the latter is an ill-defined concept.

Given these preliminaries, it is now possible to review the empirical evidence. The strongest empirical link between taxation and growth was reported in Plosser (1993). Plosser regressed the rate of growth of per capita GDP on the



Figure 23.10: Average and Marginal Tax Rates

ratio of income taxes to GDP for the OECD countries and found a significant negative relationship. The limitation of this finding is that the OECD countries differ in their income levels and income has been found to be one of the most significant determinants of growth. Taking account of this, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) showed that the negative relationship all but disappears when the effect of initial income is accounted for.

Easterly and Rebelo extend this analysis by using several different measures of the marginal rate of tax in regressions involving other determinants of growth, notably initial income, school enrollments, assassinations, revolutions and war casualties. In response to some of the difficulties already noted, four different measures of the marginal tax rate are used: statutory taxes; revenue as a fraction of GDP; income weighted marginal income tax rates; and marginal rates from a regression of tax revenue on tax base. From a number of regressions involving these variable, Easterly and Rebelo conclude "The evidence that tax rates matter for economic growth is disturbingly fragile".

A very similar exercise is undertaken in Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea (1997). The clear finding is that when initial GDP is included in the regressions, the tax variable is insignificant. Evidence contrary to this is presented in Leibfritz, Thornton and Bibbee (1997). Their regression of average growth rates for OECD countries over the period 1980 - 1995 against three measures of the tax rate (average tax rate, marginal tax rate and average direct tax rate) showed that a 10% increase in tax rates would be accompanied by a 0.5% reduction in the rate of growth, with direct taxation reducing growth marginally more than indirect taxation.

One possible route out of the difficulties of defining the appropriate tax rate is to adopt a different method of determining the effect of fiscal policy. Engen and Skinner (1996) label the regressions described above as “top-down” since they work with aggregate measures of taxation. Instead of doing this, they propose a “bottom-up” method which involves calculating the effect of taxation on labor supply, investment and productivity, and then summing these to obtain a total measure. Doing this suggests that a cut of 5% in all marginal rates of tax and 2.5% in average rates would raise the growth rate by 0.22%

An alternative line of literature (Barro (1991), Dowrick (1993) and de la Fuente (1997)) has considered the more general issue of how fiscal policy has affected growth. In particular, the relation of growth to the composition and level of public sector spending is investigated. The results of de la Fuente show that if public spending (measured as the share of total government expenditure in GDP) increases, growth is reduced (an increase in government spending of 5% of GDP reduces growth by 0.66%) whereas an increase in public investment will raise growth. There are four significant points to be made about these findings. Firstly, government spending may just be a proxy for the entire set of government non-price interventions - including, for example, employment legislation, health and safety rules and product standards - and that it may be these, not expenditure, that actually reduce growth. Secondly, since the share of public spending in GDP is very closely correlated to the average tax rate, it is not clear which hypothesis is being tested.

The final points are more significant. Levine and Renelt (1992) have shown that the finding of a negative relationship is not robust to the choice of conditioning variables. Finally, as noted by Slemrod (1995), the method of the regressions is to use national income, Y, as the left-hand-side variable and government expenditure, G, as the right-hand-side variable. In contrast, economic theory usually views the causality as running in the opposite direction: government expenditure is seen as being determined by the preferences of the population as expressed through the political system. An extreme version of this view is captured in Wagner’s law which relates government expenditure to national income via the income elasticity of demand for government-provided goods and services. If Y (or the growth of Y) and G are related via an equilibrium relationship, then a simple regression of one on the other will not identify this.

This review of the empirical evidence leads to the following observations. A visual inspection of tax rates and growth rates suggests that there is little relationship between the two. This is weak evidence but it does find support in some more detailed investigations in which regression equations that include previously identified determinants of growth, especially initial income, reveal that tax rates are insignificant as an explanatory variable. Other regressions find a small but significant tax effect. All of these results are hampered by the difficulties in actually defining marginal rates of tax and in their lack of an equilibrium relationship.

23.6 Conclusions

Growth is important since without it living standards must stagnate. The effect of even small changes in the growth rate can be dramatic. With a growth rate of 2% it takes 35 years to double the level of income but at a rate of 5% it takes just 14 years. Even if economic policy only succeeds in increasing the growth rate from 2% to 3%, it will reduce the time taken to double income by 12 years. The cumulative effect of a policy that affects the growth rate will eventually dominate anything achieved by a policy that affects only the level of economic variables.

In an exogenous growth model the economy must eventually reach a limit to its growth unless there is technical progress. The effects of policy are limited in this form of model because in the long-run they cannot affect the growth rate. Nonetheless, these models still provide some insight into what policy must achieve in order for it to have a lasting effect upon economic growth. In particular, the exogenous growth model provides a simple setting for demonstrating the important result that efficiency requires that the tax rate on capital income must be zero in the long-run.

The limitations of the exogenous growth model lead to the development of theories of endogenous growth. The literature on endogenous growth has provided a range of mechanisms through which taxation can impact upon economic growth. This chapter has described the range of models and has discussed the results that have been obtained. In quantitative terms, a wide range of theoretical predictions arose for the size of the tax effect from the insignificant to considerable. The size of the growth rate effect depends just about equally on the structure of the model and on the parameter values within the model. The production process for human capital is also critical, as are the elasticities in the utility function and the rates of depreciation. A fair summary is that the theoretical models introduce a range of issues that must be considered, but do not provide any convincing or definitive answers.

The conclusions of the empirical evidence are not quite as diverse as for the theory. Although there are some disagreements, the picture that emerges is that the effect of taxation, if there is any at all, is relatively minor. However, the estimates have to be judged taking into account to the difficulty of defining the appropriate measure of the tax rate and the choice of appropriate regressors. These problems may prove to be significant but that is unlikely. As far as policy is concerned, this is a reassuring conclusion since it removes the need to be overly concerned about growth effects when tax reforms are planned.

Reading

The classic summary of exogenous growth theory can be found in:

Solow, R.M. (1970) *Growth Theory: An Exposition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

The data in Table 23.1 are taken from:

Chamley, C. (1981) "The welfare const of capital income taxation in a growing economy", *Journal of Political Economy*, **89**, 468 - 496.

Three detailed surveys of growth theory which differ in their emphasis are:

Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1998) *Endogenous Growth Theory* (Cambridge: MIT Press).

and

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De La Croix, D. and P. Michel (2002) *A Theory of Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

The proof that the optimal capital tax rate is zero can be found in:

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Barro, R.J. (1990) "Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth", *Journal of Political Economy*, **98**, S103-S125.

The simulations of the effect upon growth of changes in the tax rate are taken from:

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Easterly, W. and Rebelo, S. (1993)"Fiscal policy and economic growth", *Journal of Monetary Economics*, **32**, 417 - 458.

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Leibfritz, W, Thornton, J. and Bibbee, A. (1997) “Taxation and economic performance”, *OECD Working Paper No.* 176.

Levine, R. and Renelt, D. (1992) “A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth models”, *American Economic Review*, **82**, 942 - 963.

Mendoza, E., Milesi-Ferretti, G.M and Asea, P. (1997) “On the ineffectiveness of tax policy in altering long-run growth: Harberger’s superneutrality conjecture”, *Journal of Public Economics*, **66**, 99 - 126.

Plosser, C. (1993) “The search for growth”, in Federal Reserve of Kansas City symposium series, *Policies for Long Run Growth*, 57 - 86, (Kansas City).

Slemrod, J. (1995) “What do cross-country studies teach about government involvement, prosperity, and economic growth”, *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 373 - 431.